after making the above statement of facts, rendered the following opinion of the Court:

Although under Law 3, Title 10, Partida 6, and Article 901 of the old Civil Code, concordant thereto, as also the doctrine of the Supreme Court of Spain cited in the first allegation of the appeal, the functions of executors depended on the powers which testators saw fit to invest them with in *187the testamentary clauses referring to their appointment as such, and according thereto, executor Morales in executing the deed of sale of the house in question in favor of Chava-varry, acted fully within the powers conferred upon him by the testatrix Carmen Grau in the ninth clause of her will, yet, from the moment said deed was executed, wherein it was finally determined what disposition should be made of the seven thousand pesos, balance of the purchase price left in the hands of the vendee subject to the outcome of the injunction prohibiting alienation of said house, which sum was to be paid to the heirs of Carmen Grau as soon as aforesaid injunction had been dissolved, and the vendee in the meantime to pay monthly to said heirs the stipulated interest at the rate of six per cent per annum thereon, it is evident that with these acts of the executor and the steps which in the deed he had agreed to take looking to the dissolution of the injunction, his trust in connection with the sale of the house had come to an end, and he could no longer legally go against his own acts, and thus leave without effect what had solemnly been agreed upon in the deed as to the delivery of the unpaid balance of seven thousand pesos, and interest thereon, to the heirs; therefore the Court below in so deciding, did not contradict itself nor violate the laws and other legal provisions cited in the first and second grounds of the appeal. Nor have Laws 3 and 5, Title 14 of Partida 5, and Articles 1156, 1162, and 1163 of the Civil Code, concordant thereto, cited under grounds III and IV, been violated, inasmuch as the vendee, Bernabé'Cha-varry, having bound himself in the deed of sale in question to pay the outstanding seven thousand pesos, and stipulated interest accrued thereon, directly to the heirs of Carmen Grau, he had to make said payment to them as the only creditors in whose favor the obligation was constituted, and not to the executor José Pablo Morales, whose capacity to effect the collection of that part of the price had already ceased by virtue of the reservation in favor of the heirs made in the deed. Whence it is further to be inferred, that neither the exe*189cutor José Pablo Morales was the holder of the credit, as alleged by counsel for appellants, nor could the debtor Ber-nabé Chavarry, have paid it to him in good faith, since he must have been aware of his agreement made in the deed, to pay said debt with the stipulated interest, to the heirs of Carmen Grau as soon as the condition agreed upon had been fulfilled, and, therefore, the-payment made by the debtor Bernabé Chavarry, to the executor Morales, does not relieve the former, or his estate, from the obligation contracted by' him with regard to the aforesaid heirs. As to the error of law in the consideration of evidence, on which the fifth ground of the appeal is based, the Court below, far from violating Articles 1248, of the Civil Code, and 658 of the Law of Civil Procedure, in not attaching any importance to the statements of the witnesses Mauricio Guerra Mondragón, José Antonio Gutierrez, Julián Blanco and Euelides Jimenez, has correctly applied said legal provisions, by which Courts of Justice are allowed a wise discretion in the consideration of the probatory value of the testimony of witnesses, with no limitation other than the rules of sound judgment, none of the 'provisions cited having been violated, inasmuch as the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses was limited to the statement that the executor José Pablo Morales was held by them iri high esteem and that they believed him incapable of appropriating to. his own use money received by him for a specified purpose, the Court below could not logically consider said declarations as sufficient evidence that said obligation had been complied with by the executor, since none of the witnesses had affirmed that he had really complied therewith, and the matter was especially one in which public documents, acquittances and other vouchers are generally availed of by executors to justify their accounts and at all time relieve themselves from responsibility tor sums received by them for distribution among legatees and heirs. As regards the violation, which is also alleged, of Law 68 Toro, namely, the 5th, Title 8, Book 11, of the “Novísima Re-*191copilación’’, and of Articles 1114 and 1969 of the old Civil Code, inasmuch as it was expressly stipulated in the deed of sale of January 22, 1877, that the seven thousand pesos, balance due on the price, was to remain in the hands of the ven-dee Bernabé Chavarry, subject to the outcomé of the injunction prohibiting alienation wherewith the house was encumbered, and that the heirs of Carmen Grau could not dispose of said sum until 'the dissolution of the injunction had been secured and “confirmed by means of the cancellation thereof” and after a month’s advance notice, which stipulations were agreed to bjr the vendee in all particulars, Bernabé Cha-varry, who thus bound himself to comply with the obligation in so far as it concerned him, and especially to abide by the result of the injunction which constituted an encumbrance upon the said house, until its final legal dissolution, it is evident that until the cancellation of the said injunction had been entered in the Registry of Property, the obligation on the part of the vendee to make payment did not become effective, nor were the heirs in a position legally to demand of him the fulfillment of said obligation, both because such was the agreement entered into in the deed, and because the injunction not being dissolved, operated to the prejudice of third persons until the cancellation thereof had been recorded in the Registry of Property, so long as this was not done, the house did not stand released from the encumbrance, nor was the vendee relieved from responsibility in that respect, and, therefore, inasmuch as from the date of the record of dissolution of the injuntion, February 23, 1881, to that of the admission of the complaint, October 11, 1900, since the date on which the same was filed is not on record, the twenty years required by Law 63 of Toro, namely, the 5th, Title 8, Book 11, of the “Novísima Recopilación”, for the prescription of personal actions, which is the nature of the suit prosecuted by plaintiffs, have not elapsed, the Court below in sustaining the complaint, instead of violating aforesaid Law of the “Novísima” and the Articles of the old Civil *193Code, cited in the seventh and final point urged by appellants, has, on the contrary correctly applied them.

