[J-59-2023]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                               WESTERN DISTRICT

       TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.


    EARL JOHN DWYER AND CHRISTINE                :   No. 2 WAP 2023
    DWYER, HUSBAND AND WIFE,                     :
                                                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                      Appellants                 :   Superior Court entered July 8, 2022
                                                 :   at No. 519 WDA 2021, Affirming the
                                                 :   Judgment of the Court of Common
               v.                                :   Pleas of Allegheny County entered
                                                 :   April 26, 2021 at No. GD01-006612.
                                                 :
    AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC.,                  :   ARGUED: October 18, 2023
    AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES,               :
    INC., RIVERSOURCE LIFE INSURANCE             :
    COMPANY, JAMES E. ANDERSON, JR.,             :
    AND DUANE DANIELS,                           :
                                                 :
                      Appellees                  :

OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT                                                 DECIDED: APRIL 25, 2024
        A trial jury returned a verdict in favor of Earl John and Christine Dwyer against

Ameriprise Financial, Inc., on common-law claims of negligent and fraudulent

misrepresentation. The jury found Ameriprise’s conduct to have been outrageous, such

that the Dwyers were entitled to punitive damages. Premised upon the same conduct,

the trial court decided that Ameriprise also had violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade

Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“CPL”).1 The CPL authorizes the trial court to

award, in its discretion, “up to three times the actual damages sustained.”2 The trial court

1       73 P.S. §§ 201-1 – 201-10.
2       73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).
here declined to make such an award, opining that treble damages under the CPL would

be duplicative of the punitive damages awarded by the jury on the common-law claims.

The Superior Court affirmed, viewing the trial court’s decision as a permissible exercise

of its discretion.

       By relying upon the jury’s common-law punitive damages award to limit the

availability of treble damages under the CPL, the lower courts have undermined the

legislative intent of the CPL. In doing so, the lower courts erred as a matter of law. Rather

than being interchangeable with punitive damages, treble damages under the CPL are a

separate remedy available to the Dwyers. The availability of treble damages is wholly

independent of any entitlement to punitive damages, and must be considered by the trial

court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common-law claims.

Contrary to the Superior Court’s holding, nullifying the availability of a statutory award

because of a common-law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion. It is an

erroneous decision not to exercise statutory discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the order

of the Superior Court.

                                       I. Background

       In July 1985, Ameriprise fraudulently and negligently induced the Dwyers to

purchase a universal whole life insurance policy on the life of Mr. Dwyer with a rider

insuring Mrs. Dwyer and their children. In order to facilitate this purchase, the Dwyers

surrendered life insurance policies they had purchased from other companies. The

maturity date of the policy was in 2051, when Mr. Dwyer would be ninety-five years old.

An Ameriprise representative misrepresented to the Dwyers that their quarterly premium

payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. If the Dwyers’ premium

payment had remained the same, the policy would have lapsed for insufficient funds in

2020, when Mr. Dwyer was sixty-four years old.




                                      [J-59-2023] - 2
       On April 4, 2001, the Dwyers commenced this action by writ of summons. On

August 23, 2007, the Dwyers filed a complaint against Ameriprise raising common-law

claims of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as a statutory claim arising

from a violation of the CPL premised upon Ameriprise’s misrepresentations. The Dwyers

sought compensatory damages of $45,570, which represented the return of their premium

payments of $14,580 plus six percent interest. The parties agreed that liability for the

common-law claims and the question of punitive damages would be decided by a jury,

with the amount of compensatory damages reserved for determination by the trial court.

If the jury returned a verdict for the Dwyers, the trial court would adjudicate the CPL claim.

       At the conclusion of the jury trial in March 2019, the jury returned a verdict for the

Dwyers on their claims of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, finding that

Ameriprise made intentional, fraudulent misrepresentations in the process of the sale of

the policy and that the Dwyers justifiably relied upon these misrepresentations to their

financial detriment. The jury also found that Ameriprise’s conduct was outrageous and

that this conduct warranted punitive damages in the amount of $75,000.

