[J-85-2024]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


  HENRY EARL FERGUSON,                             :   No. 73 MAP 2022
                                                   :
                       Appellant                   :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                   :   Commonwealth Court dated
                                                   :   December 22, 2021 at No. 123 CD
                v.                                 :   2021 Affirming the Order of the
                                                   :   Cumberland County Court of
                                                   :   Common Pleas, Civil Division, dated
  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    :   January 21, 2021 at No. 2020-4835
  DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,                    :   CV.
  BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,                      :
                                                   :   ARGUED: November 19, 2024
                       Appellee                    :

OPINION

 JUSTICE MUNDY                                                    DECIDED: July 22, 2025
        The issue presented in this appeal by allowance is whether, consistent with due

 process, a driver who resolved an earlier DUI charge via accelerated rehabilitative

 disposition (ARD) may have his privileges suspended based on a subsequent DUI

 conviction.

        In 2012, Appellant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), see 75

 Pa.C.S. § 3802, and he successfully resolved that charge through ARD acceptance. 1 In

 2020, Appellant was again charged with DUI, specifically, DUI-general impairment as an



 1 ARD acceptance is discussed below.      Briefly, when a driver is charged with DUI under
 Section 3802 as a first offense in ten years, the prosecutor, subject to certain exceptions,
 may offer the driver the opportunity to resolve those charges through ARD, a diversionary
 program that does not result in a criminal conviction and is largely rehabilitative in nature.
ungraded misdemeanor under 75 Pa.C.S. §3802(a)(1). He was convicted based on his

guilty plea. PennDOT received notice of his conviction and suspended his license for one

year pursuant to Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code, which provides in relevant part:

       (e) Suspension of operating privileges upon conviction.--

       (1) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual
       under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual's
       conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for: (i) an offense under
       section 3802 . . ..

       (2) Suspension under paragraph (1) shall be in accordance with the
       following: (i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 months for an
       ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this
       chapter. (ii) 18 months for a misdemeanor of the first degree or felony of
       the third degree under this chapter. (iii) There shall be no suspension for
       an ungraded misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the person is
       subject to the penalties provided in subsection (a) and the person has no
       prior offense.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e) (emphasis added).

       As can be seen, the above provision requires a one-year suspension unless the

present conviction is for an ungraded misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the

person, inter alia, has no prior offense. 2 As for what constitutes a “prior offense,” the

Vehicle Code defines the term to include, inter alia, prior convictions and juvenile

adjudications, and, most relevant to this matter, “acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative

Disposition” to resolve a DUI charge lodged per Section 3802 within ten years before the

date of the current offense. See id. §3806. Thus, under the statute Appellant’s 2012

ARD acceptance qualifies as a “prior offense” for purposes of his license suspension

stemming from his 2020 conviction.



2 The other requirement is that the driver is subject to the penalties in subsection (a).   In
the instant case, there is no dispute that Appellant satisfies that prerequisite.


                                       [J-85-2024] - 2
      Appellant appealed his license suspension to the county court, which upheld it

notwithstanding that the Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 

 (Pa. Super. 2020), was still in force. Chichkin disapproved of enhanced criminal

sentencing based on an earlier ARD in light of Alleyne v. United States, 

(2013), which held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a

crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 The county

court in the present matter reasoned that the Alleyne principle does not apply to a license

suspension which, as a civil penalty, “does not implicate the rigorous constitutional

safeguards applicable in criminal matters.” Ferguson v. PennDOT, 

, at

*2 (C.P. Cumberland Jan. 21, 2021).

      The Commonwealth Court affirmed in a published decision. See Ferguson v.

PennDOT, 

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). That tribunal agreed with the county court

that a license suspension is a civil, collateral consequence of a DUI conviction. As such,

the Commonwealth Court reasoned, it should be upheld so long as PennDOT produces

an official record of the conviction and demonstrates it acted in accordance with

applicable law. Therefore, the court continued, Appellant could only prevail if he could

demonstrate the record of his conviction was inaccurate – something he failed to do. See

 at 633 (quoting Spagnoletti v. PennDOT, 

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)).

      We granted further review to consider whether Appellant’s license suspension in

these circumstances violates due process inasmuch as his successful completion of the

ARD program in relation to the prior charge was not a criminal conviction. See Ferguson

v. PennDOT, 

 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam).

3 After the events underlying this appeal, Chichkin was overruled by Commonwealth v.

Moroz, 

 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Richards, 

 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). The substantive holdings of those decisions, in
turn, were recently overturned by this Court in Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 

(Pa. 2025).


