Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1857

Nightingale Another, Ex'rs. v. St. Mut. Life Ins. Co.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island · Decided September 6, 1857 · Ames

5 R.I. 38

Counsel

The case was shortly argued by T.A. Jenckes, for the plaintiffs, and by Abraham Payne, for the defendants. Jenckes cited Anderson v. Fitzpatrick, 24 Eng. L. Eq. 1, (Lord St. Leonard's opinion, pp. 13 and 15,) and Bunyan on Life Insurance, p. 80, for the principle, that the language of the conditions of a policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurers, as their language, especially where, as in this case he contended it was, the condition was new and unusual; and relied upon the qualifying clause of the terms of forfeiture contained in the policy, as holding out an express promise of an equitable adjustment in case of forfeiture from the alleged, or any other cause, which in this case had not been kept by the company, and which he called upon the court to enforce; claiming as such, under the circumstances, the amount insured, with interest. He also cited Raine v. Bell, 9 East, 195, and the class of cases there referred to, as throwing light upon the mode in which conditions are construed, regarding, as he did, the conditions of this policy as qualified by the clause stipulating for equitable adjustment. Payne relied, in defence, upon the forfeiture caused by the insured's going beyond the limits of residence prescribed by the policy, without consent, and there remaining beyond the prescribed time, during the season of the year prohibited, for such going and remaining, and contended, that the qualifying clause with regard to equitable adjustment, left that matter wholly at the discretion of the directors, as arbitrators for the benefit of all concerned, whose decision, upon full hearing, had been adverse to the claim of the plaintiffs, and was final. To the construction of the policy he cited Hathaway v. Trenton Mut. Life Fire Ins. Co. 11 Cushing, 448.

Opinion of the Court

Ames, C. J.

It is admitted that the late Bishop Henshaw did, without consent of the defendant company issuing this policy, “ first had and indorsed thereon,” and between the 1st day of *42 July and the 15th day of October, 1852, go into the state of Maryland, a portion of the United States beyond the limits of constant residence permitted by the policy, and there remain more than five days, to wit, about ten days, at the end of which period, and about the 20th day of July of that year, he died. The holy errand on which he went, the absence of all connection between his going and remaining, and the cause of his death, are not permitted to swerve our judgment from the legal effect of so plain a breach of a condition of this policy, upon the occurring of which it is, by its own terms, “ to be void, and all payments thereon to be forfeited to the company.” It is true, that by the qualifying clause of the condition of forfeiture, the executors of the assured would have been entitled to the benefit of any equitable adjustment provided for by existing rules established by the directors, or accorded by their special act. Whether such rules should be established, or such special dispensation from the forfeiture should be granted was, as it seems to us, left by this qualifying clause wholly to the discretion of the directors, who “ from time to time ” might act in the matter; except indeed, that they would not be permitted to change, to the injury of the assured, an established rule of adjustment existing at the time of the act or omission of forfeiture. The construction which supposes that such discretion was designed by both parties to the contract to be reposed in the ■directors, as fair arbiters for all interested, borrows support from the fact, that, under the charter of this company, the directors are elected by the joint votes of the assured and holders of the guaranty stock, and are to be chosen, in moieties, out of these two classes, of the members of the corporation. No rule of equitable adjustment applicable to the case at bar appears to have been established by the directors of this company, and the request made to them by the claimants for special action in their favor was, upon full consideration, rejected. We cannot interfere with their discretion in this matter without doing violence to the contract upon which we are called to adjudicate, and must therefore render

Judgment for the defendants.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.