[J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024]
                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                               MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,          :   No. 90 MAP 2023
                                         :
                  Appellant              :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                         :   Superior Court at No. 700 EDA
                                         :   2022, entered on February 1, 2023,
            v.                           :   Affirming and Remanding the
                                         :   Judgment of Sentence of the
                                         :   Montgomery County Court of
  JASON ANDREW LEAR,                     :   Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at
                                         :   No. CP-46-CR-0002239-2020
                  Appellee               :   entered on February 16, 2022.
                                         :
                                         :   ARGUED: May 15, 2024

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,          :   No. 91 MAP 2023
                                         :
                  Appellant              :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                         :   Superior Court at No. 701 EDA
                                         :   2022, entered on February 1, 2023,
            v.                           :   Affirming and Remanding the
                                         :   Judgment of Sentence of the
                                         :   Montgomery County Court of
  JASON ANDREW LEAR,                     :   Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at
                                         :   No. CP-46-CR-0002816-2020
                  Appellee               :   entered on February 16, 2022.
                                         :
                                         :   ARGUED: May 15, 2024

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,          :   No. 92 MAP 2023
                                         :
                  Appellant              :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                         :   Superior Court at No. 702 EDA
                                         :   2022, entered on February 1, 2023,
            v.                           :   Affirming and Remanding the
                                         :   Judgment of Sentence of the
                                         :   Montgomery County Court of
  JASON ANDREW LEAR,                     :   Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at
                                         :
                      Appellee                    : No. CP-46-CR-0003882-2020
                                                  : entered on February 16, 2022.
                                                  :
                                                    ARGUED: May 15, 2024

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY                                        DECIDED: October 24, 2024
       We granted review to determine whether Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

600 requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate it acted with due diligence while criminal

trials were suspended during a judicial emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 1


1 Rule 600 provides in relevant part:


       (A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
       (1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the
       date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of
       guilty or nolo contendere.
       (2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
              (a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against
              the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on
              which the complaint is filed.
                                            ***
       (C) Computation of Time
       (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the
       proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has
       failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the
       time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be
       excluded from the computation.
                                            ***
       (D) Remedies
       (1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods
       set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant’s attorney,
       or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that
(continued…)

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The Superior Court, relying on Commonwealth v. Harth, 

 (Pa. 2021), held

Rule 600 requires such proof, and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to

determine whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. For the reasons that

follow, we now reverse.

      On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court authorized

president judges to declare judicial emergencies and suspend Rule 600 in their respective

judicial districts. See In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 

, 1281-

82 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam) (Statewide Emergency I). 2 The same day, the President

Judge of Montgomery County (hereinafter referred to as “MontCo PJ”) declared a local

judicial emergency and, among other things, ordered Rule 600 suspended during the

period of the local judicial emergency; additional orders extended the judicial emergency

until May 31, 2020. See President Judge Declaration, 3/16/2020 (Original Emergency

Declaration). On May 5, 2020, however, MontCo PJ entered an order rescinding his

previous orders effective May 31, 2020. See President Judge Order, 5/5/2020. 3 On May

28, 2020, MontCo PJ declared the judicial emergency extended until further order of the

court. See President Judge Declaration, 5/28/2020. Finally, on June 3, 2020, MontCO

PJ filed an order noting that the judicial emergency had been extended by filings dated

      the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has
      been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the
      Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing
      on the motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
2 The Court subsequently ordered a statewide Rule 600 suspension that lasted through

June 1, 2020. See In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 

, 1019
(Pa. 2020) (per curiam) (Statewide Emergency II).
3 The parties dispute whether Montgomery County’s May 5th order rescinded the original

emergency declaration or only the emergency orders that followed the original emergency
declaration. As we resolve this case based on the text of Rule 600, we do not need to
decide this question.


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March 31, 2020, April 14, 2020, and May 28, 2020, and ordered “that any postponement

of criminal case scheduling caused by the declaration of this judicial emergency, from

March 12, 2020 through the expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be considered a

court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application

of [Rule 600].” President Judge Order, 6/3/2020.

       The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reopened in various stages.

Court facilities reopened on June 1, 2020, but with limited in-person hearings. See

Montgomery        County       Phase          II   Reopening      Statement       at      1,

https://montgomerycountypa.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/5215 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).

