[J-89-2024]
                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                  MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   No. 5 MAP 2024
                                                  :
                                                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                v.                                :   Superior Court at No. 511 MDA
                                                  :   2022 entered on July 11, 2023
                                                  :   Affirming the Order of the
  MANUEL ALEJANDRO RONDON                         :   Cumberland County Court of
                                                  :   Common Pleas at No. CP-21-CR-
                                                  :   0001073-2020 entered on March 8,
  APPEAL OF: STEPHEN HOBBS, SURETY                :   2022
                                                  :
                                                  :   ARGUED: November 19, 2024


              OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT


 JUSTICE McCAFFERY                                       DECIDED: August 19, 2025
        Today, we are asked to construe the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1, which

 governs forfeiture of bail proceedings. Section 5747.1 gives the lower court discretion to

 revoke a defendant’s bail when the defendant “fails to appear for any scheduled court

 proceeding.” Id. at (a). The section further directs the court to “set aside” the revocation

 under certain circumstances. Id. at (b)(2). Of most relevance to this appeal, if bail is

 “reinstated[,]” the court is prohibited from continuing a bail bondsman’s suretyship on the

 reinstated bail absent written consent from the bail bondsman. Id.

        The question we must answer is whether Section 5747.1’s written consent

 requirement is triggered when the initial revocation of bail resulted from a breakdown in

 court administration.      We conclude that written consent is required in those

 circumstances.      While a breakdown in court administration is a valid excuse for a
defendant’s failure to appear, it does not alter the basic fact that the defendant failed to

appear for a scheduled proceeding. Further, under the facts presented here, the trial

court clearly intended to reinstate bail for the defendant without a forfeiture — it did not

void the original bail revocation — and acknowledged that the consent of the bail

bondsman (Appellant Stephen Hobbs) was a necessary precondition to reinstatement of

bail.     Thus, the trial court erred in failing to obtain Hobbs’s written consent before

reinstating bail. Nonetheless, Hobbs did not timely appeal the order reinstating bail

despite having at least constructive notice of the order. We thus conclude Hobbs is due

no relief. So, while we disagree with the reasoning of the Superior Court, we affirm the

result.

I. Factual and Procedural History

          The factual and procedural history of this case is largely undisputed. To the extent

there are factual disputes, we note them where appropriate. Manuel Alejandro Rondon

was arrested in May 2020 on charges of possession with intent to deliver heroin and

fentanyl, as well as other, associated charges. The monetary condition of bail was initially

set at $500,000. When Rondon could not post that amount, he moved to reduce bail.

The bail authority granted the request and lowered the monetary condition to $75,000.

With Hobbs’s assistance, Rondon posted the required bail security on June 18, 2020. In

executing the bail bond, Hobbs agreed he was liable for the full sum of $75,000 if Rondon

failed to appear as required for any court proceeding.

          Several months later, the court scheduled a pretrial conference for October 1,

2020. In short order, the court administrator rescheduled the conference for Tuesday,

September 29th.

          What happened next is disputed, but after a hearing, the trial court found that the

court administrator informed Rondon’s counsel that the pretrial conference had been




                                        [J-89-2024] - 2
moved to Monday, October 5th. However, the court administrator failed to inform the trial

judge of the rescheduled conference and also failed to record the new date on the docket.

Thus, when Rondon and his counsel failed to appear on September 29th, the trial court

issued a bench warrant for Rondon and revoked his bail. The written order indicates that

Hobbs was served with the order revoking bail.

       On Monday, October 5th, Rondon and his attorney attended a virtual meeting, held

before a different trial judge. Rondon and his counsel believed they were attending the

previously scheduled pretrial conference. When informed of the bail revocation and

bench warrant, Rondon’s counsel explained his confusion regarding the scheduling of the

pretrial conference. The second judge accepted counsel’s explanation and announced

that she intended to vacate the bench warrant and reinstate bail.          However, she

acknowledged she could not reinstate bail for Rondon without first gaining the consent of

Hobbs.    Accordingly, she directed counsel to determine if Hobbs consented to the

continuation of his suretyship. 1

       After a break, counsel returned and stated Hobbs consented to the continuation. 2

Further, counsel indicated that Hobbs had offered to fax or e-mail a written documentation

of his consent. The trial judge determined that documentation was unnecessary, as she

accepted counsel’s representations as an officer of the court. Accordingly, the court

“ordered that the bench warrant previously issued [was] vacated and bail [was]

reinstated.” Order of Court, 10/5/2020.



