[J-29-2024]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                               WESTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


  RICHARD MARTIN, JR., RICHARD                   :   No. 24 WAP 2023
  FIDLER AND TAMMI IAMS                          :
                                                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                 :   Commonwealth Court entered April
               v.                                :   13, 2023, at No. 369 CD 2022,
                                                 :   Affirming in Part and Reversing In
                                                 :   Part the Order of the Court of
  DONEGAL TOWNSHIP, JAMES BAUER,                 :   Common Pleas of Washington
  RANDY POLAN, EDWARD SHINGLE, JR.,              :   County entered March 29, 2022, at
  KATHLEEN CROFT AND WASHINGTON                  :   No. 2021-7906 and Remanding.
  COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS                      :
                                                 :   ARGUED: April 10, 2024
                                                 :
  APPEAL OF: DONEGAL TOWNSHIP,                   :
  JAMES BAUER, RANDY POLAN,                      :
  EDWARD SHINGLE, JR. AND KATHLEEN               :
  CROFT                                          :

OPINION

 JUSTICE DOUGHERTY                                        DECIDED: OCTOBER 24, 2024
       We granted discretionary review to consider whether 53 P.S. §65402(e) (Section

 402(e)) of the Second Class Township Code (Code)1 was unconstitutionally applied in

 this case. As detailed below, we hold it was not, and accordingly reverse the order of the

 Commonwealth Court.

       Under the Code, townships of the second class are “governed and supervised by

 boards of supervisors.” 53 P.S. §65601. These boards “consist of three members or, if

 1 See 53 P.S. §§65101 – 68601.
approved by the” voters of the township, “five members.” Id. “In townships in which the

electorate has opted for a five-member board, the township shall return to a three-

member board of supervisors upon petition of at least five percent of the [voters] of the

township, or under a resolution of the board of supervisors, and upon approval by a

majority of [voters] voting at the next municipal or general election.” 53 P.S. §65402(d).

“At the first municipal election following approval of the question providing for a return to

a three-member board, three supervisors shall be elected to serve from the first Monday

of January after the election, when the terms of the officers of the five-member board of

supervisors shall cease.” 53 P.S. §65402(e). In the election for the new three-member

board, “[t]he three candidates receiving the highest number of votes for the office of

supervisor shall be elected.” Id. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes

serves a six-year term, the next highest vote-getter serves four years, and the candidate

receiving the third highest number of votes serves for a term of two years. See id.

       In 2016, the voters of Donegal Township, a township of the second class in

Washington County, voted to increase the number of members on the township’s board

of supervisors from three to five. In 2017, Tammy Iams was elected to the five-member

board with a term expiring on January 3, 2022. In 2019, Richard Martin, Jr., was elected

to the board with a term expiring on January 2, 2024, and Richard Fidler was elected to

the board with a term expiring on January 5, 2026.2

       On November 3, 2020, however, the voters of Donegal Township voted to reduce

the number of board members from five back to three. On April 8, 2021, Supervisors filed

in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County an action for declaratory judgment

and injunctive relief against the Washington County Board of Elections (Board of

Elections), Donegal Township, Edward Shingle, Jr., and Kathleen Croft, challenging the

2 We will refer to Martin, Fidler, and Iams collectively as “Supervisors.”




                                      [J-29-2024] - 2
constitutionality of Section 402(e) as applied to them. In addition, they filed a petition for

a preliminary injunction to enjoin the upcoming primary election for the board of

supervisors. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction, and the Commonwealth Court

affirmed the denial. On May 18, 2021, James Bauer, Randy Polan, Shingle, Croft, and

Iams won the primary election for the board of supervisors.

       On May 20, 2021, Supervisors filed an amended action for declaratory judgment

and injunctive relief against Donegal Township, Shingle, and Croft.           The trial court

dismissed the action, and Supervisors appealed. While their appeal was still pending, on

November 2, 2021, the general election to select the three members of the reduced board

was held. The three candidates receiving the highest number of votes, and thus the three

candidates elected to serve on the board, were Bauer, Polan, and Shingle. On December

17, 2021, the Commonwealth Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded to the

trial court to dismiss the Supervisors’ amended action for lack of jurisdiction due to their

failure to join indispensable parties (Bauer and Polan).

