Gendreau v. Canario
Gendreau v. Canario
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Jarren Gendreau challenges the Town of Bristol’s denial of his application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon. He alleges that the Town’s policy, which requires a showing of need for a concealed carry permit, violates the Second Amendment. He also asserts that the Town’s policy violates article 1, section 12 of the Rhode Island Constitution and section 11-47-ll(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws. The Court holds that the Town’s policy is permissible under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, but declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
FACTS
The Rhode Island Firearms Act—R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-47-1 to 63—first adopted in 1927, sets forth a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the sale, licensing, possession, and use of firearms in Rhode Island. Relevant to this case, the Firearms Act prohibits anyone
The Town of Bristol considers the following factors in assessing an applicant’s proper showing of need.
1. Has the applicant demonstrated a specific articulable risk to life, limb or property? If so, has the applicant demonstrated how a pistol permit will decrease the risk?
2. Can the applicant readily alter his or her conduct, or undertake reasonable measures other than carrying a firearm, to decrease the danger to life, limb or property?
3. Are there means of protection available to the applicant other than the possession of a firearm that will alleviate the risk to his or her person or property?
4. Has the applicant demonstrated the skill, training and ability to proper: ly use a firearm in accordance with Rhode Island laws?
5: Has the applicant presented a plan to properly secure the firearm so that it does not fall into unauthorized hands?
6. How greatly will the possession óf a firearm by the applicant increase the risk of harm to the applicant or to the public?
7. Has the applicant demonstrated that he or she will not use the firearm for an unlawful or improper purpose, and that he or she has not used a firearm for [a]n unlawful or improper purpose in the past?
8. Does past unlawful, dangerous or violent conduct of the applicant justify denial of the license by the Town even if it is not sufficient to disqualify the applicant as a matter of law from possessing a firearm?
9. Has a protective order been issued relative to the applicant pursuant to chapter 15-5, chapter 15-15, or chapter 8-8.1 of the general laws?
10. Are there other factors deemed lawful and appropriate by the Town to demonstrate that the applicant is or is not a person suitable to possess a firearm in public?
Id. at 5-6.
Jarren Gendreau, a resident of the Town of Bristol, applied for a concealed weapon permit from the Town in February 2012. He asserted- that he meets the Town’s criteria for four reasons: first, he is an “avid firearms collector with over $4,000.00 invested in both firearms and firearms accessories with a growing collection”; second, he is seeking employment in Massachusetts in the security industry, and having a permit in Rhode Island would allow him to get a permit in Massachusetts; third, he “occasionally deposit[ed] large sums of money (over $3,000,00) for [his] father, who owns an apartment complex and a curtain store in Fall River [, Massachusetts]”; and fourth, he “occasionally travel[s] with [his] father during business transactions. ... sometimes carrying] up to $10,000.00, cash.” Jarren Gendreau’s Written Application, ECF No. 23-1 at 15.
The Bristol Chief of Police, Josué D. Canario, had appointed a board, pursuant to Town regulations, to make recommendations to him on the granting of concealed
Mr, Gendreau filed a writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
In a letter dated October 16, 2013, Chief Canario issued a new decision, again denying Mr. Gendreau a permit, and delineating his reasons. Chief Canario wrote that Mr. Gendreau did not provide any convincing testimony that he has good reason to fear an injury to his person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver in public, as required by the Firearms Act. See ECF No. 23-6 at 2-3. Chief Canario concluded that “[i]n the event that you do become employed in a job which requires a concealed weapon permit and proof of the same is provided to me, I will reconsider a new application at that time.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Gendreau received the Town’s decision on November 21, 2013. PL’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 17-2 at 7, ¶ # 28. He never amended his writ of certiorari in the Rhode Island Supreme Court,- and the court has subsequently closed his case. ECF No. 23-7. Almost a year later, Mr. Gendreau filed this lawsuit in federal court. Mr. Gendreau’s amended complaint (ECF No. 11) asserts three counts,
ANALYSIS
Second Amendment
The single federal constitutional question presented by Mr. Gendreau’s complaint is whether the Second Amend
Mr. Gendreau’s challenge invokes recent Supreme Court decisions on the Second Amendment, D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, III., 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). In Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a “ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is .not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-cen-tury cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry, any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose [citations omitted]. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues [citations omitted]. •
Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783.
