[J-12A-2025 and J-12B-2025]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                EASTERN DISTRICT


    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :   No. 53 EAP 2024
                                                :
                      Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                :   Superior Court at No. 1910 EDA
                                                :   2022 entered on October 11, 2023,
               v.                               :   affirming the Order of the
                                                :   Philadelphia County Court of
                                                :   Common Pleas at No. MC-51-CR
    JAMES SMITH,                                :   0006183-2021 entered on July 26,
                                                :   2022.
                      Appellee                  :
                                                :   ARGUED: March 5, 2025

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :   No. 54 EAP 2024
                                                :
                      Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                :   Superior Court at No. 1911 EDA
                                                :   2022 entered on October 11, 2023,
               v.                               :   affirming the Order of the
                                                :   Philadelphia County Court of
                                                :   Common Pleas at No. MC-51-CR-
    PATRICK SMITH,                              :   0006184-2021 entered on July 26,
                                                :   2022.
                      Appellee                  :
                                                :   ARGUED: March 5, 2025


                        OPINION IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL

JUSTICE WECHT                                                 DECIDED: June 17, 2025

        Two off-duty police officers (one an Inspector, and one a Detective) chased a man

and threw him head-first into a concrete wall. The Commonwealth charged the two with

simple assault, criminal conspiracy, and recklessly endangering another person.1 The




1       18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1), 903(a), and 2705, respectively.
Philadelphia Municipal Court dismissed all of the charges, and the Superior Court

affirmed that dismissal. We granted review in order to decide whether the Municipal

Court’s ruling contravened our well-established principles governing preliminary hearings,

and whether the Superior Court’s decision upholding that ruling conflicted with our

precedents. Because the lower courts substantively altered and misapplied the legal

standards applicable to preliminary hearings, I would reverse the dismissal and remand

this matter for trial.

       Preliminary hearing testimony revealed the following. During the early morning

hours of August 19, 2020, Paul McNally was walking near his Philadelphia home when

two men, later identified as James Smith and Patrick Smith, pulled up next to him in a

blue Mazda SUV.2 Claiming to be members of a “Town Watch,” the men told McNally

that they had video footage of him trying to break into parked cars. McNally denied the

allegation, and ran away in fear of the men.3 Initially, the “town watchmen” trailed McNally

in their car, but they eventually exited the vehicle and pursued him on foot. McNally called

his mother as he ran.4 The pursuers caught up to McNally, and “knocked [him] [in]to the

wall,”5 causing his head to bleed.

       As he explained this to the court, McNally “touched the right side of his temple or

his forehead above his right eye” to indicate where his injury had occurred.6 McNally



2      Reproduced Record, (“R.R.”) at 12a.
3      Id. at 13a.
4      Id.
5      Id.
6      R.R. at 13a.


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recalled that the pursuers held him “to the ground as [he] was screaming.”7              The

prosecutor asked McNally whether he had tripped and fallen into the wall.8 McNally

answered unequivocally: “No, I did not. They manhandled me and threw me to the wall.”9

McNally was treated at an urgent care facility for his injuries.

       On cross-examination, Fortunato N. Perri, Jr., Esquire, counsel for the pursuer who

had been identified as James Smith (an Inspector with the Philadelphia Police

Department), accused McNally of attempting to break into unlocked cars.10               When

McNally denied the accusation, the following exchange ensued between counsel and the

Municipal Court judge:


              Mr. Perri:            Your Honor, I ask this video be marked as D-1
                                    for identification and I’d like to show it to the
                                    witness.

              Court:                Is it relevant to today’s proceedings?

              Mr. Perri:            Yes. It’s him trying car doors nine days before
                                    this incident.

              Court:                On the evening in question?

              Mr. Perri:            Nine days before the incident he’s –

              Court:                Well, it’s irrelevant.

              Mr. Perri:            Well, it’s not. He said he never did it before. I
                                    got a video showing him doing it.

              Court:                And I understand, but credibility is not an issue
                                    at this proceeding.


7      Id.
8      Id.
9      Id.
10     Id. at 15a.


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                Mr. Perri:         Okay. All right. All right. So we’re charging
                                   guys with crimes regardless of what the
                                   evidence is.