Phase II began on July 20, 2020, but the only criminal hearings held in person were for

violations of probation and parole, summary criminal appeals, and arraignments. See id.

at 5-7. Civil cases also remained on hold at this time. See id. at 7. However, custody

proceedings in the court’s family division began to be held in-person to “provide stability

for those children who are affected by the uncertainty caused by custody litigation.” Id.

at 3-4. Phase III was implemented on October 5, 2020, and brought about the initiation

of non-jury criminal, non-jury civil, and juvenile delinquency trials. See Montgomery

County              Phase               III            Reopening                Statement,

https://www.montgomerycountypa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5274 (last visited

Oct. 21, 2024). The protocols adopted by the Court, however, required pending criminal

cases to first proceed to a triage conference to determine whether a plea agreement could

be reached or if the parties would agree to proceed to a bench trial, as the court was still

not prepared to conduct jury trials. See Montgomery County Criminal Bench Trials

Protocol at 1, https://www.montgomerycountypa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5272

(last visited Oct. 21, 2024). These conferences were only held at a rate of twelve per day.

See id.




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 4
      On June 21, 2021, this Court ordered the Unified Judicial System to return to pre-

pandemic status, fully opening courthouses and other judicial facilities. See Order, In re:

General Statewide Judicial Emergency, No. 553 Judicial Administration Docket (Pa. filed

June 21, 2021) (per curiam). However, the order also allowed local judicial emergencies

to remain in effect until August 31, 2021, if such emergencies suspended Rule 600. See

id.

      Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against appellee Jason Andrew Lear on

May 19, June 8, and July 17, 2020, in connection with the thefts of snowplowing

equipment and an incident in which he threw a bicycle at a police officer. These matters

sat in abeyance during the various phases of the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas’ reopening. Finally, on June 22, 2021, Lear’s triage conference was scheduled for

August 10, 2021. At the conference, Lear requested a bench trial. Thereafter, the trial

court ordered trial to begin on November 1, 2021, 531 days after the Commonwealth filed

its first complaint against him, 511 days after the second complaint was filed, and 472

after the third complaint was filed. On October 21, 2021, Lear filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 600(D)(1). The court heard argument on the Rule 600 motion on the

day of trial and denied the motion, concluding “the delay in trying this case is a direct

result of the judicial emergency and in accordance with Judge DelRicci’s order as the

President Judge[.]” N.T., 11/1/21 at 8. As the court further explained, “the earliest date

for the cessation of the Rule 600 suspension was when the first criminal jury trial resumed

in this judicial district, at which time Montgomery County court leaders determined jury

trials were safe to resume. The first open date for criminal jury trials was July 12, 2021.

Computing the time between the resumption of jury trials and the bench trial for [Lear]

would still place the trial comfortably within the 365 non-excludable days. Therefore, the




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 5
Commonwealth did not delay in bringing this case to trial[.]”         Trial Court Opinion,

4/15/2022, at 18.

         Following the nonjury trial, Lear was convicted of aggravated assault, theft by

unlawful taking, and related offenses, and sentenced to five to twelve years’

imprisonment. Lear’s post-sentence motion was denied, and he appealed to the Superior

Court.

         In a unanimous published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court

vacated the judgment of sentence, reversed the trial court’s decision denying Lear’s Rule

600 motion, and remanded for a hearing under Rule 600(D). Commonwealth v. Lear,

 (Pa. Super. 2023).          The panel stated: “Lear argues that although

Montgomery County declared a judicial emergency, the delay in his cases was not

excludable when it was feasible to hold trial, noting that other court divisions and other

counties held trials while his case was pending.” 

. The panel then quoted the

text of Rule 600 and explained the Rule 600 analysis begins with determining the

“mechanical run date,” which is 365 days after the criminal complaint was filed. 

 The

panel further explained that then the “adjusted run date” must be calculated by adding

any time that is excludable from the computation under Rule 600(C)(1), and a case is

properly dismissed under Rule 600 if it is not brought to trial by the adjusted run date. 

.

