Delgado v. Executive Council
Opinion of the Court
rendered the opinion of the court.
This is an application made to this Supreme Court by Rafael M. Delgado, complaining of the Executive Council of Porto Rico, and seeking mandamus to compel that body to replace his name upon the official ballots as the Republican candidate for a member of the House of Delegates from the district of Aguadilla.
Although not raised in the pleadings, a question was presented in the course of the argument as to the original jurisdiction of this court in suits of this nature. Naturally, this question will be the first to be examined and determined. If tbe court has no jurisdiction to issue mandamus in such a case as that presented, there is no occasion to go further into the matter. ■ In the courts of some of the States of the Union, the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in matters pertaining to mandamus is limited to the necessity of enforcing its own
Although the statutes of all the States are not accessible to us, we believe that this limitation of jurisdiction will he found to arise from constitutional or statutory provisions expressly placing such limitations upon the jurisdiction of the appellate courts, in matters of mandamus. Our own jurisdiction is derived from the statute itself, which was an act passed by the Legislature of Porto Rico on the 12th of March, 1903. Section 1 of that act reads as follows:
■‘Section 1. — Mandamus is a high prerogative writ issuing out of the Supreme Court or District Courts of Porto Rico, in the .name of the People of Porto Rico, directed to any natural person, persons, company or corporation or inferior court of judicature within its jurisdiction requiring them to do some particular act therein specified and which appertains to their office or duty. It confers no new authority and the party to be coerced must have power to perform the act.”
Were it not for the words “within its jurisdiction’’ probably this question would not have arisen. It would seem from a careful study of the language of this section that these words were intended to limit the persons, companies, corporations or inferior courts upon whom the writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court, or by any one of the district courts, should operate; and had it not been that the district courts, as well as the Supreme Court, were mentioned in the prior part of the section the words “within its jurisdiction” would not have been necessary, as the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is coextensive with the Island, and extends to every place where the statutes of Porto Rico have their force. In other words, the territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico is the same as the territorial jurisdiction of the Legislature, although the district courts are limited to their respective districts. This section apparently means
In support of this view reference is made to the mandamus act of the Legislature set out in the Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the Second Legislative Assembly of Porto Rico, on pages 113 to 116, inclusive, and especially to sections 1 and 2. Reference may also be had to Bailey on Jurisdiction, section 634; 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, pp. 897 and cases were cited; Marcum v. Ballot Commissioners, 47 West Virginia 263; People v. State Board of Canvassers, 14 L. R. A., p. 646; State of South Carolina v. Whitesides, 3 L. R. A., p. 777; Sims v. Daniels, book 35 L. R. A., 146; State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis., 90, 35 Am. State Rep. 27.
The Executive Council through its president, Hon. Régis H. Post, Secretary of Porto Rico, has appeared in this court by counsel, after having been duly cited, and filed a demurrer setting out various objections to the application made by the relator, and no answer is filed herein unless it may be that a paper styled a memorandum may be so considered. Section 8 of the mandamus act reads as follows:
“Section 8. — On the return day of the alternative writ, or such further day as the court may allow, the party on whom the writ shall have been served, may show cause by answer under oath made in the same manner as an answer to a petition or declaration in a civil action. ’ ’
The first section of the demurrer is the general one that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This will be deferred until the other points are examined.
The second section raising the question of the capacity of plaintiff to bring this suit was presented by the Attorney G-en-eral with great earnestness and will be reviewed at some length. The style of the case in the petition reads “The People of Porto Rico vs. The Executive Council of Porto Rico, Ex rel. Rafael M. Delgado.” This was made the basis of severe criticism.
This objection to the manner in which the title of the case is written may be disposed of with the remarks that it is merely grammatical and may have been the result of an error on the part of the copyist. If necessary the applicant could be permitted to correct the phraseology and place the words “Ex rel Rafael M. Delgado” above the word versus in the title of the case. It is evident from other portions of the application that Rafael M. Delgado is intended to be made a plaintiff and not a defendant in this cause. He signs the application.and swears to it before a notary, and in the oath states “that he is the petitioner in the above bill of complaint.” Taking the whole complaint together we can certainly allow a party to correct a clerical error in the title [when it appears] from the other facts, of. the application that it is necessary so to do.
Then considering that this suit is brought in the name of The People of Porto Rico on the relation of Rafael M. Delgado against the Executive Council of Porto Rico, has the
Section 64 of the Political Code is cited by the Attorney General and reads as follows:
“The Attorney General shall represent the People of Porto Rico in all suits and proceedings, civil and criminal, to which it is a party; in civil proceedings he shall have the sole representation before the Insular courts of the People of Porto Rico, and of any officer, employee or agent of the Insular government, suing or being sued in his official capacity; Provided, however, that public prosecutions for crimes, except as hereinafter provided in section 74, shall be conducted by the fiscal of the proper court without special authority from the Attorney General; but in all such eases the Attorney General may intervene in the public interest.”
As the Executive Council of Porto Rico is certainly a part of the Insular government, or an agency of the same, it is clearly the duty of the Attorney General to represent it in this litigation, which he is doing in making his appearance in this court.
