First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Noguera
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Noguera
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Secretary of the Treasury notified the savings and loan association named “First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Puerto Rico”, petitioner herein, a tax assessment on personal property. The petitioner disagreed with the tax imposed on it on the ground that its property is exempt from same pursuant to § 5 (h) of the Federal Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (h), and filed a complaint before the Superior Court. The latter upheld the validity of the tax.
In view of the allegations that follow, it is fitting to make clear at the beginning that the power of the Congress of the United States to exempt the instrumentalities of the Federal Government from taxation, is not at issue in this case. It is well known that Congress has the power to determine, within the limits of the Constitution, to what extent its instrumen-talities shall enjoy immunity from taxation. Federal Land Bank v. Kiowa County, 368 U.S. 146, 149 (1961); Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952); Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945); Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, 318 U.S. 357 (1943); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941); Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923); First National Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922); Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
“No State, Territorial, county, municipal, or local taxing authority shall impose any tax on such associations or their franchise, capital, reserves, surplus, loans, or income greater than that imposed by such authority on other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (h). (Italics ours.)1
Petitioner’s position before us is tripartite. It raises the following three contentions: (1) That it (the petitioner) is an instrumentality or agency of the Federal Government and, therefore, is exempt from state taxation; (2) that the power granted by the afore-cited § 5 (h) to the states and other local authorities to impose taxes on the federal savings and loan associations (such as the petitioner) does not operate in Puerto Rico because no local institution similar to petitioner exists here; and (3) that the above-mentioned power granted by § 5 (h) does not operate in Puerto Rico because an institution similar to the petitioner exists here, namely, the Puerto Rico Government Employees Association, which is exempt from taxation.
Thus, in its first contention petitioner maintains that there is no taxing power on the part of the Commonwealth in this case. In the second argument it acknowledges that there is said taxing power, but alleges that it does not operate because in Puerto Rico there does not exist a local institution similar to it. In its third contention it also admits that there is the taxing power, but alleges that it does not operate be
1. As to contention number 1 above-mentioned, the truth is that the Commonwealth has the right to tax. The reading of the statute convinces us thereof. Upon approving the act on those terms, Congress expressly authorized the states and the other local taxing authorities to impose taxes on those federal savings and loan associations provided such taxes are not greater than those imposed on similar local institutions, that is, those incorporated under state laws. It is likewise acknowledged and explained by a well-known author in the field of savings and loan associations, Russell, Savings and Loan Associations 570-71,
The cases have consistently upheld the foregoing construction. Several kinds of state and local taxes imposed on federal savings and loan associations have been upheld by the courts. It is proper to make clear that within the context of the act of Congress involved herein and that of this opinion, as well as of the case law we shall cite, when the term “federal” savings and loan association is used, what the word “federal” means is that those associations are incorporated under the above-mentioned federal Act and not under a state law. It does not mean that those institutions are property of the Federal Government nor that its officials and employees are in the payroll of said government. Conversely, when the
Examples of that case law to which we have referred in the preceding paragraph and which is in accord with what we are deciding are the following eases: Capital tax, State v. MacCorkle, 123 S.E.2d 888 (1962); property tax, Charleston Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Anderson, 30 S.E.2d 513 (1944), affirmed in 324 U.S. 182, 89 L. Ed. 857 (1945); Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. James, 200 S.E. 845 (1939); and In Re Hancock County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 25 S.E.2d 543 (1943); income tax, State v. Minnesota Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 15 N.W.2d 568 (1944); franchise tax, First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Johnson, 122 P.2d 84 (1942); employment security, Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Metropolitan Building, 139 S.W.2d 309 (1940).
The savings and loan associations, although technically not banks, have several purposes and procedures similar to those of banks. In some respects the difference between those associations and the banks is factual and in others it is rather a matter of terminology. Said associations do not accept “deposits,” but people may entrust their savings to them. Depositors are not “creditors” but rather “shareholders” or “members”. Although the associations may demand previous notice from the shareholders for the withdrawal of funds, the general practice is that the latter may withdraw them whenever they wish as if it were a checking account. Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159, 161 (1962). Shareholders do not receive “interest” but “dividends”. The associations do not issue “manager’s checks” but they issue “money orders”.
The act which authorizes the organization and incorporation of federal savings and loan associations states that those associations may be organized in order to provide local thrift institutions and home-financing institutions. 12 U.S.C.A.
This second alternative seems more convincing for the following reasons:
(a) The act itself which authorizes the creation and incorporation of those savings and loan associations nowhere states that they are agencies or instrumentalities of the Federal Government.
(b) The mere fact that they are incorporated under a federal act and that they are under the supervision of a federal agency (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) does not automatically make them instrumentalities of the Government of the United States just as commercial banks incorporated under the state Banking Law and which operate under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury are not instrumentalities of the state government.
(c) Those associations are not created through an act of Congress. What the federal act does is to permit its organization or incorporation in the same manner that state banking and private corporation laws do not create the banks nor
(d) Those associations are not property of the Federal Government, nor are their officials and employees, officials or employees of said government.
