delivered the opinion of the court.

In the instant ease the plaintiff filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the district court in which it was prayed that the court “declare and decree that the provisions *946of paragraph. 20 of §16 of Act No. 85 of August 20, 1925, as amended by Act No. 25 of December 4, 1942, and by Act No. 116 of May 12, 1943, do not levy or impose any tax, excise or impost on the materials and effects manufactured, sold, transferred, used or introduced in Puerto Bico, and that constitute electrical apparatus or parts or accessories of the same; that it forbid the defendant to file any action against the plaintiff to collect the excise taxes to which this connoiaint refers. . The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of the lower eonrt dismissing the petition.

The allegations of the petition of the plaintiff undoubtedly set forth a controversy between the plaintiff and the Treasurer.1 The district court held, however, that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, in view of the provision of §4 of Act No. 169, Laws of Puerto Rico, 1943 (p. 609), that “The Tax Court shall have exclusive, jurisdiction. . . of all actions, proceedings, special or extraordinary ■remedies, and claims of any kind, relating to or affecting "the levying, collection, payment, return or reimbursement of ■all kinds of taxes, including excise and income taxes. . . and ■any other taxes or imposts. . .” (Italics onrs.)

The appellant conceded at the oral argument that its petition is based solely on the alleged illegality of the tax being *947claiEisd by the Treasurer, and that none of the equitable considerations are present in this ease which, prior to the passage of Act No. 169, have moved us in the past to enjoin the collection of taxes (see cases collected on p. 584 of Fernández v. Buscaglia, Treas., 60 P.R.R. 582). The plaintiff nevertheless insists that it is entitled, by way of 'a declaratory judgment, to a determination of the illegality of the tax herein; and that if such a declaration is made in its favor by the district court, it will then be entitled, pursuant to ■§8 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Act No. 47, Laws of Puerto Eico, 1931 (p. 378), to an injunction restraining ihe collection of the tax herein.

We have recited the facts and contentions herein at length in order to demonstrate that it was unnecessary for the district court to decide this case on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment herein. Taking the petition and arguments of the plaintiff at their face value, they state a case in which the district court in the appropriate exercise of its discretion should have denied relief by way of declaratory judgment (see Paul Smith Const. Co. v. Buscaglia, 140 F. (2d) 900 (C.C.A. 1st, 1944); Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293). In the ordinary case the remedy at law provided in the Tax Court is adequate, Ballester v. Court of Tax Appeals, 60 P.R.R. 749, and tax*948payers should not ordinarily he permitted to by-pass that court by utilizing the device of petitioning for a declaratory judgment in the district court. Whether or not jurisdiction still exists in the district court to give declaratory relief, coupled with the additional coercive relief of injunction, in a case coming within the rule laid down in Fernández v. Buscaglia, Treas., supra, is a question which need not concern us here and we therefore expressly leave it open. (See Annotation, Tax questions as proper subject of action for declaratory judgment, 132 A.L.R. 1108. Cf. Miles Laboratories v. Federal Trade Commission, 140 F. (2d) 683 (C.C.A., D.C., 1944); United States ex rel. Jordan v. Ickes, F. (2d), decided June 5, 1944 (C.C.A., D.C., 1944).)2

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.