Ri Resource Rec. Corp. v. Van Liew Trust
Opinion of the Court
Van Liew Trust Company (VLTC), established in 1984, is a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Providence, Rhode Island. Id. ¶ 2. VLTC is authorized by the Rhode Island Board of Bank Incorporation to engage in the business of a trust company under the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island. See VLTC's Answer Counterclaim ¶ 2. VLC is the parent of VLTC. Id. ¶ 3. Van Liew was one of fifteen subscribers to form VLTC. Id. ¶ 4.
*Page 3"this project is to procure investment managements services to assist the Corporation to maximize the rate of return on funds, subject to the proper consideration of preservation of capital that is appropriate for public funds. The selected Respondent/s will directly manage the Corporation's investment portfolio, subject to guidelines provided by the Corporation regarding risk tolerance and projected cash flow needs." See Complaint ¶ 20.
It further required a responding party to certify that "[n]o officer, agent or employee of RIRRC ha[d] a pecuniary interest in the Proposal or ha[d] participated in contract negotiations on the part of the Respondent." Id.
In response to RFQ/RFP No. 924, VLTC submitted a proposal on May 31, 1995 (Proposal No. 924). Id. ¶ 21; seealso VLTC's Answer Counterclaim ¶ 21. At the time of submission, John St. Sauveur (St. Sauveur) was a member of the RIRRC Board of Commissioners (RIRRC Board) and a member of the VLTC Board of Directors. Id. ¶ 22. RIRRC alleges that despite the required certification, this conflict was not disclosed.Id. ¶ 23.
On April 26, 1996, following a review of the submitted proposals, the RIRRC Board passed a motion authorizing a contractual agreement with VLTC to establish and manage the Remediation Trust Fund.Id. ¶ 26. According to RIRRC, St. Sauveur participated in discussions before and during the bidding process, and although he abstained from the vote, he failed to recuse himself or disclose the conflict of interest. Id.
On August 6, 1996, RIRRC and VLTC entered into the Central Landfill Remediation Trust Fund Agreement (Remediation Trust Fund Agreement) establishing the Remediation Trust Fund. See Remediation Trust Fund Agreement. The purpose of the trust was to "obtain, hold, invest and disburse funds to be utilized for the payment of certain obligations of [RIRRC] in connection with the remediation of the Central Landfill Superfund site, in Johnston, Rhode Island." Id. ¶ 2. Pursuant to the Remediation Trust Fund Agreement, VLTC agreed to "invest and reinvest the Trust Estate solely in accordance with written instructions given from time to time by the Settlor, which instructions shall be consistent with the then current investment policies of [the RIRRC Board]."Id. ¶ 4. *Page 4
On September 26, 1996, VLTC entered into a second agreement with RIRRC to furnish investment management and trustee services (1996 Agreement). See Complaint ¶ 32; seealso 1996 Agreement. Under the 1996 Agreement, VLTC agreed to furnish all trustee services required and to perform all work in strict conformity with: (1) the RFQ/RFP No. 924; (2) Proposal No. 924; and (3) the Remediation Trust Fund Agreement. See 1996 Agreement ¶ 2. The parties agreed that VLTC, as part of its annual fee, would receive twenty basis points (.20%) on the first $5,000,000 and fifteen basis points (.15%) on any amount over $5,000,000. Id. ¶ 3. Additionally, VLTC agreed to
"indemnify, save harmless, and defend [the] Corporation from and against any and all liabilities, claims, penalties, forfeitures, suits and the costs and expenses incident thereto . . . which it may incur . . . or pay out as a result of . . . (i) VLTC's breach of any term or provision of this Agreement; or (ii) any negligent or willful act or omission of [VLTC], its employees, or its agents; or (iii) any violation by [VLTC] of any applicable law, rule or regulation." Id. ¶ 4.
VLTC remained RIRRC's investment advisor and trustee for the Remediation Fund until January 2008.