The custom of bringing suits for mandamus in the name of the State on the relation of the real party at issue is followed in many States of America, but it seems to us that it is the better practice to observe the style used in other States which merely entitle the suits for mandamus in the same manner as ordinary suits. New York is one of the states which follow the old practice of using the name of the State as plaintiff on the relation of the real party in interest. In the case of The People of the State of New York Ex rel. Franklin D. Sherwood vs. The State Board of Canvassers, which is found reported in Book 14 L. R. A., on pp. 616 et seq., it is said in the syllabus that “'The rights of the relator alone, and not those of the public, will be considered upon an application for a writ of mandamus in the name of The People at the relation of a candidate for office to compel the issuance of a certificate
The case of the State v. Cunningham, reported in 35 Am. St. Rep., p. 27, from 83 Wisconsin, page 90, holds that the cases in which the leave of the Attorney General is necessary to bring suit are those involving matters strictly publici juris, in which no one citizen has any right or interest other than that which is common to citizens in general.
These cases present the correct view of the matter and apply with full force to the case before ns. Rafael M. Delgado brings this suit for his own benefit, and The People of Porto Rico have no interest in it whatever and their name need not have been used; and as the State is in this case merely a formal party and an altogether unnecessary one, no permission of the Attorney General nor of any other officer representing the State was necessary to enable the plaintiff, or his attorney in his behalf, to appear in this court and seek the enforcement of his rights. The second section of the demurrer is therefore of no avail.
The third point raised in the demurrer touches the position of the Executive Council as a party defendant. It reads as follows:
“That the Executive Council is not a proper party defendant, in that it does not exercise discretionary or original powers with relation to the matters in behalf of which said action was brought.”
It seems to us that the reasons given go to show nothing in regard to the proper parties defendant, but -do show that this is a ease in which a mandamus may properly issue to the Executive Council; since it is merely a ministerial act which is sought to be compelled and one not involving any judicial discretion.
This is in accordance with the well-known principles of law applicable to this high prerogative writ. Reference is made to 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, pp.
The fourth objection presented by the demurrer is that there is a nonjoinder of parties defendant. It is said that Rossy and Sifre ought to be made defendants, since they are the parties charged with the fraud and misrepresentation alleged in the complaint. The language of the whole complaint must be kept in view. It is not the object of this suit to recover damages for fraud or misrepresentation, committed by any one, but to compel the performance of an 'act which may have been caused by the alleged fraud and misrepresentation; and since the Executive Council is alleged to be the party whose plain ministerial duty it is to do the 'act, it is the proper party defendant, and the only necessary party defendant in the case.
It may be that the applicant has 'a cause of action against the persons named on account of the illegal acts referred to, but that fact does not interfere with his controversy with the Executive Council of Porto Rico, which is the only matter before us at this time. For these reasons we cannot see that there is any nonjoinder of parties defendant herein of which the Executive Council can complain.
The fifth point set out by the demurrer reads as follows:
“That the complaint, in so far as it alleges financial injury, as well as an injury to the public, record or future of Rafael M. Delgado, if he should be permitted by this court to be considered as an authorized relator in said action, is too remote and too indefinite in character to enable the defendant to answer thereto; and that all allegations relating to said phase of said complaint are, for the reasons given, so indefinite and uncertain as to make it impossible for the.defendant to answer the same.”
The'remarks under the previous point will apply to some extent to this also. The allegations of financial injury and injury to the public record or future of the applicant are
The prayer of the complainant is confined solely to a request that a writ of mandamus may issue directing the Executive Council to' include the name of applicant upon the official ballots of the Republican party as a candidate for the position of delegate to the Legislative Assembly of Porto Rico from the district of Aguadilla. This is the object, and the sole object of the suit, and the question of pecuniary damages need have no further consideration than to tend to show that the applicant has a substantial right; which he alleges is being withheld from him by the nonaction of the Executive Council.
To recur to the general demurrer as the first point presented. On a review of the petition and taking the allegations therein contained to be true as we must do for the purposes of the demurrer, we are compelled to the conclusion that it plainly states a cause of action. The relator alleges that he was unanimously nominated by the Republican convention of the district of Aguadilla as a cafididate for delegate to the Legislative Assembly, and that this action of the nominating convention was properly certified to the Executive Council of Porto Rico, through the Insular Secretary; that he has never resigned as such candidate, nor requested his name to be withdrawn from the list of candidates, but that, on the contrary he has declined a nomination made of him for an incompatible office, and signified the same to the Insular Secretary, and that through fraud and misrepresentation the central committee of the Republican party secured the erasure of his name as a candidate and the substitution of another in its place, stating fully the means used and the particulars of such fraud and misrepresentation. The complaint further states
This in our opinion clearly sets out a good cause of action and the petition is not subject to general demurrer.
What has the respondent to say by way of answer to this complaint?
