delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for decision is whether the San Juan Part of the Superior Court erred in issuing an order granting a petition for habeas corpus filed by appellee urging his discharge, on the ground that he did not have assistance of counsel in a prosecution for first-degree murder in which he was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. The People of Puerto Rico and James M. Jones, Warden of the State Penitentiary, appealed from that order.

The appellee was prosecuted in the Arecibo Part of the Superior Court1 jointly with José Jaime Delgado. On the day set for the trial the two defendants appeared together with Mr. Esteban Susoni, attorney for both defendants according to the record. The court inquired whether the *546defendants were represented by that attorney, to which José Jaime Delgado answered in the affirmative while the appellee said that his attorney was Mr. Roberto Martinez, who was not present. In the course of the dialogue copied in footnote 2,2 Mr. Esteban Susoni informed the court that he was *547no longer attorney for the appellee; that the latter or one of his relatives had employed Mr. Martinez to represent him at the trial, and that that attorney had asked him to request the court to wait for him until ten o’clock or ten thirty. The court, relying mainly on the fact that Mr. Esteban Susoni appeared as the attorney of record for both defendants from the time of the arraignment, chose to proceed with the trial and ruled that the attorney could act “at the commencement of the case” as attorney for both defendants. Mr. Susoni agreed but explained that if the introduction of the evidence began in Mr. Martinez’ absence, the court would be imposing on him “the defense of an accused who has not requested it.” He added that the representation of both defendants by the same attorney might possibly be incompatible, but gave no explanation as to such possible incompatibility.

The case was called for trial and Mr. Susoni represented both defendants during the impanelling of the jury. After *548the impanelling and before The People offered its evidence, the court recessed in order to give Mr. Martinez time to appear. Upon his arrival, the session was resumed and the trial went on. Mr. Susoni continued the representation of José Jaime Delgado, and Mr. Martinez from that time represented appellee. José Jaime Delgado was found guilty of second-degree murder and the appellee of first-degree murder. Subsequently, the latter filed the petition for habeas corpus which is the object of the order appealed from.

While appellant maintains that the San Juan Part of the Superior Court erred in issuing the order in question, the appellee contends that he had no “actual and effective assistance of counsel not only during the impanelling of the jury but also in the course of the trial,” alleging that “the court imposed on him . . . the professional assistance of an attorney other than his own,” referring to Mr. Susoni’s intervention in the selection of the jury; that the court, in refusing to delay the hearing until Mr. Martinez arrived and in permitting “the impanelling of the jury in the absence” of that attorney, deprived him of the right “to have the assistance of the counsel of his choice at all the stages of the proceeding”; and, finally, that Mr. Martinez “learned *549of the occurrences the very day of the commencement of the trial, and therefore had no time to prepare appellee’s defense.”

The defendants were represented at the arraignment by Mr. Esteban Susoni who continued to act as attorney of record for both, as already stated, until the very day of the trial, when he informed the court for the first time that the appellee would not be represented by him because he had selected another attorney. More than six months elapsed from appellee’s arraignment to the date set for the trial. However, he offered no excuse to explain or justify his delay in choosing another attorney and designating Mr. Martinez. The record discloses that when the trial was resumed, the latter informed the court that his client had engaged his services that morning, but did not object at any time to the commencement of the trial in his absence, or to the fact that Mr. Susoni had acted on his behalf during the selection of the jury, which in effect was accepted as selected. Thereafter Mr. Martinez participated actively in the trial of the case, which was not a complicated one, on behalf of the appellee, after informing the judge of the trial court that he was ready.3

In view of these facts, is it correct to say that the appellee was denied the right to assistance of counsel of his own choice? Certainly not. That right must be zealously protected by the courts, but the defendant should not be reluctant to exercise it, People v. González, 50 P.R.R. 187; Neufield v. United States, 118 F. 2d 375, nor use it to obstruct the normal course of proceedings. He should not wait until the last minute to designate counsel, unless he has good reasons for not doing it sooner, and then allege, if the outcome of the proceeding is adverse to him, that because *550of his own omission and lack of diligence he was denied such right. To sanction this action which we reject here would be tantamount to establishing a precedent highly injurious to the orderly administration of justice in criminal matters. The effect would be to grant the defendants the control over the calendars of the courts by placing them in a position to determine when the proceedings shall be heard, thereby furnishing an easy means to have the trials postponed at their will simply by- waiting until the last minute to employ or change counsel.

It was incumbent on the appellee to show in the habeas corpus proceeding that he was deprived of the right to assistance of counsel of his own choice, and this he failed to accomplish. We are fully convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding, when faced with the problem created by appellee himself, that the trial should be commenced and that Mr. Susoni should represent him during the impanelling of the jury. On the other hand, we are further convinced that he also failed to show that the action of the court was prejudicial to him,4 Urban v. United States, 46 F. 2d 291, or that the legal assistance during the remainder of the trial was not active and diligent after Mr. Martinez’ return, or that it would have been so to a greater degree if that attorney had had more time to prepare himself, which in any event he did not request.

The cases cited by appellee are not applicable to the facts and circumstances surrounding the case at bar.

We are of the opinion that appellant is correct in his contention that the lower court erred in issuing the order appealed from. The order will therefore be set aside and the petition dismissed.