An amended complaint was filed against the U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., and Roberto Villafañe, also known as. Roberto Vizcarrondo, to recover compensation for damages. It was alleged, in brief, that an automobile belonging to; Roberto Villafañe, insured by the codefendant company and' driven by Miguel Cestari — mentioned in the record also under' the name of Miguel Chestary Carrion — “who at the time was acting as agent of codefendant within the scope of agent, *619of Mr. Villafañe” negligently collided with a motor vehicle owned by the plaintiff causing the latter contusions, bruises and other injuries. The complaint was answered and a trial was held. The plaintiff offered in evidence a copy of certain clauses of the insurance contract held by the defendants and such evidence was admitted with the consent of said defendants. 1 After plaintiff concluded his evidence, with the exception of the testimony of a physician,2 the defendants filed a motion for nonsuit requesting the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that even after giving credit to such evidence, the same would only show that the automobile had been lent by Villafañe to Miguel Cestari for the purpose of taking the children of the former to school, which in nowise proved “the agency which must necessarily be established as provided in § 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, according to the amendment adopted in 1943,” a contention which was based on the decision in Díaz v. Iturregui, 72 P.R.R. 191. The trial court finally granted the motion for nonsuit and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appealed, and assigned such dismissal as the only error committed by the court.

In deciding the motion for nonsuit the lower court stated, among other things, that “The evidence which the plaintiff has presented in this case shows that Miguel Chestary Carrion was driving the automobile of the defendant Roberto Villafañe, following the instructions of the latter, to take Villafañe’s children to school,” adding that, “Ches-*620tary Carrion being a pupil of the defendant Villafañe and there being no labor contract between them by virtue of which Chestary Carrion should be driving Villafañe’s automobile at the time of the accident, it is definitely clear that, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Díaz v. Iturregui, supra, Villafañe has no civil liability for the damages caused by Miguel Chestary Carrion in the operation of Villafañe’s vehicle.”

In our opinion the judgment should be affirmed insofar as Roberto Villafañe' is concerned, on the authority of our decision in Díaz v. Iturregui, supra, and reversed in respect to the U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

Once the appellant presented in evidence, with the consent of the defendants as we have said, a copy of certain clauses of - the insurance policy, among them the omnibus clause copied in footnote 1, the complaint became amended pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Arcelay v. Sánchez, 77 P.R.R. 782,3 and there was included in the suit the question — which has nothing to do with the decision in the case of Iturregui — relative to the subsidiary liability of the U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., under the terms of the quoted clause, for the acts directly charged against Miguel Chestary Carrion, who, according to the lower court, was driving Villafañe’s car with his permission.4

*621The judgment appealed from will be affirmed with regard to Roberto Villafañe and reversed as to the U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., and the case will be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.