People v. Valldejuli
People v. Valldejuli
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts that gave rise to-the filing of the complaint for contempt against Attorney Juan Yalldejuli-Bodríguez are- as follows:
The hearing of the certiorari proceeding brought by Dr.. Carlos M. de Castro against the Board of Commissioners of the G-overnment of the Capital, to review an order of said board removing him from the office of City Manager of San Juan, was held before the Supreme Court on January 17,. 1940. The board was represented by the respondent.
On the morning following the day of the hearing, respondent appeared in person before Mr. Justice De Jesús, of this court, in his office in the Capitol Building where the-Supreme Court of Puerto- Bico is located, at a time when said judge was there in the discharge of his duties, and stated to him: That in the afternoon of the previous day, as he was
After listening to respondent’s report, Mr. Justice De Jesus inquired whether he wished that'the matter be brought to the attention of the court and respondent replied: “As you wish.” Considering that Mr. Valid ejuli-Rodriguez had come to see him for that purpose and interpreting his wish to be that the matter be submitted by him to the consideration of the court, that same afternoon, while the judges were in the Conference Boom with the object of discussing and •deciding the cases already submitted, Mr. Justice De Jesús notified the court of what respondent had informed him, in order that the court might take whatever measures it might •deem proper and just.
Considering that respondent is an attorney in practice of his profession and as such an officer of this court, whom the court is obliged to protect from any aggression or. other act •of violence that might be attempted or committed against his person by reason of words spoken or acts carried out in the •defense of a case pending before this court, the latter thought that the facts reported by Mr. Validejuli-Rodriguez to Mr. •Justice De Jesús and by request of the former submitted to the court, were of such a serious nature, that if true might constitute a contempt of court in conformity with the opinion in In re Castro, 52 P.R.R. 133, where this same respondent was assaulted under circumstances very similar to those
As a result of the investigation made the court doubted that the facts complained of by Mr. Yalldejuli-Eodriguez. were true and was led to believe that his statements might have been made with the object of unduly influencing the •court against the adverse party in said certiorari proceeding. On January 24, 1940, the court referred the matter to the .prosecuting attorney, with instructions to make- a full investigation of the facts and to submit the result of the same, with his recommendations, to the court.
On July 13, 1940, the Prosecuting Attorney of this Supreme Court, complying with the order entered by us on the first of said month, filed a complaint wherein after stating the facts already mentioned, the following specific charges-are made against respondent:
“Fifth: That the facts stated in the morning of January 18, 1940, by respondent Juan Yalldejuli-Eodriguez to the Hon. A. R. de Jesús, as. happened to said attorney in the afternoon of the previous day and at the place specified by him in his statements to said Justice as alleged in the second paragraph of this complaint,, were false, the said respondent knowing then and there their falsity, inasmuch as the said Attorney Juan Yalldejuli-Eodriguez, once the hearing of case No. 8070 mentioned in the first paragraph preceding, had terminated, left the Capitol Building where the Supreme Court is located accompanied by Mr. Rafael Cestero, he having gone first from the courtroom to the office of the marshal and from the latter place to the exit of the building, without anything happening between Mr. Yalldejuli-Eodriguez and any other person while the1 former was leaving and without any other person interfering with*334 him, threatening him or pointing any weapon at him, in the route followed by him in leaving this Hon. Court, and without the said ■attorney drawing his revolver at any time.
“Sixth: That when respondent Juan Valldejuli-Rodriguez reported to the Hon. A. R. de Jesús the facts stated in the second paragraph of this complaint as if the same had happened to respondent, with the request that the sam'e be transmitted by said magistrate to this Hon. Court, he did so unlawfully and wilfully, and knowing that said facts were false _ and that he was stating them with the object of tending to unduly influence the Justices of this Hon. Court against the adverse party in the aforesaid suit, that is .against appellant Dr. C. M. de Castro."
