[J-72-2023]
                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                               MIDDLE DISTRICT

     TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.


 JOSEPH S. CALDWELL, JR.,                       :    No. 30 MAP 2023
                                                :
                     Appellee                   :    Appeal from the Order of the
                                                :    Superior Court at No. 140 EDA 2022
                                                :    dated October 5, 2022, Reversing
              v.                                :    the Order at No. 2021DR00484
                                                :    dated December 3, 2021 of the
                                                :    Bucks County Court of Common
 PHILIP P. JAURIGUE,                            :    Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
                                                :    and Remanding.
                     Appellant                  :
                                                :    ARGUED: November 30, 2023

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY                                              DECIDED: May 31, 2024
      The present appeal involves a dispute over child support between the child’s

biological father and the paramour of the child’s deceased mother. We consider whether

the Superior Court correctly viewed our decision in A.S. v. I.S., 

 (Pa. 2015),

as requiring the paramour — who now has partial physical custody — to pay child support

to father. For the following reasons, we hold the Superior Court erred in so holding, and

reverse.

                                      I.      Background

      Appellee Joseph Scott Caldwell (Father) and Jacqui Spencer (Mother) are the

biological parents of L.C. (Child). Mother and Father never married, and Mother began a

romantic relationship with appellant, Philip Jaurigue, while she was pregnant with Child.

Child was born in March 2012, and in August 2013, Mother and Child began living with
Jaurigue. During this time, Mother had primary physical custody of Child, and Father had

partial physical custody. This continued for more than six years, until Mother passed

away in December 2019. Child then moved out of Jaurigue’s home and went to live with

Father. Jaurigue visited Child only when Father permitted, and those occasions ultimately

became rare.

       In June 2020, Jaurigue filed a complaint in custody claiming he stood in loco

parentis to Child and seeking partial physical custody. See Complaint for Custody,

6/8/2020 at ¶14. Father filed preliminary objections and a motion to dismiss the custody

complaint, arguing Jaurigue lacked standing. The court heard testimony, reviewed the

parties’ briefs, and overruled Father’s preliminary objections to hold Jaurigue stood in loco

parentis to Child and thus had standing to pursue custody. On March 22, 2022, after two

more hearings, the trial court issued an order giving Father sole legal and primary physical

custody, and Jaurigue partial physical custody. Jaurigue does not have any legal custody

rights to Child.

       However, Jaurigue’s partial physical custody is relatively extensive: one weekend

every even-numbered month; the second Saturday of odd-numbered months; the fourth

Saturday every month; every Thursday after school; Saturdays on the weekends before

Child’s birthday, Easter, Father’s Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas; one day during

Child’s winter break; New Year’s Day; and one week of summer vacation, which may

include domestic air travel. See Custody Order, 3/22/2021 at 1-2 (unpaginated). The

custody order also allows Jaurigue daily, private, fifteen-minute phone/FaceTime calls

with Child on non-custodial days (which Father was to encourage) and text message

exchanges once per day. See id. at 3 (unpaginated).

       The custody order also requires that: Father contact Child’s school to authorize

Jaurigue as a person permitted to pick her up on his custodial days; Jaurigue shall be




                                      [J-72-2023] - 2
notified and permitted to participate in and attend school events/activities and

extracurriculars including fundraisers, school plays, concerts, shows, exhibits, volunteer

events, gymnastics, dance, soccer, camp events, and religious activities and

observances; Jaurigue provide all transportation for his custodial visits; Jaurigue be

notified and allowed to participate in all of Child’s current and future counseling, therapy,

and tutoring (and that Father sign any required releases to permit such participation); and

Father ensure Jaurigue has all of Child’s medications for her custodial visits. See id. at

3-4 (unpaginated).

       The custody order further mandates that Father and Jaurigue “shall make a

concentrated effort to foster feelings of security, respect, and love in [Child] regarding the

other party[.]” Id. at 4 (unpaginated). It prohibits the men from making any remarks or

doing anything that could be “construed as derogatory or uncomplimentary to the other

party[,]” and from discussing any litigation or court matters in Child’s presence. Id.

Finally, the custody order requires compliance with the notice obligations in 23 Pa.C.S.

§5337 in the event of a qualifying change of residence. See id.

       Father appealed, challenging the trial court’s determination Jaurigue stood in loco

parentis to Child. See Jaurigue v. Caldwell, No. 796 EDA 2021, 

, at *2

(Pa. Super., Nov. 15, 2021) (unpublished memorandum). The Superior Court affirmed

the standing determination and Jaurigue’s in loco parentis status, reasoning Father

waived his claims because his brief failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure. See id. at *2-3.

       While that appeal was pending, Father filed a complaint seeking child support

payments from Jaurigue. See Complaint in Child Support, 5/27/21 at 2 (unpaginated).

Jaurigue filed preliminary objections, arguing, inter alia, Father failed to state a claim on

which relief could be granted; Jaurigue relied on language from A.S. stating “in loco




                                       [J-72-2023] - 3
parentis status alone and/or reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation relationship”

with a child do not create a support obligation. Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to

Plaintiff’s Complaint in Child Support, 7/23/21 at 4, quoting A.S., 

. After

briefing, the court sustained Jaurigue’s preliminary objections and dismissed Father’s

support action.

       Father timely appealed, arguing “the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting [Jaurigue’s]

Preliminary Objections and thereby dismissing [Father’s] Complaint when [Jaurigue] has

an obligation/duty to support the child pursuant to the law.” Father’s Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 1/25/22 at 2. 1 The

trial court explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that, under A.S., Jaurigue had no

obligation to support Child. See Caldwell v. Jaurigue, No. 2021DR00484, slip op. at 3

(C.P. Philadelphia, Jan. 25, 2022).      The court elaborated that, per A.S., “the mere

existence of in loco parentis status is insufficient to establish a support obligation[,]” and

that “reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation relationship with a child [are]

insufficient to obligate someone [with] in loco parentis status to pay child support for that

child.” 

 citing A.S., 

.

       The trial court further relied on Commonwealth ex rel. McNutt v. McNutt, 

 (Pa. Super. 1985), where the Superior Court held an ex-stepparent’s “continued love

and devotion to his former stepchild” do not “carry with it the duty to financially support[.]”

