[J-27-2025]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                WESTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


     MARY JOAN GIDOR,                              :   No. 21 WAP 2024
                                                   :
                       Appellant                   :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                   :   Superior Court entered January 8,
                                                   :   2024, at No. 541 WDA 2023,
                v.                                 :   reversing and remanding the Order
                                                   :   of the Court of Common Pleas
                                                   :   Crawford County Civil Division
     BENJAMIN E. MANGUS D/B/A MANGUS               :   entered September 20, 2022, at No.
     INSPECTIONS,                                  :   

                                                   :
                       Appellee                    :   ARGUED: April 10, 2025

OPINION

 JUSTICE DONOHUE                                          DECIDED: OCTOBER 23, 2025
         In this case we are asked to determine whether 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512 (“Section 7512”)

 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law1 is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations.

 Section 7512 provides:

               § 7512. Statute of limitations.

               An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection
               report must be commenced within one year after the date the
               report is delivered.
 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.

         We find the plain language of Section 7512 creates a statute of repose.

 Accordingly, a plaintiff who does not bring “[a]n action to recover damages arising from a

 home inspection report … within one year after the date the report is delivered[,]” is barred

 1   Act of December 20, 2000, P.L. 815, as amended, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.
from doing so, regardless of when the claim accrues. See id. Thus, we affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

    I. Background

         In May 2017, Appellant Mary Joan Gidor (“Gidor”) entered into an agreement to

purchase a home (the “Property”) in Titusville, Pennsylvania.       Amended Complaint,

10/10/2019, ¶ 4. Prior to completing the purchase, Gidor orally agreed with Appellee

Benjamin E. Mangus (“Mangus”)2 that he would perform a home inspection of the

Property. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6. On June 6, 2017, Mangus delivered to Gidor his home inspection

report (“Inspection Report”) for the Property, which did not disclose any problems with the

Property’s structural components or foundation. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. On July 31, 2017, based on

“Mangus’ representations in the Inspection Report,” Gidor purchased the Property. Id. ¶¶

12-13.

         During the winter of 2018-2019, a water pipe in the Property froze and burst

beneath the primary bathroom. Id. ¶ 14. A plumber repaired the pipe and discovered

that the addition to the Property was built without a foundation over bare ground supported

only by wooden posts. Id. ¶ 16. According to Gidor, the lack of foundation exposed the

bathroom pipes to the elements, which caused the pipes to freeze and burst. Id. ¶ 17.

She also discovered that the vinyl ductwork on the Property was not rated for exterior

use, which allowed animals to chew through it, leading to infestation on the Property. Id.

¶ 18.

         On August 21, 2019, Gidor filed a complaint against Mangus bringing three claims:

Count I - a claim under the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law; Count II - a common law

breach of contract claim; and Count III - a claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade


2Mangus operates his business under the tradename “Mangus Inspections.” Amended
Complaint, 10/10/2019, ¶ 2.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 2
Practice and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).3               Mangus filed preliminary

objections to which Gidor filed the operative amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”)

on October 10, 2019. In Count I, Gidor alleges that “Mangus breached the duty of care

under the Pennsylvania Home Inspection [L]aw by not revealing or discovering the

Property’s various defects and deficiencies when completing the Property Inspection

Report because such defects and deficiencies should have been apparent to a

reasonably prudent home inspector.” Id. ¶ 27. In Count II, Gidor premises her breach of

contract claim on her “oral contract with Mangus … to provide a property inspection

report[,]” and Mangus’ breach of the duties that were set forth “[i]n the Inspection

Report[.]” Id. ¶¶ 30-34. In Count III, Gidor complains that Mangus violated the UTPCPL

by:

               (a) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship,
               approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or
               quantities that they do not have;

               (b) Representing that goods or services are of a particular
               standard, quality or grade, or that goods are of a particular
               style or model, if they are of another;

               (c) Failing to comply with the terms of any written guarantee
               or warranty given to the buyer at, prior to or after a contract
               for the purchase of goods or services is made; and/or

               (d) Engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct
               which creates a likelihood of confusion or of
               misunderstanding.
Id. ¶ 38(a)-(d).4




3   73 P.S. § 201-1 – 201.10.
4 Subparagraphs (a)-(d) of paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint mirror the specific
examples of “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”
set forth in the UTPCPL at 73 P.S. §§ 201-2(4)(v), (vii), (xiv), (xxi).


                                      [J-27-2025] - 3
        On October 31, 2019, Mangus filed preliminary objections to the Amended

Complaint. First, Mangus argued that Gidor’s breach of contract and UTPCPL claims

were preempted by the Home Inspection Law.               Mangus’ Preliminary Objections to

Amended Complaint, 10/31/2019, ¶¶ 4-8. In the alternative, Mangus argued that Gidor

failed to plead sufficient facts to establish her breach of contract claim, id. ¶¶ 9-15, and

failed to plead sufficient facts to establish her UTPCPL claim, id. ¶¶ 16-34. The trial court

overruled Mangus’ first and second preliminary objections, but sustained, in part, his third

preliminary objection to strike subparagraphs (a)-(c) from paragraph 38 of the Amended

Complaint. Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2020, at 2.

        Subsequently, Mangus filed an answer and new matter where he raised Section

7512 and averred that Gidor “failed to file a lawsuit within one year of the delivery of the

Inspection Report.” Mangus’ Answer and New Matter, 7/8/2020, ¶¶ 54-55. After Gidor

admitted this fact in her reply to new matter,5 Mangus filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings (“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings”), arguing that Gidor’s claims were

time-barred pursuant to the statute of repose in Section 7512. Mangus’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, 9/16/2020, ¶¶ 4-6; 8-9.

