[J-19-2023]
                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 WESTERN DISTRICT

       TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.


    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 :   No. 17 WAP 2022
                                                  :
                        Appellee                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                  :   Superior Court entered July 7, 2021
                                                  :   at No. 1032 WDA 2020, reversing
                 v.                               :   the Order of the Court of Common
                                                  :   Pleas of Washington County
                                                  :   entered September 10, 2020 at No.
    RODNEY STERLING MCGEE,                        :   CP-63-CR-0002358-1994, and
                                                  :   remanding.
                        Appellant                 :
                                                  :   ARGUED: April 19, 2023

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                                     DECIDED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
          We granted appeal in this matter to consider whether the Superior Court erred in

holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct a patent and obvious error in a

sentencing order when the defendant’s request for correction is filed outside the time

limitations of the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 For the following reasons, we

affirm.

          On November 5, 1994, Appellant Rodney Sterling McGee2 fatally assaulted Barry

Williams.      Appellant also assaulted the victim’s daughter, Donna Lee Williams

(hereinafter, “Donna”), who suffered numerous skull fractures. Following the assaults,

Appellant kidnapped the victim’s wife, Patricia Williams (hereinafter, “Patricia”), forcing

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2Although this is Appellant’s name as reflected in the docket, at his plea hearing,
Appellant indicated that his full name is Rodney Sterlinglee McGee.
her into a police vehicle. After driving a brief distance, Appellant stopped the vehicle in

the parking lot of a nearby bar and dragged Patricia inside, at which time she escaped.

Appellant returned to the parking lot and kidnapped two other women, Twyla Chambers

and Beth Ann Ross, fleeing in Ross’s vehicle. After driving approximately two miles,

Appellant stopped the vehicle and the women escaped. Appellant, still in Ross’s vehicle,

fled the scene, and eventually was apprehended.

      On March 27, 1996, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count of

criminal homicide3; one count of attempted homicide (Donna)4; two counts of aggravated

assault (one each against Donna and Patricia)5; four counts of kidnapping (two against

Patricia, one each against Chambers and Ross)6; and two counts of theft by unlawful

taking.7 Following Appellant’s plea, the trial court, the Honorable Thomas D. Gladden,

orally imposed the following sentence: 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide; a consecutive

term of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assault of Donna; a concurrent term of 5 to 10

years for the attempted homicide of Donna; a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years for the

aggravated assault of Patricia; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnapping of

Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years on the remaining three

kidnappings and two theft offenses. N.T. Hearing, 3/27/1996, at 31-32. The court stated

that Appellant’s aggregate sentence for all of the offenses was 32½ to 65 years.

      On the same day that Appellant entered his plea and the trial court orally imposed

the above sentence, the trial court issued a three-page typed document titled “Order”

(“typed sentencing order”). The typed sentencing order, dated March 27, 1996, indicated


3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 901.

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901.

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921.




                                     [J-19-2023] - 2
that the trial court “will accept” Appellant’s guilty plea and imposed, inter alia, a sentence

of 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide, two consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 years for

the aggravated assaults of Patricia and Donna, a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years on the

charge of attempted murder of Donna; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the

kidnapping of Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years each for the

kidnappings of Patricia (second offense), Twyla, and Beth, and the two theft offenses.

Order, 3/27/1996, at 1.     The typed sentencing order also specified that Appellant’s

aggregate term of imprisonment was 32½ to 65 years. In short, it was wholly consistent

with the sentence the trial court orally imposed on the record. The official date stamp on

the typed sentencing order indicates that it was filed on March 28, 1996.

       Finally, we note that the original record in this case contains a one-page, pre-

printed form titled “Sentence,” also dated March 27, 1996, that contains handwritten

notations by the trial court imposing, inter alia, a sentence of 10 to 20 years for criminal

homicide; two consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years for aggravated assault; and a

consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for kidnapping. Notably, this order (“handwritten

sentencing order”) did not provide for a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the

attempted murder of Donna, nor did it provide for additional concurrent sentences of 2½

to 5 years for the kidnappings of Twyla Chambers and Beth Ross, or Patricia (second

offense), or the two theft offenses. The handwritten sentencing order does indicate,

however, that Appellant’s aggregate sentence was 32½ to 65 years. There is no date

stamp on the handwritten sentencing order to indicate when it was filed. Appellant did

not appeal his judgment of sentence.