       On December 18, 2019, the trial court found in the Dwyers’ favor on the CPL claim,

awarding $45,570 in compensatory damages, plus interest. The trial court declined to

treble the damages under Section 9.2 of the CPL or to provide any other additional relief,

explaining that:

       [T]he Court believes the compensatory award of the return of the entire
       premiums paid, without set-off [for providing insurance coverage since
       August 1985], at a rate of 6% interest; the $75,000 in punitive damages
       awarded by the jury; and attorneys’ fees that will subsequently be awarded,
       as sufficient to compensate the [Dwyers] for the losses caused by
       [Ameriprise], and to punish and deter [Ameriprise] from such similar future
       conduct.3



3      Tr. Ct. Order, 12/18/2019, at 2 ¶ 7; R.R. 31a.


                                       [J-59-2023] - 3
Upon the Dwyers’ motion, the trial court awarded $123,603 in attorneys’ fees and costs

under the CPL.

       On August 17, 2020, the trial court entered judgment upon the jury verdict on the

common-law claims in the amount of $120,570, representing compensatory and punitive

damages, and upon the non-jury verdict on the CPL claim in the amount of $169,173,

representing compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees and costs.

       On August 24, 2020, Ameriprise moved for an election of remedies, asserting that

the Dwyers were required to elect either the common-law verdict or the statutory CPL

verdict, but could not recover both.4 Ameriprise further argued that the Dwyers could not

recover punitive damages and statutory treble damages because both types of damages

would serve the same purpose of punishing wrongdoing. The Dwyers filed a reply in

opposition. On August 26, 2020, the Dwyers moved for post-trial relief, arguing that the

trial court erred by not awarding treble damages on the CPL claim.

       On April 15, 2021, the trial court denied the Dwyers’ motion for post-trial relief,

explaining that the award of treble damages was within the court’s discretion. Also on

April 15, 2021, the trial court separately granted Ameriprise’s motion for election of

remedies in part, agreeing that the Dwyers could not recover compensatory damages

twice, a proposition that the Dwyers did not dispute. The trial court denied the election of

remedies motion in all other respects. Responding to Ameriprise’s argument that the

Dwyers could not receive both punitive damages and treble damages, the trial court

agreed, reasoning that the two types of damages would be duplicative. Because it

believed the damages to be duplicative, the trial court explained that “of primary concern

to [Ameriprise] was the [Dwyers’] inability to recover both punitive and treble damages.

4     See Gamesa Energy USA LLC v. Ten Penn Ctr. Ass., 

, 1238 (Pa.
2019) (“The purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies is to prevent a windfall or
double recovery for a single injury.”).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 4
Under the verdicts as issued, the [Dwyers are] not recovering both, as part of the court’s

rationale in declining to award treble damages was the award of punitive damages by the

jury.”5 The Dwyers’ final award included $45,570 in compensatory damages (for either

the common-law claims or the CPL claim), $75,000 in punitive damages on the common-

law claims, and $123,176 in attorneys’ fees and costs under the CPL.6

      The Dwyers filed a notice of appeal. In their statement of errors complained of on

appeal,7 the Dwyers argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by not awarding treble

damages under the CPL. In response, the trial court stated that it enjoyed “absolute

discretion to award no extra damages, treble damages, or something in between,” that it

did not abuse this discretion by declining to award treble damages “after the jury had

already awarded punitive damages,” and that treble damages, like punitive damages,

have “at least a punitive component.”8

      The Superior Court affirmed.9 Among other arguments, the Dwyers maintained

that the trial court erred by ignoring their entitlement to treble damages under the CPL,

which arose from Ameriprise’s intentional fraudulent conduct. Evaluating the trial court’s

decision for an abuse of discretion, the Superior Court disagreed with the Dwyers. The

Superior Court opined that, because the Dwyers received compensatory damages,

punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees, they were compensated for their losses, and


5     Tr. Ct. Order (Election of Remedies), 4/15/2021, at 2; R.R. 224a.
6     Because the final award included only one award of compensatory damages, it
was less than the verdict entered on August 17, 2020.
7     See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
8      Tr. Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 8/25/2021, at 4 (citing Nexus Real Estate LLC v.
Erickson, 

 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining that treble damages have both
punitive and remedial aspects) (internal citations omitted)).
9     Dwyer v. Ameriprise Fin. Inc., 519 WDA 2121, 

 (Pa. Super. July
8, 2022) (unreported).


                                     [J-59-2023] - 5
Ameriprise was sufficiently punished and deterred from engaging in similar conduct in the

future. Thus, according to the Superior Court, the trial court acted within its discretion

when it declined to award treble damages in light of the total damages award.