                                      [J-85-2024] - 3
       Appellant primarily advances that drivers have a constitutionally-protected

property interest in retaining their driving privileges, meaning any deprivation of that

privilege cannot occur absent due process, including fundamental fairness. In PennDOT

v. Middaugh, 

 (Pa. 2021), he notes, this Court held a DUI-based license

suspension was fundamentally unfair, thereby violating substantive due process, where

PennDOT waited 28 months to notify the driver, and the delay resulted in prejudice to the

driver. See id. at 438-39. Appellant posits it is likewise fundamentally unfair for a statute

to equate a prior ARD with a prior conviction and accordingly to require a license

suspension. He states the unfairness arises from the Vehicle Code allegedly treating an

ARD participant as a recidivist where ARD requires no finding of guilt.

       It is true that, if a driver successfully completes ARD, he can obtain a dismissal of

charges, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 319, and an expungement of his arrest record, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 320. 4    Because ARD acceptance does not entail proof of guilt, the

intermediate courts have held, for example, that successful ARD completion to resolve a

charge of theft, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of willful misconduct to deny

unemployment compensation, see Reading Area Water Auth. v. UCBR, 

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), nor is it equivalent to a crimen falsi conviction for purposes

of impeaching a witness, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 

 (Pa. Super.

1996). But cf., e.g., DeNillo v. Denillo, 

 (Pa. Super. 1987) (finding a

parent’s ARD resolution as to a charge involving sexual misconduct relevant in a custody

dispute to determine the child’s best interests, at least where a prima facie case was

established at a preliminary hearing). The question is whether that also means the

government violates due process when it makes a driver with a prior ARD acceptance

4 Although the driver’s arrest record is ordinarily expunged absent objection by the
Commonwealth, see 

 PennDOT is required to retain a record of the driver’s ARD
acceptance for ten years. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1534.


                                      [J-85-2024] - 4
ineligible for an exemption from the ordinary license suspension that follows from a

criminal conviction on a DUI charge. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e). To answer that question,

it is helpful briefly to review what due process requires of the government.

       When the state seeks to deprive a person of a constitutionally protected interest

such as driving privileges, see PennDOT v. Middaugh, 

, 435 & n.11 (Pa.

2021) (affirming that the continued possession of a driver’s license constitutes a

constitutionally-protected interest whether labeled as a right or a privilege), it must provide

“the process that is due.” Commonwealth v. Turner, 

 (Pa. 2013). One

facet of that process is procedural in nature. Under the “procedural due process” rubric,

the affected person must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Shoul v.

PennDOT, 

 (Pa. 2017) (referring to these factors as the “fundamental

requirement” of procedural due process) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 

 (1950)); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 

 (Pa. 2003).

The contours of such notice and opportunity are determined through a balancing test in

which courts weigh the private interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and

the government’s interest. See Bundy v. Wetzel, 

 (Pa. 2018) (citing

Mathews v. Eldridge, 

 (1976)). 5

5 A distinct set of procedural safeguards are required where the government seeks to

impose criminal punishment. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

(2000) (describing the defendant’s right to require the prosecution to prove guilt to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt).
To the extent Appellant may be understood to suggest those safeguards apply here on
the basis that a one-year license suspension amounts to criminal punishment, see Brief
for Appellant at 9, we reject the argument. See, e.g., PennDOT v. McCafferty, 

 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a one-year license suspension imposed by PennDOT
based on an out-of-state DUI conviction was a civil collateral consequence of that
conviction and not a criminal prosecution in violation of the driver’s double-jeopardy
rights); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 

 (Pa. 1993) (stating that a license
suspension administratively imposed by PennDOT per the Vehicle Code is a collateral
civil sanction and not a criminal penalty).


                                       [J-85-2024] - 5
       Appellant does not contend he was denied procedural due process. But due

process also incorporates the distinct concept, under the label “substantive due process,”

that our organic law protects individuals from arbitrary and unjust legislation – a precept

that has been held to subsist in the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids states from

depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, as well as in

Article I, Section 1 of our State Charter, which guarantees the right to life, liberty, property,

and reputation. See Shoul, 

 (reciting that “a law which purports to be an

exercise of the police power must not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently

beyond the necessities of the case” (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 

 (Pa. 1954))); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 

, 876, (Pa. 2024); Khan v.

State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 

 (Pa. 2004). It is on this facet of

due process that Appellant’s challenge rests. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 7.