Id. at 4, quoting McNutt, 

. The McNutt court noted, “[i]f we were to hold

that a stepparent acting in loco parentis would be held liable for support even after the


1  Father also argued the trial court erred and abused its discretion by sustaining
Jaurigue’s preliminary objections without holding a hearing in violation of his due process
rights. See Father’s Superior Court Brief at 14-15. He claimed the question of whether
a party owes support requires a fact intensive analysis regarding the nature and extent of
the party’s involvement in the child’s life to determine whether a support obligation should
attach. See 

                                       [J-72-2023] - 4
dissolution of the marriage then all persons who gratuitously assume parental duties for

a time could be held legally responsible for a child’s support. . . . These acts of generosity

should not be discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone who begins

such a relationship to continue financial support until the child is eighteen years old.” 

quoting McNutt, 

. Here, the trial court likewise held “Jaurigue’s ‘past and

continued love and devotion’ to the minor child does not carry with it a duty to financially

support.” 

 quoting McNutt, 

. The court emphasized that Jaurigue

“never sought, and does not maintain, legal custody of the minor child[,]” and found it

“clear” Jaurigue “filed a Complaint in Custody to seek visitation rights in order to maintain

a relationship with the minor child after the death of Mother.” 

       A unanimous three-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed. See Caldwell v.

Jaurigue, No. 140 EDA 2022, 

, at *1 (Pa. Super., Oct. 5, 2022)

(unpublished memorandum). The court first acknowledged “in loco parentis status alone

does not make a stepparent liable to financially support his stepchildren[,]” and that “a

former stepparent’s ‘reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation relationship with

stepchildren are insufficient to obligate a stepparent to pay child support for those

children.’” Id. at *3, quoting A.S., 

. “Critically, however,” the court

continued, “A.S. went on to recognize that there are some situations, such as the one in

A.S., where a former stepparent affirmatively takes sufficient legal steps to act as a parent

so as to trigger an obligation to pay support.” Id. at *4.

       The panel recited the facts of A.S., where the former stepfather of twins filed a

custody complaint after his separation from the twins’ mother. See id. The trial court

ruled the former stepfather stood in loco parentis to the twins and awarded him shared

physical and legal custody.     See id.    The twins’ mother then filed an unsuccessful

complaint for child support, and this Court ultimately reversed the decision, imposing a




                                       [J-72-2023] - 5
support obligation on the ex-stepfather. See id. The panel below explained that despite

the general rule that a former stepparent is not required to support his former stepchildren

financially just because he makes efforts to maintain a relationship with them, the A.S.

Court held the former stepfather owed a duty of support under the circumstances of that

case. See id. The panel recited our reasoning in A.S., where the ex-stepfather’s efforts

actually prevented the twins’ mother from relocating with them:
       [T]he instant case involves a far greater assumption, indeed a relentless
       pursuit, of parental duties than that of a stepparent desiring a continuing
       relationship with a former spouse’s children . . . Here, we have a stepfather
       who haled a fit parent into court, repeatedly litigating to achieve the same
       legal and physical custodial rights as would naturally accrue to any
       biological parent. This is not the ‘typical case’ of a stepparent who has
       grown to love his stepchildren and wants to maintain a post-separation
       relationship with them.
Id., quoting A.S., 

. The panel below then repeated our general statement

in A.S. that “when a stepparent takes affirmative legal steps to assume the same parental

rights as a biological parent, the stepparent likewise assumes parental obligations, such

as the payment of child support.” 

 quoting A.S., 

.

       In the present matter, the Superior Court panel acknowledged, “the facts and

circumstances here are less clear cut than those in A.S.” 

 It reasoned, however, that

Jaurigue sought and obtained extensive custodial rights “after taking the initiative to file a

custody complaint against Father.” 

 The panel noted “it is clear that the custody

schedule allows Jaurigue to have regular, consistent, and significant amounts of custody

time with Child[,]” and further recognized under the other terms of the custody order,

Jaurigue is permitted to spend significant time with Child outside his physical custody

days. Id. at *4-5. The panel then “agree[d] with Father that Jaurigue’s actions represent

a proactive pursuit to assume parental duties of Child that would otherwise belong to

Father[,]” “significantly intrud[ing] upon Father’s full custody rights to Child.” Id. at *5. It

therefore held “[t]he amount of custodial time, along with the level of involvement in Child’s


                                       [J-72-2023] - 6
activities and life, goes well beyond the ‘typical case’ of a stepparent who wishes to

maintain a relationship with a stepchild he has grown to love, which, under our case law,

is insufficient to attach an obligation to support the stepchild.” Id. “Instead,” it held, this

case is akin to A.S., “where a stepparent has taken ‘affirmative legal steps to assume the

same parental rights as a biological parent.’” Id., quoting A.S., 

.

       The Superior Court panel below distinguished S.R.G. v. D.D.G., where a different

three-judge panel declined to impose a support obligation on grandfather, who

gratuitously accepted the burdens of partial physical and shared legal custody of his

grandchild with the child’s grandmother, whom he had divorced after agreeing to the

custody order. See 

 citing S.R.G. v. D.D.G., 

 (Pa. Super. 2019). The

panel below reasoned Jaurigue is not like the grandparent in S.R.G., who gratuitously

accepted the burdens of custody — he is a person akin to a stepparent who proactively

filed a custody complaint against a fit biological parent. See id. at *5-6. Finally, the panel

reasoned, its holding that Jaurigue was liable for child support did not undermine the

policy considerations discussed in McNutt. Rather, it advanced those set forth in A.S: “[I]t

is in the best interests of children to have stability and continuity in their parent-child

relationships. By holding a person such as [the stepfather in A.S.] liable for child support,

we increase the likelihood that only individuals who are truly dedicated and intend to be

a stable fixture in a child’s life will take the steps to litigate and obtain rights equal to those

of the child’s parent.” Id. at *6, quoting A.S., 

.

       Jaurigue filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and we granted review on the

following question: “Does the Court’s holding in A.S. v. I.S., 

 (Pa. 2015),

extend beyond the facts of that case and create child support obligations in third parties

who seek and obtain custody rights less than those held by a biological parent?” Caldwell

v. Jaurigue, 

 (Pa. Mar. 21, 2023) (Table) (per curiam).




                                         [J-72-2023] - 7
                                    II.      Parties’ Arguments

       Jaurigue argues the Superior Court erred because A.S. does not extend beyond

its own facts. He begins with the text of the child support statute, which provides only

that “[p]arents are liable for the support of their children[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. §4321(2). Jaurigue

argues he is not Child’s “parent,” so he cannot be held liable for support. He explains the

Domestic Relations Code and the Statutory Construction Act do not include a definition

of the word “parent,” so the Court must employ the canons of statutory construction to

ascertain its meaning.