        In opposition, Gidor argued that the General Assembly clearly intended for Section

7512 to be a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling pursuant to the discovery

rule.6 Gidor’s Brief in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 5/31/2022, at

6. In the event the court deemed Section 7512 to be a statute of repose, Gidor argued

that it would violate Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “Remedies

5   Gidor’s Reply to New Matter, 7/24/2020, ¶ 55.
6 “The discovery rule is a judicially created device which tolls the running of the applicable

statute of limitations until the point where the complaining party knows or reasonably
should know that he has been injured and that his injury has been caused by another
party’s conduct.” Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 

 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted).


                                       [J-27-2025] - 4
Clause”) which states, in part, that “‘[a]ll courts shall be open; and every man for an injury

done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of

law[.]’” 

 at 10-11 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 11). Lastly, Gidor maintained that her

separate breach of contract and UTPCPL claims were not subject to Section 7512

because the remedies set forth in the Home Inspection Law exist “‘in addition to any other

remedies available under the [UTPCPL] or other applicable … law.’” Id. at 15 (quoting 68

Pa.C.S. § 7505(d)).

       The trial court determined that Section 7512 was ambiguous because the parties

“interpreted the [statute] in two potentially reasonable ways[.]”          Trial Court Opinion,

9/20/2022, at 4. To resolve the ambiguity, the trial court looked to the title of Section 7512

and reasoned that “[i]f the General Assembly had intended to enact a statute of repose,

it could have titled the applicable section appropriately[.]” Id. The trial court also observed

that if Section 7512 is a statute of repose, “it would significantly frustrate a plaintiff’s right

to a remedy.” Id. at 5. The trial court theorized that there could be circumstances where

the repose period would start running before a homeowner even took possession of the

home. Id. Although it reserved judgment as to whether the discovery rule would apply to

Gidor’s claims, the trial court concluded that Mangus was not entitled to judgment on the

pleadings. Id. at 6. Upon Mangus’ request, the trial court certified its interlocutory order

for appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). Trial Court Order, 10/31/2022.

       On appeal, the Superior Court reversed after finding the case indistinguishable

from Tibbitt v. Eagle Home Inspections, LLC, 

 (Pa. Super. 2023).7 See Gidor

v. Mangus, No. 541 WDA 2023, 

 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024) (non-

precedential decision).     In Tibbitt, a homeowner filed a civil action against a home

7Tibbitt, a precedential decision, was decided on October 30, 2023, approximately two
months prior to Gidor, which was decided on January 8, 2024. Tibbitt, 

.
No allowance of appeal was sought in Tibbitt.


                                        [J-27-2025] - 5
inspection company, the sellers of the property, and the sellers’ real estate agent alleging

fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the

Pennsylvania Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law and the UTPCPL. Tibbitt, 

.    The home inspection company filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings

contending that Tibbitt’s claims were time-barred pursuant to Section 7512 because she

filed her complaint beyond one year from the delivery of the home inspection report. 

The Tibbitt court agreed, reasoning that Section 7512 is a statute of repose because the

text of the statute makes clear that “the action commences on the date of the delivery of

an inspection report—the occurrence of a ‘specific event,’ independent of any injury or

discovery of any injury.” 

 at 161 (quoting Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 

 (Pa. 2009)). Alternatively, Tibbitt argued that if the court deemed Section 7512

to be a statute of repose, it would violate the Remedies Clause. 

 The Tibbitt court

found this constitutional argument waived because Tibbitt failed to notify the Attorney

General that she was challenging the constitutionality of a statute as required by

Pa.R.A.P. 521(a).8 Tibbitt, 

. Lastly, the Tibbitt court explained that the

statute of repose applies to all causes of action under the Home Inspection Law, the

common law, and the UTPCPL that “aris[e] from a home inspection report.” 

 Since all


8   Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 521(a) provides:
               (a) Notice.-It shall be the duty of a party who draws in question
               the constitutionality of any statute in any matter in an appellate
               court to which the Commonwealth or any officer thereof,
               acting in his official capacity, is not a party, upon the filing of
               the record, or as soon thereafter as the question is raised in
               the appellate court, to give immediate notice in writing to the
               Attorney General of Pennsylvania of the existence of the
               question; together with a copy of the pleadings or other portion
               of the record raising the issue, and to file proof of service of
               such notice.
Pa.R.A.P. 521(a).


                                        [J-27-2025] - 6
of Tibbitt’s claims “emanate[d] from the [home] inspection report,” the court concluded

that all of her claims were time-barred by Section 7512. 

         In the present case, the Superior Court concluded that in light of Tibbitt’s holding

that Section 7512 is a statute of repose, and that Section 7512 applies to all causes of

action under the Home Inspection Law, the common law, and the UTPCPL that arise from

a home inspection report, Gidor’s claims were time-barred because they each “arise out

of [Mangus’] inspection report.” Gidor, 

, at *2 (citing Tibbitt, 

). Unlike in the trial court, Gidor did not attempt to bring a direct constitutional

challenge to Section 7512 if construed as a statute of repose. See Gidor’s Superior Court

Brief at 18-22. Instead, Gidor relied, in part, on the canon of constitutional avoidance,

which provides that “‘when a statute is susceptible to two constructions, by one of which

grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions

are avoided,’ the Court’s ‘duty is to adopt the latter’ construction.” 

 at 18 (quoting MCI

WorldCom, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

 (Pa. 2004)). To Gidor, if

Section 7512 is a statute of repose, it would “trigger an issue under the Remedies Clause”

and not survive, at a minimum, intermediate scrutiny. 

 at 18-20 (citing Yanakos v.

UPMC, 

, 1222 (Pa. 2019)). To “avoid unnecessary constitutional doubt[,]”

Gidor urged the Superior Court to “construe Section 7512 as a statute of limitations.” Id.

at 22.

