delivered the opinion of the Court.

On October 18, 1958, while plaintiff was passing by a farm owned by Miguel Morales in Barrio Garróchales of Arecibo, he saw a child within the farm whom a cow was trying to gore. He immediately jumped over the wire fence which was the boundary line between the property and the road, in order to help the child defend itself, and struck the animal with a stick. It turned and attacked the plaintiff, fracturing the tibia and the fibula of his right leg, and also causing contusions in different parts of his body. Invoking the provisions of § 1805 of the Civil Code (1930 ed.) 1 *925and alleging that Narciso López was the owner of the animal, the plaintiff filed an action for damages. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court, in brief, on the following ground: “The evidence clearly established that although it is true that on the day of the accident (October 18, 1953), the defendant Narciso López was the owner of the cow, yet he was not in possession of the animal at the time, because he had delivered it to Amado Morales to go shares, and the defendant was not making any use of the animal on the day of the accident.”

It is urged here: first, that Narciso López and Amado Morales were co-owners of the animal in question; second, that the defendant Narciso López was using it at the time of the accident; and third, that said defendant is liable for the damages inflicted on the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the aforecited § 1805, for there was no force majeure or fault on the part of the victim. After analyzing the facts which appear in the record and the applicable rules of law, we are convinced that these arguments lack merit and that the judgment from which this appeal was taken should be affirmed.

In effect, as established by the evidence introduced at the trial, two years prior to the occurrence here the defendant delivered to Amado Morales the cow which caused the damages, on the basis of “sharing profits,” that is to say, by virtue of the following contract: (1) the defendant Narciso López retained the ownership of the animal; (2) Amado Morales assumed the exclusive obligation of caring, keeping, and feeding the animal; (3) the profits (to wit, the proceeds from the sale of the cow, comparing its price with its value at the time of delivery) would be divided' share and share alike between the contracting parties, dividing also between them the price of the calves but not the milk which was kept by Amado Morales; and (4) the party working on shares held possession of and the exclusive right to use the animal while the contract was in force. *926This was, therefore, a typical contract for the breeding of cattle on shares which is in many respects analogous to a lease contract and a partnership contract but which constitutes sui generis a special contract. 4 Castán, Derecho Civil Español, 594-622 ( 8th ed. 1956); Diccionario de Derecho Privado, 402-406 (1950); 10 Planiol y Ripert, Tratado Práctico de Derecho Civil Francés, 928-942 (Sp. trans.) 1940.2 Thus at the time of the accident, Amado Morales had the legal possession of the animal which caused the damages and he was the only one who used it, according to the terms of the aforesaid contract of aparcería with the defendant owner. Undoubtedly Amado Morales was the only person responsible for taking care of the animal and had the right to use it as it was most convenient to him, without being bound to receive or to obey orders from the owner in that respect.

This suffices to render inapplicable to the case at bar the special liability which our Civil Code imposes on the posses*927sor of an animal, or on the one who uses the same, for the damages it may cause other persons. In principle, the basis of such liability rests on a presumption of fault for lack of vigilance. The person who has the legal possession of the animal or who uses it, is the only one who as a practical matter can take the necessary precautions to prevent any accident. Yet this liability exists even if the animal escapes or goes astray and it only ceases when the damage results from force majeure or from the fault of the victim. Ferrer v. Rivera, 56 P.R.R. 480 (1940). Therefore, this is not a mere procedural presumption of fault or negligence, but a special liability imposed by law which “ . . . has affinity with or rather penetrates into the sphere of objective liability ...” 4 Castán, op. cit. 834-835. Aside from the fact that it is not necessary to impute in the pleadings any kind of fault or negligence to the possessor of the animal or to the person who uses the same, he is relieved of liability only if there exists one of the two exceptions pointed out, which must be proved by the person alleging them in his defense. See Judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 19, 1909 (116 Jur. Civ. 120) and of December 23, 1952 (40 Jur. Civ. 2d 1066).

Liability is not limited, however, to wild or dangerous animals, but includes all animals without distinction. Nor is it limited to a dangerous conduct or activity on account of the use made of the animal. On the other hand, the alleged ground of force majeure exists (1) where the animal has been stolen and (2) where an employee of the owner uses it for purposes which are not within the scope of his employment. Colón v. Pérez, 27 P.R.R. 685 (1919) .3 Thus, in our opinion, a strictly “objective” theory is unacceptable to explain the liability established by the *928afore-cited § 1805, since it is not based exclusively on the social need to compensate for the damages suffered as a result of the risks inherent in a conduct or activity which, though dangerous, is nevertheless permitted.4 The rational basis of § 1805 is a presumption of liability arising from the right of the possessor or of the person who uses the animal to supervise and control it, and from the correlative duty of exercising such right with due precaution to prevent the infliction of damage on another. 12 Manresa, Código Civil Español, 673-686 (5th ed. 1951); 6 Planiol y Ripert, Tratado Práctico de Derecho Civil Francés, 819-830 (Sp. trans.); 3 Colin y Capitant, Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil, 869-873 (3d ed. Sp. trans. 1951).5