                Court:             Just proceed, Mr. Perri.11

         Attorney Perri concluded his cross-examination of McNally without playing the

video.     The Commonwealth then called Sergeant Zachary Koenig, an experienced

member of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division, who testified

that Inspector James Smith was designated as “injured on duty,” or “IOD,” at the time that

the incident occurred.12 On cross-examination, Attorney Perri asked Sergeant Koenig to

read into the record the “Off-Duty Action Report” (the “Report”) prepared by the Smiths’

supervisors in the wake of the incident. The Report stated:


         [o]n 8/19/20 at approximately 12:30 a.m. Detective Smith, Badge Number
         641, assigned to Major Crimes FBI Task Force, along with Inspector James
         Smith, while off duty in the area of Knights and Fairdale Road, heard a
         person screaming. They observed a male looking into a vehicle and
         attempting the doors on both sides. [The Smiths] had prior knowledge of
         auto thefts and theft from autos in the immediate area.

         [The Smiths] followed the male and attempted to identify themselves, at
         which time the male ran and tripped. The male was stopped at the rear of
         the store at Knights and Fairdale Road.

         [The Smiths] called 911 and uniformed officers arrived on location. The
         male was investigated for ped. inves.[13] at this time. The investigation
         continues into the auto thefts and thefts from autos in the area.14




11       Id.
12       R.R. at 17a.
13     Id. Attorney Perri clarified for the record that “ped. inves.” indicates that a
uniformed officer arrived and conducted a pedestrian stop. See id. at 17a-18a.
14       Id. at 17a.


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       At the conclusion of Sergeant Koenig’s testimony, the court reversed course,

asking Attorney Perri if he wanted “to recall [McNally] in regards to the video that [Attorney

Perri had]?”15 Without further explanation, the court allowed the video—which the court

previously had deemed irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible.16 Attorney Perri used the video

again to accuse McNally of attempting to break into cars nine days earlier. McNally again

denied the allegation, and insisted that he was not the person shown in the video.17

       During closing arguments, Attorney Perri accused McNally of lying. Attorney Perri

told the court: “You saw this video. It’s [McNally]. He’s on Patrician Drive nine days

before being confronted by a neighbor because he opened the car door on that one, on

the video you saw.”18 In response, the Commonwealth emphasized that McNally testified

that he had not tried to open any car doors, that the Smiths approached and chased him,

and that they “slammed him into a wall and then took him to the ground.” 19              The

Commonwealth stressed that Inspector James Smith was on IOD status, meaning that

he knew that “he should not have been taking any police action,” and that McNally himself

was “never arrested” or even “investigated any further” for the alleged car thefts.20

       The Commonwealth’s arguments notwithstanding, the court dismissed all of the

charges against both of the Smiths. The court explained that:



15     Id. at 19a.
16     See id. at 15a (stating “credibility [was] not an issue at this proceeding.”).
17     R.R. at 19a.
18     Id. at 20a.
19     Id. at 21a.
20     Id.


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      . . . when [McNally] fled, you know, police are going to follow somebody
      when they flee. Just basic police actions. I don’t see criminal culpability
      here at all. At best you have is [sic] somebody not following police directives
      because they were IOD and they never should have reacted to this. But I
      don’t find any criminal culpability whatsoever. This matter is discharged for
      lack of evidence.21

      The Commonwealth re-filed the charges pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 544, which

provides that, “[w]hen charges are dismissed [at] a preliminary hearing . . . the

Commonwealth may reinstitute the charges by approving, in writing, the re-filing of a

complaint with the issuing authority who dismissed . . . the charges.”22 At the ensuing

hearing before the Court of Common Pleas, the Commonwealth did not present any new

evidence. Instead, the Commonwealth relied exclusively upon the evidence presented

at the preliminary hearing. The Commonwealth argued that the initial court evaluated

that evidence using a higher standard than is required at a preliminary hearing. Citing

Commonwealth v. Perez,23 the Commonwealth argued that the Municipal Court

impermissibly made credibility determinations.24

      The Court of Common Pleas agreed with the lower court that the Commonwealth

had failed to establish a prima facie case, and it dismissed the re-filed charges. The

Commonwealth appealed.




