As the court cannot take judicial notice of the statute law of Massachusetts, authorizing the discharge of a contract in a mode unknown to the common law, it should have been set forth in the plea, as any other material fact necessary to the defence pleaded. The argument of the counsel for the defendant, that a copy of the revised statutes of Massachusetts would be good proof of what the law of that state was at the time of their publication, and therefore that a reference to it by chapter is sufficient, confounds the rule of evidence with that of pleading. The plea was clearly deficient in the above particular, and for that reason was properly overruled by the court below. 1 Chit. Pl. (12th Am. ed.) 216, and n. 2, and cases cited; and Peck v. Hubbard, 26 Vt. 698 ; Hampstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 486; and see remarks of Curtis, J., in Betton v. Valentine, 1 Curtis’s C. C. R. 170. As this objection disposes of the special plea, it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds of demurrer which have been relied upon in the argument.

The execution of the note being admitted, judgment was properly rendered for the plaintiffs under the general issue; the note, — though made payable to one or the other of the plaintiffs, —being evidence, at least, of a joint contract with both of them, and so, both being entitled to sue jointly thereon. 1 Chit. PI. (12th Am. ed.) 8 a, & 9, and n. 1, to p. 9, and cases therein cited.

The judgment below is therefore affirmed with costs.