"this project is to procure investment managements services to assist the Corporation to maximize the rate of return on funds, subject to the proper consideration of preservation of capital that is appropriate for public funds. The selected Respondent/s will *Page 5 directly manage the Corporation's investment portfolio, subject to guidelines provided by the Corporation regarding risk tolerance and projected cash flow needs." Id. ¶ 36.
Additionally, any party submitting a proposal was required to certify that "[n]o officer, agent or employee of RIRRC ha[d] a pecuniary interest in the Proposal or ha[d] participated in contract negotiations on the part of the Respondent." Id.
VLTC submitted a proposal on August 8, 1997 (Proposal No. 946).Id. ¶ 37. At the time of submission, St. Sauveur was a member of the RIRRC Board and the VLTC and VLC Board of Directors.Id. ¶¶ 38-39. On January 13, 1998, after reviewing the submitted proposals, the RIRRC Board authorized a contractual agreement with VLTC to establish and manage the Closure Trust Fund.Id. ¶ 42. According to RIRRC, although St. Sauveur abstained from the vote, he participated in the discussions during the bidding process and failed to disclose the conflict.Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
On March 24, 1998, RIRRC and VLTC entered into the Trust Agreement (Closure Trust Fund Agreement) establishing the Closure Trust Fund.See Closure Trust Fund Agreement. The Closure Trust Fund was established "for the benefit of the State of Rhode Island to assure closure and/or post-closure care of the facilities covered under th[e] Agreement. Id. § 3. As trustee, VLTC agreed to "make payments from the [Closure Trust] Fund as [RIRRC] shall direct . . . to provide for the payment of the costs of closure and/or post-closure care of the facilities covered by th[e] Agreement. . . ." Id. § 4. VLTC was also required to "invest and reinvest the principal and income of the [Closure Trust] Fund and keep [it] invested as a single fund, without distinction between principal and income, in accordance with general investment policies and guidelines which [RIRRC] may communicate in writing to [VLTC] from time to time. . . ." Id. § 6. *Page 6
When discharging its duties, VLTC was required to
"act solely in the interest of the beneficiary and with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing which persons of prudence, acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters, would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. . . ." Id.
For its services, VLTC was entitled to "reasonable compensation . . . as agreed upon in writing from time to time with [RIRRC]."3 Id. § 12. Finally, VLTC was indemnified,inter alia, against any liability "in connection with any act or omission, made in good faith in the administration of the [Closure Fund] Trust, or in carrying out any directions by [RIRRC] or the Director of DEM." Id. § 18.
VLTC remained RIRRC's investment advisor and trustee for the Closure Trust Fund until January 2008.
On June 2, 2004, RIRRC issued RFQ/RFP No. 840 seeking a pension fund manager to provide administrative and investment management services for the Pension Plan. See Complaint ¶ 52;see also VLTC's Answer Counterclaim ¶ 52. In pertinent part, RFQ/RFP No. 840 required each respondent to: (1) certify that "no officer, agent, [or] employee of RIRRC" had a conflict of interest; and (2) indemnify RIRRC "from any and all loss, suits, penalties, costs, *Page 7 liabilities, and expenses . . . arising out of claims . . . caused by or resulting from the Respondent's negligence or willful misconduct or breach of th[e] Agreement." See Complaint ¶ 52. VLTC submitted a proposal on June 30, 2004 (Proposal No. 840). Id. ¶ 53. At the time, St. Sauveur was a member of the RIRRC Board and a member of the VLTC and VLC Board of Directors. Id. ¶ 54.
On September 21, 2004, following a review of the submitted proposals, the RIRRC Board authorized negotiations with VLTC for pension fund services. Id. ¶ 58. RIRRC alleges that although St. Sauveur abstained from voting, he failed to recuse himself or disclose his conflict of interest. Id. ¶¶ 59-60. On December 1, 2004, RIRRC and VLTC executed an Agreement (Pension Plan Agreement) by which VLTC agreed to perform services in connection with the Pension Plan.