21    Id. at 22a.
22    Pa.R.Crim.P. 544(A).
23    

, 1102 (Pa. 2021) (explaining that weight and credibility of the
evidence are not factors at a preliminary hearing).
24    R.R. at 31a.


              [J-12A-2025, 53 EAP 2024; J-12B-2025, 54 EAP 2024] - 6
       The Superior Court affirmed.25 The appellate panel ruled that the Commonwealth

had failed to establish a prima facie case for the requisite mens rea for simple assault. A

person commits simple assault when he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]”26 Bodily injury is defined in the Crimes Code

as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”27 Even if the victim does not

actually sustain bodily injury, a person may commit simple assault if he acts with “a

specific intent to cause bodily injury[.]”28

       The Commonwealth argued that, for purposes of a preliminary hearing, McNally’s

testimony—that the Smiths manhandled him and threw him into a wall—was sufficient to

establish the Smiths’ intent to harm him.29 The Commonwealth maintained that the lower

courts instead credited the Smiths’ purported belief that McNally was committing a crime

over McNally’s testimony, an impermissible exercise at a preliminary hearing.          The

Commonwealth also asserted that the question of whether the Smiths credibly believed

that McNally was attempting to break into cars was one for a jury, not one for a preliminary

hearing.30

       The panel disagreed, reasoning that McNally’s own testimony could not support a

reasonable inference that the Smiths intended to harm him. According to the panel,



25     Commonwealth v. Smith, 

 (Pa. Super. 2023).
26     18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).
27     18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
28     Commonwealth v. Richardson, 

 (Pa. Super. 1994).

 A.3d at 9.
30     

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McNally knew that the Smiths intended to detain him, not to injure him. The Smiths

detained McNally, called 911, and waited for uniformed officers to arrive on the scene.

As such, according to the panel, it would have been unreasonable to infer that the Smiths

intended to harm McNally. Therefore, the Commonwealth failed to establish the requisite

mens rea for simple assault.31

      Similarly, the panel held that the Commonwealth could not prove that the Smiths

acted recklessly or knowingly for purposes of simple assault.       In the panel’s view,

McNally’s testimony demonstrated that the Smiths slammed him into the wall not to injure

him, but instead to stop him from fleeing. To reach this conclusion, the panel necessarily

credited the assertion that the Smiths intended to detain McNally, not to harm him.32

      Next, the panel opined that the Commonwealth also failed to establish the

elements of criminal conspiracy. A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if he: “(1)

entered into an agreement to commit . . . an unlawful act with another person . . . , (2)

with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the

conspiracy.”33 The Commonwealth argued that McNally’s testimony—that the Smiths

together confronted him, chased him, slammed him into a wall, and held him down until

uniformed officers arrived—was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for criminal

conspiracy. The Commonwealth contended that, although no express agreement was

stated between the Smiths, an agreement to assault McNally nonetheless existed




31    Id. at 10-11.
32    Id. at 11.
33    Commonwealth v. Fisher, 

 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted); see
18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1), (e).


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between them, which agreement arose from their relationship as brothers and their

identical conduct of waiting to call 911 and failing to identify themselves as police.34

However, the panel discerned no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that would have

supported a reasonable inference that the Smiths acted with a shared criminal intent. 35

The panel reiterated that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the

evidence in this case was that the Smiths intended to stop McNally from fleeing the area.

       Finally, the panel concluded that the Commonwealth failed to establish evidence

that the Smiths recklessly endangered another person. A person is guilty of recklessly

endangering another person (“REAP”) “if he recklessly engages in conduct which places

or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 36           The

Commonwealth argued that McNally’s testimony demonstrated that the Smiths chased

McNally and together used their momentum to slam his head into the wall. 37 Given that

the head is a vital part of the body, the Commonwealth argued, it was a matter of

common-sense to infer that the Smiths acted recklessly with regard to a substantial and

unjustified risk of seriously injuring McNally.38 The Superior Court rejected this argument.

 A.3d at 9.
35     Id. at 12.
36      18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; see 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (defining “serious bodily injury” as
“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ”).

 A.3d at 9.
38     Id. at 9-10.


