Fed. Natl. Mor. Assoc. v. Manor Cond. Assoc.
Opinion of the Court
Mr. Dilorenzo and Ms. Dimeo failed to timely pay their mortgages and their condominium unit fees. After giving notice to FNMA, Dean Manor Condominiums conveyed the unit at a condominium foreclosure sale on October 6, 2009. The Shirley Hurd Revocable Trust purchased the unit at the sale but has not paid the mortgage or satisfied any arrearage to FNMA.
The General Assembly has empowered this Court to issue declaratory judgments in such instances:
9-30-2 . Power to Construe. — Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
9-30-12 . Construction — This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and *Page 3 other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered. . . .
The Court rules established a procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment. Super. R. Civ. P. Rule 57. Though the powers to issue a declaratory judgment are discretionary for the Court, G.L. 1956 §
As will be discussed below, this case presents a unique question. The issue of relative priority between a mortgagee and a condominium foreclosure buyer has not yet been determined in any reported Rhode Island case. The General Assembly has modified Rhode Island General Laws Chapter 34-36.1 in 2009 P.L., Ch.
The statutes governing condominium properties and condominium unit liens are set forth in G.L. 1956, Chapter 34-36.1. If a unit owner is in arrears for unit fees, G.L. 1956, §
Section
34-36.1-3.21 (a)(3) requires notice of the sale to all mortgagees, and establishes that the conveyance would be "in fee simple."
While the subsection declares that the condominium unit foreclosure sale shall be "a perpetual bar against the defaulting unit owner, and all persons claiming the defaulted unit, so sold, by, through or under him . . ." the statute does not expressly eradicate all claims and mortgages. The statute does not imply that the mortgage interest will be subordinated to the interests of the condominium association. The following subsections (G.L. 1956 § 34-36.1-3.2(a)(4), and
More significantly, 34-36.1-3.2(b)(4) specifically defines what liens have priority over the condominium unit's sale:
Any foreclosure sale held by the association pursuant to subsection (a) above, and the title conveyed to any *Page 5 purchaser or purchasers pursuant to such sale, shall be subject to any lien or encumbrance entitled to priority over the lien of the association pursuant to section
34-36.1-3.16 (b).
• Liens recorded prior to the recording of the condominium declaration (
34-36.1-3.16 (b)(i))• Liens for taxes or certain government charges (
34-36.1-3.16 (b)(iii)) and• Liens "a first mortgage or deed of trust on the unit recorded before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent." (
34-36.1-3.16 (b)(ii).
Accordingly, the first mortgage of FNMA has priority over the condominium lien and the Hurd Trust. The Hurd Trust took title to the condominium subject to the first mortgages. Any condominium unit assessments which were delinquent prior to the FNMA mortgage recording (May 12, 2006) have priority over the mortgage. The express language of the statute is clear. As our high court recently held:
*Page 6In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature. Additionally, it is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. In re Kent County Water Authority Change Rate Schedules,
996 A.2d 123 ,130 (R.I. 2010), citations omitted.
While the General Assembly, to its credit, sought to resolve any confusion by enactments after this condominium unit was sold to the Hurd Trust, the later enactment does not modify the plain language of the earlier statute.4
The Motion to Amend the Record is denied.
On several occasions this Court has been called upon to determine the extent of MERS' interest in a mortgage. See, e.g., Bucci v.Lehman Brothers Bank, 2009 WL: 3328373 (R.I. Super, August 25, 2009). These disputes arose, in part, from MERS listing itself as a "nominee" on mortgages, while listing another financial institution as "Lender." As the financing entity traditionally prepares the mortgage documents, MERS and its associated lenders, share some blame for the confusion regarding their legal status. They opted to venture into uncharted waters.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.