delivered the opinion of the , ■ Court.

In an action for the liquidation of community property and other relief prosecuted in the San Juan Section of the former District Court of Puerto Rico by Carmen Carrion Garcia against Luz María Sampedro et al., that court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint after a hearing on the merits. The plaintiff moved simultaneously for the reconsideration of said judgment and for a new trial. After hearing the parties on both motions the court a quo entered separate orders denying them. The plaintiff then appealed from the judgment and the aforesaid orders to this Court and at her request the trial court, on May 16, 1951, ordered the preparation and filing of the transcript of the evidence for the purposes of the appeal taken. The appellant, as well as the two stenographers who acted at the trial, requested several extensions of time to file the aforesaid transcript of the evidence. Meanwhile, one of said stenographers died on .August 7, 1951, without having transcribed the notes taken by him. The plaintiff subsequently filed in the .court a quo another motion for a new trial founded on the impossibility to file the transcript of the notes taken by the deceased ste-r n'ographer or, in lieu thereof, a partial statement of the case and bill of exceptions. After hearing the said motion for a *387new trial the court a quo entered an order dismissing it. The plaintiff took the present appeal from that order.

The question for decision is whether under the attendant circumstances the court a quo abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.1 In order to determine this we must'make a brief summary of the essential facts said court had before it when entering the' order appealed from. Appellant herself summarizes them as follows:

“1. Mr. Gandía died on August 7, 1951, without having prepared the transcript of the notes he took during the trial of this case.

“2. Mr. Gandia’s notes can neither be read nor. transcribed by another person. (See Transcript, p. 7.)

“3. Mr. Gandía took down all the proceedings had and the evidence admitted in the defendant’s turn. (Transcript, p. 11.)

“1. The stenographer, Mr. Gandía, and the plaintiff had agreed on the compensation to be paid to the said stenographer for his work. (T., p. 18.)

“5. Neither the plaintiff nor her attorney took notes during the trial of the incidents between the parties, nor of the statements of the Judge, nor of the questions to the witnesses, nor of the answers of the latter. (T., p. 12.)

“6. Neither in the record of the court nor in the minutes of the case are there any remarks containing information as to the testimony of the witnesses.”

Section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904 2 provided the manner of filing in this Supreme Court an appeal from judgments of the former district courts. Said Section required the appellant to furnish the appellate court with a copy of the notice of appeal, of the judgment roll and of any bill of exceptions or statement in the case upon which the appellant relied. This Section is amended in 1911,3 and by *388virtue of said amendment the system of appeal by means of a bill of exceptions and statement of the case is established for the first time. See Mercado et al. v. Succession of Ferreiro, 26 P.R.R. 433. In 1913 4 the aforesaid Section is again amended by the addition of a “proviso,” in the sense of permitting in the appeal of a final judgment the use of the bill of exceptions and statement of the case used in a motion for a new trial.

It is in 1917 that our Legislature, through Act No. 27 of November 27 of that year, (Spec. Sess. Laws, p. 274) 5 adopts the option system to appeal, permitting the parties to choose between an appeal by means of the traditional bill of exceptions and statement of the case or by means of a transcript of the evidence prepared by the stenographer. Mercado et al v. Succession of Ferreiro, supra. Said Act was not passed as an amendment to § 299, wherefore the entire Section remained in force. Its scope was merely to grant the right of option above mentioned. González v. Méndez, 33 P.R.R. 808. Subsequently and in order to conform § 299 to the aforesaid Act No. 27 of 1917, the former was again amended by Act No. 81 of June 26, 1919 (Sess. Laws, p. 674) *389to the effect that “The record of an appeal shall bé constituted by the certificate to be issued by the secretary of the court a quo or by the attorneys of the parties, of the judgment roll6 and of the notification of the appeal, except in the case of approval of a transcript of the evidence pursuant to law. In this case the record of an appeal shall be constituted by the said original transcript and certificate of all other documents constituting the judgment roll, authorized in the manner hereinbefore provided.” (Italics ours.)

It was at this stage of the Act that we pointed out in González v. Méndez, supra, that “We have long foreseen that the death or failure of a stenographer might cause an appellant to fail.” The reason could be that if an appellant elected the transcript of the evidence to perfect his appeal and thereafter could not file it within the term granted by law or within an extension thereof on account of the death or failure of the stenographer, the term to file a bill of. exceptions and statement of the case would have already, expired by then, for which reason it became impossible for the appellant to perfect his appeal.

*390This possible contingency was elifhinated by the approval of Act No. 19'of April 11, 1935 (Sess. Laws, p. 176) amending § 299'.’ The amendment consisted in the addition of a “proviso” to the 'fifth paragraph of said Section, reading as follows:' ' '

“Provided, That in case, the appellant shall have asked for a transcript of the evidence in order to perfect the appeal, and because of death, disability, absence of the stenographer who took the notes, or of any impediment which the court may accept, it should not be possible to file said transcript, the court, upon a determination of said impossibility, shall grant the appellant a" reasonable term in order that he may then file a bill of exceptions or a statement of the case, in narrative form, ¿s hereinbefore provided.”

