Abella Blanco v. Guy Tugwell
Abella Blanco v. Guy Tugwell
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Luis Abella Blanco was removed by the Governor as Registrar of Property of Caguas after a hearing on charges preferred against him and pursuant to the recommendation of the referee who took the testimony. Abella filed a petition for mandamus in the district court to compel the Governor to restore him to his post as Registrar. The lower court dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. For reasons which are fully stated in our opinions, we set aside this judgment and remanded the case to enable the respondent to amend his answer and for further proceedings. Abella v. Piñero, Governor, 66 P.R.R. 651.
After the case was remanded to the district court, on February 13, 1947 Abella filed an amended petition. On March 18, 1947 the Governor filed his answer. After a trial on the merits, on April 23, 1947 the district court entered judgment dismissing the complaint. The petitioner appealed from that judgment.
We are confronted at the threshold of the case with the fact that Abella is no longer qualified to hold the post of Registrar, as he was disbarred by this Court, after a hearing, on April 22, 1947. In re Abella, 67 P.R.R. 211; § 1,
We are unable to agree with this contention. We take judicial notice of our own action in disbarring Abella. Since he is no longer qualified to act as Registrar, for our purposes his petition for mandamus is .in the same legal position as if he held an office with a fixed term which had expired while the litigation is pending. Under those circumstances the petition, insofar as it prays for restoration to office, becomes moot and will not be granted. Gelpí v. Tugwell, 123 F. (2) 377 (C.C.A. 1st, 1941); see De Castro v. Board of Commissioners, 59 P.R.R. 673, 136 F. (2) 419 (C.C.A. 1st, 1943), 322 U.S. 451. In so holding we are not, as the appellant argues, performing the executive function of removing Abella on the ground of disbarment. Rather we are refusing to take the action requested by Abella: to enter an affirmative judgment ordering his restoration to a post which he is now legally disqualified from holding.
Although Abella cannot be restored to office because of his disability, the question remains whether, as the appellant claims, he may nevertheless be granted judgment for salary he would have earned between the date of his removal and his disbarment, if we should hold he was illegally removed.
We assume, without deciding, that Abella was illegally removed, despite the contention of the respondent that he was validly removed. Cf. Jiménez v. Reilly, 30 P.R.R. 582; Gelpí v. Leahy, Gov., 56 P.R.R. 884, 123 F. (2) 377, 379, dissenting opinion; §§ 53, 208, paragraphs 4 and 8, Political
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.