       On December 29, 2021, Supervisors filed in the trial court another action for

declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, which is the subject of this appeal. The action

named as defendants Donegal Township, Bauer, Polan, Shingle, Croft, and the Board of

Elections.3 Supervisors alleged that pursuant to Section 402(e), which called for the

terms of the officers of the five-member board to end on the first Monday of January after

the election, i.e., January 3, 2022, Martin would be removed from office approximately

two years prior to the expiration of his term, and Fidler would be removed from office

approximately four years prior to the expiration of his term. However, they insisted,

township supervisors can be removed before the expiration of their terms only “on

3 We will refer to the defendants in this underlying action collectively as the “Donegal

Parties.”




                                       [J-29-2024] - 3
conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime,” or “by the Governor for

reasonable cause” pursuant to Article VI, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.4

Accordingly, Supervisors claimed Section 402(e) is unconstitutional as applied to them.

They requested the trial court declare Section 402(e) unconstitutional as applied, enjoin

its enforcement, enjoin the removal of Martin and Fidler, and declare the November 2021

election invalid and void.

       The Donegal Parties filed preliminary objections contending Supervisors did not

follow the procedures for challenging elections required by the Election Code. In addition,

they argued the action sounded in quo warranto, and Supervisors did not follow the

procedures for bringing such an action. They also raised standing, mootness, and laches

defenses.     On the merits, the Donegal Parties argued Supervisors were not

unconstitutionally removed from office but rather their offices were lawfully abolished.

       On March 29, 2022, the trial court dismissed the action. The court ruled Iams,

whose term expired January 3, 2022 in any event, lacked standing. In addition, the court

held Section 402(e) does not violate Article VI, Section 7, and its procedures are




4 Article VI, Section 7 provides:


       All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave
       themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of
       misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers,
       other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure
       of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers
       elected by the people, except the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor,
       members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall
       be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full
       hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.

PA. CONST. art. VI, §7.



                                      [J-29-2024] - 4
“expressly authorized” by Article VI, Section 1, and Article IX, Section 3 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. Trial court op. at 20.5 Supervisors appealed.

       On April 13, 2023, the Commonwealth Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

See Martin v. Donegal Twp., 

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023). The panel affirmed the

trial court’s determination Iams lacked standing. However, the panel reversed the trial

court’s outright dismissal of the action.     It reasoned “[A]rticle VI, [S]ection 7 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution provides the exclusive method to remove elected officials from

office.” 

. “Accordingly,” the panel held, “Section 402(e)[’s] method of terminating

[b]oard supervisor positions was unconstitutional as applied to Martin and Fidler.” 

 The

panel reinstated the action and remanded to the trial court with the direction that the

Donegal Parties file an answer.

       The Donegal Parties6 filed a petition for allowance of appeal to this Court, which

we granted limited to the first issue raised therein: “Whether Section 402(e) of the Second

Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 65402(e), is constitutional as applied when, pursuant to

its terms, the number of township supervisors is reduced by referendum from five to three,

thereby abolishing two supervisor seats?” Martin v. Donegal Twp., 

 (Pa.

2023) (per curiam order).

5 Article VI, Section 1 provides: “All officers, whose selection is not provided for in this

Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law.” PA. CONST. art.
VI, §1. Article IX, Section 3 provides:

       Municipalities shall have the right and power to adopt optional forms of
       government as provided by law. The General Assembly shall provide
       optional forms of government for all municipalities. An optional form of
       government shall be presented to the electors by initiative, by the governing
       body of the municipality, or by the General Assembly. Adoption or repeal
       of an optional form of government shall be by referendum.

PA. CONST. art. IX, §3.
6 The Board of Elections did not join in the petition.




                                       [J-29-2024] - 5
       The Donegal Parties argue Supervisors did not carry their heavy burden to

demonstrate Section 402(e) was unconstitutionally applied here. They contend the office

of supervisor of a second class township is a legislative rather than constitutional office.

As such, they assert the offices held by Martin and Fidler could be lawfully abolished

regardless of whether there was time remaining on their terms. They claim this case does

not involve the attempted removal of sitting officials from offices that would continue to

exist. The Donegal Parties insist there is a distinction between abolishing a legislative

office and removing a specific elected official for purported improprieties. In addition, they

maintain it is not necessary for this Court to consider whether reducing the number of

supervisors from five to three changed Donegal Township’s form of government. In their

view, a change in the form of government is not a prerequisite to the lawful abolition of a

legislative office. In any event, they assert the reduction in the number of supervisors did

in fact change the township’s form of government because it reduced the number of

supervisors required for a quorum and to pass an item of business, and because it

required the approval of the voters via referendum.