         According to the panel, two cases guided its analysis: Harth and Commonwealth

v. Carl, 

 (Pa. Super. 2022). The Harth Court held “before a trial court

excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay,’” the

Commonwealth must “demonstrate that it acted with due diligence,” Harth, 252 A.3d at

617, while in Carl, the Superior Court noted that any period during which Rule 600 was

suspended should be excluded and added to the adjusted run date regardless of the




                      [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 6
Commonwealth’s diligence, Carl, 276 A.3d at 751. Based on Harth and Carl, the panel

held: “If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without qualification, then the period

of the suspension is added to the [adjusted] run date without considering the

Commonwealth’s diligence. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay as a court

postponement, then that period is only excluded if the trial court determines after a

hearing that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence through the life of the case.”

Lear, 

 (internal citations omitted).

       The panel then examined the COVID-19 emergency orders entered in

Montgomery County, and based its ultimate decision on its interpretation of them. Initially,

the panel rejected Lear’s argument the county was actually able to hold jury trials during

the relevant period, like other counties did, because this Court expressly authorized

president judges to suspend Rule 600. See 

, citing Statewide Emergency I, 228

A.3d at 1282. Nevertheless, the panel determined “the plain language of the orders

reflects that Montgomery County did not continue its unqualified suspension of Rule 600

beyond May 31, 2020” because the May 5th order rescinded all previous orders and

“[t]here were no later orders suspending Rule 600.”           Id.   The panel concluded

“Montgomery County opted to order on June 3, 2020, that any emergency-related delay

‘shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time’ under

Rule 600(C).” Id., quoting President Judge Order, 6/3/2020.

       Finding no order suspending Rule 600 after May 31, 2020, the panel directed the

trial court on remand to determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence

for any period of judicial delay occurring between June 3, 2020 and August 31, 2021.

See id. The panel directed that the case be dismissed if the Commonwealth does not

meet its burden.    See id.    The panel denied the Commonwealth’s application for

reconsideration.




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 7
       We granted review to consider the following question as phrased by the

Commonwealth:
       Whether a court must assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence during a
       worldwide pandemic for purposes of Rule 600 before it excludes delay
       attributable to a local judicial emergency during which the president judge
       cancelled and suspended all trials, suspended Rule 600 and otherwise
       excluded judicial delay caused by the judicial emergency, and implemented
       strict procedures to protect the public?
Commonwealth v. Lear, 

 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). We generally review Rule

600 decisions for an abuse of discretion, but our review is plenary where “the dispositive

question implicates legal issues[.]” Harth, 252 A.3d at 614 n.13.

       First, we recognize the Commonwealth and Lear have different opinions on how

the emergency orders below should be interpreted, specifically, whether MontCo PJ’s

unqualified suspension of Rule 600 ended on June 3, 2020 or remained in effect until

August 31, 2021. However, as stated above, we need not decide this particular dispute

because we may resolve the present appeal based on the plain text of Rule 600 and the

fact that criminal jury trials in Montgomery County were judicially suspended from the

dates the criminal complaints against Lear were filed until July 12, 2021. 4

       Regarding the appropriate application of Rule 600, the Commonwealth argues

neither this Court’s holding in Harth nor the text of Rule 600 requires a court to assess

the Commonwealth’s diligence before excluding delay caused by a pandemic and the

related judicial emergency. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 25. The Commonwealth

contends the panel below “erred when it used the ‘judicial delay’ framework that applies

to an individual judge’s congested court calendar to analyze delay caused by a worldwide



4 Although Lear was ultimately tried in a bench trial, he did not waive his constitutional

right to a jury trial until the triage conference on August 10, 2021. See Trial Court Opinion,
4/15/2022, at 17 (“A review of the docket confirms that at a pre-trial conference on August
10, 2021, [Lear] requested a bench trial[.]”).


                      [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 8
pandemic[.]” Id. The Commonwealth claims the judicial delay framework used in Harth

is inapt, and instead, the time at issue here “should have been excluded as an ‘other

period of delay’ or delay not caused by the Commonwealth, which is excludable under

the rule without a diligence inquiry.” Id., quoting Pa.R.Crim.P 600(C).