It is clear that since then and under the option system^ already in force, when it later became impossible for the appellant who. elected the, transcript of the evidence to file, same because of the death, disability or absence of the stenographer who. took the notes, his appeal was not prejudiced thereby for once those facts were proved to the satisfaction of the trial court, the latter had to grant him a reasonable, term to file, in lieu of the transcript of the evidence, a bill of exceptions and statement of the case. Prior to the date-on which this substitute method was established we' had held that when it is impossible for an appellant to perfect his appeal because of exceptional circumstances, such as when without any fault on the part of the appellant the stenographer’s notes are lost, or when the stenographer dies before transcribing said notes, the trial courts retain their jurisdiction to grant a new trial on that ground. Sánchez v. Vizcarrondo, 45 P.R.R. 64 and 46 P.R.R. 674; Amaral v. Gerena, 46 P.R.R. 710, decided on May 10, 1933, May 22, 1934, and May 24, 1934, respectively. During the effectiveness of the 1935 amendment7 which established the afore*391said substitute means to perfect an'appeal, we decided Buxó v. Sellés, 48 P.R.R. 808, ratifying the doctrine laid down in-the Sánchez and Amaral cases. In the Buxó case, however, this Court was not satisfied with the impossibility of reproducing the facts that developed at the trial and reversed the: order appealed from granting a new trial. •

Act No. Ill of May 5,1939 (Sess. Laws, p. 574) amended the afore-said § 299 for the last time. This Act also repealed the 1917 Act establishing the option. Thenceforth, in civil actions, there is in principle only one manner to perfect an appeal: the transcript of the evidence. There is no right of option. Nevertheless, the “proviso” of the Act of 1935, supra, is retained to the effect that in the case of the death,, absence or disability of the stenographer, appeals shall be taken by means of the bill of exceptions and statement of the case)8

*392In 1941 and during the effectiveness of § 299 as amended by the Act of 1939, supra, we decided Olmedo v. Rivera, 59 P.R.R. 488. In that case one of the stenographers who had taken down part of the notes of the trial had died, wherefore the appellant was unable to file a complete transcript of the evidence. Nevertheless, she prepared and filed a statement of the case, but it was not approved by the judge of the court a quo to whom it was submitted for approval. We also refused to approve said statement of the case, but reserved to the appellant the right to apply to the trial court for a *393new trial. The appellant did so and said court entered an order granting her a new trial. We subsequently dismissed as frivolous the appeal taken from that order.

In Buxó v. Sellés, supra, we neither discussed nor considered the scope of the “proviso” added to § 299 by the Act of 1935, to the effect of providing a substitute means to perfect an appeal when it became impossible for the appellant, after having elected the transcript of the evidence, to file it for any of the reasons enumerated in the statute. Nor did we discuss or consider that scope in Olmedo v. Rivera, *394supra, but in the latter case it was unnecessary inasmuch as-there the appellant made'use, although unsuccessfully, of the substitute means, filing' a statement of the case, which as we have said, was not approved by the judge of the court a quo or by this Court.

The scope of such “proviso” is today evident.' By establishing the method of the transcript of the' evidence as. a mandatory method to perfect an appeal,, the Act anticipated the possibility that because of the death, disability or absence of the stenographer who took the notes in the trial, it should become impossible for the appellant to perfect his appeal, and provides that in- such case, thé appellant should make use, as a substitute method, of the bill of exceptions and statement of the case. In this manner the party prejudiced by a judgment does not lose his right to bring his case to this appellate court.

The parties are thus warned that they can not rely exclusively on the stenographer to perfect an appeal. They must also anticipate the occurrence of any of the contingencies mentioned in the Act and place themselves, by means of the exercise of a reasonable diligence, in a position to comply with the statute that reserves to them a substitute method' to appeal.

In the case at bar the court a quo based its order mainly on Rule 10 (/) of the Rules of this Court, approved March 15, 1946.9.

*395This rule follows, fundamentally, the language of § 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant maintains, however, that said rule does not apply to her case although she assumes the position that it governs the proceedings in the court a quo. Her argument is to the effect that since said rule contains no provision whatsoever as to what must be done. when the stenographer dies without having prepared the transcript of the evidence and it becomes impossible for the appellant to submit a bill of exceptions and statement of the case, a new trial then lies. Such argument we hold, would be equally applicable to § 299, which in our judgment, governs appellant’s case.

The weakness of her argument consists in that here the appellant herself, for lack of diligence, has placed herself in a position of not being able to prepare and file the partial statement of the case and bill of exceptions. Shé has- admitted that her attorney did not take notes during the trial notwithstanding that, as stated by the judge of the court a quo, the oral evidence of the defendant, which is the only evidence that the appellant has been unable to send up to this Court, consisted in four brief and simple testimonies. We certainly can not consider that a party has been diligent and that it has therefore exhausted the remedies afforded to it by law when as in the instant case, the inaction of that party in failing to take notes in the trial is not duly justified. Litigants must not expect the granting of a new trial when because of their lack of foresight it becomes impossible for them to perfect an appeal. Considering all the circumstances of this case we hold that the court a quo did not err in denying the motion for a new trial filed by the appellant.

The order appealed from will be affirmed.