1 We note that these proceedings were all held virtually due to the ongoing Covid-19

pandemic. The trial court does not assert these circumstances as an excuse for the
breakdown in court operations or for its failure to gain written consent from Hobbs.
2 The trial court, after a hearing on March 1, 2022, found Rondon’s counsel credible when

he testified that he had spoken with Hobbs’s office on October 5, 2020. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/30/2022, at 2 n.5.


                                     [J-89-2024] - 3
       For the next five months, the case proceeded along the normal course. Rondon’s

counsel sought suppression of both physical evidence and statements made by Rondon

after his arrest. The trial court denied suppression, and after several continuances,

Rondon retained new counsel in March 2021. On June 22, 2021, the trial court denied

Rondon’s request for a continuance and directed him to appear for trial on Monday, July

12, 2021. Rondon failed to appear on that date, and the trial court entered an order

issuing a bench warrant and revoking Rondon’s bail. See Order of Court, 7/12/2021.

       The court also issued and served on Hobbs a form order informing Hobbs that

Rondon had failed to appear, his bail was revoked, and the “monetary condition of release

in the amount of $75[,]000.00 may be forfeited.” Notice of Revocation and Intent to Forfeit

Bail, 7/19/2021.   In bold type, the notice indicated that “according to 42 Pa.C.S. §

5747.1(b)(3), ‘Failure to render payment of the forfeited undertaking by the close of

business on the 91st day shall bar any right of remission to collect funds pursuant to the

forfeited untertakings’ if the Defendant is recovered from the 91st day to 2 years.” Id.

       The record reflects, and Hobbs does not dispute, that Hobbs made no effort to

withdraw his surety bond before October 13, 2021. See Hobbs’s Principal Brief at 10.

On that date, Hobbs filed a petition to strike or set aside the bail forfeiture, asserting that

the trial court failed to obtain his written consent to continue as surety after Rondon’s bail

was reinstated on October 5, 2020. See Petition to Strike and/or Set Aside Bail and

Forfeiture and Exonerate Surety, at ¶ 7. Further, he indicated that the County did not

oppose the requested relief. See id. at ¶ 9. After a hearing, the trial court denied Hobbs’s

petition. See Order of Court, 3/1/2022.

II. Superior Court Decision

       In a unanimous, published opinion, the Superior Court affirmed.                    See

Commonwealth v. Rondon, 

 (Pa. Super. 2023). The panel agreed with the




                                       [J-89-2024] - 4
trial court that Rondon did not “fail to appear” since a breakdown in court operations had

led him to believe the pretrial conference had been rescheduled. 

. As a result,

the revocation of bail was not caused by Rondon, but by court error. See 

.

The panel concluded that requiring the consent of Hobbs to reinstate bail would be an

“absurd result.” 

 (citation omitted). Due to this absurdity, the panel determined “the

plain language of the statute does not contemplate that the trial court must secure the

written consent of the bail bondsman in order to continue suretyship where the initial

forfeiture of bail was due to a court error.” See 

.

III. Issue and Standard of Review

       This Court granted Hobbs’s petition for allowance of appeal, limited to the following

question:

       Is the written consent requirement of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2) triggered
       when the court’s revocation and forfeiture of a defendant’s bail was the
       result of a court error?


Commonwealth v. Rondon, 

 (per curiam order).

       Hobbs’s issue explicitly requires us to interpret 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1. In construing

a statute, we seek to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1

Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The primary indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the statute’s plain

language. See Commonwealth v. Lehman, 

, 1044 (Pa. 2024) (citation

omitted). To interpret the meaning of words that the statute does not explicitly define, “we

turn to an examination of dictionary definitions.” Ursinus College v. Prevailing Wage

Appeals Board, 

, 171 (Pa. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, that unambiguous interpretation

controls. See Lehman, 311 A.3d at 1044.




                                      [J-89-2024] - 5
       On the other hand, if the plain language is ambiguous, we must go beyond the text

and consider other factors. See A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 

(Pa. 2016). These factors include, but are not limited to:


       the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances
       under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be
       attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon
       the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular
       interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute.