       Although the Commonwealth acknowledges Harth memorialized an exception to

the general rule excluding delay not caused by the Commonwealth where judicial delay

is involved, it argues judicial delay should be limited to “delay caused by an individual

judge and that particular judge’s congested calendar or other scheduling issues.” Id. at

26.   Put simply, the Commonwealth contends “a worldwide pandemic that leads to

statewide disaster emergency declarations and the local declaration of a judicial

emergency is not the same as a single judge’s ‘congested calendar’ or ‘other scheduling

problems’ considered in Harth.” Id. at 27. According to the Commonwealth, the reason

for this dichotomy is simple: even if “the lower court [had] been available in Harth, trial

could not have commenced because the Commonwealth never met its discovery

obligations” and the Commonwealth “cannot benefit from the trial judge’s congested court

calendar”; but here, “Montgomery County did not have a jury trial calendar or any jury

trials scheduled from March 12, 2020 to July 12, 2021.” Id. at 29-30.

       The Commonwealth contends there is no need to force this type of pandemic-

related delay into the Harth judicial delay framework because the text of Rule 600

“expressly provides for the exclusion of delays that do not fit within that framework,

explaining that ‘[a]ny other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.’” Id.

at 31, quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). Further, the Commonwealth notes this Court has

recognized as much post-Harth by stating, “where delay is not caused by the

Commonwealth . . ., it must be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline.”




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 9
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

, 982 (Pa. 2023). 5                  The

Commonwealth again emphasizes that “[t]his case involves an unexpected pandemic that

created chaos across the world and upended the day-to-day operations of the

courthouse[,] . . . [t]he Commonwealth did not cause the pandemic, and it had no control

over the judicial emergency response to COVID-19.” 

 As such, the Commonwealth

contends “this delay is excludable under the text of the rule as ‘any other periods of

delay.’” 

 quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). 6

       In response, Lear argues the panel below correctly interpreted Harth as applying

to all types of judicial delay, including emergency-related court closures that affect every

judge in a particular county. See Appellee’s Brief at 33-34. Lear points out that Harth

itself concerned emergency-type judicial delays caused by the September 2015 Papal

Visit to Philadelphia. See id. at 34. Lear claims Harth “explicitly rejected the notion that

judicial delay could create an extended period where no examination of due diligence was

warranted[,]” based on the following language:


5 The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA) filed an amicus curiae brief in

support of the Commonwealth in which it agrees with the Commonwealth that the present
case is distinguishable from Harth. See PDAA Brief at 11-12. PDAA observes that “[t]he
purpose of Rule 600 is two-fold, it protects a defendant’s speedy trial rights and seeks to
protect the interest of society/the Commonwealth in prosecuting crime[,]” and requiring
the Commonwealth to prove its diligence after it relied on orders suspending Rule 600
“completely ignores the dual purpose of Rule 600[.]” Id. at 12.
6 The Commonwealth also summarizes numerous Superior Court cases holding COVID-

19 delay as excludable without consideration of the Commonwealth’s diligence to stress
that the decision below is an outlier that conflicts with numerous other Superior Court
decisions. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 32-40, citing Commonwealth v. Faison, 

 (Pa. Super. 2023); Carl, 276 A.3d at 751; Commonwealth v. Feazell, 1488 MDA
2021, 

 (Pa. Super., Aug. 15, 2022) (unpublished memorandum);
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 1489 MDA 2021, 

 (Pa. Super., Mar. 20,
2023) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 410 MDA 2022, 

 (Pa. Super., Dec. 1, 2022) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth
v. McDonald, 218 MDA 2022, 

 (Pa. Super., Nov. 13, 2023)
(unpublished memorandum).


                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 10
       We do not suggest that the Commonwealth must be prepared to proceed
       to trial the moment that a criminal case is initiated; rather, the
       Commonwealth must utilize that year to prepare itself for trial, as is required
       under Rule 600(A). We have not altered that timeline, but, instead, seek
       merely to ensure that the Commonwealth does not summarily rely upon the
       judiciary as an excuse to forego preparation for pending criminal cases,
       consistent with the language and purpose of Rule 600. Indeed, under the
       dissent’s approach, were the judiciary unable to proceed with a trial within
       the first year after a case was initiated, the Commonwealth could do nothing
       during that delay, and then take another year to prepare its case.

