delivered the opinion of the Court.

*760Confesor Meléndez Santos urges the reversal of the sentence of fifteen to thirty years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary imposed on him by the Superior Court, Ponce Part, for the crime of second-degree murder. He maintains that the lower court erred in denying a change of venue; in failing to order that he be tried separately from the other two codefendants in the case, and in admitting in evidence a sworn statement and some alleged verbal statements made by defendant without it having been proved that they were voluntarily made. We consider that appellant’s third assignment is correct and, therefore, the judgment appealed from will be reversed. For this reason, and considering the facts of this case which we shall immediately recite, we find it unnecessary to decide the other two questions.

The district attorney accused Confesor Meléndez Santos, Francisco Soto Delgado, and Hermenegildo Ramos Rivera, of having unlawfully killed Eulalia Toro Muñoz on May 29, 1955, on the road leading from Guayanilla to Ponce, site known as Salistral, “acting jointly and in common agreement, with premeditated malice, deliberation, and with the firm and deliberate intent” of killing. When the case was called for trial on February 14, 1956, the judge of the lower court denied a motion for a change of venue 1 and a motion for separate trial2 filed by Meléndez Santos. The jury was *761impanelled and the district attorney began to introduce his evidence after the three defendants had pleaded not guilty.

The medical testimony proved that the victim had died of traumatic shock and that she had sustained fractures and lacerations in the right front-parietal bone and fractures in three ribs. She had a three-fourths inch wound in the vagina, but the hymen was intact and she had not been deflowered. It also showed that Meléndez had wounds in his face and in his back and that he had said that those wounds had been inflicted with fingernails. Other testimony proved that (1) the victim was physically well on the morning of the day of the events; (2) the three defendants had been drinking near the scene of the crime that night and there had been fights between Meléndez and Ramos and Meléndez and Soto; (3) that night, near the scene of the crime, a woman’s voice was heard crying “Don’t hit me any *762more, don’t hit me any more”; (4) the victim, upon being aided by the police, stated that a group of men, white and colored, had beaten her and that “there is a dark one that is probably scratched”; and (5) the shirt that Meléndez had worn the night of the events had human blood stains. It was proved that at daybreak of the following day, Meléndez had taken the shirt to his comadre to be washed, but that she did not do it and later gave it to the detectives.3

After the jury withdrew, the district attorney called detective Francisco Vázquez, to the witness stand and he testified as to the manner the confessions of Meléndez and Soto had "been obtained, but did not say anything as to Ramos’ testimony. The defense then produced witness José Luis López, from the editorial staff of “El Día” newspaper. He testified .as to some events that occurred in the police station when the •defendants were being questioned there. Later the court admitted in evidence the testimony of the three defendants, over the repeated objections of the defense. Those statements having been admitted, the three defendants expressly waived their right of trial by jury and the trial continued to be held by the court without a jury.

Under these circumstances the defense introduced its evidence which consisted mainly of the testimony of four persons that placed Ramos, prior to the commission of the crime, in a public vehicle leaving the scene of the crime and heading towards the city of Ponce. Three issues of “El Día” newspaper containing information on the events were also admitted.

The court found the three defendants guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree, stating in so doing that “this is a case where the only evidence against the defendants (and *763I do not mean that it is poor evidence) is the sworn statement of Confesor Meléndez and Francisco Soto.” (Tr. Ev. at p. 388.) Francisco Soto did not appeal from the sentence imposed upon him. Hermenegildo Ramos appealed and we reversed the judgment because the record did not contain “evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction.” 4