 (citation omitted).

IV. Statutory Construction of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1

       We begin by noting that Section 5747.1 provides a calendar for the bail revocation

process. 3 This calendar starts with subsection (a), which details when bail may be

revoked and that a bail revocation order serves as notice of intent to forfeit the monetary

condition of bail:

       If a defendant in a criminal prosecution fails to appear for any scheduled
       court proceeding, the defendant’s bail may be revoked and notice of
       revocation shall serve as notice of intent to forfeit the bail of the defendant.
       The notice of order of revocation shall be served by the office of the clerk to
       the defendant, surety, or bail bondsman and insurer who has issued the
       qualifying power of attorney for the bail bondsman by certified mail, return
       receipt requested.


 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(a). Subsection (b)(2) begins by referring to a “forfeited undertaking”

and “the notice of revocation[,]” both of which necessarily refer back to subsection (a):

       Payment of forfeited undertaking shall be made directly to the office of the
       clerk not later than the close of business on the 91st day following the

3 We further note that our Rules of Criminal Procedure also purport to govern the bail

revocation process. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 536. While largely harmonized, there are possible
tensions between Section 5747.1 and Rule 536 (i.e., Rule 536 does not distinguish
between sureties and bail bondsmen). None of these tensions are relevant to the current
appeal, so our decision should not be construed as resolving them.


                                       [J-89-2024] - 6
       service of the notice of revocation. If the defendant has been recovered
       and placed into custody through the efforts of the bail bondsman or proof
       has been provided to the court that the defendant was discovered by the
       bail bondsman to be in custody in another jurisdiction prior to the 91st day,
       no payment of the forfeited undertaking shall be required. If the defendant
       is placed into custody or discovered to be in custody, the court shall set
       aside the bail revocation and may release the defendant with the
       reinstitution of bail pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
       Procedure. The bail bondsman shall not be continued by the court as surety
       on reinstated bail unless a written consent is signed by the bail bondsman
       agreeing to such extension of suretyship.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). Accordingly, interpretation of subsection (b)(2) requires an

understanding of the process as laid out by Section 5747.1 in its entirety.

       As noted, bail revocation and forfeiture proceedings under Section 5747.1 begin

when “a defendant … fails to appear.” 4 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(a). When a defendant fails

to appear, the court may revoke the defendant’s bail. See id. The revocation must be

served on “the defendant, surety or bail bondsman and insurer who has issued the

qualifying power of attorney for the bail bondsman[,]” and “shall serve as notice of intent

to forfeit” the monetary condition of bail. Id. Here, we observe the Legislature has

explicitly defined both “bail bondsman” and “surety[:]”

       “Bail bondsman.” A person who engages in the business of giving bail as
       a surety for compensation.

                                          …




4 For violations of other conditions of bail, third party sureties, including bail bondsmen,

are not subject to forfeiture of the monetary condition of bail. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
5747.1(b)(6). Instead, they may be subject to fines and bail bondsman license revocation
if they knowingly fail to report a violation to the appropriate law enforcement agency. See
42 Pa.C.S. § 5750. In contrast, the defendant himself may be convicted for indirect
contempt of court based on the violation of any other bail condition, see 42 Pa.C.S. §
5747.1(b)(6), and may be subject to forfeiture of the monetary condition of bail as well.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(d) (“Nothing under this section shall preclude the attorney for
the Commonwealth from seeking a bail forfeiture directly from the defendant.”).


                                      [J-89-2024] - 7
       “Surety.” A person who pledges security, whether or not for compensation,
       in exchange for the release from custody of a person charged with a crime
       prior to adjudication.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5741. From these definitions, we discern that a “bail bondsman” is a

subcategory of “surety:” both are third parties who supply security to release a defendant

on bail, but only a “bail bondsman” does so for compensation as a business model. There

is no dispute, for purposes of this appeal, that Hobbs is a “bail bondsman.”