       Decades later, on June 3, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and

counsel was appointed. On August 5, 2020, Appellant, through his counsel, filed in the

court of common pleas a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” (“Motion”), asserting that,




                                       [J-19-2023] - 3
in the course of counsel’s representation, counsel discovered the handwritten and typed

sentencing orders, and arguing that there is an obvious incompatibility between the two

orders because the typed sentencing order imposed a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10

year for the attempted murder of Donna, whereas the handwritten sentencing order did

not, and, further, that the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated assault of Donna

should have merged for sentencing purposes.

       Following a hearing, the trial court, the Honorable Gary Gilman, granted

Appellant’s motion, and vacated the concurrent 5-to-10-year sentence imposed for the

attempted murder of Donna, as set forth in the typed sentencing order. In its opinion

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court reasoned that courts have the inherent

authority to correct orders that are “patently erroneous” and “contrary to common sense.”

Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/2020, at 2.       The court further opined that its “inherent

jurisdiction . . . to correct patent and obvious mistakes” is “not barred by traditional time

limits,” such as those applicable to PCRA petitions. Id. at 3. Finally, the court explained

that “challenges to an illegal sentence can never be waived and may be raised sua

sponte” by the court. Id.

       Finding that the orders in question were “patently erroneous” and “contrary to

common sense,” the trial court concluded that amendment of the orders was proper, as

the time limits of the PCRA did not apply. The trial court further determined that, because

the crimes of aggravated assault and attempted homicide merge for purposes of

sentencing, the trial court’s imposition, in the typed sentencing order, of a sentence on

both crimes was illegal, and, therefore, Appellant’s sentence for the attempted murder of

Donna must be vacated, as both Appellant and the Commonwealth understood the

primary offense to be aggravated assault. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court’s

decision to the Superior Court, asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to




                                      [J-19-2023] - 4
entertain Appellant’s Motion because the underlying claim was cognizable under the

PCRA, and had been filed outside the PCRA’s jurisdictional time constraints.

       In a unanimous memorandum opinion, the Superior Court reversed.                  See

Commonwealth v. McGee, 1032 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 2021). In doing so,

the court first observed that the PCRA allows criminal offenders to seek collateral relief

when convicted of crimes they did not commit, or when serving illegal sentences, and,

further, that when an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the “sole means

of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory

remedies for the same purpose.”        Id. at 4 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542) (emphasis

omitted).8 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court was required to treat Appellant’s

Motion as a petition under the PCRA. Id. at 7 (citing Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 

 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Finding that Appellant’s Motion was filed outside the PCRA’s

one-year deadline, and that Appellant failed to plead and prove any exceptions to the

PCRA’s time requirements, the Superior Court held the trial court did not have jurisdiction

to grant relief.9


8 Section 9542 of the PCRA provides, in part:


               This subchapter provides for an action by which persons
               convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving
               illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action
               established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of
               obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common
               law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist
               when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus
               and coram nobis.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542.
9 Section 9545(b) provides, in relevant part:

            Time for filing petition.--
               (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a
                   second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
                   one year of the date the judgment becomes final,
(continued…)

                                      [J-19-2023] - 5
       The Superior Court acknowledged that this Court, in Commonwealth v. Holmes,

 (Pa. 2007), recognized a trial court’s “inherent power to correct patent errors

despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction” when we “created a narrow exception” to

the 30-day time limitation for modifying or rescinding court orders prescribed by 42

Pa.C.S. § 5505.10 McGee, 1032 WDA 2020 at 4 (quoting Holmes, 

).

However, the Superior Court noted that, in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 

 (Pa.

Super. 2011), it interpreted Holmes in the specific context of an untimely PCRA petition,

and found that, while “Holmes . . . recognized the limited authority of a trial court to correct

patent errors in sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505[,] it did not

establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional

requirements of the PCRA.” McGee, 1032 WDA 2020 at 5 (quoting Jackson, 

). Thus, in the instant case, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order vacating

Appellant’s sentence for attempted murder, and remanded for reinstatement of that

portion of Appellant’s sentence.

       Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, and we granted

review to consider whether the Superior Court’s application of its holding in Jackson for

the proposition “that a trial court’s inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious

mistakes in its records and orders is subject to the time-bar provisions of the PCRA”

conflicts with this Court’s holding in Holmes. Commonwealth v. McGee, 

                       unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves
                       [one of three enumerated exceptions.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
10 Section 5505, titled “Modification of orders,” provides: “Except as otherwise provided

or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order
within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if
no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.