The record of this case shows that Meléndez Santos’ confession was produced under the following circumstances: On May 31, 1955, at about 8 a.m., Francisco Soto Delgado was arrested “for investigation” and taken to the police station. Soto admitted at once having participated in the crime and from the information that he gave the police, Confesor Meléndez Santos and Hermenegildo Ramos were also arrested “for investigation.” Meléndez’ arrest took place on the very 31st at about 9 a.m., while he was leaving a wake. Detective Francisco Vázquez took him to the police station and upon arriving, Meléndez met Soto, who in front of several policemen and other persons told him that he (Soto) had testified and was witness for The People and advised Meléndez to do the same. From that moment until next morning, Meléndez was submitted to interrogation conducted in relays 5 and in which at least five armed policemen 6 and one district attorney participated.7 At no time was he advised of his right not to testify or that his testimony could be used against him. During all that time (approximately 22 hours) Meléndez was under custody at the police station *764without having an opportunity to confer with relatives, friends or counsel.8 Next day he was served a “mixta” * for lunch, then a dinner and breakfast consisting of coffee, bread and butter. He drank water, washed his mouth and face, ■ and took a bath. There is no evidence that he slept during the time he was detained. Detective Vázquez testified, referring to the defendants, that “I do not know if they slept or not. We rested and so did they.” (Tr. Ev. at p. 258.) The “rest” took place on a wooden bench. Considering Vázquez’ testimony to the effect that the questioning lasted until (Meléndez stated that he had participated, and that it' continued day and night until the morning of the first of the month (Tr. Ev. at pp. 237-38), we must conclude that Meléndez did not sleep during the time he remained at the police station.9

Vazquez testified that the questioning was conducted in a normal - tone of voice and without physical • punishment, threats, or promised benefits. The accused remained all the time “with his head bowed” and silent, except when he spoke to deny his • participation in the crime. He “always” an*765swered: “The other one wants to get me into this hut I did not commit the crime.” 10 (Tr. Ev. at pp. 231, 240, 257.)

“'Notwithstanding his insistence that he had nothing to do with that, you kept saying to him, again and again, 'it is you’?

“Yes, sir. In that same manner until I convinced him, and he told me the truth.” (Tr. Ev. at p. 240.)

Vázquez added that he continually said to the defendant: “If this one accuses you, why do you deny that you went to that place and committed that crime? Why don’t you give up and quit making us work?” (Tr. Ev. at p. 240.)

“We are already tired of this case.”11 (Tr. Ev. at p. 250.)

The persons in charge of the questioning, with the exception of the district attorney, carried firearms. Vázquez admitted that in the past on several occasions he had struck several persons in the course of official investigations — “to defend myself” —but that there had never been any charges made against him. On one occasion he was accused and acquitted.

During the night of May 31, while Meléndez was being questioned, many persons assembled 12 in front of the police station and made hostile comments about the prisoners. Some of those persons entered the station, others remained outside. The police made no effort whatsoever to comply with their clear duty of dispersing the crowd and prevent*766ing persons hostile towards Meléndez from entering very-near the room where he was being questioned. Considering the room wherein the prisoner was being interrogated and the fact that the doors and windows of the police station were open, and the noise that must have been necessarily produced by about seventy-five persons talking to each other, we must unavoidably conclude that Meléndez was aware of a mob clamor against him.

Vázquez testified that about one-thirty in the morning he went to rest, while “the other persons” continued interrogating Meléndez (Tr. Ev. at p. 255), and that the following morning between seven-thirty and eight when he returned to work, the accused, after having had his breakfast, and having washed his mouth and face and having been told that the “other one” had confessed, said to him: “Well, I’m going to tell the truth, as the thing happened.” (Tr. Ev. at 248.) Vázquez did not state what Meléndez told him.13 There was no one else present at that moment. At nine o’clock several officers took him to the place of the crime, where he stayed the whole morning together with Soto and Ramos, always surrounded by the police and police photographers and without being able to communicate with third persons. Vázquez testified that there Meléndez indicated the scene of the crime, but none of the photographs taken show that action, while in several photographs Soto, the other prisoner, appears making gestures. Vázquez explained that no photograph whatsoever was taken of Meléndez while the latter was pointing out and besides that Meléndez remained silent while Soto indicated the spot.14

At two o’clock in the afternoon of that same day Váz-quez took Meléndez, after the latter had lunch, to the office of the district attorney Fernández Cabrera, where he gave *767a sworn statement which lasted until five-thirty. Vázquez witnessed the interview with the district attorney and testified that the prisoner was not beaten, threatened or promised anything when he testified and that his testimony was voluntary and that he was “tranquil.” Three other persons were present on that occasion 15 but none of them testified at the trial. Then Vázquez took Meléndez again to the station where he ate and his fingerprints were taken. Later on he took him before a judge. On the night of that same day — approximately 36 hours after his arrest16 —the prisoner was put in jail by judicial order.