On .July 10, 1941, we overruled respondent’s motion to dismiss the proceeding (ante, p. 117) because we concluded that “the complaint states facts that, in our opinion, if proved, would be sufficient to constitute contempt." The hearing of the case was held on said date. The prosecuting attorney, after offering in evidence the journal entry of the hearing held on January 17, 1940, in case No. 8070, certio-rari, and the judgment rendered in the same proceeding on June 28, 1940, offered the testimony of several witnesses, who in short testified as follows:
Angel R. de Jesús, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, after repeating the report received by him' from Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez regarding the alleged assault, substantially as already stated by us, went on to testify: That respondent did not specify the capacity in which the statements were made to him; that witness understood that said statements were made to him as a judge, and that respondent came to his office for that sole purpose. That witness, as a private person, could have done nothing and that was why witness informed respondent that as the Supreme Court was composed of several judges defendant should see the Chief Justice; that when witness .asked respondent whether he wanted the witness to notify the court .of the matter, respondent answered “As you wish.” That as respondent had ■come to his office expressly for that purpose, witness inter
William Gr. Látimer, Marshal of the Supreme Court, testified: That he was in the courtroom during the hearing of
Attorney Borinquen Marrero, Assistant Secretary of the Supreme Court, testified: That he acted as secretary during the hearing of the certiorari proceeding and remembered having seen the following persons in the courtroom: Dr. De Castro and a lady whom he learned later was Mrs. De Castro, Attorney Tirado-Géigel, Mr. Cestero, Mr. Marcos-Morales and to his right Mr. Christian, watchman of the Capitol. After reciting what Valldejuli-Rodriguez had informed him, which was substantially the same account given by Marshal Látimer, the witness went on to testify: That Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez did not say why they attempted to assault bim but informed witness that he had learned that the previous afternoon Dr. De Castro, Mrs. De Castro, and a man were drinking at a café in Santurce. That Valldejuli-Rodriguez also said that he had seen the person who ran away and that, said person was .tall, rather thin, had a dark complexion and wore dark eyeglasses.
Juan Christian testified: That at the time of the occurrence he was employed by the House of Representatives as watchman; that he was present at the hearing of the case of the Municipality of San Juan because he used to come down every afternoon to attend the hearings of the Supreme Court as spectator; and remained in the courtroom until the hearing was over. That after the close of the hearing witness saw Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez leave the secretary’s office. Deponent was at the second door facing the exit leading to Ponce de León Avenue, and from there he saw Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez and other persons leave the secretary’s office with some papers; that Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez came down the stairs of the secretary’s office, crossed the first door towards the exit of the Capitol; “I saw him from the moment he went down the stairs until he left the Capitol
Attorney Gabriel de la Haba, who represented Dr. De Castro in the case, testified: That as soon as the hearing was over he left the court accompanied by Attorney Riverá-Zayas and went to his office; that he did not see Mr. Vall-dejuli-Rodriguez again until the following day, when the latter came to his office, manifestly excited and informed the witness that he had come to see witness because something very serious had happened to him. the day before in the court.
Recounting the story which Mr. Valldejuli-Rodriguez told him and which we already know, witness further testified that respondent stated to the witness that he came to inform him of that because as witness was the attorney for Dr. De.
Attorney Rafael Rivera-Zayas, who also represented Dr. De Castro, merely testified that when the hearing of the case .was over, he left the court accompanied by Attorney De la Haba; that he knew Jesús Avilés-Román, a messenger of the Supreme Court, who was standing near the iron-grated door of the corridor of the secretary’s office when the witness left the court.
Dr. Carlos M. de Castro, after explaining in detail what he did in the morning of January 17, 1940, testified that on that day, at about 2:10 p. m., he reached the Supreme Court 'when the hearing of his case against the Board of Commissioners of San Juan had already begun. That when the hearing was over he left the courtroom with his wife and Mr. José Marcos-Morales, but was not sure whether Attorney Tirado-Géigel was with them also; that they went in his car to San Juan where they met Mr. Rafael Rivera-Santiago, who invited them to take a soft drink, after having left his wife with Mrs. Tirado Géigel in the office of the latter’s husband ; that one and a half hours later they returned to San-turce where attorney Tirado-Géigel, José Marcos-Morales, Rafael Rivera-Santiago, and the deponent met. That from there they went back to attorney Tirado-Géigel’s office for their respective wives and then they went to Tirado-Geigel’s home in Isla Verde. Mr. and Mrs. Tirado-Géigel stayed there and deponent and his wife returned to their home.