(e) A strong evidence that Congress itself did not regard them as instrumentalities of the government is the fact that in its own Act (§5) it specifically authorized states to tax them with the afore-mentioned limitation, which we will explain further on. Contrariwise, when Congress has created federal banks it has specifically granted them immunity to state taxation. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 86 L. Ed. 65 (1941); Annotation, 86 L. Ed. 72.
(f) Said institutions are voluntarily organized by private citizens, operate for profit and compete with state savings and loan associations. For instance, in its Annual Report of 1961, the petitioner informs its members as follows:
“Once more there has been registered a considerable increase in the income and profits of the association in comparison with former years. The gross income reached the figure of $4,657,762.69 and exceeds that of last year by the sum of $801,928.69 which, until that date had been the highest in our history and which is equivalent to an increase of 20.8 percent.” (Page 9.)
“During 1961 the association paid to its depositors dividends for the sum of $2,162,684.30, which constitutes an increase of $299,713.96 over last year, a progressive increase which has been maintained through our thirteen years’ existence not only with respect to the amount of dividends paid, but also to the rate of interest thereof.
“As you already know, our association constitutes a cooperative in which the depositors are the beneficiaries of the profits obtained by the association, which profits are used entirely for the payment of dividends once operating and administration expenses and the amount which by regulation must be put in reserve, have been deducted.” (Page 12.)
*60 “With this new acquisition (the building of the Barrio Obrero Branch in San Juan) the association becomes the owner of the buildings occupied by three of its four branches, to wit: Muñoz Rivera Avenue in Río Piedras; De Diego Street in Rio Piedras, and Barrio Obrero. The depreciated value of these buildings including the site of our main office amounts to $2,334,446.14. Its real market value may be very conservatively estimated in excess of $3,000,000.
“The construction of our new building confronted us with the need of making a decision as to the old building on Ponce de León Avenue and Alianza Street, deciding that it was to the best interest of the association to sell the same and it was sold with a small profit shortly after we moved.” (Page 13.)
In view of this reality, it is difficult to believe that petitioner is an “agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government”.
It is true that the law provides that those associations will be members of the Federal Home Loan Bank and may be used by the Federal Government as its fiscal agents (they could perform such duties as receiving payments on behalf of the government, be depositors of federal funds, etc.), but only when the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States so designates them. 12 U.S.C.A § 1464 (f) and (k). However, this fact alone does not make them instrumentalities of the government. The fact that the act grants authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to designate any of those associations as fiscal agents of the government, ipso facto (there are thousands in the United States)
As stated in Texas Unemployment Commission v. Metropolitan, etc., supra, pp. 312 and 313, the courts have held that member state banks of the Federal Home Loan Bank or of the Federal Reserve System and which by virtue thereof are required to act as fiscal agents of the Federal Government are not federal instrumentalities. Furthermore, such
It might be important, for the purposes of this case, to decide whether or not petitioner is a federal instrumentality, if Congress would have kept silent as far as the imposition of state taxes is concerned, but Congress decided the issue expressly authorizing the imposition of said taxes in §5 (h) of the Act. Therefore, it is unnecessary that we decide said question since the outcome of this case would be the same in either case. Whether or not petitioner is considered a federal instrumentality, state taxation is permitted by virtue of § 5(h) above-cited. State v. Minnesota Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, supra; People of State of California v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 811, 319 (1951). We have deemed it convenient, however, to discuss at length in order to clarify the question raised by petitioner in this respect.
We also conceive that under specific circumstances and in the discharge of its duties as agent of the Federal Government, thus expressly designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, one of those associations, or several, as the case may be, be or should be considered an instrumentality of said government for specific purposes. But that would certainly not be the case as to state taxes, because, as we have seen, the federal act itself authorizes them.
2. Petitioner’s second contention consists of the allegation that taxation does not lie because there do not exist in Puerto Rico local institutions similar to it. The contention is wrong for three reasons. First, to uphold that position would be tantamount to adding to the federal act a condition which Congress did not include therein. Second, in strict logic the
Third, said contention entirely disregards the purpose of the condition or limitation prescribed by Congress in the above-cited § 5(h). In providing that state taxes imposed upon federal savings and loan associations could not be greater than those imposed on similar local institutions, the purpose of Congress was to protect federal associations from possible discriminatory taxation on the part of the states against said federal associations and in favor of state associations. Its purpose was not to grant them tax exemption. Laurens Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 365 U.S. 517, 5 L. Ed. 2d 749, 752 (1961); State v. Minnesota Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, supra, page 573; First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Johnson, supra, page 88; Russell, op. cit., 571.
The intention of Congress to protect federal associations from discriminations by the states tending to favor state associations, does not arise whimsically. It is based on experience and on the history of the relationship between the states and banking institutions incorporated by or under federal legislation since the beginning of the republic. On previous occasions the states had taken retaliatory and discriminatory measures against banking organizations incorporated by virtue of Congressional legislation.
