ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion to obtain an order from the Court to the Government to *1392elect between the two charges of the indictment returned on March 28, 1984, because the charges are multiplicious. It is a two-count indictment.1

Defendant argues that he is charged with the single offense of embezzlement in more than one count.

After the matter was referred to the Magistrate, the Magistrate recommended that defendant’s motion as to multiplicity be denied. The objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation was heard before this Court through oral argument on May 30, 1984, in lieu of briefs, because of the close proximity of the trial, which began the morning of May 31, 1984.

In open court on May 30th, after argument, the Court rejected the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation as to this motion, and granted defendant’s motion.2 The Court will now issue its opinion to that effect.

Multiplicity3 has been defined as the charging of a single offense in several counts. 1 Wright & Miller, Section 142, at page 469; U.S. v. De La Torre, 634 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1981). The principal dangers of multiplicity are that it may lead to multiple sentences for the same offense, and, as counsel for defendant stated in his brief, it may also have a psychological impact upon the jury by suggesting to it that the defendant has committed not one, but in this case, two crimes. U.S. v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 (2nd Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3rd Cir. 1978).

Count One of the Indictment charges defendant with taking a package with design to open and embezzle it in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1702.4 Count Two charges defendant with the embezzlement of a package in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1709.5 It is possible for a single act to result in various violations of a criminal statute, and thus be considered as separate charges. U.S. v. Christensen, 732 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.1984.) However, such charges should be clearly delineated so as to define separate crimes.

It is clear that both Sections 1702 and 1709 could be violated by a single act, since taking with intent to obstruct the *1393mail, or opening the mail, or secreting it, is enough under Section 1702 to constitute a crime. U.S. v. Brown, 425 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Davis, 33 F. 865 (D.Mich. 1888); U.S. v. Grieco, 187 F.Supp. 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). Thus, a defendant who is accused of taking a single piece of mail could be charged with obstructing the mail and also embezzling the mail under 1702 and 1709 respectively.

In Creed v. U.S., 283 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1960), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant could be convicted of taking a letter with intent to obstruct the mail under 18 U.S.C. § 1702, and also possession of the contents of the stolen letter under 18 U.S.C. § 1708.

However, in this case, defendant has not been charged with these other offenses. He is charged with taking a package with intent to open and embezzle, and with embezzling a package. This is in effect the same charge in two counts. The United States Supreme Court has held that bank robbery and entering with the intent to commit bank robbery cannot be separately punished. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). In the same way, to prevent multiple sentencing, this defendant should not be charged with both embezzlement and the intent to embezzle.

WHEREFORE, the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation as to the issue of multiplicity is hereby REJECTED. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. All other portions of the Magistrate’s Report. and Recommendation are hereby ACCEPTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.