         The Superior Court observed that Gidor’s constitutional avoidance argument was

“not a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 7512” but instead “an argument in favor

of construing Section 7512 as a statute of limitations[.]” Gidor, 2024 WL *80950, at *2 n.1.

However, the court reasoned that it could not consider the argument as it was “bound by

Tibbitt’s holding that Section 7512 is a statute of repose and not a statute of limitations.”

Id. The Superior Court also noted that a constitutional challenge to Section 7512 would




                                       [J-27-2025] - 7
be waived just as it was in Tibbitt because Gidor did not notify the Attorney General. Id.

(citing Pa.R.A.P. 521(a); Tibbitt, 

; Hill v. Divecchio, 

(Pa. Super. 1993)). The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the

case with instructions to enter judgment in Mangus’ favor. Id. at *3.

        Gidor filed a petition for allowance of appeal in this Court where she only

challenged the Superior Court’s determination that Section 7512 is a statute of repose.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 2/2/2024. Notably, Gidor did not discuss or request

review of the Superior Court’s separate determinations that all of the claims in the

complaint “arise out of [Mangus’] inspection report[,]” and that, pursuant to Tibbitt, her

claims were time-barred by Section 7512, which applies to all causes of action under the

Home Inspection Law, the common law, and the UTPCPL that arise from a home

inspection report.9 Gidor, 

, at *2 (citing Tibbitt, 

). We

granted allowance of appeal to consider the following issue as rephrased by this Court:

              Whether the Superior Court erred by construing Section 7512
              of the Home Inspection Law, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512, as a statute
              of repose, which barred all claims raised in [Gidor’s]
              [A]mended [C]omplaint, as opposed to a statute of limitations.
Gidor v. Mangus, 

 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam).

     II. Parties’ Arguments

Gidor’s Arguments10

        Gidor’s central argument is that Section 7512 is ambiguous because it can

“plausibly” be interpreted as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Gidor’s


9 Gidor concedes in her brief filed in this Court, referring to Section 7512: “If it’s a statute
of repose, then [her] claims are time-barred[.]” Gidor’s Brief at 11.
10 In her principal brief, Gidor presents two arguments. First, essentially replicating the
argument presented in her petition for allowance of appeal, she argues that Section 7512
is a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. Compare Petition for Allowance of
appeal, 2/2/2024, at 1-25 with Gidor’s Brief at 1-26. Curiously, in a separate argument,
(continued…)

                                       [J-27-2025] - 8
Brief at 14. Gidor explains that the plaintiff is the focus of Section 7512 because “the

statute commands her to diligently ‘commence’ an ‘action to recover damages.’” 

 at 15

(quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512). She suggests that this “procedural command … is the

hallmark of a statute of limitations.” Id. (citing Dubose v. Quinlan, 

 (Pa.

2017)).

       Gidor also argues that the event triggering the commencement of a repose period

must be an act of a defendant. See id. at 15-16. Gidor argues that Section 7512 does

not fit this structure because it is possible that the person who is being sued did not

perform the statutorily described event (i.e., delivering the home inspection report). She

imagines a hypothetical breach of contract action where a home inspector is the plaintiff

suing a home buyer for failure to pay for his or her home inspection report. She suggests

that this hypothetical would “fall squarely within the language of Section 7512” because it

would be “‘[a]n action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report.’” Id. at

16 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512). To Gidor, the home inspector would have to bring this

hypothetical breach of contract claim within one year of delivering the home inspection

report.11 Because the home inspector would be the plaintiff in Gidor’s hypothetical and

she rebuts certain arguments advanced by Mangus in the Superior Court in support of
his position that the Home Inspection Law preempts all common law and statutory causes
of action that arise from a home inspection report. See Mangus’ Superior Court Brief at
7-14. The reason for including these arguments is unclear. First, as requested by Gidor,
we only accepted review of one issue—whether Section 7512 is a statute of limitations or
repose. Second, the Superior Court, relying on Tibbitt, held that Section 7512 applies to
causes of action arising from a home inspection report including those pled as common
law, UTPCPL, or Home Inspection Law causes of action. In neither Tibbitt, nor Gidor, did
the Superior Court hold that the Home Inspection Law preempts a plaintiff from bringing
other common law or statutory causes of action arising from a home inspection report.
Rather, both cases simply held that all common law or statutory causes of action arising
from a home inspection report are time-barred by Section 7512. Tibbitt, 

;
Gidor, 

, at *2.
11 At oral argument, Mangus explained that, assuming (without conceding) that the
issuance of an invoice would arise out of a home inspection report, a breach of contract
(continued…)

                                      [J-27-2025] - 9
would have triggered the one-year period by delivering the home inspection report, Gidor

argues that Tibbitt was wrong to conclude that Section 7512 is a statute of repose on the

basis that the repose period is triggered by a defendant’s act. 

 (citing Tibbitt, 

). Had the General Assembly intended for Section 7512 to specifically relate to the

conduct of a defendant, Gidor maintains that the General Assembly could have plainly

stated that “an action to recover damages from a home inspector arising from a home

inspection report must be commenced within one year[.]” Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in

Gidor’s Brief).

        Gidor compares Section 7512 to Section 513(d) of the Medical Care Availability

and Reduction Error Act (“Section 513(d)”),12 which this Court in Dubose determined to

be a statute of limitations because it “‘focuses on when the plaintiff must commence an

action.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Dubose, 

). Gidor explains that, like Section

7512, Section 513(d) provides language that the action “‘must be commenced’” within a

specified time period. 

 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512; 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d)).

