The exceptions show that the plaintiff’s horse escaped from his inclosure, Saturday, June 10, 1882, and was impounded the next day in the afternoon. The pound keeper did not, immediately after forty eight hours, give written notice or notice by posting as directed by the statute, Pub. Stat. of R. I. cap 108, § 7, but waited until Thursday, June 16,1882, when he gave the plaintiff personal notice in writing. The action is case for damages against the keeper of the pound for detaining the horse without duly giving the statutory notice. The case was tried in the Court of Common Pleas by the court on both law and fact, jury trial being waived. The plaintiff testified that he received no notice, oral or written, until June 16. The defendant admitted that no written notice was given before June 16, but testified that he gave the plaintiff oral notice within an hour after the impounding. The court found that oral notice was given as the defendant testified, and thereupon decided that the plaintiff, having been so notified, could not maintain his ac *197 tion, and gave tbe defendant judgment for costs. Tbe plaintiff excepted.

We do not see any error in the decision. The case finds that tbe defendant gave tbe plaintiff oral notice that his horse was in pound within an hour after be had been put there, and that tbe plaintiff, having tbe notice, left him there. It is true the defendant did not give the statutory notices ; but those notices were not to be given until forty eight hours after the impounding, the obvious purpose of the delay being to give tbe owner of the animal impounded an opportunity to redeem it meanwhile, without having to pay for such notices. The defendant, undoubtedly, would have bad no right to deliver the horse for sale to the town treasurer without first giving tbe statutory notices, or even, perhaps, to ehai’ge for keeping after the first forty eight hours. This action, however, is not for any violation of right in these respects, but only for damages for the detention without giving the statutory notices; and, such being the case, we think tbe court below could properly find, if, indeed, it could do otherwise than find, from the plaintiff’s inaction after notice, that be consented to tbe detention. Of course be should not be allowed to recover for a detention to which be consented. Volenti non fit injuria.

Exceptions overruled.