       We granted review in order to decide two issues. The first is whether the Superior

Court erred by affirming the denial of treble damages under the CPL because of the award

of punitive damages and of attorneys’ fees. The second is whether the Superior Court

erred by applying an abuse of discretion standard of review instead of a de novo standard

of review to resolve whether an award of punitive damages and attorneys’ fees can

replace an award of treble damages under the CPL.10

                                        II. Arguments

       The Dwyers argue that, as a remedial statute, the CPL is to be liberally construed

in order to prevent unfair or deceptive practices.11 The Dwyers assert that statutory treble

damages serve this remedial objective by encouraging the private enforcement of the

CPL. Without the incentive of enhanced damages, the Dwyers argue, consumers would

have little reason to bring CPL actions to recoup otherwise small losses spent on goods

and services. According to the Dwyers, private enforcement of the CPL depends upon

the award of treble damages.

       Addressing the relationship between punitive damages and treble damages under

the CPL, the Dwyers argue that the award of treble damages “should not be closely

constrained by the common-law requirements associated with the award of punitive

damages,” such as the requirement of outrageous conduct.12 Because punitive damages


10     Dwyer v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 

, 647-48 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam).
11      See Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 

, 646 (Pa. 2021) (“This Court has
stated emphatically that, as a remedial statute, the CPL is to be construed liberally to
effect its object of preventing unfair or deceptive practices.”) (internal citation omitted).
12     Appellant’s Br. at 17 (quoting Schwartz v. Rockey, 

 (Pa. 2007)).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 6
are intended to punish outrageous behavior while treble damages under the CPL are

intended to incentivize the private enforcement of the CPL, the Dwyers argue, the lower

courts erred by essentially substituting common-law punitive damages for CPL treble

damages. According to the Dwyers, the legislative goals of the CPL cannot be satisfied

by punitive damages.

       By affirming on the basis that the Dwyers were sufficiently compensated by the

award of punitive damages, the Dwyers believe, the Superior Court has created a legal

standard not supported by the plain language of the CPL and has injected ambiguity and

uncertainty into the measure of damages available under the CPL.

       Confronting the trial court’s claim of “absolute discretion” to deny treble damages,

the Dwyers argue that the trial court’s discretion is not limitless, but rather is constrained

by the legislative goals that animate the CPL. Although the award of treble damages is

discretionary, the Dwyers maintain, the trial court had no discretion to decide as a matter

of law that punitive damages replaced treble damages, and the Superior Court erred in

applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard of appellate review.           The facts

established herein demonstrated that Ameriprise engaged in intentional wrongful

conduct—a circumstance that the Dwyers believe warranted the imposition of treble

damages in order to further the remedial purpose of the CPL.

       The Dwyers further argue that the trial court’s actions contravened the procedure

for electing remedies. According to the Dwyers, by imposing punitive damages but not

treble damages, the trial court forced an election of remedies rather than permitting the

Dwyers to elect their own remedy.        The Dwyers contend that this election favored

Ameriprise, as treble damages under the CPL would have been greater—by $16,000—

than the punitive damages award. The Dwyers question whether an award of less than

treble damages could further the legislative goals of the CPL.




                                       [J-59-2023] - 7
       Turning to the second issue presented for review, the Dwyers argue that the trial

court’s misapplication of the law warrants de novo review by the appellate court, not, as

the Superior Court held, review for an abuse of discretion. According to the Dwyers, this

case involves the legal standard for the award of treble damages, not the discretion to

make (or not to make) such an award.13

       In response, Ameriprise first argues that the Court should dismiss the Dwyers’

appeal as improvidently granted because the Dwyers are seeking fact-specific error

review. Ameriprise next relies upon the discretionary nature of the award of treble

damages under the CPL to argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

treble damages based upon the Dwyers’ total award (of compensatory damages, punitive

damages, and attorneys’ fees). The trial court’s decision in this respect is, according to

Ameriprise, not a question of law, but a pure exercise of discretion.

       In the absence of any express statutory factors for the award of treble damages,

Ameriprise asserts, the deterrence and punitive purposes of such damages are relevant

considerations. According to Ameriprise, the trial court appropriately considered the

award as a whole and appropriately decided that Ameriprise already was deterred and

punished without the need for trebling of damages under the CPL.

