Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1864

National Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Yeomans

Supreme Court of Rhode Island · Decided March 6, 1864 · Ames

8 R.I. 25

Counsel

Hayes, for defendant and exceptant: — The record sets forth the facts of the case. By the record, it appears that it was agreed that any defence that could be taken under pleas in bar or abatement, might be taken with like effect as if pleaded. I. The court erred in not requiring proof of the act of incorporation of the plaintiffs' company, in the opening of the plaintiffs' case. At common law, the plaintiffs would have been required to have made proof of their act of incorporation. The plaintiffs, having been notified under the rules, should have done so. II. The court should have required, upon the objection of the defendant (which was equivalent to a plea), the plaintiffs to show that the persons claiming to have acted under the charter, at its organization, were legally entitled to do so, and to show their organization under the charter. Considering this point, in connection with the fourth exception, the court erred in its ruling and refusal to charge the jury; because, had there been a plea to the effect that the persons who claim to have been the National Mutual Fire Insurance Company, and to have used its charter, never were such company, and had no such authority, the plaintiffs would have been obliged, either to show their right to sue as such company, or the defendant would, upon such plea, have been permitted to offer evidence that the plaintiffs had no authority to act under that charter, but were, in fact, strangers to it. The grant by the legislature of a franchise, is a personal grant, and is to be held and used as a trust. Strangers to it have no more right to assume to be the corporation created by the legislature, than they have to be a copartnership to which they do not belong. The evidence of the acts of the company is to be found in their records. These records show, that none of the corporators named in the act were present at the meeting for organization, and no vote was taken to associate any person with them. a. Robert H. Ives, William Goddard, and their associates, were the persons to whom the franchise was granted. b. They never met; and, of course, that being so, they never accepted the charter either by vote or act, and never associated any persons with them; — in other words, they never organized as a company. Of course, having no corporate existence, they could have no successors — "ex nihilo, nihil fit." III. The subscription, provided for in the fifth section of the charter of the company, was a condition precedent to any authority on the part of the corporation to insure against loss. Salem Mill Dam Co., v. Ropes, 6 Pick. 23; Central Turnp. Co. v. Valentine, 10 Pick. 142; Littleton Mfg. Co. v. Parker, 14 N.H. 543 ; Oldtown and Lincoln R.R. Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 571 . The court erred, as stated in the third exception, in not directing a non-suit upon failure to prove their compliance with this condition. A fortiori the court erred, as appears by the fifth exception, when it refused to allow evidence that the condition had not been complied with. IV. Without strict mutuality there can be no contract. When, therefore, the company, through its authorized agents (see sixth exception), makes contracts with insured parties, exonerating them from all liability (even though other officers of the company subsequently repudiate the contract), and especially when the company uniformly assess one class of delinquents and as uniformly omit to assess another, there ceases to be any mutuality between the insured and the insurers, and the contract becomes broken. The court, therefore, erred in refusing to instruct the jury as stated in the sixth and seventh exceptions. V. A corporation has no right, either by their charter, by statute, or at common law, to enact by-laws that are unjust and oppressive, much less that are illegal. Angell Ames on Corporations, § 347. A by-law imposing, in the nature of interest for the forbearance in the payment of money, a tax of ten per cent. per month, or one hundred and twenty per