       A claim that state action violates substantive due process invokes a means-end

inquiry pursuant to which the reviewing court examines the relationship between the law

and the governmental interest the law seeks to achieve. See Ladd v. Real Estate

Comm’n, 

, 1108 (Pa. 2020) (citing and quoting Nixon v. Commonwealth,

, 286-87 & n.15 (Pa. 2003)). Such a challenge may be facial in nature, as

we saw in D.P. v. G.J.P., 

 (Pa. 2016), where a child’s parents challenged a

Domestic Relations Code provision that gave the child’s grandparents standing to file an

action seeking partial physical custody solely based on the parents having separated.

Applying strict judicial scrutiny as the appropriate means-ends inquiry because the statute

burdened the parents’ fundamental rights, we held the provision was not narrowly tailored

to serve a compelling state interest and, as such, it violated the parents’ substantive due

process rights. We therefore severed the offending language from the statute. See 

; see also Shoul, 

 (holding that a provision of the Vehicle Code




                                        [J-85-2024] - 6
that imposed a lifetime disqualification from holding a commercial driver’s license for

persons convicted of certain drug crimes while using a motor vehicle did not violate

substantive due process because it was rationally related to the legitimate governmental

interest in deterring drug trafficking). Whereas D.P. involved a fundamental right, thus

triggering strict scrutiny, Shoul did not, and hence, the right involved in that matter, as

here, implicated rational-basis review.

       A substantive due process challenge can also be mounted based on the way an

otherwise legitimate law is applied in discrete circumstances. See Middaugh, 244 A.3d

at 434 (“In outlier situations – that is, situations that depart substantially from the ordinary

and expected application of a law – due process norms can be invoked to restrain

enforcement of a law under the circumstances where it appears that the targeting of the

particular person or entity in question will do little to achieve the evident legislative

objective.”). Thus, in Middaugh, a driver’s privileges were suspended based on a DUI

conviction, but for reasons that did not appear in the record, PennDOT did not notify him

of the suspension for 28 months. By that time his personal circumstances had changed

to the point the trial court found he would suffer substantial prejudice from the unexplained

delay. Considering that his driving record had remained clean in the interim, we found

the suspension had “lost much of its effectiveness [to achieve] its underlying legislative

purpose,” thus denying the driver the “fundamental fairness” with which the Constitution

demanded he be treated by the government. Middaugh, 244 A.3d at 439; see also Ladd,

230 A.3d at 1103 (addressing the question of whether the Real Estate Licensing and

Registration Act violated substantive due process as applied to a person whose activities

were limited to managing a few short-term vacation rental properties).

       The present challenge is facial. Appellant does not contend his situation is an

outlier and that he should be exempt from an otherwise-valid statute.              Instead, he




                                       [J-85-2024] - 7
maintains Section 3804(e) facially violates due process by excluding anyone with a prior

ARD acceptance from the exception to the license suspension requirement that ordinarily

follows from a DUI conviction.

      Legislation affecting driving privileges is evaluated under the rational basis test.

See Plowman v. PennDOT, 

 (Pa. 1993). Where, as here, that standard

is invoked as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law, the means-ends inquiry is still

deferential but less so than if it had been implicated solely under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.           The statute, like all duly enacted

legislation, enjoys a strong presumption of validity, and it will only be invalidated if it

violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, and plainly. See Lohr v. Saratoga Partners,

L.P., 

, 1209 (Pa. 2020). But instead of considering whether we may

conceive of any plausible basis for the challenged provision, see FCC v. Beach

Commc’ns, Inc., 

 (1993), we evaluate whether the statute bears a real

and substantial relation to the ends sought to be achieved, and is neither patently

oppressive nor unnecessary to those ends. See Shoul, 

. 6 In undertaking

that evaluation, we do not purport to second-guess the wisdom or soundness of the public

policy choices made by the General Assembly; we only ask whether a constitutional

6 The concurrence would utilize this case to disapprove the Gambone standard applicable

under our State Charter. We express no view concerning whether Gambone should be
overruled in an appeal where the issue has been preserved and briefed, and is material
to the outcome. See Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 

 (Pa. 2008)
(“No party has asked us to overrule our precedent, and we have no briefing on the
considerations affecting stare decisis. However legitimate the Dissent’s concerns might
be in an appropriate case, for decisional purposes, we respectfully do not believe they
are appropriate here.”). Although we did overrule precedent sua sponte in Freed v.
Geisinger Medical Center, 

 (Pa. 2009), opinion on reargument, 

(Pa. 2010), the continued vitality of such precedent was material to the outcome of that
case. Here, by contrast, Appellant cannot prevail under the traditional rational basis test
or the Gambone standard. Because our reconsideration of Gambone would thus be
advisory in nature, we leave the issue for a future case in which its resolution can have a
practical effect on the result.