       Turning to the Superior Court’s standard of review, Ameriprise notes the Superior

Court’s express statement that “where the issue . . . concerns a question of law, our scope

of review is plenary.”14 Ameriprise offers this statement to refute the Dwyers’ argument

13    The National Consumer Law Center, National Association of Consumer
Advocates, Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network, Legal Aid of
Southeastern Pennsylvania, Community Justice Project, Neighborhood Legal Services
Association, and Philadelphia Legal Assistance have together filed an amicus brief in
support of the Dwyers.
14     Dwyer, 

, *3 n.12 (citing Richards v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 

 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact
are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on
(continued…)

                                       [J-59-2023] - 8
that the Superior Court failed to engage the argument that the court should apply a de

novo standard of review. Ameriprise argues that, by upholding the trial court’s exercise

of discretion, the Superior Court applied the appropriate standard of review. 15

                                          III. Analysis

       The questions presented for review require us to construe the CPL. Statutory

interpretation is a question of law for which “our standard of review is de novo, and our

scope of review is plenary.”16 When we construe statutes, we aim to ascertain and

effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.17 “The statute’s plain language generally

provides the best indication of legislative intent.”18 “When the words of the statute are not

explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering,” inter

alia, “the occasion and necessity for the statute,” “the mischief to be remedied,” “the object

to be attained,” and “the consequences of a particular interpretation.”19 With certain

exceptions that are not presently applicable, we liberally construe statutes “to effect their

objects and to promote justice.”20




an error of law. However, where the issue . . . concerns a question of law, our scope of
review is plenary.”)).
15     The Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform, the Pennsylvania Chamber of
Business and Industry, the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association, and the National
Association of Manufacturers have together filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
Ameriprise. In addition, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America filed
its own amicus brief in support of Ameriprise.
16     Schwartz, 

.
17     1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
18     A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 

 (Pa. 2016).
19     1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (3), (4), (6).
20     Id. § 1928(c).


                                       [J-59-2023] - 9
       Section 9.2(a) of the CPL authorizes private actions, and the award of treble

damages, as follows:

       (a) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
       personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any
       ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the
       use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared
       unlawful by section 31 of this act, may bring a private action to recover
       actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater. The
       court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages
       sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide
       such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. The court may award
       to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and
       reasonable attorney fees.21
Under this provision, any person who suffers an ascertainable loss due to unlawful

conduct may bring a private action. The trial court may award up to three times the actual

damages and additional relief as necessary or proper, as well as costs and reasonable

attorneys’ fees.

       The legislature has described the mischief that it sought to remedy with the

enactment of the CPL “in clear and expansive language.”22 In Section 3, the General

Assembly provided that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce [as statutorily defined] are hereby

declared unlawful.”23     The legislature sought “to benefit the public at large by

eradicating”24 such acts or practices by sellers. “To this end, the CPL recognized ‘the

unequal bargaining power of opposing forces in the marketplace’ and ‘attempt[ed] to


21     73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).
22     Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 

 (Pa. 1974).
23     73 P.S. § 201-3(a).
24     Gregg, 245 A.3d at 646 (quoting Monumental Props., Inc., 

 (“The
Legislature sought by the [CPL] to benefit the public at large by eradicating, among other
things, ‘unfair or deceptive’ business practices.”)).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 10
place on more equal terms seller and consumer.’”25 As the CPL is a remedial statute, we

construe it “liberally to effect its object of preventing unfair or deceptive practices.”26

       Although the CPL does not provide any standards to guide the trial court in

exercising its discretion to award (up to) treble damages,27 the court’s discretion must be

exercised within the constraints of the legislative goals evinced by the statute. Contrary

to the trial court’s belief, it does not enjoy “absolute discretion” to award, or not to award,

up to treble damages under Section 9.2(a).28 Such unfettered discretion would insulate

awards under Section 9.2(a) from appellate review.29 As we have explained,

       [S]ome words are more common than they are clear, or are by virtue of their
       malleability fated to highly context-specific adjudication. ‘Discretion’ is one
       such word. So we must interpret the language in question ‘not in isolation,
       but with reference to the context in which it appears.’30
In the absence of legislative standards to guide the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we

look to the legislative intent apparent in the CPL and the role that treble damages play to




25     

 (quoting Monumental Props., Inc., 

).
26    

 (quoting Monumental Props., Inc., 

); see also Verona v.
Schenley Farms Co., 

 (Pa. 1933) (“As a statute for the prevention of fraud,
[the CPL] must be liberally construed to effect the purpose.”).
27     See Schwartz, 

 (“As all parties recognize, the statute, on its plain
terms, does not provide any standard pursuant to which a trial court may award treble
damages.”).
28     Tr. Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op., 8/25/2021, at 4.
29      See Clean Air Council v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 

, 948 (Pa. 2023) (“Under
the Commonwealth Court’s approach [affirming the Environmental Hearing Board’s
invocation of broad statutory discretion], it seems that very little that the Board might do
in this regard could ever justify appellate intervention.”).
30    Id. at 947 (Pa. 2023) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kingston, 

 (Pa. 2016)).