After examining the entire official conduct in this case and the defendant’s personal circumstances, we are convinced that Meléndez Santos’ confession was obtained by psychological coercion. In view of the fact that in the cases of People v. Fournier, 77 P.R.R. 208 (1954), ante, p. 376, we made an exhaustive analysis of the subject matter, it is unnecessary to overburden this opinion with a recital of the applicable principles and rules. It suffices to remember that it is incumbent on this Court, irrespective of the conclusion of the trial judge, to determine, in the light of the admitted or undisputed facts and the fair inferences emanating therefrom, whether the defendant’s confession was obtained by means of physical or psychological coercion in violation of the constitutional clause of due process of law. We comply with such delicate responsibility by the “weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.” People v. Fournier, ante, p. 405. We therefore pass on to enumerate the elements constituting coercion in this case and the precedents supporting them.

*7681) Illegal detention for approximately thirty-two and one-half hours from the arrest until the moment the prisoner placed his mark on the confession. People v. Fournier, 77 P.R.R. 208, 247, 250; 80 P.R.R. 435; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563 (1958); United States v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7, 12 (C.C.A. 2, 1958).

2) During that same number of hours the accused remained without sleep.17 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1943); United States v. Jackson, supra at 12.

3) Interrogation by five armed policemen 18 and a prosecuting attorney, using the relay system. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra at 149; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63 (1949). Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1946).

4) Interrogation during one whole day and one night, which was interrupted only when the prisoner agreed to testify. Aside from some “rests” on a wooden bench, Melén-dez was answering questions for about twenty-two consecutive hours. Later he was taken under police custody to the scene of the crime and thereafter he testified for about three and one-half hours before the district attorney and several police officers and employees of the office of the district attorney. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra at 153; United States v. Jackson, supra at 12; State v. Crittenden, 36 So. 2d 645, 647 (1948); State v. Roberson, 103 So. 283, 286-87 (1925).

*7695) From the arrest until he signed the confession (thirty-two and one-half hours) the prisoner was held incommunicado from his relatives, friends, and persons not belonging to the police, had no legal assistance and always remained in custody of the police. He was not advised of his right not to testify until several hours after his resistance had been broken and he had made a statement to Vázquez and, consequently, when he was subject to the psychological and practical disadvantages of such conduct.19 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405 (1945); Turner v. Pennsylvania, supra at 64; Payne v. Arkansas, supra at 567; United States v. Jackson, supra at 16; cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1946).

6) Pressure produced by the presence of a hostile mob. While part of the questioning was taking place, a good number of persons assembled in front of the police station making hostile comments about the prisoners. Some of those persons entered the police station. Cf. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954); Payne v. Arkansas, supra at 564; Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); People v. Crabb, 24 N.E.2d 46, 49 (1939).

7) Limited psychological capacity of the defendant to resist the pressure to which he was submitted — he is a sugar cane cutter, illiterate, poor, unaware of his rights as defendant20 and with experiences only in his own social sphere. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra at 148; Harris v. South Carolina, supra at 70; cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); *770Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, supra at 567; State v. Peterson, 75 A.2d 368, 371 (1950); State v. Bernard, 106 So. 656, 657 (1925); State v. Robinson, 41 So. 2d 848, 851 (1949); State v. Phelps, 69 So. 856 (1915); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).