        After concluding that Section 7512 is ambiguous, Gidor relies on the following

canons of interpretation to support her position that Section 7512 is a statute of limitations:

the title-and-headings canon, the term-of-art canon, the constitutional avoidance canon,

action brought by a home inspector for non-payment for a home inspection report would
be subject to Section 7512. Oral Argument at 2:34:40-2:35:41, Gidor v. Mangus, 21 WAP
2024           (Pa.        Apr.         10,         2025),          available       at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JNSk0JXMVTA.
12   Section 513(d) provides:
               (d) Death or survival actions.—If the claim is brought
               under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301 (relating to death action) or 8302
               (relating to survival action), the action must be commenced
               within two years after the death in the absence of affirmative
               misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of
               death.
40 P.S. § 1303.513(d).


                                      [J-27-2025] - 10
and the absurdity canon. Id. at 19-26. Gidor maintains that, in titling Section 7512 a

statute of limitations, the General Assembly made a deliberate choice to use a term of art

with a well-settled meaning. Id. at 20 (citing Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., 

 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d, 

 (Pa. 2022)). Gidor next argues

that if the Court interprets Section 7512 as a statute of repose, it “would trigger an issue

under the Remedies Clause” and the one-year time bar would not satisfy intermediate

scrutiny. 

 at 21-24 (citing Yanakos, 218 A.3d at 1216). To avoid this construction, Gidor

urges the Court to abide by the constitutional avoidance canon and interpret Section 7512

as a statute of limitations.13 Id. at 21. Gidor also argues that interpreting Section 7512 to

be a statute of repose would lead to absurd results as, in some instances, the repose

period would begin to run before the buyer even takes possession of the property. Id. at

25.

       Gidor also points to the legislative history of Section 7512, highlighting that, in

2019, the General Assembly passed an amendment to the Home Inspection Law to add

the phrase “regardless of when the claim is discovered by the client” at the end of the

statute. Id. at 26 (quoting H.B. 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019)). Gidor argues that this

is evidence that the General Assembly intended to change Section 7512 from a statute

of limitations to a statute of repose; however, because Governor Wolf vetoed the

amendment, it remains a statute of limitations. Id.



13  Gidor maintains that because she is arguing that the Superior Court’s construction of
Section 7512 violates the constitutional avoidance canon, rather than that Section 7512
is plainly unconstitutional, she did not have to provide notice to the Office of the Attorney
General pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 521(a). Gidor’s Brief at 21 n.4 (citing Bray v. McKeesport
Hous. Auth., 

, 445 n.4 (Pa. Commw. 2015)). Given our ultimate disposition,
we need not address this issue. Moreover, even if an ambiguity had been detected, we
were not asked, and did not grant allowance of appeal, to decide the distinct issue of
whether one who raises the constitutional avoidance canon must provide notice to the
Attorney General.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 11
Mangus’ Arguments14

      Mangus argues that Section 7512 is a statute of repose because it

“unambiguous[ly] and completely eliminates all causes of action arising from a home

inspection report one year after its delivery, not from when a plaintiff’s claim accrues.”

Mangus’ Brief at 5. Mangus emphasizes that Section 7512 follows the “hallmark” of a

statute of repose in that “the existence of an action or event … triggers the countdown,

after which the claim is abolished.” 

 at 7 (citing Noll by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA,

 (Pa. 1994)).

      Mangus analogizes Section 7512 to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536 (“Construction Statute of

Repose”), which this Court has repeatedly deemed to be a statute of repose. Id. at 9-10

(citing Vargo v. Koppers, 

 (Pa. 1998); Noll, 

;

McConnaughey v. Bldg. Components, 

 (Pa. 1994); Misitis v. Steel City

Piping Co., 

 (Pa. 1971)). Mangus sets forth the relevant portion of the

Construction Statute of Repose as follows:

             [A] civil action or proceeding brought against any person
             lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning,
             supervision or observation of construction, or construction of
             any improvement to real property must be commenced
             within 12 years after completion of construction of such
             improvement[.]

 at 10 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a)) (emphasis in Mangus’ Brief). Mangus highlights

that both Section 7512 and the Construction Statute of Repose “contain verbiage that an


14   In response to Gidor, Mangus again argues the preemptive effect of the Home
Inspection Law presumably because Gidor raised the arguments. However, Mangus did
not file a cross petition for allowance of appeal seeking our review of these arguments in
the event our resolution of this matter somehow made relevant the triumph of the Home
Inspection Law over all other actions arising out of a home inspection report. Since our
grant of allowance of appeal was limited to the interpretation of Section 7512 as a statute
of limitations or a statute of repose, we need not further discuss nor decipher the purpose
of the extraneous briefing.


                                     [J-27-2025] - 12
action ‘must be commenced within’ a certain period of time ‘after’ a statutorily prescribed

action.” Id. (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a)). Given the similar structure

of both statutes, coupled with the fact that they both address similar subject matter,

Mangus argues that we should interpret Section 7512 to be a statute of repose. Id. at 11

(citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4)).

       Based on his conclusion that the plain language of Section 7512 is a statute of

repose, Mangus asserts that we need not address the canons of construction argued by

Gidor. Id. at 8. Nonetheless, Mangus rejects Gidor’s reliance on the constitutional

avoidance canon, arguing that Gidor waived such argument because she failed to notify

the Attorney General as required by Pa.R.A.P. 521(a). Id. As to the failed amendment

to Section 7512, which would have added the phrase “regardless of when the claim is

discovered by the client” to the end of the statute, Mangus argues that this was an attempt

by the General Assembly “to clarify that the discovery rule does not apply to Section 7512,

thereby affirming its status as a statute of repose.” Id. at 12 (quoting H.B. 2019 Leg.,

Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019)).