We should declare, and do declare, that the appeal in cassation for violation of law, taken by Tomasa Lopez Dominguez and her children Romualdo, Josefa, Bernabé and José Chavarry y Lopez, does not lie, and tax the costs against them.

Dissenting opinion of

Referring to the facts in this case, as stated in the opinion of the majority of the Court, I shall allude only to the part thereof which I deem necessary for the purposes of this dissenting opinion. Carmen Grau and Estéfana Grau were joint owners of a house in the City of San Juan, No. 15, Cruz Street. By a document dated November 14, 1876, Estéfana authorized Francisco de Paula Acuña to sell and convey said real estate to Bernabé Chavarry, for the sum of twenty-six thousand pesos. Carmen Grau in her testament, dated November 14, 1876, directed that in case she should die before the sale was effected, it was to be carried out by her executors, or any of them, the amount of the sale to be apportioned among her heirs and legatees. It appears that José Pablo Morales, one of the executors, after the death of Carmen Grau, effected the sale to Chavary, receiving from him the sum of nineteen thousand pesos, as partial payment, and according to the instrument executed by said Chavarry in favor of Pablo Morales, dated January 22, 1877 it was stipulated that the former was to retain the sum of seven thousand pesos, that is to say, the balance due by him to *195the latter, until an injunction encumbering said real estate had been satisfied and dissolved, and that then the said Chavarry would “pay the heirs and successors of Carmen Grau” the aforesaid sum of seven thousand pesos. It also appears, and this has not been denied, that said Morales, the executor, out of the money he had received from Chavarry, duly applied the respective sums appertaining to the estate of Carmen Grau, to satisfying injunctions, mortgages and annuities (censos) which, having been contracted previously, encumbered said house. It also appears that when the “Audiencia Territorial” issued a decree and delivered judgment-declaring that the injunction had become extinct and ordering the cancellation thereof in the public records, Chavar^ paid executor Morales the aforesaid sum of seven thousand pesos, the former receiving - from the latter an acquittance for the full amount thereof, and a month after-wards executor Morales .effected the cancellation of aforesaid injunction in the Registry. On October 6, 1900, the heirs of said Carmen Grau brought this action in the District Court of San Juan against the heirs of Chavarry who at present possess the house No. 15, Cruz Street, to recover from them the aforesaid sum of seven thousand pesos and interest accrued thereon. The District Court of San Juan declared that said sum was due and should be paid, and rendered judgment to that effect. The majority of this Court has affirmed said opinion and judgment. I cannot concur in this decision. It is true that the will of Carmen Grau directs that the amount of the sale of the property he apportioned among the heirs and legatees of the testatrix, but it seems to me that by this clause she merely determines or indicates who are to receive the money, forbidding by said clause any other application of said funds. She authorized Morales to make and execute the deed of sale of said property. And it is natural to infer that the person who executed the deed should also have authorization to receive the proceeds of the conveyance. Said person could not *197execute the deed without receiving the amount or cost thereof. It was so understood, it would seem, by the heirs of Carmen Grau, because they offered no objection when Morales received the portion belonging to Carmen Grau, and paid the first credits. And I make this affirmation with a perfect knowledge of the fact that under the laws in force in Porto Rico, which go as far back as the “Partidas”, the powers of an executor were strictly defined and could not exceed the limits of their authorization. And the fact that