Lehmann v. S/V THALIA

UUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND ) ) ROBERT LEHMANN; SCOTT FYFE; ) KIRK GIBBS; RYAN TULLOCH, and ) SARAH STEELE; ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) C.A. No. 1:20-CV-00296-MSM-PAS ) S/V THALIA (O.N.: 725680) and ) her engines, tackle, apparel, ) appurtenances, etc. ) , and ANTHONY J. LANGLEY, ) , ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 15.) The Defendants have moved to “dismiss certain of Plaintiffs … claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they are moot.”. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, Robert Lehmann (“Lehmann”), Scott Fyfe (“Fyfe”), Kirk Gibbs (“Gibbs”), Ryan Tulloch (“Tulloch”), and Sarah Steele (“Steele”) (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the S/V THALIA (“THALIA”) and Anthony J. Langley, (“Langley”) . The Plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §1333.1 The allegations in the complaint surround the payment of wages and other contractual benefits to members of the crew of defendant THALIA. Beginning in 2014 Plaintiff Lehmann entered into a maritime agreement with defendant Langley to provide services as the Captain of THALIA in exchange for salary and benefits described in the initial contract. Pursuant to a later executed Letter of Authority dated August 28, 2014 Captain Lehmann later hired the remaining Plaintiffs for various crew member positions on the THALIA. Each person signed an individual agreement that detailed, among other things, their role, salary, and benefits. Under each of the agreements the crew member was entitled to 38 paid vacation days per year accrued at a rate of 3.5 days per month for which they would receive payment in lieu of leave for accrued days upon termination of their employment. The agreements also provided for the payment of repatriation expenses.2

At some point after that arrival Langley told the crew that he would not pay them wages for July 2020 at all and that they would instead be required to discharge unused vacation time in order to be paid for that month. Each crew member resigned and by August 2, 2020 all Plaintiffs had concluded their employment with the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs filed suit alleging three claims; breach of maritime contract; quantum meruit and a claim to enforce a preferred maritime lien. The facts summarized above form the basis of each of these claims. Plaintiffs have alleged that Langley failed to pay them complete wages for the days worked after March 13, 2020

III. DISCUSSION The court decides motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) using the same standard it uses to decide motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing “the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” , 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998). The burden rests on the plaintiff to establish the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. , 45 F.3d 520, 522 citing , 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir.), , 114 S. Ct. 82 (1993).

Subject matter jurisdiction depends on the facts of the case when the complaint is filed, although subsequent events can defeat jurisdiction. , 273 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2001). For a court to exercise subject

However, a case is not moot when the parties retain any interest in the outcome of the litigation. (“As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” , 466 U.S. 435, 442, 104 S. Ct. 1883, 80 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1984)). “[T]he availability of a ‘partial remedy’ is ‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.” , 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996). Therefore, a matter is not rendered moot simply because a defendant has paid – or offered to pay –some of the total amount of damages alleged.

Plaintiffs acknowledge some payment to three of them and concede that the partial payment may reduce the amount of damages owed to them. They assert, however, that each claim still presents a live controversy and, as a result, the action is not moot.

All parties acknowledge that even after Mr. Langley made the partial payment to some Plaintiffs, there remains a live controversy about the amount that each Plaintiff may recover under each count asserted in the Complaint. That Mr. Langley paid some amount less than what the Plaintiffs demanded does not prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining a remedy through the current action. As a result, none of the three claims are moot. The claims simply assert two bases for recovery of wages and other benefits that they claim are owed, as well as a request for a preferred maritime lien to enforce the payments.

TI. CONCLUSION For these reasons Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SM Mary - McElroy United States District Judge February 16, 2021