                [J-12A-2025, 53 EAP 2024; J-12B-2025, 54 EAP 2024] - 9
The panel ruled that “[t]here was simply no evidence” to support a reasonable inference

that the Smiths’ conduct placed McNally “‘in danger of death or serious bodily injury.’”39

       We granted review in order to resolve the question of whether “the Superior Court

[violated] this Court’s controlling legal standard by holding that the evidence was

insufficient to establish a prima facie case” that the Smiths committed simple assault,

criminal conspiracy, and recklessly endangering another person.40 Because the lower

courts made credibility determinations, in violation of the standards that govern the

conduct of preliminary hearings, I would answer this question in the affirmative and would

reverse the Superior Court. I would remand this matter for trial.

       The preliminary hearing is not a mere formality in the criminal process. Although

not constitutionally required, the hearing serves vital interests in maintaining the delicate

balance between the Commonwealth’s obligation to prosecute crimes and the

defendant’s constitutional liberty interests.41    For the Magisterial District Judge or

Municipal Court Judge, the hearing is an opportunity to “fulfill their essential role of

determining whether the Commonwealth has presented enough evidence to detain the



39     Id. at 12 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705).
40     The question, as presented by the Commonwealth, states:
       Did the Superior Court override this Court’s controlling legal standard by holding
       that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that defendant[s],
       [ ] off-duty police officer[s], committed simple assault, criminal conspiracy, and
       reckless endangerment, where the co-defendants . . . .accused a [pedestrian] of
       breaking into cars, chased him as he ran for help, and slammed him into a
       pillar−injuring his head, arms, and legs?
Commonwealth v. Smith, 

 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam).
41    Commonwealth v. McClelland, 

, 737-38 (Pa. 2020) (Wecht, J.,
concurring).


               [J-12A-2025, 53 EAP 2024; J-12B-2025, 54 EAP 2024] - 10
accused.”42 For the Commonwealth, a preliminary hearing is often “the prosecutor’s entry

point into the process, and provides the prosecutor with the first substantive view of the

evidence that police uncovered before charging the defendant.”43 The Commonwealth’s

ability to gauge the strength of its case serves judicial efficiency by “prompting the

Commonwealth to utilize its resources to prosecute only the charges that are reasonably

capable of being proven at trial.”44

       For the defendant, the hearing affords the chance to gain a fair assessment of the

strength of the case he faces. The defendant is provided a limited opportunity to test the

Commonwealth’s case, to direct his pretrial investigation, to exercise his constitutional

right to an attorney in a meaningful fashion, and to consider intelligently whether to plead

guilty or proceed to trial.45 It is also the first event at which the defendant’s right to counsel

attaches.46

       At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth’s initial burden is not particularly

onerous or demanding. To the contrary, the “Commonwealth’s evidentiary burden is a

relatively light one.”47 The Commonwealth must only establish a prima facie case, which

requires the Commonwealth to come forward with some evidence as to each of the




42    See Commonwealth v. Ricker, 

 (Pa. 2017) (Wecht, J.,
dissenting).
43     Commonwealth v. Harris, 

, 42 (Pa. 2024) (Wecht, J., concurring).
44     

45     Ricker, 

 (Wecht, J., dissenting)
46      

 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 

 (1970) (plurality)).
47     McClelland, 233 A.3d at 737 (Wecht, J., concurring).


               [J-12A-2025, 53 EAP 2024; J-12B-2025, 54 EAP 2024] - 11
elements of the crimes charged as well as some evidence that the accused is probably

the individual who committed the offense.48

       The presiding jurist is not to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused.49 The

court must consider the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth and must draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the

Commonwealth’s favor.50        Of particular relevance here, the credibility of the

Commonwealth’s witnesses is irrelevant.51 The judge must take the Commonwealth’s

evidence as true.52 The question in this case is whether the lower courts turned a blind

eye to this legal standard.

       The question of the “evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie

case is one of law.”53 As such, this Court’s standard of review is de novo, and our scope

of review is plenary.54

       In Perez, we reminded the bench and bar that “[t]he weight and credibility of the

evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing stage.”55          Here, at first, the

Philadelphia Municipal Court Judge heeded this standard. The court prohibited Attorney

Perri from challenging McNally’s credibility. By initially preventing counsel from using the


48     Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102-03.
49     Id.
50     Id. at 1102.
51     Id.
52     Id.
53     Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
54     Id. (citing McClelland, 233 A.3d at 732).
55     Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102.