       Specifically, Jaurigue asserts the Court should read the support statute in pari

materia with other closely related statutes, namely, the child custody statutes in Chapter

53 of the Domestic Relations Code. He recites that only certain individuals have standing

to file an action for physical or legal custody: “(1) A parent of the child[;] (2) A person who

stands in loco parentis to the child[;] (3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco

parentis to the child . . . [, and] (4) . . . [A]n individual who establishes by clear and

convincing evidence [certain factors.]” 23 Pa.C.S. §5324. He compares this language to

that of the support statute, and argues the General Assembly specifically distinguished

between “parent,” “person who stands in loco parentis,” “grandparent,” and other

individuals for purposes of custody, making it notable that the support statute imposes

obligations on “[p]arents” only, and not individuals in those other categories. Id.; 23

Pa.C.S. §4321(2).

       According to Jaurigue, Pennsylvania law allows parentage to be established in four

ways only: (1) biological paternity, (2) adoption, (3) the presumption of paternity, and (4)

paternity by estoppel. See Jaurigue’s Brief at 23, citing 23 Pa.C.S. §4343; K.E.M. v.

P.C.S., 

 (Pa. 2012); and In re Davies’ Adoption, 

(Pa. 1946). Thus, he argues, the General Assembly intended to limit support obligations




                                          [J-72-2023] - 8
to those who are “parents” as defined in these four ways, and as opposed to nonparents,

grandparents, or those acting in loco parentis.          Jaurigue claims A.S. supports this

interpretation, as it held an individual becomes a “parent” subject to support obligations

when they obtain “all — not some — of the rights of parenthood equal to those of the

child’s biological or adoptive parent.” 

 He argues the Superior Court’s extension of

A.S. below created a broad new doctrine of parentage where nonparents seeking to

maintain any level of contact with a child may be required to pay support. He asserts this

will lead to one of two results: either nonparents will be considered “parents” in the support

statute and other related statutes (creating uncertainty in applying the custody statute,

which distinguishes between the different types of parentage), or courts will have to draw

arbitrary lines to distinguish when nonparents can be considered “parents.”

       Jaurigue argues Pennsylvania precedent makes clear nonparents cannot be held

liable for child support absent extraordinary circumstances like those in A.S. He explains

the A.S. Court adopted a line of Superior Court case law dating back to McNutt in 1985,

which established that nonparents (such as stepparents) who voluntarily undertake to

love and care for children should not be penalized by financial obligations. See 

 at 26-

28, citing McNutt, 

; and Drawbaugh v. Drawbaugh, 

 (Pa.

Super. 1994) (explaining Pennsylvania’s policy of guarding a stepparent’s right to

visitation and rejecting the argument a stepfather owed a duty of support because he

secured visitation rights). 2 Jaurigue asserts A.S. expressly preserved this general rule of

non-support and carved only a narrow exception warranted to the specific facts of that

case. He argues the Superior Court erred by applying A.S.’s fact-specific reasoning, as

2 Jaurigue was never married to Mother, so he was never Child’s stepparent. But
Jaurigue concedes in his Superior Court brief that his relationship with Child was “akin to
that of a stepparent.” Jaurigue’s Superior Court Brief at 9. He also relies on cases like
McNutt that involved stepparents. Thus, while Jaurigue is not technically a stepparent,
we nonetheless consider those decisions where sufficiently analogous and applicable.


                                       [J-72-2023] - 9
this case is analogous to Drawbaugh and the general rule should have applied to

“jealously guard” Jaurigue’s right to visitation even without a support obligation. Id. at 30.

       Finally, Jaurigue argues the Superior Court’s overly broad application of A.S. —

that penalizes a nonparent for attempting to maintain a voluntary and limited relationship

out of love and devotion — undermines Pennsylvania’s public policy. See id. at 31. He

notes the central question for all issues involving minor children is: what is in the child’s

best interests? He submits that for children with fewer than two biological parents, more

adult engagement almost always benefits the child. According to Jaurigue, Pennsylvania

courts have long recognized the importance of these relationships. See id. at 32-35, citing

McNutt, 

 (“If we were to hold that a stepparent acting in loco parentis

would be held liable for support even after the dissolution of the marriage then all persons

who gratuitously assume parental duties for a time could be held legally responsible for

a child’s support. . . . These acts of generosity should not be discouraged by creating a

law which would require anyone who begins such a relationship to continue financial

support until the child is eighteen years old.”); Spells v. Spells, 

 (Pa.

Super. 1977) (“when a stepparent is ‘in loco parentis’ with his stepchildren, courts must

jealously guard his rights to visitation”); and Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 

 (Pa. Super 1965) (“The putative father may, in many instances, instill in the child a

sense of stability. He may develop qualities in the child which the mother is uninterested,

unwilling or incapable of developing. To the extent that he can perform such a valuable

service, his presence becomes exceedingly important.”).

       Indeed, Jaurigue explains, the A.S. Court expressly based its holding on the same

public policy “that it is in the best interests of children to have stability and continuity in

their parent-child relationships.” Id. at 35, quoting A.S., 

. He claims the

Superior Court’s broad application of A.S. threatens to destabilize children who rely on




                                      [J-72-2023] - 10
nonparents for emotional support. Further, Jaurigue argues, it creates practical issues.

He posits the Superior Court’s holding will cause biological parents who want money from

third-party nonparents to withhold visitation from the nonparent, causing them to seek

court intervention and exposing them to liability to pay child support. He also claims it

creates questions about ongoing support obligations; here, if Father relocates or

Jaurigue’s visitation rights otherwise diminish, the parties will have to relitigate the nature

of Jaurigue’s relationship to Child to determine if he is a “parent” for support purposes.

Thus, Jaurigue argues the Superior Court’s broadening of A.S.’s narrow holding threatens

to upend the stability and continuity children enjoy from nonparents like Jaurigue.

       Father, on the other hand, argues it is in the best interests of children to impose a

support obligation on non-biologically related individuals who stand in loco parentis to a

child and affirmatively pursue significant custodial rights similar to those of a natural

parent. He therefore requests the Court extend the principles supporting A.S. beyond the

facts of that case. Father believes Jaurigue’s reliance on custody statutes to define

“parent” for purposes of the support statute is “misguided.” Father’s Brief at 3. Instead,

he asserts A.S. requires reference to Pennsylvania case law to determine who is a

“parent” for purposes of imposing a support obligation. He insists A.S. answered this

question: “[w]hen a stepparent takes affirmative legal steps to assume the same parental

rights as a biological parent, the stepparent likewise assumes parental obligations, such

as the payment of child support.” 

 quoting A.S., 

. 3

       Father acknowledges this case is factually distinct from A.S., and that Jaurigue is

not a stepparent because he never married Mother. But, he argues, A.S.’s holding still

3 At oral argument, Father’s counsel condensed this proposed rule into a three-prong test,

asking whether: (1) there were sufficient affirmative steps (2) that the individual took to
obtain substantial custodial rights (3) over the objection of a natural parent. See Oral
Argument at 1:48:45, Caldwell v. Jaurigue, No. 521 MAL 2022 (Pa. Nov. 30, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5ug-rMji7k.