Id. at 34-35, quoting Harth, 252 A.3d at 618 n.15 (emphasis in original).

       Lear also contends the Commonwealth’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced as this

Court in that case specifically stated, “judicial delay is delay caused by the court, rather

than the Commonwealth, and is likewise excludable if the Commonwealth exercised

diligence during that time.” Id. at 35, quoting Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982. Lear claims the

Commonwealth’s approach to Harth is unworkable as it would “create[ ] a morass in which

lower courts must determine whether Harth’s two-step framework applies or whether the

cause of judicial delay must be first examined.” Id. at 36. According to Lear, this would

“invite[ ] a never-ending stream of factual scenarios through which lower courts would

need to navigate in an effort to apply the proper standard.” Id. In Lear’s view, “[t]here is

simply no reason why [the Harth] analysis cannot be extended to an assessment . . . of

the Commonwealth’s due diligence during the post-June 1, 2020 pandemic period.” Id.

For all these reasons, Lear asserts the Superior Court properly remanded his case for the

trial court to assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence. See id. at 40-42.

       In reply, the Commonwealth denies the standard it forwards is unworkable, as any

emergency-related closure is obviously beyond the control of both the courts and the

Commonwealth, and there is no reason to assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence

because trial could not possibly have occurred in any event. See Commonwealth’s Reply




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 11
Brief at 22-23. The Commonwealth insists that forcing it to prove due diligence during an

emergency “flies in the face of the second purpose of Rule 600: protecting society’s right

to effective prosecution of criminal cases.” Id. at 23.

       Rule 600 requires that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed

against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). To decide whether the rule was violated,

“a court must first calculate the ‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days after the

complaint was filed, and then must account for any ‘excludable time[.]’” Johnson, 289

A.3d at 981 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rule 600 explains the computation

of time as follows: “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be

included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other

periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

       As this Court unanimously clarified post-Harth, the first sentence of Rule 600(C)(1)

expresses the general rule: “Rule 600 establishes two requirements that must be met for

delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay must be caused by the

Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth must have failed to exercise due diligence.”

Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 (emphasis added); see id. (“Put differently, where delay is not

caused by the Commonwealth or delay caused by the Commonwealth is not the result of

lack of diligence, it must be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline.”)

(emphasis added). The second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) then explains that “[a]ny other

periods of delay” — meaning any periods of delay not caused by the Commonwealth or

not resulting from the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence — are “exclud[able]” and

are removed from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Once the “excludable time” is calculated, this time is added to the “mechanical run date”




                     [J-40A-2024, J-40B-2024 and J-40C-2024] - 12
to produce the “adjusted run date,” which is the deadline for the Commonwealth to bring

the defendant to trial under Rule 600. See Johnson, 289 A.3d at 981-83. 7

       Harth announced a limited exception to the general rule in certain cases involving

“judicial delay.” See 252 A.3d at 603 (“we find that a trial court may invoke ‘judicial delay’

in order to deny a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss only after the Commonwealth

has demonstrated that it complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all

relevant periods throughout the life of the case”). That case involved a number of dates

where Harth’s criminal trial was continued. Some continuances were explained in docket

entries, such as those stemming from the 2015 Papal Visit to Philadelphia, 8 and the

Commonwealth’s refusal to sever Harth’s case from that of his co-defendant, while others

were seemingly unexplained. See id. at 603-05. However, the critical fact was that the

7  The dissent insists we have “circumvent[ed] Rule 600’s order of operations” and
“misconstrue[d] Rule 600’s analytical sequencing.” Dissenting Opinion at 12, 14. But it
is the dissent that reads the language of the rule out of order. Again, the pertinent
computational provision provides that “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings
caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due
diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, “[t]he first thing that the Rule instructs
courts to do, when determining whether time is excludable” is not, as the dissent claims,
“an assessment of the Commonwealth’s diligence[.]” Dissenting Opinion at 14. Rather,
“the path expressly prescribed by the rule” is to first assess whether the Commonwealth
caused the delay in question. Id. Moreover, we do not “disregard[] the possibility that it
will be the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence that caused the delay.” Id. (emphasis
omitted). We simply recognize, in accordance with the plain text of the rule, that the
causation analysis precedes the due diligence inquiry, and it is only when the
Commonwealth both caused the delay and lacked due diligence that the delay is properly
included in the Rule 600 calculation.
8 Due to the Pope’s visit, the courts of the First Judicial District in Philadelphia County