cent. per annum, is, upon the face of it, unjust, oppressive and contrary to the law in relation to usury. James Tillinghast, for the plaintiffs: — I. The first three exceptions are clearly untenable. It is well settled, that a corporation suing on a contract made directly with itself, particularly a mutual insurance company, suing one of its members to recover an assessment, is not bound to prove, in detail, its organization and compliance with charter requisites, as a part of its prima facie case in the opening. Angell Ames on Corporations, § 635, and cases cited; Williams v. Cheney, 3 Gray, 215; Jones v. Dana, 24 Barb. 395. II. The fourth and fifth exceptions are equally untenable. 1. It is equally well settled, that a defendant contracting directly with the corporation, as such, and a fortiori a member of a mutual insurance company, sued for an assessment, is estopped to deny the existence of the company and its capacity to contract. Angell Ames on Corporations, § 635, and cases cited; Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey, 16 Mass. 94 ; White v. Coventry, 29 Barb. (Sup. Ct.) 305; Appleton Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Jesser, 5 Allen, 446; Steam Navigation Co. v. Weed, 17 Barb. 378, and cases cited in opinion; Trumbull County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Horner, 17 Ohio, 407. 2. Again, these subscriptions necessarily would not appear upon the record book of the corporation. They, of course, preceded the organization. 3. The General Assembly have ratified the organization, by several times amending the charter. White v. Coventry, supra. III. These guaranties, complained of in the sixth exception, were unauthorized acts of the secretary and brokers, and could not bind the company or the directors, were expressly disavowed when they came to their knowledge, and in making the assessments were entirely disregarded. They were, in fact, individual guaranties, and have been so treated by the company, and, indeed, as the exception shows, by the parties themselves, who have voluntarily paid notwithstanding them. But even if the parties guarantied could have avoided paying their assessments, inasmuch as they were equally assessed, certainly the defendant has not been injured by them, and cannot, therefore, complain. They are entirely inter alios acta without prejudice in any way to him. IV. The seventh exception is without foundation. By the very terms of the by-law, it is optional with the company whether or not to enforce this additional percentage. And, certainly, the defendant cannot complain that it is not enforced against those who pay voluntarily, and is enforced against him and others who put the company to the expense of litigation. This is a highly reasonable exercise of their discretion. Whatever had been done in this regard, had been the individual act of the secretary, without any authority or knowledge on the part of the company. V. Nor is this by-law objectionable for either of the causes alleged in the last exception. The company has full power to make by-laws. Compare § 1 of charter, and §§ 1 and 2 Rev. Stats. chap. 125. Aside from statute, it is a power incident to the corporation. Angell Ames on Corporations, § 325. And this necessarily supposes the power to enforce them by pecuniary penalties. Ibid, § 360, and cases cited. Even were it bad as a by-law it is good as a contract between the parties. By his application the defendant expressly agrees, to be bound by the charter and by-laws of the company. See Jones v. Sisson, 6 Gray, 288; Angell Ames on Corporations, §§ 360 and 342, and cases cited; Cahill v. Kalamazoo Mutual Insurance Co. 2 Doug. (Mich.) 138-9. It is similar to the frequent provision, that in case of default in payment of assessment the whole premium note may be collected, which has always been enforced. Jones v. Sisson, 6 Gray, 288; Rix v. Mutual Insurance Co., 20 N.H. 198; Huntley v. Merrill, 32 Barb. 626; St. Louis Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Boeckler, 19 Mo. 135; Cahill v. Kalamazoo Mutual Insurance Co., 2 Doug. (Mich.) 138-9. It is also highly reasonable, as enforcing prompt payment of the assessments, the sole reliance of the company for payment of losses.