The “memorandum” filed herein by the Attorney General cannot be considered in any sense as an answer to the complaint. It is merely a brief of the authorities, combined with an argument made in support of a demurrer previously filed; taken as such, it has had our careful consideration. As no proper answer has been filed, the pleadings then considered in the most favorable light towards the defendant can only consist of the complaint made by the applicant, Rafael, M. Delgado, and the demurrer presented by the Executive Council. Under this state of the pleadings the facts alleged in the complaint not having been denied or explained in any manner must be taken to be true. Considering them upon their face we must look into the election laws, which are applicable to these facts. By section 22 of the Election Law it is made the duty of the Executive Council to cause to be printed on the official ballot the names of the candidates nominated by the conventions of any party that casts 5 per cent, of the total vote of Porto Rico at the last election held, as the names of the candidates nominated may be certified to the Secretary of Porto Rico by the presiding officer and secretary of the convention or caucus or committee making such nomination; it is also provided in the same section that in the case of the death, resignation or removal of any candidate subsequent to nomination, unless a supplemental certificate or petition of nomination be filed with the Secretary of State, the president of the
Thus we see that according to the allegations of the petition the law has been complied with in so far as the names of the candidates nominated were certified to the Secretary of Porto Rico by the convention which nominated them at Agua-dilla. It is true that this certification was made through the central committee of the Republican party, but there is nothing in the law to prevent this course being taken. But after this certification was made and the name of Rafael M. Delgado appeared on the certificate, another document was filed by the central committee, through Manuel P. Eossy, president, and Jaime Sifre, secretary, certifying that Eafael M. Delgado having renounced the nomination, by accepting another place in the local candidature of Tauco, Juan Roig was nominated in his place. This document, together with the certification of the o'riginal candidates, seems to have been presented at the same time to the Executive Council by the Insular Secretary. It also appears from the allegations of the complaint and by the documents attached as exhibits thereto, that Ea-fael M. Delgado having been nominated as a candidate for a member of the school board in the town of Yauco, and also as a delegate to the Legislature by the district of Aguadilla, and taking into consideration that according to the election laws the same could not appear twice upon the ballot, renounced the nomination for the school board and accepted the nomination as a delegate, and this fact was communicated to the Insular Secretary on the 11th of October, 1904. Again on the
“If any candidate whose nomination has been certified according to law shall wish to resign from such ticket, he shall file his resignation in writing with the Secretary of Porto Eico within three days after the filing of such certificate of nomination, and any resignation filed after the time mentioned in this section shall not be*413 considered; Provided, that no resignation shall be filed with, or received by, the Secretary of Porto Rico within twenty days immediately preceding an election.”
It would appear from a fair consideration and interpretation of this section that no one has a right to withdraw the name of a candidate from a ticket after his nomination has been duly certified to the Secretary of Porto Rico, except the candidate himself, and that he must do so within three days after the filing of such certificate of nomination and not less than twenty days preceding the election.
If the president of the central committee had any authority to erase the name of Delgado and insert the name of Boig, it was under that clause of section 22 of the Election Law which says:
“In case of the death, resignation or removal of any candidate subsequent to nomination, unless a supplemental certificate or petition of nomination be filed, the president of the central committee of the party shall fill such vacancy. ’ ’
. According to the facts, as stated in the complaint, and as shown by the exhibits attached thereto, and which, not having been denied or explained, for the purposes of this case must be taken as true, there was no death, resignation or removal of any candidate upon the ticket of the Republican party for the district of Aguadilla, and the case did not arise in which the president of the party or of the central committee had a right to fill a vacancy, as no vacancy existed, and of course there was none to fill.
After the name of Rafael M. Delgado had been certified to the Secretary of Porto Rico as the candidate of the Republican party for the position of delegate to the Legislative Assembly from the district of Aguadilla, no one had a right to withdraw his name except the candidate himself, and it was only in the case of his death or resignation, or his removal from the Island, thereby creating a vacancy, that the president
It does not appear that the Executive Council was in any particular directly a party to the fraud or misrepresentation which is alleged by the complainant, but at most could only be considered as negligent in accepting the names on the ballot as they were changed in accordance with the representation made by the Republican central committee. We have nothing to do with the motives which caused this change. The mere fact that the name of Delgado was omitted, wlien it should have been included as a candidate for the Legislative Assembly, is all with which we have any concern in the decision of this case.
The allegations of the complaint being sufficient to make out a case, and showing that the applicant is entitled to the relief sought, we must look to the answer of the respondent, which should have been filed, under section 9 of the act in regard to mandamus. This section reads as follows:
“If no answer be made, a peremptory mandamus must be allowed against the defendant; if answer be made containing new matter, the same shall not in any respect preclude the plaintiff who may,*415 on the trial or other proceeding, avail himself of any valid objections to its sufficiency or may countervail it by proof either in the direct denial or by way of avoidance.” Laws of 1903, p. 115.
As no answer lias been filed in accordance with, the law above quoted, a “peremptory mandamus must be allowed against the defendant” and the prayer of the petitioner must be granted. Accordingly, the alternative writ which has heretofore been issued will be made peremptory, and the secretary of this court should prepare and issue the necessary writ to the respondent herein.
Decided accordingly.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.