                                      [J-72-2023] - 11
applies to this case since “Jaurigue has not only sought out but also obtained parental

rights identical to th[ose] of a biological parent.” Id. at 4. Referring to the custody order,

Father notes Jaurigue was awarded substantial physical visitation — which he calculates

as Jaurigue having physical custody no less than 106 days each year, or approximately

29% of the days of the year — along with rights to communicate with Child and be

involved in her extracurriculars, tutoring, and therapy on non-custodial days. He claims

“Jaurigue is not merely maintaining a relationship with [Child]; he is actively parenting and

raising [her].” Id. at 4. Thus, Father argues Jaurigue took “sufficient affirmative steps

legally to obtain parental rights [and] should share in parental obligations, such as paying

child support.” Id. at 5, quoting A.S., 

. He believes if Jaurigue’s

custodial rights are not comprehensive enough to be akin to those of a biological parent

for purposes of A.S., “few could ever meet such a threshold[.]” 

       Father argues because Jaurigue affirmatively pursued and obtained these

significant custodial rights to Child, he has a duty to support her. He repeats the public

policy statement in A.S. that imposing support ensures only “individuals who are truly

dedicated and intend to be a stable fixture in a child’s life will take the steps to litigate and

obtain rights equal to those of the child’s parent.” 

 quoting A.S., 

. He

highlights Jaurigue’s own admission that, “[f]or the first six years of [Child’s] life, Jaurigue

assumed many parental duties, resulting in a close, parent-like relationship between the

two, with [Child] referring to Jaurigue as ‘Da.’” Id. at 6, quoting Jaurigue’s Brief at 5-6.

Father asserts “Jaurigue has been parenting the child since birth and now retains rights

to, inter alia, attend parent-teacher conferences for the child, review sensitive medical

information of the child, and partake in therapy with the child.” Id.

       Father pushes back against Jaurigue’s characterizations of the custody litigation

and that Jaurigue sought only partial physical custody. Father explains “partial physical




                                       [J-72-2023] - 12
custody” is defined by 23 Pa.C.S. §5322(a) as “any amount of physical custody less than

a majority of the time.” Id. at 7. Father notes as a result of seeking “only” partial physical

custody, Jaurigue was awarded significant visitation. Father further claims although he

received sole legal custody, Jaurigue was effectively awarded a form of “quasi-legal”

custody, as Father must now inform Jaurigue of all developments under the “legal

umbrella,” including school, medical, and religious matters. Id. Father reasons A.S.’s

holding that a non-biological parent who takes “sufficient affirmative steps legally to obtain

parental rights” owes a duty of support was not an “all or nothing” approach to be applied

only in anomalous cases with identical facts. Id. at 8. He argues such an interpretation

would exclude nonbiological parents who obtain 49% of custodial time as compared to

the biological parent, against “whom they purposefully initiated litigation to secure

significant legal rights.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). Father theorizes this could lead

to the manipulation of custody pleadings to avoid support obligations.

       Finally, Father argues public policy, equity, and the best interests of Child require

the Court to apply A.S.’s rationale to this case and mandate an award of child support.

According to Father, Jaurigue did not pursue mere minimal contact to maintain a

relationship with a former stepchild; he took affirmative legal steps to secure significant

parenting rights to Child. Father asserts both the interests of Child and equity mandate

Jaurigue cannot, on the one hand, obtain such comprehensive custodial rights over

Father’s objection, while on the other hand, deny Child’s right to be supported financially.

He rebuts Jaurigue’s argument that applying A.S. to this case would destabilize children

who rely on nonparents for emotional support, by arguing Jaurigue’s position would lead

to more custody litigation, where non-biological parents will aggressively pursue custodial

rights just shy of the “arbitrary and unreasonably high threshold suggested by Jaurigue.”

Id. at 9.   This, he argues, would be contrary to the law and public policy of the




                                      [J-72-2023] - 13
Commonwealth, allowing a “willful abandonment . . . of all obligations to financially

stabilize the child[.]” Id.

       Jaurigue replies that he does not have rights “identical” to a biological parent as

Father claims, since the custody order granted him only partial physical custody and not

any form of legal custody. Jaurigue’s Reply Brief at 3, quoting Father’s Brief at 2, 4. He

argues the distinction between the two is significant, noting “partial physical custody” is

the “right to assume physical custody of the child for less than a majority of the time[,]”

while “legal custody” is the “right to make major decisions on behalf of the child, including,

but not limited to, medical, religious, and educational decisions.” Id. at 3, quoting 23

Pa.C.S. §5322(a). Jaurigue insists a person with only partial physical custody “has no

right whatsoever to make any substantial decisions regarding the child’s life.” Id. at 4.

       Jaurigue further argues Father inaccurately portrays the custody order as giving

Jaurigue something more than partial physical custody. He counters Father’s calculation

of physical custodial time (29%), noting that in terms of hours, Jaurigue is allowed only

10% of the hours in a year. Jaurigue further argues that since Pennsylvania’s support

guidelines quantify custody in terms of custodial overnights, the appropriate measure is

determined by totaling the number of possible overnights — and Jaurigue has only 5% of

the nights each year. He clarifies he does not have a right to attend parent-teacher

conferences or review sensitive medical information as Father claims. See id. at 5. Most

importantly, Jaurigue emphasizes, since he does not have legal custody, he does not

have the authority to make decisions over Child’s life — he cannot decide to baptize her,

make decisions about her schooling, authorize vaccinations or other medical decisions,

get her ears pierced, etcetera. Thus, he argues, unlike the ex-stepfather in A.S., he

simply does not have rights “identical” to a biological parent.




                                      [J-72-2023] - 14
       Next, Jaurigue contends A.S. created a bright-line rule for rare circumstances

where a nonparent has obtained “all the rights of parenthood” — including legal custody.

