Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Colón
Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Colón
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Porto Eican Leaf Tobacco Company appeals from an adverse judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding and says that the district court erred in refusing to admit as evidence the carbon copy of a letter. Prom the transcript of the evidence we take the following extract:
“Plaintiff. We withdraw the document. We submit as evidence the carbon copy of a letter dated October 20, 1934, addressed to Mr. Moisés Colón, Comerlo, Puerto Rico, prepared under the direction of and duly posted by this attorney.
“Defendant. We object to the admission of this document. It does not appear that the court has been requested to summon Mr. Moisés Colón to whom said letter had been addressed.
“The court. The admission of this document is denied, under section 24 of the Law of Evidence.
“Plaintiff. We take an exception.”
Assuming without holding that the statement of counsel amounted to “proof of the due mailing of the letter” within the meaning of Section 84 of the Law of Evidence, the district judge should have admitted the carbon copy if otherwise unobjectionable. Puig v. Soto, 18 P.R.R. 130, 136. The letter, however, is not before us and in view of the conclusion reached as to other aspects of the case the error herein complained of is not a sufficient ground for reversal.
Other assignments are:
“2. The trial court erred in finding that the conflict of title in the instant case is clear.
“3. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant herein supplied the element of proof necessary to establish a conflict of titles.
“4. The trial court erred in weighing the evidence submitted in the instant case by the defendant.”
In an equitable foreclosure suit brought by the Porto Eican Leaf Tobacco Company against Eafael Cruz and his wife, Juana María Díaz Sánchez, a special master sold to the
“Rural building lot in the Palomas Ward of Comerlo which measures 14.83 meters or 49 feet in front and at the rear, and 18.96 meters or 62 feet inches on each side, these measurements being taken from the very center of the gutter on the south side of the road, with an area of 283.07 square meters, equivalent to seven hundredths of a cuerda, or 3 ares, 7 centiares and 3 milliares, bounded on the North by the Comerío-Bayamón road, on the West, East and South by the remaining estate belonging to Rafael Cruz- Diaz. There is on it a house which is partly a one-story structure with an upper floor at its rear, the main floor being built of wood on a concrete base and roofed with galvanized iron. It measures 7.10 meters in front and 11.50 meters at the rear, including the balcony, and there is annexed to it on the right s*'de at the southeastern end a section intended to be used as a kitchen and a bath-room, built of concrete with galvanized iron roof, which measures approximately 4.90 meters in front by 4.50 meters deep. The ground floor, has the same width as the main building and is about 4 meters deep, being built of reinforced concrete. ’ ’
The tobacco company also alleged that after the commencement of the mortgage foreclosure suit, August 7, 1931, Moisés Colón extended his fence so as to include the parcel now in controversy described in the complaint as follows:
“Parcel of land located in the Palomas Ward of Comerio. It is 46 meters long on its north side and is bounded by the Bayamón-Comerío road; 50 meters long on the South and bounded by the Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Company; 26.50 meters long on the East and bounded also by the Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Company, and 26.62 meters long on the West and also bounded by the same Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Company.”
Moisés Colón, defendant in the instant case, testified that Rafael Cruz owned two cuerdas of land and purchased more increasing his acreage to 9 cuerdas; that defendant and his family lived in a house formerly belonging to him but now the property of the People of Puerto Rico and in another house built by defendant on land adjoining the government property; that he was in possession of this land as owner thereof; that he had it fenced and planted; that he bought in 1922 or 1923; that in addition to the house, he built on the west a garage with a concrete base and a super structure of galvanized iron; that the garage was destroyed ■by the San Felipe hurricane but the debris remained; that he built the garage in 1922 or 1923 and remained in possession thereof until it was destroyed in 1928; that he was in possession of the two houses, the garage and about a quarter of a cuerda of land; that he had been in possession of the parcels marked X and T on a map introduced in evidence
The witness was then questioned, first by the court and thereafter by counsel for defendant as follows:
“The Court: What did you buy first there?
“A. The house.
“Q. Do you own that house at present?
“A. No.
“Q. Who owns that house at present?
“A. The people of Puerto Rico.
“Q. Can you tell who lives in that house?
“A. I and my family.
“Q. What did you buy next?
“A. The lot.
“Q. How long afterwards, more or less, did you buy the lot?
“A. I bought the house in 1920 and the lot in 1921. I am not sure whether it was in 1922 or 1923.
“Q. What took place in connection with the house and the lot?
“A. I mortgaged the same to Finlay either in “24 or in ‘25.
