Pabón v. Alvarado
Pabón v. Alvarado
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 28th of August, 1914, Angélica Alvarado filed a complaint in the District Court of Aguadilla against Her-minio López as the sole heir of Eurípides López, alleging that the said Eurípides López and herself had had carnal relations, as a result of which a child, Herminia, was born; that both parents were single and capable of contracting marriage without obstacle, and other like averments to the effect of compelling an acknowledgment from Herminio Ló-pez that Herminia Alvarado was a natural child of Euripides López. The -record shows that there was an answer and a trial and that the District Court of Aguadilla rendered judgment in favor of' Herminio López, the defendant in the action.
On the 15th day of May, 1917, the present complaint was filed in the District Court of Aguadilla and the case was subsequently transferred to Mayagüez. The complaint was subsequently amended to. read substantially as follows: (1) That the complainant, Dionisio Ulises Pabón,ás the guardian (defensor) of the child Herminia, known as Herminia Alvarado, 7 years of age, and that the complainant is authorized to bring this suit in her name in accordance with an order made by the District Court of Aguadilla on the 15th of March, 1917, in the ex parle civil suit No. 2351; (2) that the said Herminia is of illegitimate birth and was not acknowledged by either of her parents either at the moment of birth or by public deed or in' any other solemn form; (3) that on the 28th day of August, 1914, the present defendant, Angélica Alvarado,’who-resided'in Lajas, alleging that she was the mother of Herminia Alvarado, but without saying whether she was the mother of an. illegitimate or an acknowledged natural child, presented a complaint before the District Court of Aguadilla to show that the child Herminia, known as Herminia Alvarado, was the natural child of Eurípides López
On the 10th February, 1919, when the case was called for trial, the complainant presented the order of the District Court of Aguadilla in civil case No. 2351 authorizing him, the said Dionisio Ulises Pabón, to file various suits. The complainant then presented the birth certificate of Herminia Alvarado, which recited that in the city of Lajas
The judgment must be reversed and while most of the points have been raised by the appellant, for convenience we treat them in a little different order.
While, perhaps, Dionisio Ulises Pabón had prima facie authority to represent the child by reason of his statements to the District Court of Aguadilla, the proof revealed that he was without such authority because the child had a natural mother who had legally acknowledged- it. Under the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure the authority to name a guardian only exists when there is no natural guardian or when the latter is for some reason incapacitated or unfit. If Angélica Alvarado is the natural mother of this child and has duly acknowledged it, there is nothing shown in the record why anyone should file a suit in her stead.
The Civil Code speaks in several places of acknowledgment by either parent, but we may question whether a natural mother who has the custody of the child may not be considered to have acknowledged it if she maintains and supports the child. We are inclined to think that the mother under these circumstances has patria potestas over the child to such a degree as would enable her to file a suit, but we do not care to stress this point.
The mother prima facie acknowledged the child at the time of its birth, as shown by the birth certificate presented by both sides in this case. It is true that the mother did not appear personally in the registry, but the certificate makes it appear that the person who came there was delegated to record the birth of the child. We have recently
The filing of the previous suit in Aguadilla was an acknowledgment by the mother. A complaint filed by an attorney who has authority is a solemn public document and whether it should be technically called a document or not, is k solemn act for which no special statute is necessary. If for no other reason Angélica Alvarado is estopped to deny as against Herminio López that she was the natural acknowledged mother of the child and brought the suit in its name.
Likewise the record discloses that Angélica Alvarado bought property in the name of’ herself and her minor child Herminia and also sold same by public deed from property recorded in the name of herself and of Herminia.
We mention too, although we do not base our decision on this state of the-law, that the child was born in 1909, after the Code of 1902 went into effect and before it was reformed in these particulars by the law of 1911. Section 187 of that Code says that illegitimate children may be recognized in any way by the father and mother jointly or by either of them. Thus it would seem that Angélica Alvarado admits having acknowledged the child from the time of its birth.
The demurrer in this case was valid because a complainant seeking to annul a judgment must show an interest. An illegitimate child can only have an interest in destroying a judgment declaring that it is not a natural child by alleging and showing that it is in point of fact such natural child.
Given the fact that there was an acknowledged mother, as shown by the proof, it was impossible to set aside the judgment of the District Court of Aguadilla without a showing that Herminio López and Angélica Alvarado conspired or committed fraud. The provisions of the law that permit a natural mother to file a suit without any solemn prerequisite are all in favor of natural children. The questions raised by the appellee here would, if valid, be available to a putative father. If there was, in point of fact, fraud in this case, there were ways of protecting the child, but in the absence of an averment and proof of fraud, as we have stated, the judgment of the District Court of Aguadilla must stand.
The judgment of the District Court of Mayagüez must be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.