                                        [J-19-2023] - 6
(Pa. 2022) (order). As the question of whether a court has jurisdiction to grant relief is a

question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Holmes, 

.

       By way of background, Holmes was a consolidated appeal of two cases, the first

involving Christopher Holmes. Holmes had committed a parole violation, for which he

could be sentenced only to serve the balance of his original sentence. The trial court,

however, sentenced him as if he had violated his probation, as opposed to parole, and

imposed a new sentence of 3 to 6 years incarceration, to run concurrently to any sentence

Holmes was serving for unrelated crimes. When it realized its error, the trial court sua

sponte vacated the sentence, despite the fact that more than 30 days had elapsed since

its imposition.   The Commonwealth appealed, asserting that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to correct or vacate its prior sentence once the 30-day period prescribed in

Section 5505 expired.

       The Superior Court reversed, observing, inter alia, that the trial court’s vacatur of

Holmes’ sentence more than 30 days after the imposition thereof was impermissible

under Section 5505. The court acknowledged that challenges to the legality of sentence

cannot be waived, and may be raised by a court sua sponte, but reiterated that jurisdiction

is a prerequisite to the court’s ability to address the illegality. In rejecting Holmes’

assertion “that the trial court had inherent jurisdiction to correct patent and obvious errors

in orders,” the court distinguished this Court’s prior decisions in Commonwealth v. Jones,

 (Pa. 1989) (approving a trial court’s correction of an illegal sentence the

same day it was imposed), and Commonwealth v. Cole, 

 (Pa. 1970)

(approving the trial court’s correction of an order more than three months after its entry

because it was internally inconsistent, providing for both a grant of a new trial and the

arrest of judgment), explaining that “the order sentencing Holmes was neither ‘facially




                                       [J-19-2023] - 7
self-contradictory or irreconcilable nor did it contain a clerical error.’” Holmes, 

 (citation omitted).

       On appeal to this Court, Holmes argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted within

its power to correct the patent and obvious mistake of imposing a new higher sentence,

rather than recommitting him to serve the remainder of his original sentence. In response,

the Commonwealth reiterated its position that the trial court lost jurisdiction when the 30-

day period prescribed in Section 5505 expired. Recognizing that a claim of an illegal

sentence can never be waived, the Commonwealth argued that a court must first have

jurisdiction to address it, and the only method by which the trial court could have obtained

jurisdiction was through the PCRA. The Commonwealth also suggested that Holmes

misinterpreted our decisions in Cole and Jones as suggesting that trial courts have

inherent power to correct illegal sentences at any time because (1) there was no

jurisdictional question in Jones because the court acted immediately to correct the

erroneous sentence, and (2) Cole was distinguishable because it involved an obvious

clerical error apparent from the face of the order.

       The other appeal in Holmes involved Rufus Whitfield, who pled guilty to theft and

was sentenced to 11½ to 23 months incarceration; no term of probation was imposed.

Subsequently, Whitfield was convicted on a separate charge, and, at the sentencing

hearing, the trial court erroneously entered an order revoking Whitfield’s “probation.”

Whitfield filed a motion to vacate the sentence, arguing it was illegal because no probation

had been imposed for the theft offense. The court denied the motion and Whitfield

appealed to Superior Court. While the appeal was pending, the trial court entered an

order vacating the sentence on the ground that it was illegal, and Whitfield withdrew his

appeal. The Commonwealth appealed, asserting the trial court did not have jurisdiction

to vacate its sentence while Whitfield’s appeal was pending.         Relying on Cole and




                                      [J-19-2023] - 8
Commonwealth v. Klein, 

 (Pa. 2001) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction

to correct a manifest error in the calculation of sentence notwithstanding a pending

appeal), the Superior Court affirmed, concluding that “the [trial] court’s correction was

authorized by the legal necessity of rectifying a patent illegality.” Holmes, 

(citation omitted).

       The Commonwealth, on appeal to this Court, argued that the alleged illegality was

not comparable to the clerical errors under Cole and Klein, and that the Superior Court

erred in holding that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Additionally, the

Commonwealth averred that, not only had the 30-day period for correction of orders under

Section 5505 expired, but the court had been divested of jurisdiction when Whitfield

appealed to the Superior Court. Finally, the Commonwealth asserted that the PCRA was

the sole means by which Whitfield could obtain relief.