       In response, Supervisors contend they were unconstitutionally removed from office

under Section 402(e). Relying on In re Petition to Recall Reese, 

 (Pa.

1995), and South Newton Tp. Electors v. South Newton Tp. Sup’r, Bouch, 

(Pa. 2003), they argue Article VI, Section 7 generally provides the exclusive method for

removing elected officials from office before the expiration of their terms. They allege two

narrow exceptions to this general rule: laws predating the Pennsylvania Constitution of

1874,7 and a change in the form of government. Neither of these exceptions, Supervisors

7 The 1874 Constitution included Article VI, Section 4, the predecessor to Article VI,

Section 7, which provided:

            All officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave
       themselves while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of
(continued…)

                                       [J-29-2024] - 6
claim, is implicated here. They argue Section 402(e) was enacted in 1933. Moreover,

they insist the implementation of Section 402(e) did not change the township’s form of

government. They emphasize reducing the number of board members did not change

the system of electing supervisors, abolish the position of supervisor, or alter the powers,

duties, or authority of the supervisors. Similarly, while Supervisors acknowledge it is

permissible for a municipality to abolish a municipal office and abolition is beyond the

scope of Article VI, Section 7, they maintain that is not what happened here. On the

contrary, they contend the office of supervisor in Donegal Township will remain the same,

with the sole difference being the number of supervisors who comprise the board.

       Preliminarily, as counsel for Supervisors appeared to concede at oral argument,

only one of the three Supervisors (Fidler) currently has a potential claim to relief. See

Oral Argument at 4:26:13-15, Martin v. Donegal Twp., J-29-2024 (April 10, 2024),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlCMf4YU7MI&t=15992s (“So the one person who

remains is Mr. Fidler.”). First, Iams lacks standing. In order to pursue a legal action in

the courts of this Commonwealth, “an individual must as a threshold matter show that he

has standing to bring the action.” Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Com., 

 (Pa. 2005). An individual has standing if he “has demonstrated aggrievement, by

establishing ‘a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.’”

Robinson Tp., Washington County v. Com., 

 (Pa. 2013), quoting Fumo


       misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other
       than judges of the courts of record and the Superintendent of Public
       Instruction, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they
       shall have been appointed. All officers elected by the people, except
       Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly, and
       judges of the courts of record learned in the law, shall be removed by the
       Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the
       address of two-thirds of the Senate.

PA. CONST. art. VI, §4 (1874).



                                       [J-29-2024] - 7
v. City of Phila., 

 (Pa. 2009). “[A] ‘substantial’ interest is an interest in

the outcome of the litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens in

procuring obedience to the law[.]” Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Com., 

 (Pa. 2012).       “[A] ‘direct’ interest requires a showing that the matter

complained of caused harm to the party’s interest[.]” 

 An interest is “immediate” if that

“causal connection” is not remote or speculative. 

 Iams’s term as a member of the

township’s board of supervisors naturally expired on January 3, 2022, “the first Monday

of January after the election” for the new three-member board. 53 P.S. §65402(e). Thus,

unlike Martin and Fidler, her time in office was not truncated by the implementation of the

Section 402(e) reduction. Rather, she served the entirety of the term to which she was

elected in 2017. Under these circumstances, Iams was not aggrieved by the application

of Section 402(e), and lacks standing to join in the as-applied constitutional challenge to

this provision.

       Moreover, while Martin, in contrast to Iams, had standing at the outset of the

litigation, his individual claim to relief is now moot. Pennsylvania courts “generally will not

decide moot” claims. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 

 (Pa. 2002). A claim

is moot if “the court lacks the ability to issue a meaningful order, that is, an order that can

have any practical effect.” Burke ex rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross, 

 (Pa. 2014). The underlying action is a claim for declaratory and injunctive

relief. Yet, the term Martin was elected to serve in 2019 expired on January 2nd of this

year. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to issue a meaningful order practically

affecting Martin. Declaring Section 402(e) unconstitutional would not affect Martin now

that he is no longer a board member subject to this provision. Moreover, injunctive relief

securing him the remainder of his term cannot be ordered because his term has already

ended. At this point, Martin’s claim is moot. See Meyer v. Strouse, 

                                       [J-29-2024] - 8
(Pa. 1966) (dismissing as moot quo warranto action challenging tax collector’s ouster

from office where “the term of office involved had already expired”).