Id. at 8. He claims Father takes language in A.S. out of context to argue legal custody is

not required to trigger the exception in A.S. and that a nonparent has a duty to pay child

support if he takes general “sufficient affirmative steps legally to obtain parental rights.”

Id. at 9. Instead, Jaurigue argues, this language was cabined to apply only to the facts

of A.S., where the ex-stepfather “litigated and obtained full legal and physical custody

rights . . . [and] has insisted upon and bec[o]me a full parent in every sense of that

concept.” Id., quoting A.S., 

 (“We find that under these facts, Stepfather

has taken sufficient affirmative steps legally to obtain parental rights and should share in

parental obligations, such as paying support.”) (emphasis provided by Jaurigue).

Jaurigue stresses he did “the least amount possible” to “maintain a regular, stable

relationship with the child he had already grown to love.” Id. at 10.

       Lastly, Jaurigue asserts Father’s sliding-scale approach to applying A.S. would be

contrary to the public policy accepted by the Court in that case: that nonparent

involvement in the life of the nonbiological children with whom they are bonded is critical

to the child’s development and should be “jealously guarded.” Id. at 12-13, 16, quoting

Spells, 

. Jaurigue claims Father’s approach undermines the third parties’

right to visitation and would incentivize biological parents to leverage custody to receive

funding from in loco parentis nonparents. See id. at 15. He further argues Father’s

approach would penalize nonparents for seeking visitation in violation of Pennsylvania’s

public policy. Thus, Jaurigue asks us to reverse the Superior Court’s decision.

                                        III.   Discussion

       Whether someone like Jaurigue — a deceased parent’s paramour who, after

establishing in loco parentis standing to seek custody of a child, sought and obtained




                                      [J-72-2023] - 15
extensive physical, but not legal, custody — owes a duty to pay child support under 23

Pa.C.S. Section 4321 as construed by A.S. is an issue of first impression. This issue

presents a legal question: in broad terms, whether someone in Jaurigue’s position is a

“parent” for purposes of Section 4321. As such, our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary. See A.S., 

.

      The child support statute in Section 4321(2) provides: “Subject to the provisions of

this chapter: . . . [p]arents are liable for the support of their children who are

unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger.” 23 Pa.C.S. §4321(2) (emphasis added).

As we acknowledged in A.S., Section 4321 is the statute “from which all child support

obligations are derived.” 

. Notably, however, the support statute does

not define the term “parent.”     We must therefore look to our canons of statutory

interpretation to determine if Jaurigue is a “parent” for purposes of the support statute.

See 1 Pa.C.S. 1901 et seq.

      As always, our analysis must be grounded in the text of the statute to ascertain

and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. See 1 Pa.C.S. §1921. Specifically,

“[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to

their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as

have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this part, shall be

construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” 1 Pa.C.S.

§1903(a). While dictionary definitions are not dispositive to our statutory interpretation,

see, e.g., Whitmoyer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Mountain Country Meats),

, 955 (Pa. 2018), they can provide a good starting point. Merriam-Webster’s

dictionary defines the noun “parent” as “one that begets or brings forth offspring[; or] a

person who brings up and cares for another.”            Parent (1), MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S

DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parent (last visited Feb. 12,




                                     [J-72-2023] - 16
2024). Apparent from this definition is that “parent” can encompass biological and non-

biological relationships, but for those with a non-biological connection, further

responsibilities must be attendant to the relationship — they must both “bring[] up and

care[] for” the child. Id. (emphasis added). 4

       Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary provides a definition of “parent” that is not limited

to those with a biological or adoptive relationship:
       parent (15c) 1. The lawful father or mother of someone. In ordinary usage,
       the term denotes more than responsibility for conception and birth. The
       term commonly includes (1) either the natural father or the natural mother
       of a child, (2) either the adoptive father or the adoptive mother of a child, (3)
       a child’s putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity,
       and (4) an individual or agency whose status as guardian has been
       established by judicial decree. In law, parental status based on any criterion
       may be terminated by judicial decree. In other words, a person ceases to
       be a legal parent if that person’s status as a parent has been terminated in
       a legal proceeding. — Also termed legal parent.
Parent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (providing related definitions for a variety

of different types of “parent,” including “adoptive parent,” “biological parent,” “de facto

parent,” “equitable parent,” and “psychological parent”).

       And although the legislature has not given us a definition of “parent” in the support

statute, Section 1991 of the Statutory Construction Act provides a definition of “children.”

See 1 Pa.C.S. §1991 (“The following words and phrases, when used in any statute finally

enacted on or after September 1, 1937, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise,

4 Helpfully, Merriam-Webster also defines the phrases that make up this definition.       It
defines “bring up” (in relevant part) as “to bring (a person) to maturity through nurturing
care and education[.]”            Bring up (1), MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bring%20up (last visited Feb. 12, 2024). It
also defines the phrasal verb “care for” (in relevant part) as “to do the things that are
needed to help and protect (a person or animal): look after (someone or something).”
Care for (1), MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/care%20for (last visited Feb. 12, 2024). From these definitions, it appears
“bring up,” as used in the “parent” definition, refers more to the long-term childrearing
involved with raising a child, while “care for” implicates more day-to-day responsibilities
of ensuring safety and supervision.


                                      [J-72-2023] - 17
shall have the meanings given to them in this section . . .”). According to Section 1991,

“[c]hild” or “children” “[i]ncludes children by birth or adoption.”       Id.   Like the above

definitions of “parent,” this statutory definition of “children” extends beyond biological

relationships, explicitly including “children by . . . adoption.” Id. Facially, however, this

definition is somewhat stringent. Although the use of the word “[i]ncludes” suggests the

definition of “children” extends beyond “children by birth or adoption[,]” id., the ejusdem

generis canon of statutory construction teaches that other “children” falling within the

definition must be of the same general class or nature. See, e.g., Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v.

Cumberland Coal Res., LP, 

 (Pa. 2014) (“the presence of such a term

as ‘including’ in a definition exhibits a legislative intent that the list that follows is not an

exhaustive list of items that fall within the definition; yet, any additional matters purportedly

falling within the definition, but that are not express, must be similar to those listed by the

legislature and of the same general class or nature”). The statute’s examples of what is

“include[d]” by the term “children” — those “by birth or adoption” — certainly suggest the

requirement of an extremely strong legal relationship between the “parent” and the

“child.” 5

        In harmony with these definitions, Pennsylvania case law has developed to

acknowledge parentage (and concomitant support obligations) beyond cases of biological

or adoptive parents. See A.S., 

. We explained in A.S. that in those

non-biological, non-adoptive situations, “courts have looked to whether a nonparent has

taken affirmative steps to act as a legal parent so that he or she should be treated as a

legal parent.” 

