This case comes up on exceptions from the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant was indicted in that court under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 79, § 9, which reads as follows, to wit: “ No swine shall be kept in any town to be fed on swill, offal, or other decaying substances, brought from any other town, except in such places as shall be designated by the town council thereof.” The indictment, following the language of the statute, charges that the defendant did keep divers swine, to wit, thirty swine, at a place within the town of Middletown in this State, “ then and there to be fed on swill, *287 offal, and other decaying substances brought from another town than said Middletown, to wit, from tbe city of Newport,” witb an averment that tbe place where tbe swine were kept bad not been designated for tbeir keeping by tbe town council of Middle-town. Tbe defendant moved the court below to quash tbe indictment because it did not allege any offence known to tbe law. The court below overruled the motion, and after verdict against him the defendant moved in arrest of judgment for tbe same cause, which motion the court below also overruled. Tbe defendant excepted to tbe rulings for error.

Tbe defendant contends that tbe keeping of swine in one town to be fed on swill, &c., brought from another is not an offence under tbe statute, unless tbe swine are so fed, and consequently that tbe indictment is bad because it does not allege that they were so fed. We do not think tbe construction is valid. The statute prohibits not the feeding but the keeping to be fed. Doubtless the General Assembly intended not to have any one begin the business until he had first got a place designated for it,' and then intended to have him begin it there. The statute is well suited to effectuate such an intent. The defendant argues that the statute cannot be so construed, because such a construction would make the keeping criminal or not according as the keeper had or not a given intention to do a thing which is not itself criminal, namely, to feed the swine as aforesaid, such feeding being nowhere else forbidden. The argument is not convincing. Such a statute may be unprecedented, but it does not follow that it is impossible. The General Assembly did not mean to forbid a person living in one town to feed his swine on swill or offal brought from another, unless he kept them purposely to be fed in that way. It meant to prevent the carrying on of the business of keeping swine to be so fed, except in places designated for it, on account of the resulting nuisance, and with that view prohibited the very inception of it, without waiting for it to get into full operation. We see no reason for regarding the prohibition, under the limitations specified, as either impossible or unconstitutional.

Exceptions overruled.