                                       [J-59-2023] - 11
effectuate this intent. It is only within the framework of the CPL that the trial court may

exercise discretion.31

       Section 9.2 of the CPL serves three purposes. First, Section 9.2 authorizes the

award of treble damages in a private cause of action in order to incentivize the private

enforcement of the law, shifting to private citizens the ability to ferret out fraudulent, unfair,

and deceptive trade practices that the legislature has deemed illegal. There is a long line

of precedent recognizing that the legislative award of (up to) treble damages is intended

to encourage the private enforcement of the law.32 Private plaintiffs who bring claims

under the CPL further the legislative goal of eradicating unfair or deceptive trade

practices. These plaintiffs act in their own self-interest and, simultaneously, in the public

interest, supplementing the government’s own enforcement of the law.33 As the Supreme

Court of the United States has explained of private actions in the context of distinct federal

statutes, private actions “bring to bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a

serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed

inadequate.”34




31     See Commonwealth v. Gill, 

 (Pa. 2019) (explaining that the term
“discretion” “imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a
dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law”).
32    See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 

(1969) (“Moreover, the purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive
remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high
purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”).
33    See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146 (2004) (recognizing that “the literature more
commonly employs the label [of private attorney general] to describe private attorneys
whose work for private clients contributes to the public interest by supplementing the
government’s enforcement of laws and public policies”).
34     Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 

 (1987).


                                        [J-59-2023] - 12
       Second, Section 9.2 seeks to compensate private plaintiffs for their “ascertainable

loss” by allowing them to recover up to three-times their actual damages.35            This

compensatory aspect of the CPL recognizes that actual damages may not suffice to

compensate the plaintiff for the losses caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.

Plaintiffs who accept the invitation of the CPL to embark upon a private action expend

their own time and energy to do so. Even with competent attorneys, litigation is not

effortless, and may arise only after the consumer has dealt with the hassle of ascertaining

the wrongdoing of another. Litigation may demand varying degrees of time, energy,

stress, travel, lost work, childcare expenses, and opportunity costs.36 Actual damages

alone may be insufficient to account for or to compensate the plaintiff for these

expenditures. In this way, the availability of treble damages encourages plaintiffs to

pursue their claims by “counter-balancing the difficulty of maintaining a private suit.”37

Treble damages are not available solely to compensate plaintiffs for actual damages, but

to compensate plaintiffs for enforcing the CPL.

       Third, the availability of enhanced damages under the CPL serves to deter

wrongful conduct. As we explained in Schwartz, “many individual claims asserted under

the [CPL] will be small.”38 Thus, “it seems reasonably likely that the Legislature wished


35     73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).
36      See Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 

 (N.M. 1990) (“Certainly, high
among the factors motivating legislatures to enact [consumer protection] laws such as we
are considering today is the frustration experienced by consumers having to run around
to straighten out unfair or deceptive trade practices.”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Updegrave, 

 (Wash. App. 1983) (explaining that consumer protection
damages “include the consumer’s inconvenience, financial considerations such as loss
of time in helping prepare the case, [and] actual time spent in court”).
37     Am. Soc. of Mech. Engineers, Inc., v. Hydrolevel Corp., 

 (1982)
(internal citation omitted).
38     Schwartz, 

                                     [J-59-2023] - 13
to enhance the impact of monetary awards under the statute to deter wrongful trade

practices affecting the public at large.”39 To this end, it is not solely the defendant whose

wrongful conduct is being deterred. The availability of enhanced damages under the CPL

also serves to deter the same kind of wrongful conduct by other sellers of goods and

services in the marketplace, thereby protecting the public at large.