, citing K.E.M., 

 (reaffirming paternity by estoppel


5 Unlike the support chapter of the Domestic Relations Code, the custody chapter
provides its own specific definition of “[c]hild.” See 23 Pa.C.S. §5322(a) (“‘Child.’ An
unemancipated individual under 18 years of age.”). Our analysis here does not disturb
that more specific definition designated by the General Assembly for custody matters.


                                       [J-72-2023] - 18
doctrine, but holding it applies only where it serves the best interests of the child); Fish v.

Behers, 

 (Pa. 1999) (estopping mother from seeking support from her

paramour/child’s biological father where she and her husband held the child out as the

husband’s); L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 

 (Pa. Super. 2002) (imposing support

obligation on non-biological mother who agreed to start a family with her same-sex

partner — the biological mother — where both partners acted as mothers to the children

and the non-biological mother obtained legal and physical custodial rights after their

separation based on in loco parentis standing); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 

 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (non-biological former stepfather who held himself out as child’s father was

subject to support obligation under paternity by estoppel doctrine). 6

       As we acknowledged in A.S., however, another line of cases limits the extension

of parenthood where former stepparents simply seek to maintain a relationship with their

stepchildren. Preliminarily, in Spells, the Superior Court held a former stepparent may be

entitled to visitation rights if he or she stood in loco parentis to the stepchild. See 

. The court emphasized the benefit of allowing such relationships to

continue after divorce, noting the value to the child of maintaining a stable relationship

with the nonparent. See 

.

       Then in McNutt, the Superior Court reversed a trial court order requiring a former

stepfather to pay support for his former stepdaughter. See 

. In that

case, the stepfather married the stepdaughter’s mother when the child was two months

old. See 

. The stepfather and mother had a child together during their marriage,

6 These decisions involved claims of estoppel. In Fish, we explained paternity by estoppel

“is merely the legal determination that because of a person’s conduct (e.g., holding out
the child as his own, or supporting the child) that person, regardless of his true biological
status, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will the child’s mother who has
participated in this conduct be permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the
third party is the true father.” 

, quoting Freedman v. McCandless, 

 (Pa. 1995).


                                      [J-72-2023] - 19
and the stepfather considered adopting the stepdaughter but never proceeded with the

adoption. See id. at 817. After the stepfather and mother divorced, he continued to visit

both children and the stepdaughter continued to call him “Daddy.” See id. The trial court

found the stepfather stood in loco parentis to the stepdaughter, and on that basis alone

held he was liable to support her. See id. In reversing, the Superior Court explained the

stepfather’s “past and continued love and devotion to his former stepchild [did not] carry

with it the duty to financially support [her, and that t]his would be carrying the common

law concept of in loco parentis further than we are willing to go.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Holding “[t]he general rule is that no legal duty rests upon the stepparent to support after

termination of the marriage[,]” the court explained its rationale:
       If we were to hold that a stepparent acting in loco parentis would be held
       liable for support even after the dissolution of the marriage[,] then all
       persons who gratuitously assume parental duties for a time could be held
       legally responsible for a child’s support. . . . . These acts of generosity
       should not be discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone
       who begins such a relationship to continue financial support until the child
       is eighteen years old.
Id. The Superior Court reaffirmed these principles three years later in DeNomme v.

DeNomme, holding “[b]ecause the policy is to encourage gratuitous assumption of

responsibility by stepparents, courts are reluctant to extend the duty of support beyond

marriage. The general proposition derived from this public policy is that, after divorce, no

legal duty rests upon the stepparent.” 

 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also

Garman v. Garman, 

 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“This court desires to

encourage the generous actions of step-parents. . . . We might encourage the opposite

effect by using a technical approach to support law and holding a step-parent responsible

following separation for support of a child who was not adopted by that step-parent.”).

       Then, in Drawbaugh, the Superior Court applied these principles where a former

stepfather sought court-ordered visitation with his former stepchildren. See 647 A.2d at



                                      [J-72-2023] - 20
242-43. In that case, the stepfather began residing with the mother and her two children

when the children were very young. See id. at 240. The stepfather and mother married,

and together they provided food, clothing, shelter, and medical care for the children. See

id. The stepfather was involved in childrearing, and the children referred to him as “dad.”

See id. After ten years of living together and six years of marriage, the mother filed for

divorce and stopped all contact between the stepfather and the children. See id. The

stepfather filed a petition for minimal visitation with the two children, which the trial court

granted. See id. The mother subsequently filed a complaint for support, which the trial

court also granted after concluding the stepfather stood in loco parentis to the children.

See id. at 241.

       Reversing the trial court, the Superior Court “beg[a]n with the general rule that a

stepparent has no legal obligation to support his or her stepchild.” Id., citing, inter alia,

DeNomme, 

. It further acknowledged “a stepfather who lives with his wife

and her natural children may assume the relationship of in loco parentis.” 

 citing

Spells, 

. But, it noted, Spells did not involve child support — it held only that

an in loco parentis former stepfather should be permitted visitation. See id. at 242.

Instead, and in line with McNutt, the court explained “it appears that no appellate case in

Pennsylvania has imposed a duty of support on a stepparent, even one who stands in

loco parentis to his stepchildren, following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, absent

a written agreement to assume such obligation.” Id. Thus, it held:
       [A]s in McNutt, [s]tepfather should not be penalized for having provided both
       financial and emotional support to his stepchildren for the past ten years.
       Although [s]tepfather sought visitation rights, to which he is entitled on this
       record, Spells v. 

 and clearly loves and cares about his
       stepchildren, it was an abuse of discretion to hold him legally responsible
       for their support.
Id. at 243.




                                      [J-72-2023] - 21
       Most recently, in A.S., this Court approved of the Superior Court’s rule generally

precluding former stepparents from support obligations, but we carved out a narrow

exception to address the nuanced facts of that case. As noted above, in A.S., the mother

of twin sons was divorced from their former stepfather (with whom they maintained a

relationship), when she decided to relocate with the twins to California. See 

. The stepfather filed a complaint for custody of the twins and an emergency petition

to prevent the relocation, claiming in loco parentis status for standing to seek custody.