               [J-12A-2025, 53 EAP 2024; J-12B-2025, 54 EAP 2024] - 12
video, the court correctly acknowledged that “credibility is not an issue at this

proceeding.”56 In an about-face, the court subsequently allowed the video, with no on-

the-record justification for doing so. The court understood that the purpose of the video

was to impeach McNally’s credibility. Admitting the video as relevant evidence at the

preliminary hearing was error. By admitting the video, the court opened the door to the

Smiths’ closing argument, in which Attorney Perri referenced the video to, once again,

impeach McNally’s credibility.

      The lower court then credited the Smiths’ version of events—which amounted to

an affirmative defense—disregarding our instruction in Perez that it could do no such

thing. Indeed, defense counsel stated that the video was relevant because “[McNally]

said he never [tried to open car doors] before. [Attorney Perri had] a video showing him

doing it.”57 The court concluded that:


       [E]ven if [the judge] couldn’t see that it was [McNally] in that video, what it
      does show is that there is that type of criminal activity going on in that
      neighborhood. So it certainly bolsters the [Smiths’] mental state that they
      were knowledgeable about the fact that there were car thefts in the area.
      And it was a legitimate reason to inquire of the individual.58

      The judge stated that he thought the video “bolster[ed]” the Smiths’ “mental

state.”59 In other words, faced with two versions of events, the court chose to believe the

one presented by the defense over the one presented by the Commonwealth. The only

way to achieve this result is to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to elevate one


56    R.R. at 15a.
57    Id.
58    R.R. at 22a.
59    Id.


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over the other. This is impermissible at the preliminary hearing stage. As Perez requires,

if McNally’s testimony alone establishes all of the elements of a prima facie case, a court

is not permitted to disregard that testimony, no matter the defense or justification offered

by those charged.

       The Superior Court’s analysis suffers from the same shortcoming. It is reasonable

to infer that two men who knock or throw another into a wall intend to harm him, no matter

their reason for doing so. This is especially so after the two men chase their victim in a

car and then on foot. The off-duty Smiths engaged in a pursuit without seeking back-up

and without alerting law enforcement to the pursuit until after they had harmed McNally.

The lower courts were bound to infer an intent to harm when viewing the testimony in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Neither did so. Instead, the courts concluded

that the Smiths merely intended to detain McNally. This inference favored the defense,

premised upon impermissible credibility determinations and disregard of the governing

law.

       By presuming that the Smiths attempted to identify themselves as law enforcement

officers, the lower courts also construed the facts in the light most favorable to the Smiths,

not the Commonwealth, as the law requires. McNally testified that the Smiths identified

themselves as a part of a “Town Watch,” which was not true.60 The Report authored by

the Smiths’ supervisors asserted that the Smiths “attempted to identify themselves.”61

These two accounts contradict one another.            Our clear mandate for preliminary

hearings—that “the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the


60     Id. at 16a.
61     Id. at 17a.


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Commonwealth’s case”—required the lower courts to accept the Commonwealth’s

evidence on this point, not the defendants’.62 For its part, the Superior Court opined that,

when the Smiths approached McNally, “instead of engaging in further conversation,

McNally ran.”63 The suggestion that McNally should have stayed and engaged in further

conversation credits the defense assertion that alleged that the Smiths “attempted” to

identify themselves as law enforcement officers. It would be unreasonable to assume

that a citizen would stay and engage in further conversation with strangers who

approached him in a car after midnight, claiming to be a part of some “Town Watch.” Had

the lower courts viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as

required, their examination of the mens rea elements of the crimes charged would have

accounted for the fact that the Smiths failed to identify themselves correctly.

       The Superior Court made a similar mistake in reviewing the REAP charge. The

Superior Court failed to view the evidence in the Commonwealth’s favor, and cherry-

picked inapposite language from the transcript to imply that McNally was to blame. The

Superior Court created an artificial distinction between “knocking” and “ramming” another

person’s head into a wall for purposes of reckless endangerment. A person is guilty of

recklessly endangering another person “if he recklessly engages in conduct which places

or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 64 In its one

paragraph consideration of the REAP charge, the Superior Court resolved the matter on

unpersuasive linguistic grounds:



62     Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102.