It will be remembered that the first bank in the United States was incorporated by Act of Congress in 1791, mainly
An example of how the feeling ran at that time on that issue is the resolution approved by the Legislature of Pennsylvania “instructing” the senators and representatives of that state in Congress “to use every exertion, in their power, to prevent the charter of the Bank of the United States from being renewed, or any other bank from being chartered by Congress, designed to have operations within the jurisdiction of any state, without first having obtained the consent of the legislature of such state.”
Mainly because of the needs which arose as a result of the war with Great Britain, those in favor of the national bank again prevailed in Congress and they approved a new act incorporating in 1815 the second Bank of the United States, which Madison vetoed, but signed it the following year.
Upon mentioning the state of Maryland in connection with that political and economic controversy, we immediately recall the famous McCulloch v. Maryland case, decided in 1819,
The controversy on the Bank remained dormant and exploded again near the expiration date of the franchise, which was also for 20 years, of the second Bank of the United States. Andrew Jackson had been President since 1829 and if he were re-elected it would correspond his administration to decide whether or not the Bank’s franchise would he renewed. When those in favor of the Bank were convinced that Jackson did not favor the renewal, they started campaigning against Jackson and in favor of his opponent Henry Clay. The Bank itself was involved actively, and at times improperly, in the political campaign.
It is unnecessary to continue with the historical background. To conclude, it will suffice to say that serious banking and currency problems which again made crisis during the Civil War were involved in that political controversy. A system of national banks different from the concept underlying the two former experiments was then created.
Naturally, we are not taking sides on the historical controversy. Besides, the case of federal savings and loan associations is different; they are the product of another era, of other legislation based on different premises, and are not national banks but, as we have seen, institutions of a different nature. Nevertheless, when their incorporation under the
3. Petitioner’s third and last contention is based, contrary to that alleged in the second, on the fact that there exists in Puerto Rico an association similar to the “First Federal Savings and Loan Association”, namely, the Puerto Rico Government Employees Association which is exempt from taxation and that, therefore, petitioner is also exempt pursuant to the provisions of the above-cited § 5 (h). This contention is little less than frivolous. The Puerto Rico Government Employees Association
The Act which creates said Employees Association orders the deduction of a monthly quota from the salaries of all permanent public employees and officials, which sums are set aside by the Secretary of the Treasury to constitute the
We conclude that petitioner is not exempt from the payment of property taxes and, therefore, the trial court did not err in so holding. The judgment rendered in this case by the Superior Court, San Juan Part, on August 28, 1959, will be affirmed.
Because it expressly so provides, this act is applicable to Puerto Rico. 48 Stat. 184 (1933); 12 U.S.C.A. $ 1466.
“... Congress, however, has granted the state the right to tax such institutions provided it is done uniformly at the same rate that similar state institutions are taxed... Stated positively, the meaning (of section 5-h) would be that any state may impose any such tax on federal associations, provided any such tax is not greater than the tax or taxes imposed on similar state institutions. In the absence of a specific exemption, the provision appears to authorize almost any form of nondiscriminatory tax; ... Not being federally owned, federal savings associations are naturally subject to such state taxes.” Russell, op. cit.
United States v. Harper, 241 F.2d 103, 105 (1957); People of State of California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (1951); State v. Minnesota Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 15 N.W.2d 568, 573 (1944).
Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Metropolitan Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 139 S.W.2d 309, 312-14 (1940); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Johnson, 122 P.2d 84, 86 (1942); Capitol Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Kansas Commission of Labor, 83 P.2d 106 (1938); North Carolina Unemployment Commission v. Wachovia Bank & T. Co., 2 S.E.2d 592 (1939).
Russell, op. cit, 145.
Holmes, Common Law 1 (1946 ed.).
“The purpose (of section 5-h) was to protect federal associations from discriminatory taxation which would put them on any less favorable basis than state building and loan associations.” Stcute v. Minnesota Fed. Sav., etc., supra, p. 573.
1 Stat. 191 (1791); Swisher, American Constitutional Development 72 (2d ed. 1954).
Americam, State Papers, VIII. Finance, II, p. 467, cited in Swisher, American Constitutional Development 171 (2d ed. 1954).
3 Stat. 266 (1816).
IV Beveridge, Life of John Marshall 206-208 (4 Vols., 1916-1919) ; I Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 505-506 (rev. ed., 2 Vols., 1926); Swisher, op. cit., 173-74.
4 Wheaton 316. For some interesting comments on this case, see IV Beveridge, op. cit., Chap. 6; I Warren, op. cit., Chap. 12; Swisher, op. cit., 174-78.
IV The Works of Alexander Hamilton 104^138 (D.C. Hamilton ed., 7 Vols., 1850-1851); Swisher, op. cit., 72-74 and 176-77.
1 Warren, op¡ eit., 511-640; IV Beveridge, op. eit., 309.
Swisher, op. eit, 180-85.
Davis, The Origin of the National Banking System, Senate Doc. 582, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., 1910; 12 Stat. 665.
That is its new name. 3 L.P.R.A. § 831, 1961 Supp.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.