delivered the opinion of the Court.

On May 9, 1963, Ángel Matos Rodriguez, appellant herein, was convicted of a violation of § 4 of Act No. 220 of May 15, 1948, 34 L.P.R.A. § 1250, consisting in that on December 9, 1962, at the place known as “Los Viejitos” in the ward of Hato Tejas, of Bayamón, he had in his possession two notebooks containing printed three-digit numbers which is material used in the illegal bolipul game. The prosecution evidence consisted in the sole testimony of undercover agent Daniel Soler Valle. The two notebooks were also admitted in evidence. He appealed in his own right.

On January 29, 1964, when the Rules of Criminal Procedure of 1963 were already in force, and while the petition for appeal from the judgment had not yet been perfected, Matos appeared, represented by Mr. F. Gallardo Díaz, and filed a motion entitled “new trial,” praying that, “in consonance with Rule 192 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . and after studying the new evidence and the law, the judgment rendered be set aside ... on the ground that it was based on the false testimony offered to the court by Daniel Soler.” He refers to the testimony given by the undercover agent at the hearing held on January 20 in a criminal cause against Mónico Cortés Rodríguez for a violation of the Bolita Act, which is allegedly in conflict with the testimony offered in the prosecution against appellant.

On April 15 the trial court entered an order denying the motion for a new trial on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, since appeal had been taken from the judgment challenged. Reconsideration was sought — the motion for a new trial was labelled motion to set aside the judgment ren*618dered on the ground that it was on a false testimony — and the same having been denied, appeal was taken from both orders. We shall consider both appeals.

The transcript of evidence was approved on June 1, 1964. The record on appeal was received on July 2 in the office of the secretary of this Court.

1. In the brief requesting reversal of the judgment appellant makes continued reference to the testimony given by agent Soler in the prosecution against Mónico Cortés, pointing out the irreconcilable contradictions which, in his opinion, exist between the latter and that which led to appellant’s conviction. He also challenges the order denying a new trial, and argues accordingly that pursuant to Rule 192, in connection with Rule 189 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the existence of the notice of appeal from the judgment did not bar consideration of his motion for a new trial. In other words, that it did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion for a new trial.

In order to pass upon the petition for appeal against the judgment rendered on May 9, 1963, we must consider only the evidence which the trial court had under consideration. We cannot consider the transcript of the testimony offered in support of the motion for a new trial.1 Having examined the undercover agent’s testimony,2 there is no *619question that it is sufficient to sustain the conviction. People v. Seda, 82 P.R.R. 695 (1961), aff’d, 299 F.2d 576 (1962), cert. den.

2. Rule 188 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for granting a new trial.3 Another ground *620■was added to Rule 192 in the following language: “The court may in like manner and at the request of the defendant grant a new trial if after the sentence is pronounced new facts or new evidence are found of a nature tending to establish defendant’s innocence.”4

As a general rule the motion for a new trial must be filed before judgment is rendered, Rule 189, except in the following cases: (1) when it is based on the impossibility to obtain a transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings by reason of the death or incapacity of the stenographer, or the loss or destruction of his notes, and to prepare in lieu of such transcript an exposition of the case in narrative form; and (2) when it is based on the provisions of Rule 192 copied hereinabove. In the first situation, the motion must be filed within 30 days after learning of *621the death or incapacity of the stenographer or of the loss or destruction of his notes; in the second, within 30 days following the day on which knowledge was had of the new facts or of the new elements of proof.5

According to Rule 197(a), an appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of conviction shall stay its execution. Nothing is expressly provided as to the effects of the existence of a notice of appeal as respects the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court. We must resort to § 14(a) of the Judiciary Act, 4 L.P.R.A. § 37 (Supp. 1963, p. 254), which provides that final judgments rendered in criminal cases originated in the Superior Court shall be appealable to the Supreme Court, and in the same breath it provides that “The filing of notice of appeal shall stay all proceedings in the Superior Court with respect to the judgment or part thereof on appeal, or the questions comprised therein, but the Superior Court may proceed with the suit as to any question involved therein not comprised in the appeal. . . .” This text corresponds to § 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. § 1284, which was not expressly repealed by Rule 72 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1958. In the light of this provision we have held that a trial court had jurisdiction to hear a motion for a new trial after appeal has been taken from the judgment, Martínez v. Independence Indemnity Co., 36 P.R.R. 775 (1927) Aguayo et al. v. García, 11 P.R.R. 263, 274 (1906); Horton et al. v. Robert, 11 P.R.R. 168, 186 (1906); Altuna v. Ortiz et al., 11 P.R.R. 24, 29 (1906), but not to entertain a motion to set aside the judgment, Molina v. Rodríguez, 63 P.R.R. 458 (1944), adducing that the proceedings on a motion for *622a new trial are not a direct attack on the judgment but rather independent and incidental thereto.6

In the case of a motion for a new trial based on Rule 192 requiring that it be filed within 30 days after having knowledge of the new facts or of the new elements of proof, would this same doctrine be applicable? If not, is it necessary to desist from the appeal in order that the trial court may forthivith entertain the motion?7 Furthermore, we need not attempt to pass upon these questions and to pass definitively on the propriety of the order denying a new trial, since we are barred by a previous jurisdictional question. As already stated, Matos appealed from the order denying a new trial. Contrary to the situation prevailing until the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,8 this order is not appealable since a final judgment in a criminal case is not involved, § 14(a) of the Judiciary Act, supra, in connection with Rule 193, and it may only be reviewed by way of certiorari, § 14(e) of the Judiciary Act.9

' In view of the foregoing, the judgment rendered by the Superior Court on May 9, 1963, will be affirmed, and the *623appeal taken from the orders in the new trial incident will be dismissed; but the motion under Rule 192 having been timely filed, and the jurisdictional bar adduced by the trial court to refuse to' take cognizance of the merits having disappeared by the affirmance, the trial court should set a date to hear the parties on the contentions made in the said motion.