       Mangus contends that interpreting Section 7512 to be a one-year statute of repose

would be consistent with the Home Inspection Law as a whole. Id. at 13. In particular,

Mangus points to Section 7509 of the Home Inspection Law which requires home

inspectors to carry insurance “for at least one year after the latest home inspection report

the home inspector delivers.” Id. (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7509(b)(1)). Mangus also notes

that, by definition, home inspections are “noninvasive visual examination[s]” meant “to

identify material defects” in the structure of the home. Id. at 14 (citing 68 Pa.C.S. §

7502(a) (defining “home inspection”)). Accordingly, Mangus believes that the General

Assembly made a sensible policy decision in deciding to draw the line at one year. Id.




                                     [J-27-2025] - 13
Amici

        In support of Gidor, Pennsylvania Association for Justice (“PAJ”) submitted an

amicus brief focusing primarily on the constitutional issue under the Remedies Clause.

According to PAJ, if Section 7512 is a statute of repose it would result in a “draconian,

absurdly-short repose period that does not pass constitutional scrutiny.” PAJ’s Amicus

Brief at 2. Regardless of how the Court interprets Section 7512, PAJ argues that the

statute is not even implicated in this case because Mangus’ alleged negligence for failing

to mention certain conditions of the Property does not arise out of the inspection report

but instead arises from the negligent home inspection. Id. at 10.

        In support of Mangus, International Association of Certified Home Inspectors

(“IACHI”) submitted an amicus brief mirroring Mangus’ arguments that we should defer to

the General Assembly’s policy decision to create a one-year statute of repose in these

circumstances. IACHI’s Amicus Brief at 6-9. IACHI also highlights that Gidor failed to

preserve the constitutional argument discussed by PAJ and that, as amicus, PAJ “‘cannot

raise issues that have not been preserved by the parties.’” Id. at 10 (quoting All. Home

of Carlisle, PA v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 

, 221 n.8 (Pa. 2007)).

   III. Analysis

        We begin our analysis with the text of Section 7512, which provides:

              § 7512. Statute of Limitations.

              An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection
              report must be commenced within one year after the date the
              report is delivered.
68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.

        In this matter of statutory interpretation, “our standard of review is de novo, and

our scope of review is plenary.” In re Borough of Downingtown, 

 (Pa.

2017). The Statutory Construction Act directs that “[t]he object of all interpretation and



                                     [J-27-2025] - 14
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General

Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “The best expression of intent is found in the statute’s

plain language.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 

, 1222 (Pa. 2021); 1 Pa.C.S.

§ 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter

of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). Only where a statute

is ambiguous do we turn to the canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 

, 734 (Pa. 2020). “A statute is ambiguous

when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text.” A.S. v. Pa. State

Police, 

 (Pa. 2016).

       Here, although Section 7512 is entitled “Statute of Limitations[,]” it is well-settled—

and not disputed by the parties—that we only look to the title of a statute if the text of the

statute is ambiguous. Commonwealth v. Magwood, 

 (Pa. 1983) (citing

1 Pa.C.S. § 1924 and explaining that the title “cannot control the plain words of [a] statute”

and that even if a statute is ambiguous, the title may only be considered to “resolve the

uncertainty”). The parties do not dispute the meaning of any word or phrase used in the

statute. Instead, Gidor’s ambiguity arguments are premised on the legal effect of the

plain language of the statute, suggesting that it can be construed as either a statute of

limitations or a statute of repose. See Gidor’s Brief at 15 (“[O]ne can plausibly read

Section 7512 as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose[; t]hus the statute is

ambiguous[.]”).

       We find that the text of Section 7512 is plain and unambiguous in commanding

that “[a]n action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be

commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.

To determine whether Section 7512 is a statute of limitations or repose, we must read it

in the context of our case law interpreting other statutes of limitations and statutes of




                                       [J-27-2025] - 15
repose. This approach is consistent with how this Court has analyzed whether other plain

and unambiguous statutes are either statutes of limitations or statutes of repose. See

Dubose, 

 (discussing the characteristics of statutes of limitations and

statutes of repose to define “the plain language of Section 513(d)” as being a statute of

limitations); City of Phila. v. City of Phila. Tax Rev. Bd. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan E.,

Inc., 

 (Pa. 2015) (relying on our discussion in Abrams that “a statute of

repose delineates a defined time that begins with a definitely established event,

independent of the injury or its discovery” to conclude that the plain language of Section

19-1703(1)(d) of the Philadelphia Code is a statute of repose); Vargo, 

-

26 (interpreting the plain language of the Construction Statute of Repose to be a statute

of repose based on precedent from this Court and the Commonwealth Court). Therefore,

we turn to the legal principles fundamental to both statutes of limitations and statutes of

repose to determine whether Section 7512 is a statute of limitations, or repose.

       A statute of limitations limits the time for a plaintiff to bring suit based on when a

cause of action accrues. Vargo, 

. A cause of action accrues “when an

injury is inflicted and the corresponding right to institute a suit for damages arises.”

Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 

 (Pa. 2011). While a statute of repose

also limits the time for a plaintiff to bring suit, unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of

repose “‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action” because “the injury need not

have occurred, much less have been discovered.” Abrams, 

 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “Where a limitations period begins with a definitely

established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the

statute is considered to be one of repose.” City of Phila., 

 (citing Abrams,

 (explaining that “the period contained in a statute of repose begins when

a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether




                                       [J-27-2025] - 16
any injury has resulted”)); see also Altoona Area Sch. Dist. v. Campbell, 

 (Pa. Commw. 1992) (noting that “statutes of limitation begin to run from the time of

an injurious occurrence or discovery of the same, … whereas statutes of repose run for

a statutorily determined period of time after a definitively established event independent

of an injurious occurrence or discovery of the same”). Importantly, a statute of repose

“completely abolishes and eliminates [a] cause of action” regardless of when the claim

accrues and, in some cases, even before the claim accrues. Vargo, 

(citing Noll, 

).