       In response, Whitfield argued that the imposition of a sentence for violation of non-

existent probation was an obvious and patent error, which the trial court had inherent

jurisdiction to correct. He further challenged the Commonwealth’s contention that the

error was not an obvious or patent mistake, emphasizing that notations in the Quarter

Session file, which was part of the certified record, demonstrated that no probationary

period was imposed. Finally, citing Cole and Klein, Whitfield averred that statutory

jurisdictional requirements must yield to the inherent power of courts, and he suggested

that public policy demands that trial courts be permitted to correct erroneous sentences

in order to avoid squandering judicial resources when a petitioner would ultimately be

entitled to relief under the PCRA.

       Upon review, this Court observed that “[t]he trial courts in both cases . . . clearly

lacked jurisdiction, absent the exercise of the rarely used power of the courts to correct

patent errors.” Holmes, 

. We further noted that, “[w]hile the causes of the




                                      [J-19-2023] - 9
two trial courts' lack of jurisdiction are undeniably distinct,” both implicated Section 5505,

and we stated:

              both cases fall within the limited class of cases amenable to
              the exercise by a trial court of the inherent power to correct
              patent errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction.
              As we have in the past, we hold today that the limits of
              jurisdiction enshrined in Section 5505 do not impinge on that
              time-honored inherent power of courts.

 (citing Klein, 

; Cole, 

).

       Finally, we determined that both Holmes and Whitfield were entitled to relief:

              Holmes’s sentencing order, like the order in Cole, contained a
              patent mistake, a fact apparent from a review of the docket
              without resort to third-party information. The order stated,
              “parole is hereby revoked,” and then sentenced Holmes to
              serve “Not less than three (3) years nor more than six (6)
              years in the State Correctional Institution, to run concurrently
              with any sentence now serving.” . . . The Commonwealth has
              not disputed that the sentence imposed was in direct conflict
              with the longstanding precedent that a parole violator cannot
              be sentenced to a new sentence but instead can only be
              recommitted to the remainder of the original sentence. . . .
              There is no dispute that Holmes’s original sentence entailed a
              maximum of twenty-three months of incarceration.
              Considering that the error of the sentence was clear from the
              order and the docket sheet, the trial court properly exercised
              its inherent power to correct the mistake.

              Similarly, . . . Whitfield is entitled to the relief granted by the
              trial court under our caselaw upholding the inherent
              jurisdiction of courts to correct patent and obvious mistakes.
              The trial court imposed a new sentence of incarceration on
              Whitfield for a violation of probation even though probation
              was never imposed. While the mistake is not apparent based
              on the face of the order itself, one need only look to the
              Quarter Session notes in the record to see the mistake.
Id. at 66.

       Notwithstanding the above, we cautioned that:

              [a]lthough the defendants before this court warrant relief
              under the inherent power of courts to correct patent errors, we


                                      [J-19-2023] - 10
                must also emphasize the limits of this power. This exception
                to the general rule of Section 5505 cannot expand to swallow
                the rule. In applying the exception to the cases at bar, we
                note that it is the obviousness of the illegality, rather than the
                illegality itself, that triggers the court’s inherent power. Not all
                illegal sentences will be amenable to correction as patent
                errors. Moreover, the inherent power to correct errors does
                not extend to reconsideration of a court's exercise of
                sentencing discretion. A court may not vacate a sentencing
                order merely because it later considers a sentence too harsh
                or too lenient. . . . These cases involve clear errors in the
                imposition of sentences that were incompatible with the
                record, as in Whitfield, or black letter law, as in Holmes.
Id. at 66-67.

       Notably, former Justice Eakin filed a dissenting opinion, contending that, unlike the

errors in Cole and Klein, the error in Whitfield’s sentencing order was not facially

contradictory or illegal, nor was it clerical or patent. He further opined that the majority’s

observation that “one need only look to the Quarter Session notes in the record to see

the mistake,” demonstrated that “it is not a patent mistake – it is a mistake which requires

inquiry into the record, far beyond the face of the order.” Holmes, 

 (Eakin,

J., dissenting) (emphasis original; citation omitted).