The oral evidence introduced by respondent was as follows:
Attorney Benigno Fernández-García, former Attorney General of Puerto Eico, testified that he has known respondent for many years; that when deponent was Attorney General and the office of District Attorney became vacant, Governor Winship and the witness agreed to offer the vacant position to Mr. Valldejuli-Eodriguez, who refused to accept the same because his private interests and his clientele prevented him from abandoning his law office.
Attorney Fernando J. Géigel, who at the time' of the hearing was City Manager of San Juan, testified: That on the
The witness Eafael Cestero stated that he accompanied Mr. Valldejuli-Eodriguez the day of the hearing of the case of Dr. De Castro, from the time the hearing began until it ended; and that he left with Mr. Valldejuli-Eodriguez; that as he left with Mr. Yalldejuli-Eodriguez, he saw a man hiding behind the first column of the rotunda, a hand with a pointed revolver; that he called the attention of the man and shouted to him; that Valldejuli-Eodriguez dropped the books, stepped ahead and drew his revolver* and the man ran towards some lumber or scaffolding for making repairs; that deponent pickedup the books, delivered them to Yalldejuli-Eo-driguez, and they left together towards the Municipal Theater Building, where the municipal offices were located. That Valldejuli-Eodriguez entered the building with the object of talking to the City Manager and deponent stayed in the, waiting room; that from there they left together towards Vall-dejuli-Eodriguez ’ home; that the man who pointed the revolver was a middle-aged person, white, rather good-looking and wore large eyeglasses. The impression of deponent is that if he saw the man again anywhere he would identify
Respondent testified in his own behalf and, after relating the incident between him and Mr. Enrique Castro Martinez, went on to state: That District Attorney Franco called Mm to his office and told him to be careful because the brother
The evidence, taken as a whole, is in our opinion amply sufficient to justify the averments of the complaint. Witnesses Aviles and Christian who .were present at the time- and place of the alleged assault and were in a position to-notice the facts, had they occurred, emphatically testified that nothing happened then and there to call their attention and that on the contrary they saw Mr. Valldejuli and his companion, Mr. Cestero, descend the stairs of the hallway of the-secretary’s office, cross the vestibule and go out to the street through the doors of the southern facade of the Capitol,, which lead to Ponce de León Avenue, and that nothing unanticipated happened to them, and that they walked and. tallied in perfect peace and quiet. The court gives full credit to the testimony of these witnesses whose presence at the place where respondent alleges the assault occurred, has been established beyond all doubt by the testimony of Marshal Látimer and of Attorney Rivera Zayas.
The court has been strongly impressed by the fact that,, although respondent had told all the persons to whom he reported the alleged assault, that a friend of his told respondent that prior to the trial of the case said friend saw the-man who had pointed a revolver at respondent, at a café at Stop 15, in Santurce, drinking with Dr. De Castro and his-wife, and although he had stated under oath in the preliminary investigation made by order of this court, that when he was informing the City Manager of what happened at the Capitol Building “I was informed there by a person I can identify, that prior to the trial of the case before this Hon.
The evidence offered by respondent, in a belated effort to withdraw his false accusation against Dr. and Mrs. De Castro and to direct the same against the brother of the deceased Irizarry, is unworthy of any credit, for according to the testimony of Aviles and Christian, to which we have accorded credit, it is not true that respondent was assaulted with a revolver by any person.