       The key difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose is when

the clock starts running. For a statute of limitations, “the clock ‘begins to run as soon as

the right to institute and maintain a suit arises[.]’” Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown,

, 246 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Pocono Int’l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce,

Inc., 

 (Pa. 1983)). While an action typically accrues when the plaintiff

is injured, we have recognized the discovery rule as one important tolling exception:

              [I]n some circumstances, although the right to institute suit
              may arise, a party may not, despite the exercise of diligence,
              reasonably discover that he has been injured. In such cases
              the statute of limitations does not begin to run at the instant
              the right to institute suit attaches, rather the discovery rule
              applies. The discovery rule is a judicially created device which
              tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations until the
              point where the complaining party knows or reasonably
              should know that he has been injured and that his injury has
              been caused by another party’s conduct.
Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 

 (Pa. 2000).

       Conversely, because statutes of repose not only bar a party’s right to a remedy,

but abolish and eliminate a cause of action entirely, a plaintiff may not invoke the

discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations. See Noll, 

. There

simply is no action to toll once a repose period lapses.




                                       [J-27-2025] - 17
        We have explained that when the General Assembly drafts statutes of repose, it

includes “‘wording describing a definitely established event which commences the

statutorily determined [repose] period[.]’” Vargo, 

 (quoting Altoona Area

Sch. Dist., 

). Importantly, the General Assembly does not tie the repose

period to “whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.”

Abrams, 

. Rather, the focus is on whether the “limitations period begins

with a definitely established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or

discovery thereof[.]” City of Phila., 

. If so, “the statute is considered to

be one of repose.” 

        Therefore, the stakes are clear: if Section 7512 is a statute of limitations, Gidor

could potentially invoke the discovery rule to toll the running of the one-year limitations

period. However, if Section 7512 is a statute of repose, Gidor’s suit is time-barred. The

parties rely primarily on two other statutes—and this Court’s interpretation of each—to

support their desired interpretations of Section 7512. Gidor points to Dubose, where we

interpreted Section 513(d) to be a statute of limitations.15 To Gidor, “Section 7512

contains language that is virtually identical to the statute of limitations at issue in Dubose”

in that each statute specifies that the action “‘must be commenced within [a certain time].’”

Gidor’s Brief at 17 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512; 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d)).




15   Section 513(d), relied on by Gidor, provides:
               (d) Death or survival actions.—If the claim is brought
               under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301 (relating to death action) or 8302
               (relating to survival action), the action must be commenced
               within two years after the death in the absence of affirmative
               misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of
               death.
40 P.S. § 1303.513(d).


                                      [J-27-2025] - 18
      Mangus relies on the Construction Statute of Repose16 and our consistent

interpretation that it is a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. Mangus’

Brief at 9 (citing Vargo, 

; Noll, 

; McConnaughey, 

; Misitis, 

). Because both Section 7512 and the Construction

Statute of Repose “contain verbiage that an action ‘must be commenced within’ a certain

time period ‘after’ a statutorily prescribed action[,]” Mangus contends that Section 7512

is a statute of repose. 

 at 10 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. 7512; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a)).

      There is a marked symmetry between Section 7512 and the Construction Statute

of Repose. Each statute commands that an “action … must be commenced within [a

certain amount of time] after [the occurrence of a definitely established event that is

independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof].” 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512; 42

Pa.C.S. § 5536(a).17 In each instance, the clock begins to run when the statutorily

16 The relevant portion of the Construction Statute of Repose, relied on by Mangus,
provides:
             [A] civil action or proceeding brought against any person
             lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning,
             supervision or observation of construction, or construction of
             any improvement to real property must be commenced within
             12 years after completion of construction of such
             improvement to recover damages[.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a).
17  Subsection (b)(1) of the Construction Statute of Repose contains a limited exception
to the twelve-year repose period, providing:
             (1) If an injury or wrongful death shall occur more than ten
             and within 12 years after completion of the improvement a civil
             action or proceeding within the scope of subsection (a) may
             be commenced within the time otherwise limited by this
             subchapter, but not later than 14 years after completion of
             construction of such improvement.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(b)(1). Even under this exception, no action may be brought “later than
[fourteen] years after the completion of construction of such improvement.” Id. Thus,
(continued…)

                                     [J-27-2025] - 19
prescribed event occurs, not when the plaintiff’s claim accrues. Section 7512 embodies

the accepted principle of all statutes of repose that the occurrence of “a definitely

established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof”

triggers a countdown, after which a claim is abolished. City of Phila., 

;

Abrams, 

.

       Although the Construction Statute of Repose is more specific than Section 7512 in

defining the applicability of the statute of repose, so that it only applies to “civil action[s]

or proceeding[s] brought against any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design,

planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of any improvement

to real property[,]” we find no significance in this level of specificity as it pertains to the

instant matter. We did not conclude that the Construction Statute of Repose is a statute

of repose because it specifies what claims are subject to the statute. Rather, in Vargo,

we explained that the Construction Statute of Repose is a statute of repose “[b]ecause it

eliminates a plaintiff’s cause of action [twelve] years after completion of construction of

an improvement to real property, regardless of when the plaintiff’s injury occurs[.]” Vargo,

 (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Section 7512 follows this

established framework, we conclude that it is also a statute of repose.

       We reject Gidor’s argument that Section 7512 is analogous to Section 513(d)

simply because each statute contains language that the action “‘must be commenced

within [a certain time].’” Gidor’s Brief at 17 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512; 40 P.S. §

1303.513(d)). Indeed, the Construction Statute of Repose contains the same “must be

commenced” language. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a). In Dubose, we were tasked with deciding

whether Section 513(d) is a statute of limitations such that the limitation period for medical


while this exception allows certain claims to be brought within fourteen years after the
completion of construction, it embodies the fundamental principle of statutes of repose by
placing an outer limit on bringing an action without the possibility of equitable tolling.


