This is a petition for the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, preferred by an employee of the contractor, who agreed with the respondent as owner to build the house on which the lien is claimed. The petitioner was hired by the day to do any carpenter’s work to which he might be assigned. He worked on the house at different times, working continuously, the last time from about November 12, 1883, to December 10, 1883. The statute provides that no person, employed as the *505 petitioner was to work for tbe contractor, shall have any lien for bis work, unless be “ shall, witbin thirty days after commencing tbe work, give notice in writing to tbe person against whose estate or title be claims a lien, that be has commenced the work and that be shall claim tbe benefit of tbe lien.” 1 Tbe petitioner gave the respondent notice that be should claim tbe lien on December 25, 1883. He claims a lien for $27.50 for eleven days’ work, being work done during tbe eleven working days next before December 10, 1883. The respondent objects that tbe notice was not given witbin thirty days after the work was commenced. Tbe petitioner replies that, being hired by tbe day and from day to day, he commenced work anew every day, and that be is therefore entitled to tbe lien for tbe eleven days included in bis claim.

We think tbe petitioner did not give bis notice witbin thirty days after commencing tbe work, witbin tbe meaning of tbe statute. He commenced tbe work, the last time be worked on tbe bouse, November 12, and did not give tbe notice until December 25, forty three days afterwards. Tbe fact that be was hired by the day and might have been dismissed at tbe end of any day does not, in our opinion, make any difference ; for be did not leave and was not dismissed, but went steadily on with tbe work without interruption from November 12, when be begun, until December 10, when be ended. If we were to bold that for a workman hired by tbe day the work begins and ends every day, we should also have to bold that bis notice of lien could only avail for work previously performed, for according to tbe statute tbe notice is to be given after commencing tbe work. We do not think that such a construction has ever been given in practice, or that it is in accord with tbe intent of tbe statute. Petition dismissed.