were closed from 5 P.M. on September 22, 2015 to 9 A.M. on September 29, 2015. See
In re: Administrative Closure of the Courts and Offices of the First Judicial District of
Pennsylvania September 23, 2015 to September 28, 2015 (Administrative Governing
Board of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania No 01 of 2015),
https://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/notices/2015/Papal-Visit-Operational-Changes-
Notice.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).


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Commonwealth failed to complete discovery on numerous occasions and even passed

fifteen pieces of discovery on the morning scheduled for trial. See id. at 604-06, 622 (“the

record here amply demonstrates that the Commonwealth failed to complete its discovery

obligations through the date of trial”). Harth filed a Rule 600 motion, which was denied,

and he appealed to the Superior Court after he was convicted and sentenced. The

Superior Court ordered a remand to the trial court to conduct a hearing to clarify the record

with respect to the cause of each continuance, the Commonwealth’s readiness for trial,

and the Commonwealth’s due diligence or lack thereof. Harth petitioned this Court for

allowance of appeal, and we granted review.

       Harth requested that all the delay in his case be included in the Rule 600

calculation since the Commonwealth never completed discovery and was therefore not

diligent in bringing the case to trial. More specifically, Harth asked this Court to adopt

Justice Wecht’s concurrence in Commonwealth v. Mills, 

 (Pa. 2017), which

argued that trial courts must assess the Commonwealth’s diligence before labeling a

continuance “judicial delay.” See Harth, 252 A.3d at 610-11, citing Mills, 

-

27 (Wecht, J., concurring). The Commonwealth, on the other hand, relied on the text of

Rule 600(C)(1) to argue periods of delay caused by the trial judge’s calendar should be

excluded from the Rule 600 calculation. The Commonwealth observed, consistent with

our explanation above, that Rule 600 provides two requirements before a period of delay

may be included in the computation ― (1) the Commonwealth caused the delay; and (2)

the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence ― and the first requirement is not met

when the delay is caused by the trial judge’s calendar rather than the Commonwealth.

       In a sharply divided 4-3 decision, with this author writing for the dissenters, this

Court held “a trial court may invoke ‘judicial delay’ in order to deny a defendant’s Rule

600 motion to dismiss only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it complied




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with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life

of the case.” Id. at 603. The Harth majority reasoned that “requiring the Commonwealth

to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time from its

Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay’ comports with the language of

Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior

jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.” Id. at 617. The Court then

determined a remand was unnecessary as the Commonwealth had neglected to fulfill its

discovery obligations without providing a reasonable explanation for this deficiency and,

as a result, failed to prosecute Harth’s case with due diligence. See id. at 621-22.

       Although the facts of Harth involved other sorts of delays in addition to judicial

delays, including delays due to the Papal Visit and the lack of severance, the Court’s

holding regarding the Commonwealth’s due diligence obligation, which is what binds

future decisions, was explicitly limited to “judicial delay.” Id. at 603, 617. More precisely,

though, it was about judicial delay in conjunction with other periods of delay caused by

the Commonwealth. Delay actually occasioned by the Commonwealth was essential to

the Harth majority’s analysis, because without it, the second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1)

would have controlled rather than the first. See Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 (“judicial delay

is delay caused by the court”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (“Any other periods of delay [not

caused by the Commonwealth] shall be excluded from the computation.”). In those

limited circumstances, where the Commonwealth caused multiple periods of delay and

attempted to excuse them by pointing to other periods of judicial delay, the Harth majority

determined “a trial court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met its

obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case; if the Commonwealth

meets its burden of proving due diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its own

congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification for denying the




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defendant’s motion.” Harth, 252 A.3d at 618. In establishing this exception to the general

rule, the Harth majority expressed that Rule 600(C)(1) is “not a model of clarity,” hence

its decision to turn to the Rule’s “commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior

jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor.” Id. at 617.