In accordance with the Pension Plan Agreement, the terms of RFQ/RFP No. 840 and Proposal No. 840 were incorporated by reference and made a part of the agreement "as fully and to the same effect as if they had been included." See Pension Plan Agreement ¶ 2. Additionally, VLTC agreed to "indemnify and hold [RIRRC] harmless from any and all loss, damages, suits, penalties, costs, liabilities, and expenses . . . arising out of any claim . . . caused by or resulting from [VLTC's] negligence or willful misconduct or breach of this Agreement." Id. ¶ 6. In exchange for its services, VLTC would receive compensation not to exceed sixty basis points. Id. ¶ 3.
VLTC remained pension fund manager until its services were terminated in December 2007. *Page 8
Generally, because "the sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint [or counterclaim]," a court's review is confined to the four corners of that pleading.Palazzo v. Alves,
Moreover, "the First Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a `practical, commonsense approach' for determining what materials may be properly considered on a motion to dismiss." Roy v.General Elec. Co.,
It is well settled that a breach of contract claim requires the existence of a valid contract, a breach of the contract, and damages resulting from the breach. See Petrarca v.Fidelity Cas. Ins. Co.,
Here, RIRRC has collectively pled its allegations against the named Defendants — generally asserting that Van Liew, VLC, and VLTC each executed and were parties to the Contracts — and therefore, the Complaint, on its face, is of no avail. See
Complaint ¶¶ 32, 62, 70 ("RIRRC entered into four separate contracts with Van Liew"). Although upon a cursory examination of the Complaint it may appear that these generalized allegations satisfy the pleading requirements necessary to implicate VLC and Van Liew; in actuality, these allegations are directly contradicted by subsequent specific allegations specifying that the Contracts were executed solely by Van Liew on behalf of VLTC. Seeid. ¶¶ 34, 49, 63. Accordingly, while the Court is mindful that a complaint must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the pleading party, the Court also may not ignore the well-settled notion that "[s]pecific averments in a pleading are usually given precedence over general ones regarding the same matter."Lord v. Shaw,
This, however, does not end the Court's inquiry. See
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 463 (2010) ("The signatures on a contract, however, cannot alone be looked to for the purpose of determining who are the parties to a written contract."). Indeed, contracts are formed through mutual assent which is evidenced by the objective intent of the parties. Filippi v. Filippi,
Although RIRRC has set forth a set of circumstances by which VLC may be subject to contractual liability, where, as here, the Complaint's allegations — and the Contracts themselves — indicate that they were executed by Van Liew on behalf of VLTC, the Court finds that RIRRC has failed to set forth a basis to impose personal liability upon Van Liew under the Contracts.See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 464 (2010) ("[A]n individual who signs a corporate contract and indicates the name of the corporation and the nature of his or her representative capacity on the contract is generally not subject to personal liability on the contract"). Moreover, while RIRRC may seek to impose liability on Van Liew by piercing the corporate veil, the Court finds that RIRRC may not rely on its opposition papers to satisfy its pleading requirements.6 See Bruno v. Criterion Holdings,Inc.,
Similarly, RIRRC's allegations that VLC "is an affiliate of [VLTC]" and Van Liew "is the Managing and Founding Partner" of VLTC are simply inadequate. See Complaint ¶¶ 3-4. Indeed, the Complaint neither mentions alter-ego theory nor requests that the Court pierce the corporate veil. Furthermore, it fails to set forth any allegations demonstrating that VLC or VLTC were so organized and controlled as to make them mere instrumentalities of Van Liew, or that Van Liew did not treat them as separate and distinct entities.See U.S. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc.,
It is well settled that the existence of a fiduciary duty does not depend on the existence of a contract. See Bullmore v.Ernst Young Cayman Islands,
In its Complaint, RIRRC alleges that VLC and Van Liew's fiduciary duties, and RIRRC's reliance thereon, arose not only out of the inherent nature of the parties' relationship, but also by virtue of their right to invest RIRRC's accounts and to give advice on those investments.7 See Complaint ¶ 81 ("[A]s investment manager, trustee and pension fund manager, and because of the influence [VLC, VLTC, and Van Liew] held over RIRRC's *Page 16 investment strategies for its EPA Trust Funds and Pension Plan, a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the parties, and Van Liew was subject to a fiduciary duty toward RIRRC."). While the Court is mindful that this allegation alone may be insufficient to set forth a claim against the Defendants, where, as here, the Court is also presented with Proposal No. 924 — listing both Van Liew and VLC as part of the staffing responsible for investment management services — the Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that RIRRC would not be entitled to recover from the Defendants.See Proposal No. 924. (indicating that VLC would meet with RISWMC and assess its investment risk parameters and Van Liew would be a principal person committed to managing and monitoring the performance of RISWMC's portfolios). For that reason, the Court denies VLC and Van Liew's Motions to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint.