       Turning to the constitutionality of Section 402(e) as applied to Fidler,

“[c]onsideration of the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law; accordingly,

our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Keystone RX v.

Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office, 

, 329 n.4

(Pa. 2021). An as-applied constitutional challenge “does not contend that a law is

unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular

circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. McCabe,

, 1290 (Pa. 2021), quoting United States v. Marcavage, 

(3d Cir. 2010). There is a “strong presumption in the law” that statutes are constitutional.

Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Com., 

 (Pa.

2005). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute “bears a very heavy burden

of persuasion.” McLinko v. Department of State, 

, 565 (Pa. 2022). A statute

may not be deemed unconstitutional “unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the

Constitution.” Keystone, 265 A.3d at 331. “If there is any doubt that a challenger has

failed to reach this high burden, then that doubt must be resolved in favor of finding the

statute constitutional.” Id., quoting Pennsylvania State Ass’n of Jury Com’rs v. Com., 

 (Pa. 2013).

       “[T]he general principles governing the construction of statutes apply also to the

interpretation of Constitutions.” Perry Cnty. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 

 (Pa. 1919). As with statutes, “words and phrases” in our state Constitution

“shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and

approved usage[.]” 1 Pa.C.S. §1903(a). “The common and approved meaning of a word




                                       [J-29-2024] - 9
or phrase is appropriately gleaned from dictionary definitions.”          Commonwealth v.

Chisebwe, 

, 269 (Pa. 2024).

       Again, Article VI, Section 7 of our Constitution provides:

       All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave
       themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of
       misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers,
       other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure
       of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers
       elected by the people, except the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor,
       members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall
       be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and
       full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.

PA. CONST. art. VI, §7 (emphases added). Article VI, Section 7, by its express terms,

applies only when a civil officer is “removed” from office. “Removed” in this context is the

past tense of the verb “remove,” which is pertinently defined as “to dismiss from office[.]”

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remove.

       Importantly, while Article VI, Section 7 provides the “exclusive method” for

removing elected civil officers, this constitutional provision is not implicated in

circumstances not involving removal. South Newton, 

, Reese, 

. For instance, and relevant here, Article VI, Section 7 does not encroach on the

legislature’s power under Article VI, Section 1 to modify a legislative (i.e., non-

constitutional) office.8 See Visor v. Waters, 

 (Pa. 1936) (“It is thoroughly

settled now beyond question that the Legislature has power to abolish or change offices

which are legislative only, and not constitutional, without infringing upon any constitutional

right of the possessor of the office and without violating any duty of the legislative body.”);


8 The office of township supervisor is a legislative office.
                                                      See In re Supervisors of Milford
Tp., Somerset County, 

 (Pa. 1927), overruled on other grounds, Reese,

.

                                       [J-29-2024] - 10
Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 

 (Pa. 1901) (“[A]s to offices which are

legislative only, and not constitutional, the power which created them may abolish or

change them at pleasure, without impinging upon any constitutional right of the possessor

of the office, and without violating any duty of the legislative body.”); Commonwealth ex

rel. Braughler v. Weir, 

 (Pa. 1895) (same); Commonwealth v. McCombs,

 (1867) (“Not having been mentioned by the Constitution, the legislature

was left with unrestricted power to prescribe what the duties of the office should be, what

the length of its tenure, what its emoluments, and how it should be filled. Having the

power to create, they have also the power to regulate, and even destroy.”); see also

Arneson v. Wolf, 

 (Pa. 2015) (“[O]ur case law establishes that [Article

VI, Section 7] is read together with Article VI, Section 1[.]”). Article VI, Section 7 “was

never intended to put offices created by the legislature beyond the control and regulation

of the creating power[, or] to ordain that an office for a term of years, once made, should

not be modified or abolished, while the term remained unexpired.” McCombs, 

; accord Com. ex rel. Tarner v. Bitner, 

 (Pa. 1929); Weir, 

.

       Section 402(e) provides:

       At the first municipal election following approval of the question providing
       for a return to a three-member board, three supervisors shall be elected to
       serve from the first Monday of January after the election, when the terms of
       the officers of the five-member board of supervisors shall cease. The three
       candidates receiving the highest number of votes for the office of supervisor
       shall be elected. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes shall
       serve for a term of six years. The candidate receiving the second highest
       number of votes shall serve for a term of four years. The candidate
       receiving the third highest number of votes shall serve for a term of two
       years. After that, supervisors shall be elected under section 403 [53 P.S.
       §65403].




