We do not think it is necessary for us to decide, in this case, whether the statute, Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 172, § 1, extends to deeds of trust; for, granting that it does, we think the deed here contains words “ manifestly showing it to be the intention ” to have the three grantees take as joint tenants. The deed here is to tbe grantees, their heirs, and assigns, to have and to hold “ unto and to the use of them, their heirs, and assigns ” in trust. The words which we think manifestly show an intention to have the grantees take as joint tenants follow, to wit: “ In trust for the parties of the second part,” i. e. the grantees, “ or other the trustees hereunder for the time being, to take charge and possession of said trust estate, and to hold the same for the sole use,” &c., of the eestuis que trustent. . . . “ With power to the parties of the second part, or the survivors or survivor of them, or other the trustees or trustee hereunder for the time being, at any time and from time to time, in their or his *634 discretion, and as soon as reasonably and profitably may be to sell, let, or lease tbe same, together or in parcels, and by public or private sale. . . . And in further trust for the parties of the second part or the survivors or survivor of them, or other the trustees or trustee hereunder for the time being, to receive the proceeds of all sales or leases,” &c., “ and to pay therefrom all the taxes,” &c., “ and the surplus to pay whenever and so often as it can conveniently be done to ” the cestuis que trustent.

Perhaps the clause first quoted affords no inference, but the words that succeed do, in our opinion, manifestly show an intention to have the trustees take as joint tenants, for otherwise the powers and the estate over which the powers are to be exercised may be partly disjoined, a result which, in the case of an estate conveyed in trust for others for whose benefit the powers are conferred, it is utterly unreasonable to suppose can have been intended. Moreover, the language, “ the parties of the second part or the survivors or survivor of them, or other the trustees or trus tee,” plainly indicates that it was in the mind of the settlor that the sole survivor might be the sole trustee. No reason can be conceived why the settlor should have wished not to have the estate and the powers survive together. Slighter indications will suffice in a trust deed than in other deeds to amount to a “manifest showing,” because the courts are inclined to hold that trustees are joint tenants on account of the inconvenience resulting from their holding as tenants in common. Perry on Trusts, § 343. Our conclusion is that the estate is in the surviving trustee, and that therefore the heirs of the deceased trustees are not necessary parties.