       Several years after our decision in Holmes, the defendant in Jackson pled guilty to

burglary and related charges and was sentenced to 20 years probation. Approximately

six years later, Jackson violated his probation, and, in 1988, following a probation violation

hearing, the trial court revoked Jackson’s probation and sentenced him to 2 to 20 years

incarceration, to be served consecutively to other sentences Jackson was serving.

Jackson’s subsequent appeal to the Superior Court was denied, as was his petition for

further review by this Court. Thereafter, in 2010, Jackson filed a motion to correct illegal

sentence, asserting that the sentence he received for violating his probation was illegal

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(a) because it did not specify “the authority that shall conduct the

supervision.” Jackson, 

. Treating Jackson’s motion as a PCRA petition,



                                         [J-19-2023] - 11
the PCRA court dismissed it as untimely. On appeal to the Superior Court, Jackson

conceded that (1) his petition was untimely, and (2) the PCRA court lacked statutory

jurisdiction to consider his claim. He argued, however, that his claim involved a challenge

to the legality of his original sentence as a violation of black letter law, and, therefore, the

PCRA court had authority to consider his claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct

patent errors in sentences.

       The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of Jackson’s PCRA petition, noting that,

where an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA provides the sole means of

obtaining collateral relief. 

 The court further observed that the time limitations of the

PCRA are jurisdictional, and a court has no authority to consider the merits of untimely

petitions unless an exception has been pled and proven.              

.    The court

acknowledged, however, that this Court has upheld “the inherent authority of trial courts

to correct patent mistakes in sentences despite the absence of statutory jurisdiction” at

least in the context of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Id. (citing Cole, 

).

       Nevertheless, the Superior Court found Jackson’s reliance on Holmes to support

his claim that the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider his claim unavailing for two

reasons. First, the Superior Court opined that, contrary to the sentences at issue in

Holmes, “there was no error in Jackson’s sentence, let alone a patent and obvious

illegality.” Id. at 521. Second, the court determined that, “even if there was an obvious

illegality in Jackson’s sentence, the PCRA court would not have had jurisdiction to

consider Jackson’s claim,” as this Court in Holmes “recognized the limited authority of a

trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section

5505; it did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the

jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA.” Id.

       The court elaborated:




                                       [J-19-2023] - 12
                 Inherent jurisdiction has been upheld as an exception to
                 section 5505 because section 5505 was never intended to
                 create a strict jurisdictional deadline for correcting orders
                 where there is an obvious illegality in the sentence. See
                 [Holmes]. This intent is evident from the plain language of the
                 statute. Section 5505 confers on the trial court an affirmative
                 right to modify orders within 30 days after its entry if there is
                 no appeal, and does not expressly limit this authority after the
                 30-day period has expired. Because section 5505 does not
                 directly prohibit a court from correcting an order after the
                 deadline, our courts have recognized a limited equitable
                 exception to the statute that permits a trial court to correct
                 obvious illegalities in its sentences that are not discovered
                 within the 30-day statutory period.

                 Section 9545 of the PCRA is not amenable to such equitable
                 exceptions. Section 9545 expressly states that a PCRA
                 petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment
                 becomes final” unless one of the statutory exceptions is pled
                 and proven. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. Our courts have strictly
                 interpreted this requirement as creating a jurisdictional
                 deadline. . . . Further, our courts have interpreted jurisdiction
                 under section 9545 differently than section 5505. Unlike
                 section 5505, section 9545 does not merely grant a court
                 authority to consider a PCRA petition for a limited period of
                 time; it acts to divest a court of jurisdiction once the filing
                 period has passed. See [Commonwealth v. Perrin, 

 (Pa. Super. 2008)] (courts are without jurisdiction to
                 consider the merits of untimely PCRA petition). Therefore,
                 when the one-year filing deadline of section 9545 has expired,
                 and no statutory exception has been pled or proven, a PCRA
                 court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to correct orders,
                 judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and
                 obvious.

