Of the general right of the pledgee to collect . notes and securities pledged to him, there can be no doubt. If he could collect only the amount for which the paper was pledged, this would render two suits necessary to collect the whole amount of the note pledged. The pledgee can collect the whole, and account to the pledgor for the surplus over his debt.

But with paper known to be accommodation paper the case is different. If, in this ease, the pledgee could collect the whole *78 of tbe maker, be could be obliged to pay tbe surplus over bis own claim to the pledgor, who would be in bis turn liable to repay such surplus to tbe maker. We think, therefore, that in case of accommodation paper pledged, tbe pledgee can recover of tbe maker only tbe amount of tbe debt due him from tbe pledgor. Jones v. Hibbert, 2 Starkie, 304; 3 Eng. Com. Law, 356; Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Met. 40 ; Chitty on Bills, 81; Wiffin v. Roberts, 1 Esp. 261.

On the trial of tbe case, tbe defendant claimed that tbe burden of proof (it being a pledge) was on tbe plaintiffs to show tbe amount of the defendant’s indebtedness; and tbe plaintiff, at tbe bearing before us, claimed that tbe defendant was obliged to prove that tbe debt for wbicb tbe note was pledged as collateral, bad been paid wholly or in part.

Tbe bolder of commercial paper is presumed to be a bolder for value, that is, until the contrary be shown. In tbe present case, it was proved that the defendant’s check (payable to bearer) was pledged by Cushing, to whom it was given, to tbe plaintiffs, for bis (Cushing’s) indebtedness. This shows a valuable consideration, and makes tbe plaintiffs holder’s for value, even if the indebtedness be fluctuating. Byles on Bills, (side page,) 122 ; Heywood v. Watson, 4 Bing. 496 ; Chitty on Bills, (side page,) 85 ; Woodruff v. Bayne, 1 C. & P. 600; 1 Starkie, 483.

It is generally sufficient for tbe holder of such paper to present it; and it is held to be prima facie evidence that be is a bolder for value and to tbe amount expressed. The burden of proof is indeed on tbe plaintiff to prove a valuable consideration, but by presenting tbe paper he makes a prima facie ease, that is a case sufficient to justify a verdict for him if tbe defendant does not rebut it. But if tbe defendant does produce evidence to rebut this presumption, tbe burden is still on tbe plaintiff, taking all tbe testimony together, to show a valuable consideration by a preponderance of evidence on bis side. Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 500 ; Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 366, (which criticises and explains 1 Cush. 170) ; Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick 69, 76.

But if tbe defendant, not disputing tbe original consideration, *79 takes some new ground of defence, for example, payment, failure of consideration, and the like, theu the burden is on bim to prove this matter of avoidance. Delano v. Bartlett, ante; 3 Phillips on Evidence, (side page,) 161.

In the present ease therefore, it would be sufficient for tlie plaintiffs in tbe first instance to produce their check to tbe jury, wbicb would entitle them to a verdict for tbe face of it, unless tbe defendant produced evidence to show that the amount of the indebtedness was either originally less or had been reduced by payment. If he does so, then, taking all tbe evidence together, the burden of proof would return on tbe plaintiffs to show themselves entitled to recover the face of the check. Chitty on Bills, (side page,) 688, note c.

A new trial will be granted, on the defendant’s filing an affidavit that he has evidence to show that the amount of Cushing’s indebtedness to the plaintiffs was less than the amount of the check.