       The date the surety or bail bondsman is served with the notice of intent to forfeit is

day zero for the Section 5747.1 timeline. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(1). On day 90, “the

revocation shall become a judgment of forfeiture, payment of which shall be immediately

required by the defendant or the surety.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). To wit, the payment

must be made by the close of business on day 91, or else the liable party (the surety or

bail bondsman and insurer who has issued the qualifying power of attorney for the bail

bondsman) loses the right to seek remission of the forfeited bail. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

5747.1(b)(3). 5

       The judgment of forfeiture can be avoided prior to day 91 under certain

circumstances:

       If the defendant has been recovered and placed into custody through the
       efforts of the bail bondsman or proof has been provided to the court that the
       defendant was discovered by the bail bondsman to be in custody in another
       jurisdiction prior to the 91st day, no payment of the forfeited undertaking
       shall be required.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). 6 The statute does not explicitly provide for any right of

remission prior to the 91st day for sureties other than bail bondsmen.

5 Bail bondsmen, such as Hobbs, may be subject to further penalties.  See 42 Pa.C.S. §
5747.1(b)(2) (stating that if a bail bondsman fails to make a “timely” payment on the
judgment, the appropriate district attorney or county solicitor is directed to pursue
suspension or non-renewal of the bail bondsman’s license).
6 We discern no statutory language that supports the Concurring and Dissenting opinion’s

conclusion that the bail revocation must be declared void ab initio. Instead, as the plain
(continued…)

                                      [J-89-2024] - 8
       If the defendant is “recovered” after day 91, “a surety may petition the court … to

remit all or a portion” of the forfeited bail. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(5). The surety is entitled

to the full amount of the forfeited bond, minus $250, if the defendant is recovered after 91

days but before six months. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(5)(i). If the defendant is

recovered between six months and one year, the surety is entitled to 80% of the amount

of the forfeited bond. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(5)(ii). If the defendant is recovered

between one and two years, the surety is entitled to 50% of the amount of the forfeited

bond. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(5)(iii). Notably, unlike subsection (b)(2), all sureties,

not just bail bondsmen, are entitled to remission under the subsection (b)(5) schedule.

V. Whether Rondon “Failed to Appear”

       Returning to the case before us, three operative facts are undisputed: (1) Hobbs

is a bail bondsman under the statute; (2) Rondon was returned to the custody of the court

before the 91st day; and (3) Rondon’s return was not secured through Hobbs’s efforts.

The Attorney General argues that both the trial court and the Superior Court correctly

recognized that Rondon never “fail[ed] to appear.” 7 Amicus Brief of Attorney General at

14. Thus, according to the Attorney General, Section 5747.1’s provisions were never

invoked. See id.

       The Attorney General’s argument is belied by the record. The September 30, 2020

order had two components. First, it issued a bench warrant for Rondon. Second, it

directed that “[a]ny previous bail is forfeited.” Order of Court, 9/30/2020. The subsequent

order, entered by a second, different judge, on October 5, 2020, vacated the bench

warrant and “reinstated” bail. The October 5th order did not vacate the bail forfeiture.


language sets forth, the bail authority must “set aside” the revocation and cannot require
“payment of the forfeited undertaking[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5747.1(b)(2).
7 Cumberland County declined to take a position in this appeal.     In our order granting
allowance of appeal, we invited the Attorney General to participate as amicus curiae.


                                       [J-89-2024] - 9
And there is no indication in the record that the second judge intended to vacate the bail

forfeiture; rather, the record indicates the judge clearly understood that Hobbs’s consent

was required to reinstate bail:

       THE COURT: The new rules - - sir, did you have a conversation with his
       bail bondsman about whether he would be willing to stand by the bail?

       [COUNSEL:] I have not yet, judge.

       THE COURT: I should have started with that. I cannot under the bail bonds
       rules, they got that accomplished, I can’t do anything with his bail unless his
       bail bondsman is given an opportunity to be heard. So you have to give him
       or her a call and see if they are willing to stand by the bail and let me know
       that. I will give you some time to do that. I can’t handle the bench warrant
       until I know that.