                                     [J-85-2024] - 8
violation has occurred. See id.; Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth.,

 (Pa. 2007) (“[I]t is the Legislature’s chief function to set public

policy and the courts’ role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations.”).

       In forwarding his argument, Appellant paints Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code

as a recidivist statute. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 17. He claims he was convicted

of an offense that “does not have a license suspension penalty,” and that PennDOT is

improperly treating him as a recidivist, which is the only reason it suspended his driver’s

license.   Appellant asserts that this violates substantive due process because it is

fundamentally unfair to impose a license suspension – which, again, he terms a

“recidivist” measure – absent “proof of wrongdoing.” Id. at 7; see also id. at 20 (“Without

a finding of fault, it is improper to interfere with the enjoyment of a protected property

interest.”). He reasons that, here, there was no proof of wrongdoing because “[t]he

acceptance of ARD disposition involves no finding of fault.” Id. at 22.

       What Appellant overlooks is that the finding of wrongdoing follows from his

conviction for the present offense. That conviction is the direct statutory basis for his

license suspension. In other words, PennDOT suspended his license because of his

2020 DUI conviction, not as a civil consequence for his 2012 ARD acceptance. Section

3804(e), quoted above, directs that when anyone is convicted of DUI, PennDOT must

suspend that person’s driver’s license, subject to a narrow exception for which Appellant

does not qualify. 7 This civil sanction is imposed under the Vehicle Code as an exercise

of the state’s police power “for the purpose of preserving the public health, safety and



7 While Appellant repeatedly emphasizes that his presumption of innocence was never

rebutted by his 2012 ARD acceptance, see, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 13
(“The critical difference between a conviction . . . and the acceptance of ARD . . . is and
remains the presumption of innocence.”), his presumption of innocence was rebutted in
2020 when he was convicted of DUI.


                                        [J-85-2024] - 9
welfare,” which has been termed “probably the most important function of government.”

Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 

 (Pa. 1983).

       If the General Assembly had left that narrow exception out of Section 3804(e)(2)

entirely, and simply made a blanket rule that everyone who is convicted of DUI is subject

to a suspension of driving privileges, the entire premise of Appellant’s argument would

vanish. And such suspensions would bear an obvious “real and substantial relation” to

the Commonwealth’s undeniable interest in deterring drunk driving, see Birchfield v. North

Dakota, 

 (2016) (observing that states have a compelling interest in

deterring drunk driving), and in removing drivers who have been convicted of DUI from

the Commonwealth’s roadways for a period of time. See Illinois v. Batchelder, 

 (1983) (describing that state interest as “particularly strong”). As it is, the

General Assembly has made essentially that very rule, albeit subject to a narrow

exception for drivers who satisfy certain criteria, including that they have no prior

convictions or ARD acceptances. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2). The question becomes,

then, whether it violates due process for the Legislature to determine that a driver in

Appellant’s position should not be eligible for the statutory exception. 8

       We find that such a legislative determination is neither unfair nor unreasonable,

nor is the prescribed action oppressive or unnecessary to the legislative goals involved.

When a driver is charged with DUI as a first-time offender under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, as a

matter of legislative grace the driver may, at the district attorney’s discretion, accept the

terms of ARD as an avenue to avoid the criminal process. See id. § 3807(a). Such a

driver is under no compulsion to accept ARD and enjoys the full panoply of constitutional

8 Because we resolve this specific issue – indeed it is the central issue of the case – we

have taken appropriate care to analyze “the statute that we have.” Concurring Op. at 12.
Our earlier reference to a hypothetical statute without the exception serves a limited
purpose: to illustrate why Appellant is wrong in suggesting the challenged provision
imposes a license suspension without a predicate finding of wrongdoing.


                                      [J-85-2024] - 10
rights attendant to any criminal prosecution. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 317. But ARD, if the

defendant does accept it, is not a “trivial mechanism for avoiding a conviction and

expunging an arrest record.      Rather, it is an intensive process involving personal

assessments, safety classes, and addiction treatment, if necessary, all under court

supervision for six months to a year[.]” Whalen v. PennDOT, 

 (Pa. 2011);

see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(b). The court-imposed conditions may include those “imposed

with respect to probation after conviction of a crime,” such as restitution, costs,

administrative expenses, and any other conditions agreed to by the parties. Pa.R.Crim.P.

316(A); see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(b). In some instances, a suspension of driving privileges

must accompany the ARD acceptance itself. See id. § 3807(d)(2)-(4). 9

       These are only some of the terms a driver voluntarily agrees to in return for

avoiding exposure to a criminal conviction and all of its potential adverse consequences.