However, following a review of the pleadings, the Court is satisfied that RIRRC has sufficiently alleged its claims against both VLC and Van Liew. RIRRC's Complaint clearly sets forth that (1) St. Sauveur was a fiduciary of RIRRC by virtue of his position as an RIRRC Commissioner; (2) St. Sauveur breached his fiduciary duty to RIRRC by failing to disclose the conflict created by his position on the VLTC and VLC Board of Directors; (3) VLC and Van Liew had knowledge that St. Sauveur was on VLTC and VLC's Board of Directors while simultaneously serving as a Commissioner of RIRRC; and (4) VLC and Van Liew participated in the breach by failing to disclose the conflict of interest despite the terms of the Contracts and their position as fiduciaries. See Complaint ¶¶ 27-28, 44-45, 60, 85-92. Although Defendants allege that RIRRC has failed to set forth a claim because they were not parties to the Contracts and had no obligation to disclose the information to RIRRC, at this juncture the Court is satisfied that RIRRC has sufficiently pled its claims. Moreover, while VLC and Van Liew may not have had a contractual duty to disclose the conflicts to RIRRC, it is clear, in light of the Court's previous determinations, that under the fiduciary relationship alleged by RIRRC, they may have had a duty to act in RIRRC's best interest and to disclose the conflict.
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, and for the reasons previously set forth, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that RIRRC would not be entitled to recover under any set of circumstances alleged in the Complaint. Consequently, the Court denies VLC and Van Liew's Motions to Dismiss as to Count III. *Page 18
It is axiomatic that the elements necessary to establish a claim for professional negligence are identical to those for ordinary negligence. See Cronan v. Iwon,
Here, the crux of Defendants' motions surrounds the first element — the existence of a duty between Plaintiff and the Defendants. Defendants contend that the lack of a contractual relationship with RIRRC is dispositive. However, as already indicated, the existence of a contract between the parties is not a prerequisite for the existence of a duty. SeeBullmore,
Therefore, in addition to adequately alleging proximate cause and damages, RIRRC has sufficiently pled the existence and breach of a duty. See Complaint ¶¶ 93-96. Indeed, RIRRC has not only alleged that VLC and Van Liew owed a duty of care in connection with the administrative and investment services they provided, but also that Defendants breached their duties through unsuitable investment choices and by failing to disclose a known conflict of interest.See id. ¶¶ 82-83, 94. Moreover, as previously set forth, Proposal No. 924 clearly indicates that both Van Liew and VLC would be part of the staffing responsible for investment management services. See Proposal No. 924. (indicating that VLC would meet with RISWMC and assess its investment risk parameters and Van Liew would be a principal person committed to managing and monitoring the performance of RISWMC's portfolios). Consequently, in light of the foregoing, and for the reasons previously articulated, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any set of circumstances alleged, and hence, the Court denies their Motions to Dismiss as to Count IV of the Complaint.
Prevailing counsel may present an order consistent herewith which shall be settled after due notice to counsel of record.
"any person who (a) exercised any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of the Plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (b) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any monies or other property of the Plan or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (c) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of the Plan." See Pension Plan Agreement ¶ 1.18.
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Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.