“Q. I want to know what finally happened. What were the events leading to the ownership of the house and lot by the People of Puerto Rico?
“A. As regards the house and lot, I want to explain, it is a muddle, when ....
“Q. I want to know the result of it all. How did the People of Puerto Rico acquire the house?
“A. For the taxes.
“Q. And the lot.
“A. The same.
*297 “Q. What happened next in connection with the house and the lot and everything else? You have mentioned two houses, what •about the other?
“A. At that time when I bought the lot . . .
“Q. When did you buy the lot?
“A. Between ‘22 and ‘23.
“Q. So that yon bought the lot of the second house almost at •the time yon lost the other house and lot?
“A. Subsequently.
“Q. Then yon got that lot before yon lost the other two pieces >of property?
“A. Before.
“Q. From whom did you buy that second lot?
“A. From Rafael Cruz Diaz.
“Q. Is that the one that yon say yen bought by private deed?
“A. That is the one.
“Q. Was there any house on that lot?
“A. No.
“Q. Is there any house at present?
“A. There is one.
“Q. Who built it?
“A. I did.
“Q. What is the area of that lot?
“A. I do not know exactly, about one fourth of an acre.
“Q. Did yon fence that lot at the time you bought it?
“A. I did.
“Q. What did you fence it with?
“A. With barbed wire and wire netting.
‘ ‘ Q. Are that wire netting and barbed wire still there ?
“A. They are.
“Q. Then you built the house?
“A. I did.
“Q. Who lives in that house at present?
“A. I with my family which is numerous and we occupy the two houses.
“Q. So that part of your family lives in the house lately built by you and part lives in the house of the People of Puerto Rico ?
“A. Now of the People of Puerto Rico.
“Q. Do you only occupy the house of the People of Puerto Rico or the house and lot as well?
“ A. I do.
*298 “Q. Do you occupy the lot and also the house?
“A. I do.
“Q. In short, do you occupy both houses and lots?
“A. I do. _1 have received notice from the People of Puerto Rico.
“The court. That is all.
“Defendant. What is there to the west of that other lot to which you have referred ?
“A. Formerly there was a concrete garage with the upper part built of galvanized iron.
“Q. Is the debries still there?
“A. It is.”
The attorney, Francisco Rodríguez Alverio, mentioned by defendant, Colón, while on the stand, testified: that witness in 1924 lived in New York and in 1925 in Comerlo; that he knows Rafael Cruz and Moisés Colón; that he is practicing his profession in Comerlo; that in 1928 witness leased from Rafael Cruz the property in controversy (sic); that when he went to take possession, Rafael Cruz explained or pointed out to him the landmarks and what was included in the property with the view to indicating the portion covered by the contract of lease and showed him the parcel of land which belonged to Moisés Colón which was enclosed at the time by a barbed wire fence; that the parcel occupied by Moisés Colón was in the parcel leased by witness; that witness had seen it the day of the trial and the day before; that it is the-same property leased by witness from Rafael Cruz; that in 1926, Rafael Cruz did not exhibit any document; that Moisés Colón showed it to witness and hold him that he (Colón) wanted to get all the documents which he (Colón) had delivered to Belisario Boscana, which he had left in the office of Celestino J. Pérez; that Belisario, who was a “curial”, a scrivener, had died about that time; that Beli-sario did not work with Pérez; that witness went to work in the office where Belisario had worked; that witness saw a private document executed by Cruz and Colón concerning a lot, the dimensions of which the witness did not remember; that it was the same lot; that they talked to witness
Eafael Cruz testified that he had been the owner of 9 and some hundredths cuerdas of land in Palomas; that witness sold the property to Moisés Colón because witness had bought two cuerdas, one-half cuerda at a time; that witness
The surveyor, who shortly before the trial surveyed the property and made the plat introduced in evidence by plaintiff, testified as a witness for plaintiff to the existence of an old fense of woven wire and barbed wire and to the existence of trees along the boundary lines of the parcel in controversy as well as to the existence of the concrete foundations of what had once been a garage within the inclosure. The testimony for defendant is thus corroborated in a measure bj the testimony of this witness. It is practically uncontradicted by the testimony of any other witness. Taken as a whole and corroborated to some extent by the testimony 'of plaintiff’s surveyor, it was enough to justify the conclusion reached by the district judge if he had no reason to believe from the demeanor of defendant and his witness or other wise that their story had been concocted and committed to memory. In the typewritten record we find no such evidence of mendacity as to require a reversal.
The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.