See 

 The trial court granted the emergency petition, and the stepfather continued to

litigate vigorously for custody rights to the children. See 

 After full custody proceedings,

the trial court entered a custody order granting the parties shared legal and physical

custody. See 

       During the pendency of the custody litigation, the mother filed a complaint for child

support against the stepfather. See 

. The lower courts held the stepfather did

not owe a financial support obligation, citing the above Superior Court case law (e.g.,

McNutt, Garman, and Drawbaugh) establishing that stepparents are generally not liable

for child support after dissolution of the marriage. See 

 The mother appealed to this

Court, arguing that notwithstanding the general rule, the Court should hold the stepfather

had a support obligation because he pursued and obtained parental custody rights equal

to hers, the twins’ natural parent. See 

. We agreed.

       We began our analysis by looking at the text of the support statute, providing that

“[p]arents are liable for the support of their children[.]” 

, quoting 23 Pa.C.S.

§4321. We rejected the parties’ suggestions that we adopt the definition of “parent” used

in other statutes and instead assessed the meaning of “parent” as used in the support

statute according to the development of our case law. See id. We identified that on the

one hand, Pennsylvania case law establishes the term “parent” for support purposes




                                      [J-72-2023] - 22
encompasses more than biological and adoptive parents, and that “courts have looked to

whether a nonparent has taken affirmative steps to act as a legal parent so that he or she

should be treated as a legal parent.” Id. at 769 (relying on Fish, Hamilton, N.E.M., and

L.S.K.). On the other hand, however, we acknowledged support obligations have not

been extended to stepparents that do not take sufficient affirmative steps to act as a

child’s parent. See id. at 770 (relying on McNutt, DeNomme, Garman, and Drawbaugh).

       Considering these two lines of cases, we initially reaffirmed the general principle

that “in loco parentis status alone and/or reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation

relationship with stepchildren are insufficient to obligate a stepparent to pay child support

for those children.” Id. We held, however, “the instant case involves a far greater

assumption, indeed, a relentless pursuit, of parental duties than that of a stepparent

desiring a continuing relationship with a former spouse’s children[.]” Id. We distinguished

McNutt and its progeny, explaining “[h]ere, we have a stepfather who haled a fit parent

into court, repeatedly litigating to achieve the same legal and physical custodial rights

as would naturally accrue to any biological parent. . . . Stepfather in the instant case has

litigated and obtained full legal and physical custody rights, and has also asserted

those parental rights to prevent a competent biological mother from relocating with her

children.” Id. (emphasis added). Because the ex-stepfather “insisted upon and became

a full parent in every sense of that concept[,]” we held he had “taken sufficient

affirmative steps legally to obtain parental rights and should share in parental obligations,

such as paying child support.” Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added).

       Although this was the first time we held a former stepparent could be liable for child

support under such circumstances, we emphasized we were “not creating a new class of

stepparent obligors” and that our holding comported with the principle that “in loco

parentis standing alone is insufficient to hold a stepparent liable for support.” Id. at 771.




                                      [J-72-2023] - 23
We reaffirmed the public policy of “encouraging stepparents to love and care for their

stepchildren[,]” but we clarified that “when a stepparent does substantially more than offer

gratuitous love and care for his stepchildren, when he instigates litigation to achieve all

the rights of parenthood at the cost of interfering with the rights of a fit parent, then the

same public policy attendant to the doctrine of paternity by estoppel is implicated: that it

is in the best interests of children to have stability and continuity in their parent-child

relationships.”   Id. (emphasis added).      We explained our holding “increase[d] the

likelihood that only individuals who are truly dedicated and intend to be a stable fixture in

a child’s life will take the steps to litigate and obtain rights equal to those of the child’s

parent.” Id.

       Applying the plain text of Section 4321 and the above case law to the facts of the

present case, we hold Jaurigue is not a “parent” obligated to pay child support.

Principally, we hold as a matter of law Jaurigue does not fit into the class of third-parties

obligated to pay support pursuant to the rule announced in A.S. because he does not

have legal custody of Child. He has partial physical custody only, which, although

rather extensive, is akin to the visitation rights obtained by the former stepfather in

Drawbaugh. See Drawbaugh, 

. As we held in A.S., “in loco parentis

status alone and/or [such] reasonable acts to maintain a post-separation relationship with

stepchildren are insufficient to obligate a stepparent to pay child support for those

children.” A.S., 

.

       For context, our Domestic Relations Code provides definitions for the various types

of child custody. Relevantly, legal custody is defined as “[t]he right to make major

decisions on behalf of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and

educational decisions.” 23 Pa.C.S. §5322. By contrast, physical custody is “[t]he actual

physical possession and control of a child[,]” and partial physical custody is “[t]he right to




                                      [J-72-2023] - 24
assume physical custody of the child for less than a majority of the time.” Id. 7 It is possible

for parties to have shared legal custody — “[t]he right of more than one individual to legal

custody of the child.” Id. Indeed, that was the case in A.S. But in this case, Father has

sole legal custody, or “[t]he right of one individual to exclusive legal custody of the child.”

Id. This means that Father, and Father alone, has the “right to make major decisions on

behalf of [C]hild[.]” Id.

       Without this right to make such major decisions on Child’s behalf, Jaurigue is

simply not a “parent” for purposes of Section 4321. He does not have “all the rights of

parenthood.” A.S., 

; see also 

 (holding the stepfather subject

to support obligation where he “litigated and obtained full legal and physical custody

rights” and “insisted upon and became a full parent in every sense of that concept”). Even

under the simple dictionary definitions of “parent” offered above, Jaurigue does not seem

to fit. Although he has opportunity to “care for” Child, it is doubtful he is “bring[ing her]

up.”     See      Parent    (1),   MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/parent (last visited Feb. 12, 2024); supra note 4. And under

Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition, he is not Child’s “lawful father or mother.” Parent,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even under that definition’s non-biological and

non-adoptive examples — i.e., “a child’s putative blood parent who has expressly

acknowledged paternity” and “an individual or agency whose status as guardian has been

established by judicial decree” — Jaurigue is still not a “parent” for purposes of the support

obligation. Id.




7 Notably, Section 5322 also provides:    “In a statutory provision other than in this chapter,
when the term ‘visitation’ is used in reference to child custody, the term may be construed
to mean: (1) partial physical custody; (2) shared physical custody; or (3) supervised
physical custody.” 23 Pa.C.S. §5322(b).


                                        [J-72-2023] - 25
       As noted, dictionary definitions are not dispositive to the plain meaning of a

statutory term.    But certainly, the definition of “children” provided in the Statutory

Construction Act sheds critical light on whether Jaurigue is a “parent” for purposes of

Section 4321. See 23 Pa.C.S. §4321(2) (“Parents are liable for the support of their

children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger.”) (emphasis added).