N.T. 10/5/2020, Request ID: 4124, at 5. 8

       Further, we note that there is no contention that the September 30th order was the

result of a mistake that is evident from the face of the order or the record.            See

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 

 (Pa. 2007) (permitting a trial court to correct an

error that is obvious on the face of the record). Neither party asserts that, on September

30th, the court was aware of the breakdown in court operations. Rather, the confusion

caused by the court administrator was only brought to the court’s attention on October

5th. Under these circumstances, the September 30th order was valid when issued. 9

8 There are two transcripts from the October 5th proceedings — one transcript detailing

the discussion before counsel contacted Hobbs, and one transcript of the proceedings
after counsel contacted Hobbs. We utilize the “Request ID” of each transcript to
differentiate between the two, as there is no other explicit distinction on the cover page of
each.
9 The Concurring and Dissenting opinion would prefer to interpret the statute such that

the written consent requirement applies only if bail is revoked because the defendant
chose not to attend a scheduled court date. See CDO at 11. Try as we might, we cannot
locate this language in the statute as written. Instead, the statute identifies the
precondition as “If a defendant in a criminal prosecution fails to appear for any
scheduled court proceeding[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5474.1(a). While we may agree, as a matter
(continued…)

                                      [J-89-2024] - 10
Once Rondon presented evidence of the breakdown in court operations, the trial court

was authorized to exercise its equitable powers to vacate the bench warrant and reinstate

bail.   But it could not, and indeed did not, indicate that it intended to “correct” the

September 30th order.

        Accepting the Attorney General’s position could have unintended consequences:

what if a law enforcement officer had executed the bench warrant before October 5 and

apprehended Rondon? Would the court’s subsequent acceptance of Rondon’s excuse

for non-appearance render the arrest illegal? There is no reason to inject uncertainty into

the process when it is clear the October 5th order did not “void” the bail forfeiture notice,

but rather “reinstated” bail.

VI. Whether Hobbs’s Written Consent was Necessary to Reinstate Rondon’s Bail

        Hobbs argues that the statute unambiguously requires the court to obtain his

written consent to continue as surety after bail has been reinstated. The Attorney General

counters by asserting that Section 5747.1(b)(2)’s written consent requirement must be

restricted to circumstances where the defendant’s recovery is secured through the efforts

of a bail bondsman. Since, as set forth above, it is undisputed that Rondon’s recovery

was not secured through Hobbs’s efforts, the Attorney General posits that written consent

was not required.

        Both arguments have facial validity. Subsection (b)(2), when read in isolation,

could support the Attorney General’s inference.          Two of the four sentences in the

subsection explicitly reference “the bail bondsman.”          Further, the remaining two

sentences are written in the passive voice, thereby obscuring who is acting: “Payment of

forfeited undertaking shall be made ….”; and “If the defendant is placed into custody or


of policy, that a defendant should not suffer the possible loss of bail under circumstances
where he did not intentionally fail to appear, we are not free to ignore the plain language
utilized by the Legislature in an effort to attain our preferred policy outcome.


                                      [J-89-2024] - 11
discovered to be in custody ….” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). The Attorney General urges

us to interpret Subsection (b)(2) such that every provision in the section is restricted to

situations where a bail bondsman recovers or locates the defendant. Thus, the Attorney

General asserts that the fourth sentence of the subsection would be best interpreted as

follows: If the defendant is placed into custody or discovered to be in custody [by the bail

bondsman’s efforts], the court shall set aside the bail revocation and may release the

defendant with the reinstitution of bail pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

         In contrast, Hobbs encourages us to focus solely on the fourth and final sentence

of Subsection 5747.1(b)(2), which sets forth the written consent requirement: “The bail

bondsman shall not be continued by the court as surety on the reinstated bail unless a

written consent is signed by the bail bondsman agreeing to such extension of suretyship.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). Hobbs correctly observes that there is no language in the

sentence which limits its application to situations where the bail bondsman secures or

locates the defendant.

         The clash between the Attorney General’s position and Hobbs’s position is

perhaps best described as a disagreement about whether this Court must focus only on

the operative sentence in isolation (Hobbs), or instead focus only on the subsection in

isolation (Attorney General). We conclude that both arguments miss the forest for the

trees.

         Since both constructions are reasonable — i.e. it is not clear if written consent is

necessary when a defendant is recovered through means other than the efforts of a bail

bondsman — the statutory language is ambiguous. We therefore must consider the

occasion and circumstances under which the statute was enacted as well as the mischief

to be remedied and the consequences of a particular interpretation. In this regard, it is of




                                       [J-89-2024] - 12
note that Act 16 of 2015, which created Section 5747.1 as part of a comprehensive

treatment of bail bondsmen, was enacted shortly after this Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Hann, 

 (Pa. 2013). There, we addressed a bail bondsman’s

liability for a defendant’s breach of a bail condition other than non-appearance. 