See Concurring Op. at 14 (listing other consequences). And while a driver’s acceptance

of ARD does not constitute an admission or finding of guilt, it does reflect a decision by

the driver not to affirmatively dispute his commission of the offense as, for example, he

agrees to undergo rehabilitation and to reimburse others for financial losses occasioned

by his conduct. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(b)(1)(v). Further, by the time a driver accepts

9 Section 3807(d), entitled “Mandatory suspension of operating privileges,” requires the

court to “order the defendant’s license suspended as follows: (1) There shall be no
license suspension if the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of testing
was less than 0.10%. (2) For 30 days if the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at
the time of testing was at least 0.10% but less than 0.16%. (3) For 60 days if: (i) the
defendant’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of testing was 0.16% or higher; (ii)
the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is not known; (iii) an accident which resulted
in bodily injury or in damage to a vehicle or other property occurred in connection with the
events surrounding the current offense; or (iv) the defendant was charged pursuant to
section 3802(d) [involving controlled substances]. (4) For 90 days if the defendant was a
minor at the time of the offense.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(d).
We note parenthetically that Appellant’s driving privileges were, in fact, suspended for 60
days in connection with his 2012 ARD acceptance. See RR. 74a-76a.


                                     [J-85-2024] - 11
ARD, he has been advised of the charges lodged by the Commonwealth and has had a

chance to obtain a lawyer or have one appointed. A court hearing has been held with the

driver’s counsel present in which the court has ensured he understands and agrees to

the terms of the program.      See Pa.R.Crim.P. 312, 313.       If the driver successfully

completes ARD, some indication thereof becomes part of his record of prior conduct so

that, for example, he cannot again be considered for ARD on a subsequent charge within

ten years, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(a)(2)(i), and the ARD acceptance is considered in an

evaluation of whether he is a habitual offender, see id. § 1542(c). See generally supra

note 4.

      We also cannot overlook that the new DUI charge arose after the driver, who had

the right in relation to the earlier charge to require the Commonwealth to prove his guilt

of every element of the offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, voluntarily waived

that right in favor of ARD and then elected to drive under the influence thereafter. 10

Because driving under the influence is a “life-threatening act,” Commonwealth v. Lutz,

 (Pa. 1985); see also Mikulan, 

 (referring to the

“carnage caused by drunk drivers” (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 

(1983))), it is in the public interest to deter that particular conduct through a license-

suspension scheme per which drivers convicted of DUI must suffer a temporary loss of

driving privileges if they resolved a prior DUI charge through ARD acceptance. Such

individuals “have chosen to drive drunk after having been placed under court supervision,

after having been enrolled in alcohol highway safety school, and [in some cases] after



10 Appellant emphasizes that the only rights a driver waives by entering ARD are the rights

to a speedy trial and to a statute-of-limitations defense, see Brief for Appellant at 18;
Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 14, but that only applies where the defendant fails to
complete ARD. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 312(2). Our present discussion relates to a driver who
successfully completes ARD and subsequently drives under the influence.


                                     [J-85-2024] - 12
having had their operating privileges suspended” in connection with the ARD.

Commonwealth v. Becker, 

 (Pa. Super. 1987).

       One of the primary goals of the ARD program is to incentivize drivers who have

been charged with DUI to refrain from drinking and driving in the future.            Accord

Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 11 (“A licensee who accepts ARD . . . understands the

gravity of a DUI violation and should be fully aware of the consequences of another arrest

for DUI.”). It is rational to believe an individual who completes ARD and thereafter drives

while intoxicated is “less easily deterred from continuing to drink and drive than first time

offenders who have had no prior contact with the criminal justice system.” Becker, 

; accord Brief for Appellee at 6 (positing the General Assembly has permissibly

determined that such drivers have “not demonstrated an understanding of the severe

danger to the public caused by [their] driving under the influence”). Because such a driver

has demonstrated through his actions that his prior ARD did not have the desired

deterrent effect, the General Assembly concluded his driver’s license should be

suspended and, as such, the exception written into the statute should not apply. We

perceive no substantive due process violation inherent in that scheme.

       The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed. 11

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty and McCaffery join the opinion.

       Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.

       Justice Donohue concurs in result.

       Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

11  After oral argument concluded, Appellant filed a motion for post-submission
communication pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2501, which allows such communication only
where permitted at the time of oral argument or when there has been a material change
in the status of a legal authority. Because the motion does not suggest any such change
has taken place, and we did not permit the filing at oral argument, the motion is denied.
See Commonwealth v. Abdul Salaam, 

, 504 n.3 (Pa. 2002).


                                      [J-85-2024] - 13