In practice it is usually easy' to determine on whom such liability is imposed. The owner generally has the legal possession and as a rule he is also the one who uses the animal. Reddinger v. Crespo, 18 P.R.R. 106 (1912); Torres v. Dávila, 47 P.R.R. 298 (1934); Ferrer v. Rivera, 56 P.R.R. 504 (1940); Galarza v. G. Llinás & Co., 71 P.R.R. 103 (1950). The liability of the owner continues (1) even if he has surrendered the physical custody of the animal to an employee, and (2) even if he makes use of the animal through an employee. De Jesús v. Arzuaga, 53 P.R.R. 497 (1938); Puig Peña, op. cit. 581. *929However, the owner may actually deliver the animal to be used by another person: through lease, loan, contract of aparcería, etc. In such case, it is the lessee, the borrower, or the party working on shares who, as a rule, possesses and uses the animal. Therefore, even if he continues to receive a financial profit from the animal, the owner may not be held liable under § 1805. He could only be held liable if his fault or negligence is established, as provided by § 1802 of the Civil Code (1930 ed.). See 12 Manresa, Código Civil Español, 673 et seq. (5th ed., 1951) ; Borrell Maciá, Responsabilidades Derivadas de Culpa Extracontractual Civil, 203-212 (1942); 6 Planiol y Ripert, Tratado Práctico de Derecho Civil Francés, 819-830 (Sp. trans.); Colombo, op. cit. 514-515; 2 Mazeaud y Mazeaud, op. cit., 46-88.

This solution conforms with the literal language of § 1805 and with the underlying thought that the basis of liability for the damages caused by an animal rests on the duty of care and of supervision rather than on the fact that profit is obtained from it. Obviously, under § 1805, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant is the owner of the animal which caused the damages if he had it in his possession (Vélez v. Orozco, 59 P.R.R. 519) or if he used it (Ruiz v. Solís, 61 P.R.R. 787). On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the liability of the possessor and of the person who uses the animal do not accumulate — they are separate and alternative. Puig Peña, op. cit., 581; 6 Planiol y Ripert, op. cit., 820-21. The possessor (under any title) may not have the animal under his custody at the time of the accident because another person is using the same. Under such hypothesis, pursuant to § 1805, the only person liable is the one using the animal, although the victim could then prove that the possessor was guilty of the fault that caused the damage, basing his action on § 1802: for example, that he delivered an animal known to be vicious without a warning that it was necessary to take special care to prevent damage to third persons. See 2 Mazeaud y Mazeaud, *930op. cit., 50-51; Colombo, op. cit., 515. These rules agree with the wording of § 1805, which imposes the presumption of liability on “the possessor ... , or the one who uses the same . . . , ” and again with the essential notion that the basis of liability is the duty of care and vigilance of the animal, since the idea of benefit or profit would tend to favor joint liability.

The above is enough to establish that, under the attendant circumstances, the presumption of liability of § 1805 does not fall on the owner of the animal, who is the only defendant in this action. It might have been invoked only against the party working on shares, as he is the only person who at the time of the accident (1) possessed the animal, and (2) used the same. Consequently, it is not necessary to decide whether or not the damage resulted from the fault of the victim. But we should point out here that construing § 1385 of the French Civil Code6 which corresponds to § 1805 of our Code, the legal doctrinal works and the case-law in France unanimously agree that the act of abnegation or sacrifice of a person who risks himself to save another from the injury which an animal may cause him does not constitute fault or blame if his intervention was the only apparent means of saving the other person from serious danger.6a Nor is he, who in such a way attempts to avoid *931a serious risk provoked by an animal, guilty of fault merely because he enters another’s property without permission. In other words, he can not be labeled a “trespasser” having no right to invoke the special liability imposed by law for the damages caused by animals. 2 Mazeaud y Mazeaud, op. cit., 421-424; 1 Savatier, op. cit., 127-129; Colombo, Culpa Aquiliana, 525-526 (1944). Cf. Troche v. Matos, 52 P.R.R. 271 (1937), and Ferrer v. Rivera, supra.7 And to be exact, we must finally indicate that according to the evidence introduced the defendant owner herein was not guilty of fault or negligence of any kind, for which reason he is not liable pursuant to the provisions of § 1802.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment will be affirmed.