Id. at 522-23.
       Turning to the parties’ arguments in the case sub judice, Appellant contends that

the Superior Court erred in concluding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant

him relief. Relying on, inter alia, this Court’s decisions in Cole, Klein, and Holmes,

Appellant maintains that trial courts have the “inherent authority to correct patent and

obvious mistakes in its records,” as “evidenced by the record and/or black-letter law,”

notwithstanding the time constraints of the PCRA. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Appellant


                                         [J-19-2023] - 13
avers that the trial court in the instant case entered “two irreconcilable sentencing orders,”

which “cannot both be intentional.” Id. at 28. Appellant further claims that, in light of the

fact that “the hand-filled order correctly merges the two inchoate murder offenses,

whereas the typewritten order does not, it is patent and obvious that the latter contains a

mistake as demonstrated by its nonconformance with black-letter merger law,” which the

trial court had inherent authority to correct.11 Id. Finally, Appellant asserts that the

Superior Court erred in relying on its decision in Jackson, as that decision is contrary to

this Court’s decision Holmes, and, in Appellant’s view, should be disapproved. Id. at 27.12

       In response, the Commonwealth argues that the Superior Court properly reversed

the trial court’s decision. First, the Commonwealth contends that “the negotiated plea

agreement here was not patently and obviously illegal.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 19.

Referring to the dissenting opinion of former Justice Eakin in Holmes, the Commonwealth

11 Despite Appellant’s repeated references to merger principles, a concept that implicates

a challenge to the legality of sentence, see Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 

, 567
(Pa. 2022), Appellant insists that he is not raising a challenge to the legality of his
sentence under Section 9543(a)(2)(vii) of the PCRA (providing relief from the imposition
of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum), and, thus, the trial court’s authority to
correct the error was not constrained by the timeliness provisions of the PCRA. In this
regard, Appellant posits that, while “there are instances in which a claim that a sentence
is a mistake as evidenced by its clear illegality will lie at the same time that a claim that
sentence exceeds the lawful maximum,” that will not always be the case. Appellant’s
Brief at 19 (emphasis omitted). Appellant offers the following distinction: “the claim that
the sentence is a mistake is predicated in its inadvertence as evidenced by clear illegality,
whereas the claim that the sentence exceeds the lawful maximum is predicated on its
illegality.” Id. at 20 (emphasis original).
12 The Defender Association of Philadelphia (“DAP”) filed an amicus brief in support of

Appellant. DAP asserts, inter alia, that the authority of a trial court to correct its own errors
is an inherent power which exists independent of the legislature and, specifically, the
PCRA. Indeed, DAP submits that this Court’s reference in Holmes to the jurisdictional
time constraints of the PCRA “equated the effects of jurisdictional divestiture under
Section 5505 with jurisdictional divestiture under the PCRA.” DAP’s Brief at 10. DAP
also suggests that the language of Section 9542 of the PCRA, which states that “[t]his
subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of remedies in the trial court,” is
particularly apropos to the instant case, where the trial court corrected its own patent
mistake in a sentencing order. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).


                                       [J-19-2023] - 14
maintains there was no patent and obvious error in the sentencing orders in this case

because, unlike the error on the face of the order in Holmes, “the merits of Appellant’s

claim are not as clear [as to what] order dictates and whether the doctrine of merger

applies.” Id. at 22. The Commonwealth further argues that the Superior Court properly

relied on its decision in Jackson to conclude that Appellant’s sole means of obtaining

relief is the PCRA, as both Jackson and the instant case are distinguishable from Holmes.

As the PCRA petition filed by Appellant was untimely, the Commonwealth avers that the

PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to address Appellant’s claim.13

       Prior to determining whether the trial court erred in granting Appellant relief based

on its inherent authority to correct patent and obvious errors in the record despite the time

limitations of the PCRA, we must resolve the threshold issue of whether there is, in fact,

a patent and obvious error in the record to correct. As noted above, Appellant’s claim of

a patent and obvious error is premised on trial court’s entry of what Appellant asserts are

“two irreconcilable sentencing orders,” Appellant’s Brief at 28, one of which provides for

a concurrent sentence for the attempted murder of Donna, and one which does not. Upon

review of the record in this case, we conclude there is no patent and obvious error.