                                       [J-27-2025] - 20
professional liability wrongful death and survival actions would be two years from the time

of the decedent’s death.18 Dubose, 

. To answer this question, we

analyzed the entirety of Section 513 and noted the distinct language of Section 513(d)

compared to Section 513(a) (“Section 513(a)”), which we explained is a statute of

repose.19 While we recognized that “Section 513(d) focuses not on the defendant’s

conduct, but on the time within which the plaintiff must sue[,]” 

, this was not

dispositive to our conclusion that Section 513(d) is a statute of limitations. Critically, we

observed that Section 513(d) sets forth “specific equitable considerations that may toll the

two-year period to commence a suit: ‘affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent

concealment of the cause of death.’” 

 (quoting 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d)). Conversely,

we explained that Section 513(a)

               bars the plaintiff’s ability to sue regardless of whether the
               cause of action accrued, whether the injury occurred, or
               whether it was discovered. Section 513(a), while providing
               exceptions for lawsuits involving injuries caused by foreign

18 The decedent in Dubose suffered bedsores on August 9, 2005. Dubose, 

. In July 2007, one bedsore caused an infection that ultimately led to sepsis on
September 12, 2007. On October 18, 2007, the decedent died. 

. On August
13, 2009, the decedent’s estate filed a wrongful death and survival action. After a verdict
in favor of the decedent’s estate, the defendants argued on appeal that the survival
claims—filed four years after the decedent was first injured—were barred by the general
two-year statute of limitations for survival action actions, which started running in 2005
when the decedent was first injured. 

 at 637 & n.3 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2)). The
defendants argued that Section 513(d) is not a statute of limitations, but a statute of
repose, and as such, does not affect the two-year limitation period set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5524(2). Id. at 640.
19   Section 513(a) provides:
               (a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c),
               no cause of action asserting a medical professional liability
               claim may be commenced after seven years from the date of
               the alleged tort or breach of contract.
40 P.S. § 1303.513(a). In Dubose and Yanakos we explained that Section 513(a) is a
statute of repose. Dubose, 

; Yanakos, 218 A.3d at 1225.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 21
               objects and injuries to minors, does not provide for any
               equitable considerations that would toll the seven-year period
               to sue. Section 513(a) begins running on the date of the tort
               or breach of contract, no matter when the cause of action
               accrues (and may even bar a cause of action before it
               accrues). However, Section 513(a) does not provide how it
               relates to Section 513(d). Instead, Section 513(d) stands
               separately.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

       Importantly, neither Section 7512 nor the Construction Statute of Repose contain

any of the equitable tolling considerations present in Section 513(d). In Dubose, we made

clear that the inclusion of equitable tolling considerations in Section 513(d) rendered it a

statute of limitations. Id. We made equally clear in Dubose that Section 513(a), which

“does not provide for any equitable considerations that would toll the seven-year period

to sue” and “bars the plaintiff’s ability to sue regardless of whether the cause of action

accrued, whether the injury occurred, or whether it was discovered[,]” is a statute of

repose. Id. The distinction as applied here leads to the conclusion that the absence of

any equitable tolling possibilities in Section 7512 renders it a statute of repose.20 See id.

       Gidor further argues that the definitely established event triggering the

commencement of a repose period must be an act of a defendant. See Gidor’s Brief at

20  Despite the fact that Gidor relies on Dubose in support of her argument that Section
7512 is a statute of limitations, the Concurrence scolds our discussion distinguishing
Dubose, claiming that it “overcomplicates the analysis[.]” Concurring Op. at 9. According
to the Concurrence, because Section 7512 “imposes a firm and unqualified time limit for
bringing suit under its provisions[,] … [i]t should be enough to say this and be done.” Id.
at 2. Failing to heed its own advice, the Concurrence, sua sponte, goes to great lengths
to attack the reasoning of Dubose, all the while “struggl[ing] to understand how this Court”
concluded that Section 513(d) is a statute of limitations. Id. at 7. Where a party relies on
our precedent to make a well-developed legal argument to support its position, it is
important to the legitimacy of our decision to articulate the reasons for rejecting or
accepting the argument. While the Concurrence views our treatment and ultimate
rejection of Gidor’s argument as “overcomplicat[ing] the analysis[,]” id. at 9, it is the
Concurrence’s lengthy sua sponte attack of Dubose’s holding that overcomplicates this
appeal. That is the Concurrence’s prerogative even though the Concurrence will not
recognize our responsibility to faithfully address the developed argument of a party.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 22
15-16. She maintains that Section 7512 does not fit this structure because it is possible

that the person who is being sued did not perform the definitely established event (i.e.,

delivering the home inspection report). For example, she argues that the homeowner

could be a defendant in an action for breach of contract for failure to pay the invoice for

the home inspection report. She argues that this would be “‘[a]n action to recover

damages arising from a home inspection report.’”21 Id. at 16 (quoting 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512).

Because the home inspector would be the plaintiff in Gidor’s hypothetical and would have

triggered the one-year period by delivering the home inspection report, Gidor argues that

Tibbitt was wrong to conclude that Section 7512 is a statute of repose on the basis that it

is triggered by a defendant’s act. Id. (citing Tibbitt, 

).