Opinion of the Court

Ames, O. J.

Tbe main questions raised by tbis record are questions of evidence, merely. To say, in a suit by a mutual insurance company against one of its members, tbe company being a corporation de facto, at least, whose corporate existence is acknowledged by tbe action and contract of tbe defendant, and wbicb is permitted to act as a corporation by tbe legislature whose charter it affects to wield, that tbe due organization and right of tbe company to act under its charter, is, in tbe absence of proof to tbe contrary, to be presumed, is far within tbe line both of principle and precedent; and tbe only question bas been, whether tbe defendant is not estopped to deny it, thus incidentally, for tbe purpose of avoiding an obligation into wbicb be bas deliberately entered, and upon tbe faith of wbicb others have become co-insurer and co-insured with him. If, upon such a ground, be could avoid payment of bis assessments, — tbe fund to wbicb those members who have sustained losses by fire must look for their indemnity, — it would be very much like permitting him to practise a fraud upon them. It would be very difficult to contravene, upon principle, tbe decision of tbe Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Appleton Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Jesser, 5 Allen, 446, that tbe lawfulness of tbe organization of a corporation de facto, for mutual insurance, cannot be impeached, collaterally, in an action to recover an assessment. At least, tbe learned judge, who tried tbis case below, did not err in bolding, that, in tbe absence of proof to tbe contrary, it was to be presumed, that tbe plaintiffs bad done all those things- under their charter, wbicb were required to enable them to act as a corporation for mutual insurance, and that tbe fact that tbe minute book of tbe corporate proceedings did not affirmatively show that these requisites bad been complied with, did not con *34 trol this presumption. The fact that this book did not contain evidence that, before the issuing of any policy, the sum of $1,000,000 had been subscribed to be insured, did not even tend to prove that such subscription had not been made. It is not the place in which we should expect to find such a subscription and was properly excluded as proving by what was not in it, that no such subscription had been made. The subscription probably preceded the organization, as the basis upon which the corporation was entitled to insure.

Another exception presented to us is, that the judge who tried this cause did not, though requested, instruct the jury, that, because, of four policies issued by the plaintiffs during the period in which the defendant effected his policies with them, two bore endorsed a written agreement signed by the secretary of the company, and two signed by the brokers who procured them, that the holders of those policies were not to be liable to assessment, the assessments upon the defendant’s policies were void. When the bill of exceptions finds that these agreements were wholly unauthorized by the board of directors and were repudiated by them; that the policy holders were assessed, notwithstanding the agreements, and paid their assessments, as others, and that the assessments sought of the defendant were not all affected in amount by this irregular conduct on the part * of the secretary and of the brokers, it would be difficult to find a reason why the agreements should release the defendant from an obligation expressly assumed by him, unless upon the logic that a wrong attempted and repented of by one, sanctions a similar wrong persisted in by another.

The remaining exceptions turn upon the 23d article of the by-laws of this mutual insurance company, which is alleged to be illegal and oppressive, and, as construed in praotice, unequal and unjust. Whatever may be the merits of ten per cent, per month upon unpaid assessments, as a means of inducing their prompt payment, the 8th section of the charter, * which *35 gives to the company an action to recover them, if they shall remain unpaid thirty days after demand, prescribes, as we read it, that their amount is to be recovered in such action, — which, of course, includes simple interest. The by-law, cannot, in this particular, add to the rule of damages thus fixed by the charter; and we shall do entire justice to both parties, by allowing the verdict to stand, on condition that the plaintiffs release, upon the record, the excess of the verdict over the proper amount of the same, thus ascertained. This will take away from the defendant all canse of complaint, since it will place him upon the footing of those most favored by the company in the exercise of the discretion that they seem to have assumed,_ as to the enforcement of the penalty of this by-law. Upon tbe above release, let judgment below be affirmed, and tbe clerk issue execution for the balance thereof, with costs.

Sbc. 8. If any member of said corporation, or the legal representatives of any member, shall neglect or refuse to pay the amount which may be assessed *35 upon Ms or their policy or policies of insurance, for the space of tMrty days after demand shall have been made for payment of tbe same, in tbe manner tbe said corporation shall appoint, he or they shall be liable to tbe suit of tbe corporation therefor, in an action of the case in any court of competent jurisdiction; and the said corporation, having obtained judgment and execution for the amount, may, at their election, cause said execution to be levied upon the estate or property, .whereon, by this act, they may have a lien for the same; and the officer having said execution, shall proceed to satisfy the same by the sale and conveyance of said estate or property, in the same manner as is provided by law in case of attachment of similar property or estate, on mense process or execution; and the owner or owners thereof, shall have the right of redeeming the same within one year, by paying to the purchaser or purchasers thereof, the amount of said execution and costs, with interest on the same at the rate of twelve per cent.

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