the heirs ratified the acts of the executor, permitting him to' satisfy the first credits that encumbered the property is to my mind conclusive evidence that they interpreted said agreement as giving Morales the right to receive the money. The clause in the document executed by Cha-varry in favor of Morales wherein he declares “that he ivill pay the heirs and successors of Carmen Grau the sum of seven thousand pesos”, is merely a repetition of the clause contained in the will, namely, “that the money was to he paid to the respective heirs and legatees designated therein, and it should not be applied to any other purposes”, or paid to other persons, the opinion being also admitted, it would seem, that if Morales had power to execute the deed of cancellation of the injunction, he also had the right to receive the money. The defendants plead the law of prescription after twenty .years. The question arises as to whether the period for instituting the action should be reckoned from the time when the “Audiencia Territorial” decreed the dissolution of the injunction, or from that in which the latter was recorded at the Registry. Should the former prevail, the action is extinguished by prescription, if the latter, then the action was instituted some two months before the expiration of the twenty years. It may, therefore, readily be observed that this controversy and surrounding circumstances are involved in doubt. In cases of this kind, where plaintiffs allow years and years to pass without alleging any right, when generations which had the primary right, if there *199was any right, have disappeared; when other, persons who . could have been held responsible have abandoned this life; when the executor is dead; when after a lapse of more than twenty years since the original acts took place, a claim is revived, a strong doubt should naturally arise in the mind of the Court as to the ground for the demand, leading to a presumption of payment. And this doubt should be decided in favor of the heirs, the supposed debtors, unless the plaintiffs are able to dispel that uncertainty, and establish their rights, clearly and beyond all discussion. They base their claim wholly upon deductions and the most rigid interpretation of the law. Article 658 of the Law of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

“Judges and Courts shall weigh the force of the declarations of witnesses according to rules of sound judgment, taking into consideration the reasons upon which they are based and the circumstances connected therewith”.

The witnesses are here, the documents of evidence are in view, and the Court, after such a long period of time, should apply, for the purpose of weighing them the rules of sound judgment. By these principles it should have been declared that Morales, pursuant to the will of Carmen Grau, had real, if not implicit, authorization to receive the money, with the condition of delivering it to the heirs and legatees, according to the instructions contained in said will. It also should have been, taken into consideration that the condition contained in the document executed by Chavarry in favor of Morales, to pay the seven thousand pesos to the “heirs and successors of Carmen Grau”, was only a repetition of the provisions of the will, and that, therefore, he had a right, and it was his duty, to receive the money. Taking into consideration the period of time elapsed; the death of all the parties who had intervened in the transactions; that the claim was not put forward, nor any right alleged, during the life of any of them, and that no action has ever been brought against the executor or his *201heirs, not only the acts of the executor Morales should be declared as authorized by the various documents, but also a strong presumption of his having paid said sum to the heirs of Carmen Grau, pursuant to the provisions contained in the will. For these reasons I am of opinion that the judgment of the District Court should have been reversed and the complaint dismissed.