In short, the circumstances that we have analyzed manifestly show that a confession was wrung from Meléndez Santos by means of uninterrupted and unrelenting psychological pressures exercised by the investigating officials. That coercion, composed of all those elements that we have outlined,21 commenced from the very moment of his illegal detention and was prolonged with all its cruel effects for nearly one and one-half day, some of its elements persisting even after the prisoner had confessed. Vázquez’ testimony to the effect that he questioned Meléndez in a tranquil manner and in a normal tone of voice 22 and that the district attorney did the same thing later, can not militate against that conclusion, especially when such explanations must be *771taken with a “grain of salt” in view of the disregard shown by the investigators towards defendant’s rights. Cf. Haley v. Ohio, supra at 600.

It is impossible to find in the vast jurisprudence dealing with confessions two identical cases. There are always variations either in the official conduct or in the arrested person’s personal circumstances. Nevertheless, we believe that United States ex rel. Santo Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (C.C.A. 2, 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955), is so strikingly similar to appellant’s case that we feel it is our duty to outline it in detail.

The defendant (“humble, inconspicuous”) was detained during an investigation of a crime of murder. The proven facts, as established in Judge Jerome Frank’s opinion, were the following:

“(1) Caminito was taken into custody by the police on Sunday, May 11, 1941 at 6 P. M.

“(2) Commencing about 9 P. M. Sunday, he was continuously interrogated by five or six police officers for a period of approximately five hours, until 2 A. M. the following morning, Monday, May 12th.

“(3) At 3 A. M. on Monday, May 12th, he was locked in a cell in which there were no bed, blankets, spring or mattress, but only a wooden bench. (He testified that the cell was unheated. A witness for the State testified that the cell was equipped with a radiator but that he ‘did not know if the heat was on’ during the time Caminito was there confined.)

“ (4) At 10 A. M. on Monday, May 12th, the questioning was resumed. The interrogation continued all day, with several detectives taking turns.

“(5) Members of Caminito’s family, his friends and an attorney retained by the family, called at the station house where he was detained and tried to get information concerning his whereabouts. The police officers knew these facts, but kept him incommunicado. Other than the police and the District Attorney, no one was permitted to see him until he was arraigned forty hours after being taken into custody.

“(6) During the afternoon of Monday, May 12th, two women and a man were brought in to face Caminito. He was *772not told that they were detectives. Each falsely pretended to identify him as the person who was sitting at the wheel of the automobile at the time of the shooting, which occurred in connection with the holdup.

“(7) About 9 P. M., Monday, May 12th, twenty-seven hours after having been taken into custody, he signed a confession. He gave a second confession to a District Attorney a short time later.” (At 699-700.)

Judge Frank added: “Alone or together, neither the unlawful detention for many hours nor the deceit in confronting Caminito with disguised police officers who lied in identifying him would suffice to vitiate the confessions as unconstitutionally obtained. But those factors did aggravate the following unconstitutional practices which — even in the absence of those factors — rendered the confessions inadmissible: (a) The police interrogated him almost continuously for 27 hours, with but a brief interval for rest in a cell so badly equipped as to make sleep virtually impossible for a man already harried by the questioning, (b) During this long period, the police, in effect, kidnapped him: They kept him incommunicado, refusing to allow his lawyer, His family, and his friends to consult with him. (At 700-701.) (Italics ours.)

a

“All decent Americans soundly condemn satanic practices, like those described above, when employed in totalitarian régimes. It should shock us when American police resort to them, for they do not comport with the barest minimum of civilized principles of justice. It has no significance that in this case we must assume there was no physical brutality. For psychological torture may be far more cruel, far more symptomatic of sadism. Many a man who can endure beatings will yield to fatigue. To keep a man awake beyond the point of exhaustion, while constantly pummelling with questions, is to degrade him, to strip him of human dignity, to deprive him of the will to resist, to make him a *773pitiable creature mastered by the single desire — at all costs to be free of torment. Any member of this or any other court, to escape such anguish, would admit to almost any crime. Indeed, the infliction of such psychological punishment is more reprehensible than a physical attack: It leaves no discernible marks on the victim. Because it is thus concealed, it has, under the brutalitarian régimes, become the favorite weapon of the secret police, bent on procuring confessions as a means of convicting the innocent.” (At 701.)