.

Specifically, the Commonwealth sought forfeiture of a $100,000 bond supplied by a bail

bondsman when the defendant murdered his ex-girlfriend and committed suicide while at

liberty on bail. 

 Applying the contemporaneous version of Pa.R.Crim.P. 536 and

primarily foreign precedent, this Court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis

and opined that the surety’s status as a bail bondsman “lean[s] in favor of forfeiture” of

the monetary condition of bail. 

. Further, we held that “upon the government’s

showing that a defendant breached a condition of a bail bond, the burden then shift[s] to

the defendant or surety to prove that forfeiture was not warranted.” 

 Act 16 of 2015

was enacted approximately 20 months later and contains many provision that are contrary

to our holding in Hann.

       From this, we conclude that through Act 16 of 2015, the legislature had several

interrelated goals. First, the legislature desired to reject several aspects of our holding in

Hann. Perhaps foremost among the rejected holdings was our observation that a surety’s

status as a bail bondsman weighed in favor of forfeiture of the monetary condition of bail.

Instead, Act 16 of 2015 limits forfeiture of a surety’s bond solely to violations based upon

a failure to appear. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(6). For violations other than non-

appearance, bail bondsmen are subjected to professional license revocation and

monetary fines that are between $500 and $5,000. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5750.

       Additionally, Act 16 rejected Hann’s burden-shifting test regarding remission of

forfeiture. Under Hann, the Commonwealth bore the burden to establish a violation of a

bail condition by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hann, 

. Once a




                                      [J-89-2024] - 13
violation was established, the defendant or surety was required to establish that justice

did not require full forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. See 

 In place of this

paradigm, Act 16 provides for bright-line time-based reductions in the amount of money

forfeited by sureties when a defendant fails to appear. See 42 Pa.C.S. 5747.1(b)(2) and

(6). For example, if a defendant is recovered three months after forfeiture, a surety is

entitled to remission of the full value of the forfeited bond less $250. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

5747.1(b)(5)(i).   However, if the defendant is not recovered until nine months after

forfeiture, the surety’s entitlement to remission is reduced to 80% of the forfeited bond.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(5)(ii).

       This Court has long recognized that bail serves important foundational principles

in our system of law:

       The fundamental purpose of bail is to secure the presence of the accused
       at trial. However, in the absence of evidence the accused will flee, certain
       basic principles of our criminal law indicate bail should be granted, these
       are: (a) the importance of the presumption of innocence; (b) the distaste
       for the imposition of sanctions prior to trial and conviction; and (c) the desire
       to give the accused the maximum opportunity to prepare his defense.


Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 

 (Pa. 1972). Through Act 16, the

legislature clearly intended to reduce the risk faced by third-party sureties in supplying a

bail bond, thereby making bail affordable to more defendants.

       Act 16’s provisions also demonstrate the legislature’s second related goal:

incentivizing quick recovery of absent defendants. The scheme, set forth in Section

5747.1(b), reduces the amount of remission a surety is entitled to as the time between

forfeiture and recovery increases. This sliding scale of remission indicates a preference

for quick recovery of absconding defendants.

       With these purposes in mind, we turn to the specifics of Act 16’s structure. Section

5747.1(a) provides that a court may revoke the bail of a defendant who does not appear



                                      [J-89-2024] - 14
for a required proceeding. Further, the bail revocation constitutes notice of intent to forfeit

bail, and 90 days after that notice is served on the appropriate party, the notice

automatically becomes a judgment of forfeiture. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(1). Read in

isolation, subsections (a) and (b)(1) provide no explicit mechanism for avoiding the entry

of the judgment of forfeiture.

       The second sentence of Subsection (b)(2), when read in isolation, provides a

mechanism for a bail bondsman, and only a bail bondsman, to avoid the entry of the

judgment of forfeiture:


       If the defendant has been recovered and placed into custody through the
       efforts of the bail bondsman or proof has been provided to the court that the
       defendant was discovered by the bail bondsman to be in custody in another
       jurisdiction prior to the 91st day, no payment of the forfeited undertaking
       shall be required.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2).

