The only question raised here is whether the assignment mentioned in the bill was effectual under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 237 § 12, 1 to dissolve the attachment *300 there mentioned. The defendant contends that it was not because it excepted out of the property conveyed “ so much thereof other than debts secured by bills of exchange or negotiable promissory notes as is or shall be exempted from attachment by statutes of the State and of the United States.” The exception is identical in language with the exception allowed by the statute; but the defendant contends that, as used in the assignment, it includes not only all such property other than bills of exchange and negotiable promissory notes, belonging to the assignor, as was exempt when the assignment was made, but likewise all such as shall thereafter become exempt by any statute either of the State or of the United States : whereas the exception allowed by the statute can only be construed to extend to such property as is exempt when the assignment is made. We do not think the contention can avail. The assignment so construed defeats itself ; for it cannot be known what is assigned until it is known what is excepted, and, granting the construction contended for, it can never be known what is excepted so long as either the State or the United States is capable of adding to what is exempt from attachment. The exception must be reconciled, if it be possible, with the plain and paramount purpose, or subordinated to it, and evidently the purpose was to convey all the property of the assignor but the property excepted to his assignee, on trusts for his creditors, which could be immediately executed; and therefore, to reconcile the exception with the grant, the property excepted must be immediately ascertainable, or, in other words, the exception must be construed to include only such property as was exempt when the assignment was made. The construction may do some little vio *301 lence to the assignor’s grammar; but of course it is better that'his grammar should suffer than his manifest meaning. The use of “shall be” instead of “may be,” to signify indeterminateness rather than futurity, is not unknown.

Demurrer overruled.