       The mechanism to reach these three objectives—to incentivize private actions for

unfair and deceptive trade practices, to compensate plaintiffs, and to deter wrongful

conduct—is “the carrot of treble damages.”40 Without treble damages, many private

plaintiffs would have claims too small to justify the burdens of bringing a private cause of

action. The treble damages authorized by Section 9.2(a) operate to “correct imbalances

in the marketplace”41 and to encourage the private enforcement of consumer protection

laws. In this way, the CPL “attempts to place on more equal terms seller and consumer,”

predicated upon the legislature’s recognition of “the unequal bargaining power of

opposing forces in the marketplace.”42 Treble damages under Section 9.2 are central to

this remedial purpose and operate in tandem with the private action to effectuate the

legislative goals of the CPL. The availability of treble damages, as well as attorneys’ fees,

under Section 9.2, incentivizes the private enforcement of the CPL, which serves the

overarching legislative goal of eradicating unfair and deceptive trade practices.




39     

40    See Agency Holding Corp., 

 (recognizing that “the mechanism
chosen to reach the objective in” in two remedial statutes “is the carrot of treble
damages”).
41     Monumental Props., Inc., 

.
42     

.


                                      [J-59-2023] - 14
       Punitive damages, on the other hand, are penal in nature and are intended to

punish a tortfeasor and to deter the tortfeasor and others from similar conduct.43 Such

damages are appropriate “where the defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to

demonstrate willful, wanton or reckless conduct.”44 As a remedial statute, the CPL

authorizes damages in order to deter other marketplace actors from engaging in unfair or

deceptive trade practices. Although there may be some overlap in the function of punitive

damages and statutory damages under the CPL, we have recognized the CPL as

remedial in nature and have rejected the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of the CPL

as a penal statute warranting strict construction.45

       In Schwartz v. Rockey,46 this Court was faced with the argument that, like an award

of punitive damages, the award of treble damages under the CPL required a finding of

outrageous or egregious conduct. We stated that, although the trebling of damages

“obviously has a strong punitive dynamic,”47 the legislature intended to incentivize private

actions through treble damages. Consequently, we held that a trial court’s discretion to

treble the damages available under the CPL is not “closely constrained by the common-

law requirements associated with the award of punitive damages.”48 The trial court’s




43     Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 

 (Pa. 2005) (“The purpose
of punitive damages is to punish a tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or
others like him from similar conduct.”).
44     

45     Monumental Properties, Inc., 

 (Pa. 1974) (rejecting the
Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the CPL “was penal in nature and therefore
required a strict construction”).
46     

.
47     Schwartz, 

.
48     

.


                                     [J-59-2023] - 15
discretion with respect to treble damages “is not limitless,”49 but should focus upon “the

presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful conduct, as to which an award of treble

damages would be consistent with, and in furtherance of, the remedial purposes of the

[CPL].”50 This directive to the trial court—to focus upon the presence of intentional or

wrongful conduct—serves the deterrent purpose of the CPL.

      Section 9.2(a) of the CPL authorizes private actions and defines the damages that

are available in such a private action without any reference to or consideration of any

other causes of action or remedies. In this respect, Section 9.2(a) creates a defined

cause of action with defined remedies. Extra-statutory considerations are not permitted.

By making treble damages available under the CPL, the legislature has provided that the

availability of (up to) treble damages serves the remedial purposes of the CPL. The trial

court’s discretion to award (or not to award) treble damages is not bound by the common-

law entitlement to punitive damages. With the CPL, the legislature created a statutory

cause of action to supplement the common law. Although punitive damages are available

to punish outrageous conduct occasioned by common-law infractions, the legislature has

created an additional layer of damages available for conduct that also violates the CPL.

      The purposes of a remedial statute such as the CPL are not served by restricting

the availability of damages to those that may already exist under the common law.

Withholding treble damages under the CPL because of an award of punitive damages for

common-law claims does not serve the object to be attained with the enactment of the

CPL. Indeed, the award of punitive damages under the common law has no bearing


49    

50      

 The Court reached this decision over a partial dissent opining that punitive
damages and treble damages under the CPL served the same purpose and that the CPL
merely codified the principles governing punitive damages under the common law. See

 (Cappy, C.J., concurring and dissenting).


                                    [J-59-2023] - 16
whatsoever on the court’s exercise of discretion to award treble damages under the CPL.

A court’s discretion under the CPL is limited to providing the relief prescribed in the

statute. It does not extend to nullifying the availability of such relief based upon distinct

common-law damages.