The testimony of the witness Cestero deserves no credit at all. When this witness was invited on January 23, 1940, by Marshal Látimer to show him the exact place where he saw the man with the revolver hiding, he showed to the marshal the second column to the left of the hallway, after descending the stairs close to the marshal’s office, and subsequently, on the same day, he called the marshal, rectified the first report given, and stated that the place of the occurrence was near the fourth column, in front of the stairways at the exit of the Capitol, saying: “Mr. Látimer, I made a mistake this afternoon when I showed you where the facts had occurred; the ease happened here,” pointing to a column next to the outer doors of the Capitol. Moreover, his manner of testifying and the readiness with which he availed himself of the description that Attorney Franco had made of Mr. Iri-
Let us examine the questions raised by.respondent in his brief.
Our attention has been called to the evident variance between the averment of the complaint, that Attorney Vallde-juli requested Mr. Justice De Jesús to transmit his statements to the court and the evidence, which only shows that respondent “authorized said Justice to do so, when respondent said ‘as you wish’.” The variance is in our opinion of no importance. A Justice of the Supreme Court, upon being informed by an attorney that the latter had been assaulted near the courtroom, after the close of the hearing of a case and by reason of and in connection with the same, is bound to convey such information to the court in order that the latter may discharge its duty to give due protection to the assaulted attorney and enforce respect for its own dignity by punishing the aggressor. No request or authorization from the attorney is necessary in order that the court may take cognizance of the occurrence'. In the instant case, the attorney, from the moment he authorized the Justice to. whom he applied for protection, to transmit his report to the court, placed himself under the jurisdiction of the court, and was subject to punishment as for contempt of court if from
The respondent urges that, in the complaint, it is charged against him that the statements made by him to Mr. Justice De Jesús were false, and that they were made with the “specific intent” to unduly influence the Supreme Court against Dr. De Castro; and that said specific intent has not been proved “as an independent and distinct element in the commission of the crime.”
What the complaint charges is that the respondent, in making the report of the alleged assault, “did so unlawfully and voluntarily, and knowing that said facts were false and that he was stating them with the object of tending to unduly influence the Justices against Dr. De Castro.
It is true that when a specific intent is an essential element of a particular crime, such specific intent must be proved in order that a conviction may be upheld. Hence in the case of People v. Pérez, 48 P.R.R. 704, cited by respondent, where the defendant was convicted of the crime of burglary in the first degree, committed as alleged in the information, by entering into a house at night with the intent to commit the crime of rape, the judgment was reversed because the facts shown tended to deny rather than to establish the intent to commit a rape, and in the absence of such intent the crime of burglary consequently did not exist. The evidence showed that Pérez entered the house to meet his sweetheart, who had agreed to abandon the house and elope with him. The specific intent to commit the crime of rape could not be inferred from those facts. Had'the. evidence shown that Pérez had raped his sweetheart or had assaulted her with such intent, the judgment of the lower court would undoubtedly have been affirmed, for the act carried out would have been enough in order that the intention with which the defendant had entered the house could be inferred. The only way of proving malice, which is the intent to do injury to
It having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts stated by respondent,to Mr. Justice De Jesús and transmitted by the latter to the court, were false, and that respondent had knowledge of their falsity, we must reach the conclusion that the object respondent had in making such a false report was to carry to the minds of the Judges the idea that Dr. De Castro and his wife were persons capable of entering into a conspiracy with a criminal and of inducing the latter to attempt against the life of respondent, by the mere fact that respondent had represented the opposite party in the case pending before this court. Respondent’s purpose could not have been, as claimed, to ask for protection and security for his person, for the evidence has shown that absolutely nothing happened to him. The facts and circumstances of the case lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the object that respondent aimed to reach with his contemptuous and direspectful conduct was to influence the court against Dr. De Castro. Respondent was not interested in the investigation of the alleged assault. What he was interested in was in dropping poison upon the minds of the Judges, in the hope that the effect thereof would be prejudicial to his opponent.
Attorneys, as officers of the courts of justice, are bound more than all other citizens to show, the courts and their judges all due respect and consideration. The aim of the courts and of the attorneys is only one: to know the truth. An attorney who, instead of aiding in the determination of the facts, seeks to cloud them, and resorts to deceitful practices in order to mislead the court and induce it to do an injustice, is guilty of contemptuous and insolent conduct, and hence is also guilty of contempt.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.