       The third sentence — “If the defendant is placed into custody or discovered to be

in custody, the court shall set aside the bail revocation and may release the defendant

with the reinstitution of bail pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure” —

requires the court to set aside the bail revocation and allows the court to release the

defendant by reinstating bail pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. Read in

isolation, this sentence is not limited to bail bondsmen, but also does not have any

reference to time. Thus, taken literally, the third sentence of Subsection (b)(2) directs the

court to set aside the bail revocation no matter when the defendant is placed into, or

discovered to be in, custody, rendering the second sentence utterly superfluous. Even

more troubling, a literal reading of the third sentence in isolation would render the entirety

of Subsection (b)(5) superfluous.

       If we accept Hobbs’s suggestion that each sentence in Subsection (b)(2) is an

island, the third sentence requires a trial court to set aside the bail revocation no matter


                                      [J-89-2024] - 15
when the defendant was recovered. As this contradicts the explicit provisions of other

sentences in Subsection (b)(2) as well as the entirety of Subsection (b)(5), this quite

clearly is not what the Legislature intended.       See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922 (“the General

Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”).

       Similarly, if we accept the Attorney General’s preferred construction, Subsection

(b)(2) applies only to bail bondsmen; other third-party sureties gain no benefit from the

90-day period before the notice of forfeiture automatically becomes a judgment of

forfeiture:

       If the defendant has been recovered and placed into custody through the
       efforts of the bail bondsman or proof has been provided to the court that the
       defendant was discovered by the bail bondsman to be in custody in another
       jurisdiction prior to the 91st day, no payment of the forfeited undertaking
       shall be required.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5747.1(b)(2). It is possible to find reasons why the Legislature may have

desired this result. However, viewing the statute as a whole, it would be absurd to

conclude the Legislature intended such a result.         To illustrate the absurdity of this

construction, consider what would happen if a non-bail bondsman surety located the

defendant thirty days after bail was revoked for non-appearance.              If we interpret

Subsection (b)(2) in accord with the Attorney General, such a surety could not benefit

from placing the defendant in the court’s custody before 90 days. Instead, that surety

only has a statutory remedy after 91 days have elapsed. 10            Further illustrating the


10 Contrary to the Concurring and Dissenting opinion’s strained interpretation of our
analysis, we do not conclude that it would be absurd for the Legislature to choose to
withhold a remedy to non-bail bondsmen sureties. See fn. 11, infra. Rather, our
conclusion rests entirely on the incentives that are created under the Concurring and
Dissenting opinion’s preferred construction: non-bail bondsmen sureties are better off
not returning a bail-jumper immediately, but instead waiting until after 90 days when they
have an explicit right to remission of a substantial portion of the forfeited bond. This result
is contrary to common sense, let alone the clear intent of the Legislature in enacting
Section 5747.1.


                                      [J-89-2024] - 16
problem, only defendants who contract with a bail bondsman, and whose return to court

is secured through the efforts of the bail bondsman, can have bail reinstated without any

forfeiture if they submit to the custody of the court within 90 days. This result is contrary

to the point of Subsection (b)(2) and Subsection (b)(5), both of which prioritize the timely

recovery of defendants, as well as goal of reducing the risk born by third-party sureties.

       Indeed, the clear intent of Section 5747.1 is to provide incentives for quickly

returning bail jumpers to the jurisdiction of the court, while providing sufficient

predictability for sureties to ensure bail is a realistic option for those defendants who are

detained pre-trial. Thus, contrary to the parties’ arguments, the proper construction of

Subsection (b)(2) recognizes that the third sentence, written in the passive voice, requires

a court to set aside the bail revocation, and allows for reinstatement of bail without

forfeiture, at the court’s discretion, no matter how the defendant is recovered: “If the

defendant is placed into custody or discovered to be in custody, the court shall set aside

the bail revocation and may release the defendant with the reinstitution of bail pursuant

to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.” From the second sentence and

Subsection (b)(5), we infer that the third sentence applies only to recoveries that occur

before the 91st day. Thus, a court may reinstate bail with no forfeiture of the monetary

condition of bail regardless of how the defendant was recovered, so long as it is before

the 91st day. In turn, the fourth sentence, which contains the written consent requirement,

applies to bail bondsmen whenever bail is “reinstated[]” pursuant to the third sentence. 11

       Here, as noted above, Rondon’s bail was revoked for non-appearance, placing

Hobbs’s bond in jeopardy. However, less than a week later, Rondon was “recovered,” as

he appeared before the trial court, albeit a different judge. The trial court was therefore

11 The fourth sentence explicitly applies only to bail bondsmen.  As the issue of whether
a court must obtain written consent of other third-party sureties before reinstating bail is
not before us, we do not reach that issue today.