It is difficult to see how Child could be Jaurigue’s “child” under that statutory definition,

which “[i]ncludes children by birth or adoption.” 1 Pa.C.S. §1991. As stated above, while

we recognize the word “[i]ncludes” suggests the definition might extend beyond biological

and adopted children, any “child” fitting into the definition must be of that same general

class or nature under the ejusdem generis canon of construction. We again stress the

strength of the legal relationship between parents and their biological or adopted children.

Indeed, absent court intervention, such parents enjoy the full panoply of parental rights to

their children, or what the A.S. Court referred to as “all the rights of parenthood.” A.S.,

. Here, where Jaurigue does not have legal custody of Child, that is,

where he cannot participate in making major decisions about her life, their relationship is

simply not of the same general class or nature as those recognized in Section 1991’s

definition of “children.”

       Moreover, while there are a handful of Pennsylvania cases imposing a support

obligation on a non-biological, non-adoptive parent figure, those holdings should be

narrowly construed based on their specific facts. For instance, in the context of support

obligations found by way of paternity by estoppel, the non-biological parents had stepped

fully into the role of “parent.” In Hamilton, the Superior Court explained the non-biological

father had held the child out as his own and that he was “the only father the [c]hild ha[d]

ever known.” Hamilton, 

. It was because of these circumstances, where




                                      [J-72-2023] - 26
the non-biological father “never told the [c]hild he was not her father[,]” that Hamilton fit

squarely within the concept of paternity by estoppel articulated in Fish:
       Estoppel is based on the public policy that children should be secure in
       knowing who their parents are. If a certain person has acted as the parent
       and bonded with the child, the child should not be required to suffer the
       potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that the father
       he has known all his life is not in fact his father.
Fish, 

 (citation omitted). And this Court ensured narrow adherence to that

policy in K.E.M. when we held paternity by estoppel should be applied only where it

actually serves the child’s best interests. See K.E.M., 

. Thus, a non-

biological, non-adoptive third-party assumes a financial support obligation by way of

estoppel only where they have assumed parenthood in all other respects by holding

themselves out and acting as the child’s parent and where it is in the child’s best interests.

       To be sure, the decision in A.S. was similarly narrow and explicitly supported by

the same policy considerations as the paternity by estoppel doctrine. We emphasized

that case did “not creat[e] a new class of stepparent obligors.” A.S., 

. We

specifically reiterated “in loco parentis standing alone is insufficient to hold a stepparent

liable for support” and that the “public policy behind encouraging stepparents to love and

care for their stepchildren remains just as relevant and important today as it was when

Drawbaugh was decided.” 

 We held only that a former stepparent achieves the status

of “parent” for purposes of support under Section 4321 — without the ties of biology,

adoption, or a legal doctrine like paternity by estoppel — when he “does substantially

more than offer gratuitous love and care for his stepchildren, when he instigates litigation

to achieve all the rights of parenthood at the cost of interfering with the rights of a fit

parent[.]”   

 (emphasis added).       Considering that particular ex-stepfather’s full

assumption of parental rights, we reasoned “the same public policy attendant to the




                                      [J-72-2023] - 27
doctrine of paternity by estoppel is implicated: that it is in the best interests of children to

have stability and continuity in their parent-child relationships.” 

       Here, where Jaurigue does not have the right to make the major, long-term

decisions that will impact Child’s life for years to come, the stability and continuity policy

concerns are, frankly, less imperative than in A.S. or the paternity by estoppel cases.

Instead, the paramount policy consideration in this case is that expressed in McNutt and

Drawbaugh:
       If we were to hold that a stepparent acting in loco parentis would be held
       liable for support even after the dissolution of the marriage then all persons
       who gratuitously assume parental duties for a time could be held legally
       responsible for a child’s support. . . . These acts of generosity should not
       be discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone who begins
       such a relationship to continue financial support until the child is eighteen
       years old.
McNutt, 

; Drawbaugh, 

. This is not to say adults like

Jaurigue cannot (or should not) be stable fixtures in the lives of the children they love. In

fact, as expressed by McNutt and Drawbaugh, our policy is to encourage continuation of

these relationships. But without the power to decide the monumental facets of a child’s

life such as their medical treatment, religion, or course of education, the non-parent’s role

is plainly subordinate to that of a parent. 8

       Thus, although our case law has evolved in this area, our decision here may not

be unmoored from the text of the statute. Under Section 4321(2), child support obligations

fall on “parents” only. It is true these obligations may attach to individuals without a

biological or adoptive parental tie in certain situations, but Jaurigue, who does not even



8 In fact, it could likely be inequitable to require a third-party without legal custody to pay

support to fund major life decisions, while having no say in making those decisions. For
example, if the third-party was an atheist but the parent with sole legal custody was
Christian and decided the child should attend a parochial school, why should the third-
party be forced to pay for the schooling without having any say in that decision?


                                       [J-72-2023] - 28
have legal custody, does not fall into that category. 9 Our law recognizes that the concept

of a “parent” is somewhat elastic and sometimes extends beyond biological or adoptive

ties. But applying the term, with its concomitant statutory support obligation, to Jaurigue

under these circumstances would stretch the term too far.

                                        IV.    Conclusion

       For the reasons above, we reverse the order of the Superior Court, and remand

for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Wecht, Mundy and Brobson join the

opinion.

       Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.




9 Our reasoning here is specific to the type of adult-child relationship presented in this

case. Nothing in this opinion displaces the well-established support obligations of
biological or adoptive parents, even where they do not have legal custody of their children.
See, e.g., Oeler by Gross v. Oeler, 

 (Pa. 1991) (“the duty to support a
minor child is absolute”); Conway v. Dana, 

 (Pa. 1974) (“Support, as
every other duty encompassed in the role of parenthood, is the equal responsibility of
both mother and father.”). Further, in accordance with the distinctions made above, this
holding does not speak to cases where parentage is otherwise established for support
purposes by common law doctrines such as parentage by estoppel. See, e.g., L.S.K.,

; Hamilton, 

. Finally, our decision is limited to the child support
context. While there is certainly overlap between “parents” for purposes of standing in
custody disputes, see 23 Pa.C.S. 5324(1), and “parents” for purposes of support, we do
not hold the two are identical in all cases. Cf. A.S., 

 (holding
stepfather had a duty to support where he “insisted upon and became a full parent in
every sense of that concept[,]” but did so by asserting in loco parentis standing at the
custody phase of the litigation).


                                      [J-72-2023] - 29