If the facts of the Caminito case are compared with what happened to Meléndez Santos, it will be observed that, except for the false identification, the elements of coercion present in both cases are the same — illegal detention, continuous interrogation and in relays, absolute incommunicado detention until the confession is obtained,23 lack of many hours’ sleep, and limited psychological capacity of the prisoner to resist.24 Meléndez’ situation is made worse by the fact that the number of hours that elapsed between the illegal arrest and the written confession was greater than in Caminito’s *774ease; that the latter’s interrogation was suspended for seven hours (3 to 10 a.m. of Monday, May 12) while Meléndez’ continued uninterruptedly until he made the oral admission; and that in the Gaminito ease there was no public pressure of any kind whatsoever while that element existed in the appellant’s case herein.25

In People v. Fournier, 77 P.R.R. 208, 285-86; 80 P.R.R. 436, we emphatically expressed our repudiation of coercive methods directed to exact confessions from persons taken into custody.26 Powerful reasons affecting the very essence of our judicial system support our attitude. Among them we enumerate the great probability that the confession might be false because it is solely the product of the confessor’s desire to escape torture,27 the possible violation of the con*775.stitutional privilege against self-incrimination — People v. Fournier, 77 P.R.R. 208, 243, footnote 6 — and the impact between those improper practices and such basic notions of justice as preclude a civilized community from inflicting mental or physical torture to prove its charges against a •defendant. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Haley v. Ohio, supra at 600, 605-07; Malinski v. New York, supra at 416-17; Payne v. Arkansas, supra at 567. Intimately bound to this elementary notion of justice is the effect that such practices necessarily have on those who employ them as well as on those who become their victims. For the former it may mean the easy road in criminal investigation, the manner of saving the effort and fatigue that accompany careful and exhaustive work. It constitutes necessarily a degrading and brutalizing influence that will imperceptively lead the officer to become cynical and disregard the guarantees of law and of constitution. In the latter, it will stimulate their antisocial behavior and destroy their confidence in the agencies charged with vigilance and investigation and eventually their faith in justice. The growth of such developments and the expansion of their sphere of action might, in view of the mutual influences between government and society, give rise to the imminent danger of a police state.

*776Nothing points to that danger now. In the last four years only two cases in which the use of coercion was proved have come up to this Court. In both, the dire circumstances of the crime and the pressure of social clamor were the cause of a short deviation in the conduct of the investigating officials. Certainly, we have no indication that the use of “third degree” methods has widely spread throughout our country as it did in the United States in the decade of the thirties and still exists in many localities of that nation.28 However, this is no reason for relaxing the standards and the vigilance. Puerto Rico is undergoing a period of profound social and economic transformation. Parallel processes of industrialization, urbanization, economic growth and mass emigration are leaving indelible marks in its physiognomy. To these processes we must add the tensions produced by the last wars and the serious international situation. Although they do not constitute the only cause of crime, the fact is that historically those transformations and *777tensions have been associated with a rise of criminality.29 The statistics of recent years reveal that the same tendency •exists in Puerto Rico.30 The pressure of the number of *778crimes, the refinement of criminal methods, the lack of training in scientific crime detection, the rise of the professional criminal and the clamor of the public and the press in the-future might easily induce the official investigators to indulge more frequently in physical or mental coercion to elicit confessions from arrested persons. Generally, the humble- and forsaken,31 as in the case at bar, would be the victims-of those institutional or individual deviations. In order to contribute effectively to the constitutional and moral soundness of our system of justice it rests with the judiciary to-reaffirm its unwavering abhorrence of such improper methods'- and its firm disposition to reject the use of its fruits.

The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the: case remanded for new trial.