       Contrary to Gidor’s argument, the Tibbitt court did not conclude that Section 7512

is a statute of repose on the basis that it is triggered by a defendant’s act. On this point,

the Tibbitt court merely referenced the Black’s Law Dictionary definition for a statute of

repose as a “‘statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the

defendant acted … , even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting

injury.’” Tibbitt, 

 (quoting Abrams, 

) (quoting Statute of

Repose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1251 (8th ed. 2004)). However, the Tibbitt court

neither applied this definition to Section 7512, nor did the court conclude that Section

7512 is triggered by an act of a defendant. Rather, the court explained:

              Based upon the clear and unambiguous language of [S]ection
              7512, we agree with the trial court that the statute is intended
              to be one of repose, and not limitations, where the action
              commences on the date of the delivery of an inspection
              report—the occurrence of a “specific event,” independent of
              any injury or discovery of any injury. Abrams, [981 A.2d] at
              211 (“the period contained in a statute of repose begins when


21 We do not decide the validity of this proposition but note that Mangus accepted it for
the sake of argument. See supra note 11.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 23
              a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of
              action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted”).
              Moreover, because the home inspection report was delivered
              to Tibbitt on February 16, 2017, and Tibbitt did not file her
              lawsuit until more than one year later, on March 20, 2019, her
              action is time-barred by section 7512. Thus, we affirm the trial
              court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings.
Tibbitt, 

-61 & n.3 (footnote discussing the inapplicability of the discovery

rule omitted). Accordingly, we reject the premise of Gidor’s argument that the Tibbitt court

erred in finding Section 7512 to be a statute of repose on the basis that it is triggered by

the act of a defendant. The Tibbitt court made no such finding.

       More fundamentally, Gidor’s argument that a statute of repose requires that the

triggering occurrence be an act of the defendant is belied by our case law. City of

Philadelphia is a case that clearly articulates the essence of a statute of repose: “Where

a limitations period begins with a definitely established event that is independent of an

injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is considered to be one of repose.”

City of Phila.,

.22 Moreover, Gidor’s position is obviously contradicted by



22  In City of Philadelphia, the Court was tasked with answering whether taxpayers’
requests for tax refunds were timely despite being filed beyond three years from when
the taxes were due. The Court concluded that the refund requests were untimely based
on the following provision of the Philadelphia Code:
              (d) Every petition for refund of moneys collected by the
              Department on or after January 1, 1980, for or on behalf of the
              City or the School District of Philadelphia, and, where
              authorized by ordinance, every request for credit on account
              of moneys collected by the Department for or on behalf of the
              City or the School District, including but not limited to any tax,
              water or sewer rent, license fee or other charge, and interest
              and penalties thereon, shall be filed with the Department
              within 3 years from the date of payment to the City or the
              School District of Philadelphia or the payment due date,
              whichever is later.
Phila. Code § 19-1703(1)(d).
(continued…)

                                      [J-27-2025] - 24
the repetitive pronouncements that the Construction Statute of Repose is a statute of

repose because it is triggered by the “completion of construction[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a).

We have explained that the twelve-year repose period does not begin running until “the

entire construction project is so completed that it can be used by the general public[,]”

Noll, 

, a point that is unrelated to the conduct of any party to a lawsuit. In

the residential construction context, the Superior Court has further specified that the

completion point is the moment a certificate of occupancy is issued. Venema v. Moser

Builders, Inc., 

 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that the twelve-year repose

period commences when a certificate of occupancy for a residential home is issued

because that is the first time third parties can be exposed to defects in the design,

planning, or construction of the residence).       The “completion of construction” is an

independent act, unrelated to injurious conduct or the discovery of it. 23 Thus, it is clear

that Pennsylvania law does not require a repose period to be triggered by a defendant’s

act.

We found Section 19-1703(1)(d) of the Philadelphia Code to be a statute of repose,
explaining that “[w]here a limitations period begins with a definitively established event
that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is
considered to be one of repose.” City of Phila., 

 (citing Abrams, 

). Although the repose period was triggered by the due date, the Court stated that
“[t]he only reasonable interpretation is to confine [Section] 19-1703(1)(d) to the later of (1)
the date of payment or (2) payment due date.” Id. at 952 (emphasis added). Thus, we
expressly recognized that a plaintiff’s act—in paying a tax—could trigger the
commencement of a repose period.
23 Gidor also relies on a statement in Dubose that statutes of repose are triggered by an
act of a defendant. Dubose, like Tibbitt, referenced the Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition
of a statute of repose. This definition appeared in a larger quotation to CTS Corporation
v. Waldburger, 

 (2014), where the High Court quoted the definition provided in
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Dubose, 

 (quoting CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at
7) (quoting Statute of Repose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). The
Dubose Court’s discussion related to the distinction between Sections 513(a) and (d).
Certainly, the passing reference to a definition in Black’s Law Dictionary did not upend
decades of jurisprudence on the essence of the triggering event to identify a statute of
repose when that issue was not before the Court.


                                      [J-27-2025] - 25
        Finding Section 7512 to be a statute of repose, we have no basis to analyze Gidor’s

secondary arguments seeking to resolve the non-existent ambiguity. See Woodford v.

Ins. Dep’t, 636, 

, 73 (Pa. 2020) (“When the text of the statute is ambiguous,

then—and only then—do we advance beyond its plain language and look to other

considerations to discern the General Assembly’s intent.”). Accordingly, all arguments by

Gidor concerning the utilization of the canons of construction to interpret an ambiguous

statute are irrelevant.24

     IV. Conclusion

        Section 7512 is a statute of repose because it plainly, unambiguously, and without

equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time

period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim

accrues. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

        Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join

the opinion.

        Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.




24  One such canon of construction argued by Gidor is the canon of constitutional
avoidance. Here, because Gidor has not challenged Section 7512’s constitutionality—
which we express no view on in this case—and because the statute is not ambiguous,
we have no occasion to apply the constitutional avoidance canon. See Commonwealth
v. Gamby, 

, 317 n.20 (Pa. 2022) (explaining that the canon of constitutional
avoidance is only implicated where a party makes a constitutional challenge to a statute
or “where the parties offer two competing, but reasonable, statutory interpretations, and
the court is tasked with choosing between them”); see also supra note 13.


                                     [J-27-2025] - 26