 A.3d at 11.
64     18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.


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       There was simply no evidence presented to support a reasonable inference
       that [the Smiths] engaged in conduct that placed McNally “in danger of
       death or serious bodily injury.” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. Although the
       Commonwealth emphasizes that repeated blows to a person’s head can
       support an inference that the actor “inten[ded] to inflict serious bodily
       injury[,]” that was not what occurred in the present case. . . . Nor, as the
       Commonwealth suggests, did McNally state that [the Smiths] “used [their]
       momentum” from the chase to “ram his head into a wall.” . . . Instead,
       McNally testified that the men “knocked” or “threw” him into the wall,
       where he “slammed the side of [his] head.” N.T., 2/22/22, at 11-12.
       There is simply no testimony to support an inference that [the Smiths]
       repeatedly hit McNally in the head, or purposely smashed McNally’s head
       into the wall.65

       The panel acknowledged that McNally testified that, “[t]hey manhandled me and

threw me to the wall.”66 The panel further acknowledged that McNally testified that the

Smiths, “knocked [him] to the wall.”67 And yet the panel suggested that there was some

factual distinction between two men “purposely smash[ing]” someone’s head into a wall

and what took place here.68 The panel reframed the testimony to imply that McNally

testified that he slammed his own head into the wall, after tripping or falling on his own.

       The panel’s justification for finding that McNally was not put at risk of serious bodily

injury was the purported absence of evidence that the Smiths “repeatedly” hit him in the

head, or “purposely smashed” his head into the wall.69 The panel elevated the contents

 A.3d at 12 (emphasis added, some citations omitted).
66     

 at 4 (citing R.R. at 13a).
67     

 (citing R.R. at 13a).
68     Id. at 12.
69     Id.


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of the Report, which claimed that McNally tripped, over McNally’s own testimony that he

“did not [trip]. They manhandled me and threw me to the wall.”70

       Regardless, the panel made no attempt to explain how throwing or slamming

someone into a wall puts them at less risk for bodily injury than smashing someone into

a wall. To distinguish between smashing someone’s head into a wall and throwing

someone into a wall, whereupon the person slams his head, is to impermissibly frame the

facts of this case in the light most favorable to the Smiths.71

       The lower courts deviated from the standards governing preliminary hearings.

Today’s affirmance by operation of law will have significant, far-reaching consequences.

Prosecutors’ burdens at preliminary hearings have now been made more difficult. The

Superior Court’s decision rewrites the law of such hearings.

       Defendants will feel free to present evidence at preliminary hearings that would

tend to impeach the credibility of the victims of crimes, whereas such evidence was

inadmissible and irrelevant until today.      Judges now will draw inferences for the

defendant, even if such inferences are not supported by the facts presented by the

Commonwealth. Those judges no longer will feel bound to view the facts in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, so long as the defendant can produce some contrary

facts that the judge finds more credible. The lower courts in this case flipped our

preliminary hearing standard on its head.        By sitting silent, this Court allows that

paradigmatic shift to creep into, and to take over, the law of preliminary hearings. This

Court’s error perpetuates, and indeed magnifies, the lower court’s missteps.


70     R.R. at 13a.
71     Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102.


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       This is bad news for prosecutors and law enforcement officers (other than the two

charged as defendants here). Preliminary hearings will transform into mini-trials. This,

in turn, will require prosecutors and law enforcement officers to find and present more

evidence than they otherwise are required to do.

       The prosecutor here presented more than enough evidence, when viewed as our

law requires, to present these charges to a jury. The Superior Court’s approach in this

case will be detrimental to law enforcement and prosecutors throughout Pennsylvania.

Police officers may hesitate to file simple assault charges. It may be too difficult to prove

a prima facie case when the defense can impugn the credibility of the injured victim. In

light of the incongruent application of current Pennsylvania law and the troubling effect

that this new standard likely will produce, we should reverse the Superior Court’s order

and remand this matter for trial.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justice Donohue join this opinion in support of reversal.




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