       Our holding that punitive damages are no substitute for remedial, statutory

damages is consistent with our decision in Hoy v. Angelone.51            In Hoy, the Court

addressed the issue of whether punitive damages were available under a remedial statute

that was silent on the question.     In concluding that the legislature’s silence on the

availability of punitive damages indicated an intent not to permit them, we explained that

“[p]unitive damages are not consistent with this goal of achieving the remedial purposes

of the statute and are not a make-whole remedy.”52 Punitive damages, being penal in

nature, are distinct from damages available under a remedial statute. Just as punitive

damages do not serve the remedial purpose of statutory damages, the award of statutory

damages does not depend upon an award of punitive damages.

       In reaching this result, we are mindful of the consequences of a contrary

interpretation.53 To hold that the award of punitive damages is relevant to the trial court’s

exercise of discretion to award treble damages would defeat the CPL’s remedial objects,

rendering the availability of treble damages superfluous. Were the General Assembly

satisfied by the damages available under the common law, it would not have authorized

separate actions and damages under the CPL.

       Were we to hold to the contrary that the trial court may consider the jury’s award

of punitive damages in exercising its discretion to award, or not to award, up to treble


51     

 (Pa. 1998).
52     

.
53     See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 17
damages under Section 9.2(a), we would place plaintiffs in a precarious position relative

to an appeal of a punitive damages award. If the trial court dispenses with consideration

of up to treble damages under Section 9.2(a) due to the jury’s award of punitive damages,

and the appellate court reverses the award of punitive damages, plaintiffs would be

without adequate compensation under the CPL, thereby undermining the legislative goals

of eradicating unfair or deceptive trade practices. Consequently, CPL damages must

stand alone in order to further the intent of the CPL.

       The conduct of a seller of goods or services may give rise to common-law causes

of actions as well as CPL violations. In such circumstances, the CPL makes available a

separate remedy that cannot be preempted, substituted, or replaced by common-law

remedies.    Rather, damages available under the CPL are in addition to whatever

remedies are available under the common law.54 “As a general rule, a plaintiff may have

as many remedies as the law provides.”55 In enacting the CPL, the General Assembly

gave no indication that it intended to abrogate this rule or to limit the availability of

statutory damages based upon the availability of common-law damages (or vice versa).

       Although we have characterized treble damages under the CPL as having “a

deterrent, punitive element”56 and a “punitive dynamic,”57 any such element or dynamic

54     See Schwartz, 

 (“Thus, it seems reasonably likely that the
Legislature wished to enhance the impact of monetary awards under the [CPL] to deter
wrongful trade practices affecting the public at large.”); Agliori v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 

 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“Case law does, however, make clear that the [CPL]
was meant to supplement—not to replace—common-law remedies.”); Gabriel v. O’Hara,

, 496 n.22 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“The remedies of the [CPL] are not exclusive
but in addition to these other remedies.”).
55     Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 

 (Pa. 1961).
56    Meyer v. Cmty. College of Beaver Cnty., 

 (Pa. 2014) (“[Treble
damages under the CPL], although designed, in part, for other more remedial purposes,
do contain a deterrent, punitive element.”).
57     Schwartz, 

.


                                      [J-59-2023] - 18
is incidental.   By design, the CPL incentivizes private causes of action to root out

fraudulent and deceptive practices in the marketplace, compensates injured parties, and

deters wrongful practices. The nature of the remedies available under the CPL remains

remedial “even if the imposition of statutory damages. . . may have the effect of

encouraging compliance with the provisions” of the statute.58 Although deceptive and

fraudulent market participants may feel that they are being punished, the CPL was not

enacted to penalize wrongdoers.59 As a consumer protection statute, the CPL stands

apart from age-old common-law remedies.

         The same analysis pertains to the lower courts’ beliefs that the fee-shifting

provision of the CPL would result in sufficient compensation to the Dwyers and obviated

the availability of treble damages. Attorneys’ fees are “in addition to” other relief, not a

substitute for that relief. 60 As we have explained, “Section 9.2(a)’s plain language makes

it readily apparent that the General Assembly deemed ascertainable losses and

attorneys’ fees to be distinct items for redress.”61 The availability of the statutory remedy

under the CPL does not depend in any respect upon either the award of punitive damages

on common-law claims or upon the award of statutory attorneys’ fees.