                                     [J-29-2024] - 11
53 P.S. §65402(e). The application of Section 402(e) to Fidler did not result in his being

“removed” under Article VI, Section 7.          He was not dismissed from the board of

supervisors, leaving his term unexpired and a vacancy on the board. Rather, after the

reduction of the number of supervisors as authorized by the Code, application of Section

402(e) shortened his existing term and provided him an opportunity to win a new term of

office. Indeed, had Fidler received the highest number of votes in the election for the new

three-member board, he would have received a new six-year term beginning on January

3, 2022, and ending on January 3, 2028. That is, his new term of office would have been

two years longer than his existing term, which was set to expire on January 5, 2026. As

it happens, however, Fidler lost in the primary election to serve on the new three-member

board.9 But his lack of success at the ballot box does not mean application of Section

402(e) in this context violates Article VI, Section 7. On the contrary, application of this

provision to Fidler is a lawful exercise of the legislature’s constitutional authority under

Article VI, Section 1 to modify a legislative office it has itself created.

       Supervisors’ reliance on Reese and South Newton, where this Court held very

different laws violated Article VI, Section 7, is misplaced. Reese involved the recall

provision of the Kingston Home Rule Charter, which provided:

       Petition demanding the recall of any elective municipal officer shall be
       signed by qualified electors equal in number to at least forty-five percent
       (45%) of the number of total votes cast for the office of mayor in the most
       recent election for mayor in the municipality. No signature contained in a
       petition on recall shall be valid unless affixed to the petition within ninety
       (90) days prior to the filing of the petition. If the majority of the votes cast
       on the question are in favor of recall, the office shall become vacant


9 See Summary Results Report, 2021 Municipal Primary, Washington County, at 23, 344,

available                                                                       at
https://cms.washingtoncopa.gov/uploads/2021_Primary_Official_Results_Election_Sum
mary_3868b5c430.pdf.

                                       [J-29-2024] - 12
       immediately upon certification of the results by the County Board of
       Elections. Any vacancy created by recall shall be filled in accordance with
       Articles II and III of this Charter.
Reese, 

. South Newton concerned Section 503 of the Code, which

provided:

       If any township officer fails to perform the duties of the office, the court of
       common pleas upon complaint in writing by five percent of the electors of
       the township may issue a rule upon the officer to show cause why the office
       should not be declared vacant. The officer shall respond to the rule within
       thirty days from its date of issue. Upon hearing, the court may declare the
       office vacant and require the vacancy to be filled under section 407 [53 P.S.
       §65407].
South Newton, 

, quoting 53 P.S. §65503 (held unconstitutional). The

laws at issue in Reese and South Newton explicitly provided for removal of elected civil

officers. They purported to authorize the dismissal of individuals from office and creation

of immediate vacancies. Accordingly, these removal provisions squarely contravened

Article I, Section 7, which, again, “is exclusive and invalidates statutory pronouncements

governing the removal of elected civil officers.” South Newton, 

. Here,

on the other hand, Section 402(e) does not authorize the removal of Fidler from office, or

anyone else for that matter. Instead, its application modified Fidler’s existing term of office

and presented him with the opportunity to win a new term on a three-member board.

       Supervisors’ other arguments also miss the mark. The fact Section 402(e) was

enacted in 1933, and therefore postdates the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, is

irrelevant. A statute providing for the removal of an elected civil officer in violation of

Article VI, Section 7 is nonetheless constitutionally permissible if it antedates the 1874

Constitution. See South Newton, 

 (“[L]egislation directing a particular

form of process that pre-existed the 1874 Constitution remains effective.”). However,

where, as here, the statute does not provide for removal in the first place, and hence does

not infringe upon the exclusive domain of Article VI, Section 7, the time of its passage is



                                      [J-29-2024] - 13
of no legally relevant moment. Similarly inconsequential are Supervisors’ contentions

that Section 402(e) did not change the form of government of Donegal Township or

abolish the office of township supervisor. Irrespective of whether Section 402(e) did either

of these things, it does not authorize the removal of anyone from office. As such,

application of this statute to Supervisors did not run afoul of Article VI, Section 7. Under

its plain language, Article VI, Section 7           supersedes overlapping legislative

pronouncements as to removal only.

       For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Wecht, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery

join the opinion.

       Justice McCaffery files a concurring opinion.




                                     [J-29-2024] - 14