       Unlike Harth, this case does not involve judicial delay in conjunction with delay

caused by the Commonwealth. In fact, it involves neither. Judicial delay is delay caused

by an individual judge’s “own congested calendar or other scheduling problems[.]” Id. at

618; see also id. at 619 (“trial courts must assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence

before relying upon their own scheduling difficulties and congested court calendars as

justification for denying Rule 600 motions to dismiss”). Here, Lear’s trial was not delayed

because of the assigned trial judge’s heavy caseload or because the judge had other

scheduling conflicts or difficulties. Rather, trial was postponed because of a global

pandemic, during which emergency orders completely closed the Montgomery County

Courthouse for an extended period of time, with narrow exceptions not relevant here. See

President Judge Emergency Order, 3/16/2020 at 1. When court reopened on a limited

basis, proceedings involved stringent protocols that limited the kinds of hearings that

could take place as well as the pace and volume of proceedings. See President Judge

Order, 5/5/2020; Montgomery County Phase II Reopening Statement at 1,

https://montgomerycountypa.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/5215 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).

Importantly, criminal jury trials were suspended entirely from March 12, 2020 (before the

criminal complaints against Lear were filed) to July 12, 2021. Moreover, there was no

hearing scheduled in Lear’s criminal matters until August 10, 2021, already more than

365 days from when the Commonwealth filed each set of charges. These circumstances

stand in stark contrast to the situation of a single judge unable to entertain a case because




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of a scheduling problem, and so they are not properly characterized as “judicial delay” as

envisioned by Harth.

      Nor can it be seriously argued that the Commonwealth caused the delay from the

filing of the complaints to the triage conference on August 10, 2021. This delay was

necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its concomitant emergency court closures

and restrictive protocols, not anything the Commonwealth did or did not do. Likewise, the

Commonwealth is not alleged to have caused any other periods of delay during the

relevant timeframe.

      In the absence of judicial delay in conjunction with some period of delay caused

by the Commonwealth, the limited Harth exception does not apply. The general rule

instead controls. Applying that rule here, we conclude that since the Commonwealth was

not responsible for the suspension of all criminal jury trials or the protocols adopted in

Montgomery County in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the time period up until the

August 10, 2021 conference is properly excluded from the Rule 600 computation as an

“other period[ ] of delay.”   Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).    Moreover, because the matter

proceeded to trial within three months on November 1, 2021, well before the adjusted run

date expired, there was no violation of the Rule 600 deadline in this case.

      There is good reason not to extend the narrow Harth exception, which itself

constituted an expansive construction of the rule language providing that only delay

“caused by the Commonwealth” should be included in the computation of time, to the

COVID-19 delay here. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Delay stemming from the unavailability

of a single judge could conceivably be averted if the Commonwealth is ready to proceed,

as the case could potentially be reassigned to a different judge. On the other hand, when

a global pandemic precipitates a court-wide shutdown followed by a court-wide slowdown,

delay is unavoidable irrespective of the Commonwealth’s diligence. No amount of due




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diligence on the part of the Commonwealth could have possibly hastened Lear’s trial date.

As such, we hold the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic-related emergency court

closures and restrictive protocols do not fall under Harth’s limited exception but, instead,

constitute “other periods of delay” for purposes of Rule 600. 9               And since the

Commonwealth’s diligence is never relevant to the Rule 600 analysis for “other periods

of delay,” we reverse the Superior Court’s decision remanding this case to the trial court

for a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. Because

we hold Rule 600 was not violated in this case, no hearing is necessary. 10

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.

       Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.




9 It is not hard to imagine other types of delays that fit neatly in this category. For example,

medical-, weather-, and security-related emergencies often lead to court delays, by no
fault of the Commonwealth. Such circumstances, like the COVID-19 pandemic, properly
constitute “other periods of delay” under Rule 600(C)(1).
10 As should be obvious, we do not endorse the approach taken by the Superior Court.

Whereas the panel below crafted a rule for assessing the validity of Rule 600 suspension
orders and then applied that rule to the suspension orders issued by the MontCo PJ, our
analysis turns on Rule 600 itself. There is simply no need to parse the suspension orders
given our conclusion that, even if Rule 600 was in effect at all relevant times, it was not
violated in these circumstances.


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