         Here, the trial court acted to the contrary, believing not only that the award of

punitive damages and attorneys’ fees was relevant to the exercise of discretion under the

CPL, but also that punitive damages and attorneys’ fees rendered treble damages



58       Cubler v. TruMark Fin. Credit Union, 

 (Pa. Super. 2013).
59     Monumental Props., Inc., 

 (“Although the Consumer Protection
Law did articulate the evils desired to be remedied, the statute’s underlying foundation is
fraud prevention.”).
60       73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).
61       Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Philadelphia, LLC, 

 (Pa.
2014).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 19
unnecessary. The punitive damages award was not in furtherance of the legislative goals

of the CPL and should have had no bearing upon an appropriate remedy under the CPL.

Where an innocent consumer is harmed by fraudulent or deceptive consumer

transactions, the consumer should not receive less under the CPL because the

defendant’s conduct also created liability under the common law. Otherwise, marketplace

sellers would receive a volume discount on their wrongful conduct.            The remedial

purposes of the CPL require the consideration of additional damages, above what is

warranted by the common law.

       Where the trial court exercises discretion under Section 9.2 to award “up to three

times the actual damages sustained” or “additional relief as [the court] deems necessary

or proper,”62 the trial court must do so in service of the legislative goals animating the

CPL. In affirming the trial court, the Superior Court found that the Dwyers already had

been “adequately compensated” without treble damages. There is no statutory language

in the CPL that supports an award of damages based upon the amorphous concept of

adequate compensation.

       Contrary to the lower courts’ holdings, the trial court’s decision not to award treble

damages due to the award of punitive damages and attorneys’ fees was not an exercise

of discretion. It was a refusal to exercise discretion.63 This refusal resulted from a purely



62     

63     As the Court of Appeals of Maryland has explained:
       There is a difference, however, between how a trial court makes its decision
       and what decision it makes. The standard that a trial court applies in
       evaluating whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs is a legal decision;
       the conclusion that the court arrives at after applying that standard to the
       facts of the particular case is an exercise of discretion.
Ocean City, Md., Chamber of Com., Inc. v. Barufaldi, 

 (Md. 2013).


                                      [J-59-2023] - 20
legal misapplication of the law.64 We hold, as a matter of law, that the availability of up to

treble damages under Section 9.2(a) is not dependent upon other damages to which the

plaintiff is also entitled. The trial court’s exercise of discretion under Section 9.2(a) of the

CPL was clouded by its consideration of other damages. Contrary to the trial court’s

belief, the court may not rely upon the jury’s award of punitive damages on the common-

law claims to resolve the Dwyers’ entitlement to treble damages under the CPL. The trial

court may not conflate the two species of damages. Rather, it was incumbent upon the

trial court to evaluate the Dwyers’ request for treble damages in light of the legislative

goals apparent in the CPL.65

       Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Superior Court with directions to remand

to the trial court for reconsideration of damages under Section 9.2(a) of the CPL. In

exercising the discretion afforded by the statute, the trial court is directed to consider the

remedial purposes of the CPL—to incentivize private actions to root out unfair and

deceptive trade practices, to compensate the plaintiff, and to deter wrongful conduct. The


64      See Mitchell v. Shikora, 

 (Pa. 2019) (“To the degree the issue
of whether the law has been misapplied involves a purely legal question, it is reviewed de
novo.”); Schwartz, 

 (considering the question of whether a finding of fraud
is sufficient to support treble damages under the CPL to be a question of law over which
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary).
65      The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion agrees that augmented damages under
the CPL are not interchangeable with common law punitive damages, but opines that “an
award of punitive damages may be relevant in informing” a trial court’s decision under
Section 9.2(a) of the CPL. Conc. and Dis. Op. at 2. Respectfully, this view undermines
the objectives the CPL seeks to advance: to incentivize private actions, to compensate
plaintiffs, and to deter wrongful conduct. The General Assembly enacted the CPL to
supplement remedies available at common law. Section 9.2(a) creates its own defined
cause of action and its own defined remedies in addition to what otherwise may be
available to a plaintiff, and wholly independent of any award of punitive damages on
related common-law claims. Although, as the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
observes, id. at 5, there may be some overlap in the function of punitive damages and
statutory damages under the CPL, the remedies available under the CPL remain
remedial.


                                       [J-59-2023] - 21
trial court is directed to determine whether the award of actual damages alone is sufficient

to accomplish the legislative purposes of the CPL. The trial court may not consider the

Dwyers’ separate award of punitive damages or the award of attorneys’ fees, neither of

which may serve to limit the availability of up to treble damages or additional relief under

the CPL.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.

       Justice Brobson files a concurring and dissenting opinion.




                                     [J-59-2023] - 22