Post-Heller, the First Circuit set forth binding precedent that the government may constitutionally regulate the carrying of concealed weapons outside the home. See Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Under [the First Circuit’s] analysis of Heller ... the government may regulate the carrying of concealed weapons outside of the home.”)
“Together, Heller and McDonald establish that states may not impose legislation that works a complete ban on the possession of operable handguns in the home by law-abiding, responsible citizens for use in immediate self-defense.” Powell v. Tompkins, 783 F.3d 332, 347 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1448, 194 L.Ed.2d 555 (2016) (emphasis added). However, the Town of Bristol’s policy does not limit an individual’s right to possess handguns in the home; it is only concerned with possession and use in the public ■sphere. On that issue, the First Circuit stated that firearm possession regulation in “the public sphere context” does not “even reach the safe haven of the Second Amendment.”
“Laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons” are an example of “longstanding,” presumptively lawful restrictions, which “were left intact by the Second Amendment and by Heller.” U.S.
Mr. Gendreau’s challenge to the Town of Bristol’s concealed carry permit regulations, adopted pursuant to the Rhode Island Firearms Acts, fails. The Court finds no Second Amendment constitutional violation and grants judgment to the Defendants on Count One of Mr. Gendreau’s complaint.
State Claims
In addition to the federal constitutional challenge, Mr. Gendreau posits that Bristol’s policy violates Rhode, Island’s Constitution and statutory law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law-only claims, now that the basis for federal question jurisdiction has been dismissed. The Court declines to hear and decide the state law claims for a number of reasons. First, while this matter is at the summary judgment stage of the litigation, it does not appear to the Court that the parties have done much pre-trial discovery on the specific issues involved in interpreting the state law matters. Second, the Rhode Island Supreme Court should have the opportunity to interpret its state constitutional provision and law as it relates to the Town’s policy. See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 78-79 (expressing preference that a state’s highest court has an opportunity to address these types of issues). Finally, it appears to this Court that the state court has already adjudicated this matter with finality. The Rhode Island Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Gendreau’s state case, and afforded him a full right to appeal an adverse decision by the Town. Order, Gendreau v. Canario, No. 13-55-M.P. (R.I. 2013), ECF No. 23-5 at 3. He chose not to amend his writ of certiorari before the Rhode Island Supreme Court after the Town explained its reasons for denying his permit. It would be improper for this Court at this stage, after the Rhode Island Supreme Court afforded Mr. Gendreau an opportunity to have these matters heard, to now step in and decide a matter of state law.
CONCLUSION
The Court holds that the Town of Bristol’s policy regulating concealed carrying of weapons does not violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, the Court declines, to exercise supplemental- jurisdiction over Mr. Gendreau’s remaining state law challenges to the Town’s policies. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19), and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is DENIED as moot in light of this Court’s decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. There are exceptions to this requirement, none of which is relevant in this litigation. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-47-9 (law enforcement officers, etc.).
. The Town's denial is subject to review on certiorari by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1048 (R.I. 2004) ("the proper procedure for denial by a town council of a license application is by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court” (citing Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly, 823 A.2d 1144 (R.I. 2003))).
. Mr. Gendreau's original complaint (ECF No. 1) contained only two counts, alleging violations of the federal and state constitutions.
. The Second Amendment rights enunciated in Heller where subsequently applied to the states. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010).
. Because Powell was a federal habeas case, the First Circuit was only concerned with clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The court noted, however, that its own Second Amendment jurisprudence has "hewed closely and cautiously to Heller's circumscribed analysis and holding." Powell, 783 F.3d at 347 n. 9 (emphasis added). The court "flatly reject[ed]” the petitioner’s position that Heller clearly established an individual’s right to keep and bear arms unrelated to the home. Id.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Jarren GENDREAU v. Josue D. CANARIO, in his capacity as Chief of Police of the Bristol Police Department and the Town of Bristol, Rhode Island
- Status
- Published