                                      [J-89-2024] - 17
required to set aside the bail revocation and was permitted to reinstate bail for Rondon.

However, as even the trial court acknowledged, Hobbs’s consent was necessary before

continuing Hobbs’s bond.      Unfortunately, the trial court failed to recognize that this

consent was required to be in writing. Since the trial court did not obtain written consent

from Hobbs, the trial court erred by continuing Hobbs’s bond on the reinstated bail.

VII. Whether Hobbs Appealed From the Proper Order

       Nevertheless, it is important to note that Hobbs’s complaint is directed at the

October 5, 2020 order reinstating bail, not the March 1, 2022 order from which he actually

appealed. It is the October 5, 2020 order that constitutes trial court error, and Hobbs had

an obligation to seek specialized review of that order within 30 days. See Pa.R.A.P. 1602

(adopted Jan. 7, 2020, effective Aug. 1, 2020). Although the record does not indicate

whether Hobbs was served with the October 5th order, he was clearly served with the

September 29, 2020 order forfeiting Rondon’s bail. 12 He therefore was on notice that,

absent further action by the court, Rondon’s bail bond would be forfeited 90 days after

September 29th, or December 28, 2020. Since the bail bond was not forfeited for another

12 The Attorney General asserts that Hobbs was judicially estopped from asserting a

challenge to the October 5 order because Rondon’s counsel informed the trial court that
Hobbs consented to the reinstatement of bail. The doctrine of judicial estoppel provides
that, “[a]s a general rule, a party to an action is estopped from assuming a position
inconsistent with his or her assertion in a previous action, if his or her contention was
successfully maintained.” In re Adoption of S.A.J., 

 (Pa. 2003) (citation
and footnote omitted). “[W]hen a man alleges a fact in a court of justice, for his advantage,
he shall not be allowed to contradict it afterwards.” 

 Neither Hobbs nor any agent of
Hobbs appeared in court or made any assertions on October 5, 2020. Rather, the
assertion of fact at issue was made by Rondon’s counsel. There is no evidence in the
record capable of establishing that Hobbs had granted Rondon’s counsel power to bind
Hobbs. Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable since neither Hobbs nor
his agent made any representation in court.
Further, this is precisely the reason the Legislature chose to require written consent
under these circumstances – to avoid subsequent litigation over whether consent was
actually given. The application of judicial estoppel would create a loophole in the statute
that has no grounding in the explicit language of the statute.


                                      [J-89-2024] - 18
nine months, and the bail bond was not otherwise released, Hobbs was constructively on

notice that the court had reinstated bail by December 28, 2020. As a result, even if,

contrary to the trial court’s findings, Hobbs was not immediately aware of the

reinstatement in October, he was aware of the trial court’s error by the end of December

2020 and required to promptly file a petition for nunc pro tunc relief from the October 5,

2020 order reinstating bail. Hobbs’s Petition to Strike and/or Set Aside Bail and Forfeiture

did not explicitly seek nunc pro tunc relief from the October 5, 2020 order. Further, the

petition was not promptly filed, as Hobbs did not file it until October 25, 2021 — nearly

nine months after he had constructive notice of the forfeiture. As a result, Hobbs cannot

now challenge the October 5, 2020 order which reinstated bail without his written consent.

VIII. Conclusion

         In summary, we conclude: (1) Rondon’s bail was properly revoked on September

29, 2020; (2) Rondon’s bail was reinstated without the required written consent of Hobbs

on October 5, 2020; but (3) nevertheless, Hobbs is due no relief in this appeal since he

failed to timely seek review of the October 5, 2020 order. Therefore, we affirm the

decision of the Superior Court, finding Hobbs is not entitled to relief, but we do so on a

different basis, namely, that Hobbs failed to file a timely appeal.

         Order affirmed.

         Justice Mundy joins the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court and Justice

Brobson joins Parts I-III and VII only of the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the

Court.

         Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Todd

and Justice Donohue join.

         Justice Dougherty did not participate in the decision of this matter.




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