       As noted above, at Appellant’s plea and sentencing hearing, Judge Gladden orally

stated, on the record, that he was imposing, inter alia, a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10

years for the attempted murder of Donna. See N.T. Hearing, 3/27/96, at 31 (“On the

13 The Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) and the Pennsylvania District Attorneys

Association (“PDAA”) filed amicus briefs in support of the Commonwealth. Both the OAG
and PDAA take the position that a trial court’s power to address an obvious sentencing
illegality is subject to the time limits of the PCRA, and they maintain that Holmes did not
purport to hold otherwise. PDAA further avers that Appellant’s sentence is not “patently
illegal” simply because the trial court failed to merge his sentences for aggravated assault
and attempted murder, and it notes that, at the time Appellant’s sentence was imposed,
the trial court would have been required to consider the facts and elements of the offenses
to determine whether they merged for sentencing purposes, and the propriety of such
determination is not amenable to correction by the trial court pursuant to Holmes. PDAA
Brief at 12-13.


                                      [J-19-2023] - 15
charge of Criminal Attempt/Homicide against Donna Lee Williams, the defendant is

sentenced to a concurrent sentence of five to ten years.”). Notably, Appellant does not

reference the transcript of the plea hearing. The typed sentencing order, which is dated

the same day as the sentencing hearing and bears an official date stamp indicating it was

filed on March 28, 1996, precisely reflects the trial judge’s intended sentence as stated

on the record, including the concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder

of Donna.14

       Admittedly, the handwritten sentencing order, which does not contain an official

date stamp, does not reference a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted

murder of Donna. However, it also does not list the five additional concurrent sentences

of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnappings and two theft offenses orally imposed at Appellant’s

sentencing hearing and listed on the typed sentencing order. Instead, in the limited space

available on the pre-printed form, the trial court listed the consecutive sentences which

resulted in Appellant’s aggregate sentence of 32½ to 65 years imprisonment, a sentence

which is not disputed. In our view, the trial court’s abbreviated recitation of the Appellant’s

sentence on the handwritten sentencing order does not render the handwritten and




14 We acknowledge that, in Commonwealth v. Borrin, 

 (Pa. 2013) (Opinion

Announcing the Judgment of the Court), we explained that a “signed sentencing order, if
legal, controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into the
signed judgment of sentence,” and we held that “comments the trial court made after-the-
fact . . . regarding its subjective intent when sentencing [the defendant] and the sentence
it meant for [the defendant] were irrelevant to the process of order clarification the trial
court was authorized to undertake.” 

. As noted, however, the trial court’s
oral statements in the instant case were not made after-the-fact to explain its prior
sentence; rather, the court described the sentence it was going to impose, which was fully
consistent with the typed sentencing order.


                                      [J-19-2023] - 16
typewritten sentencing orders “irreconcilable,” nor does it evidence a patent and obvious

error in the record.15

       As we have determined that there is no patent and obvious error in the record,

Appellant’s claim for relief rises and falls on his assertion that the sentences for the

aggravated assault and attempted murder of Donna should have merged for sentencing

purposes. This is plainly a challenge to the legality of his sentence, see Prinkey, 277

A.3d at 567, which is subject to the time limitations of the PCRA, and it is undisputed that

Appellant’s Motion, if treated as a PCRA petition, was untimely.

       Accordingly, and in conclusion, as there is no patent and obvious error in the trial

court’s sentencing orders, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Appellant relief

under Holmes, and so we affirm the Superior Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s

grant of relief.16 Further, in light of our determination that there is no patent and obvious

error in the record, we do not reach the question of whether a trial court’s inherent

authority to correct patent and obvious errors in the record is subject to the time limitations

of the PCRA.17

       Affirmed.

15  Indeed, we observe that we have no way of knowing at what point during the
proceedings on March 27, 1995, the handwritten sentencing order was created by the
trial court, although it was included among the plea waiver forms in the original record
reviewed by this Court. Further, as noted above, there is no date stamp indicating when
it was filed.
16 Notably, even if we were to find that Appellant was entitled to relief, his aggregate

sentence would remain unchanged.
17 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wecht asserts that our decision “undermines the

inherent authority” of courts to correct patent and obvious errors, and that we “fail[] to give
due regard” or “adhere” to this principle. Dissenting Opinion (Wecht, J., dissenting) at 2,
13. To the contrary, as the dissent otherwise seems to recognize, id. at 2 (noting that,
“rather than resolving the timeliness question,” we find there was no error to correct); id.
at 4 (same), we do not speak to the timeliness question. While we certainly disagree with
the dissent that there was a patent and obvious error to correct in this case, our analysis
ends with the threshold conclusion that there was no such error.


                                      [J-19-2023] - 17
Justices Dougherty, Mundy and Brobson join the opinion.

Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.




                             [J-19-2023] - 18