We do not think the action lies. The decree must b.e construed as a decree entered in pursuance of the bill, which is a bill for the foreclosure of a mortgage. It consists of two parts. The first orders the defendants named to pay the complainant one sixth of the sum due on the mortgage notes, to wit, $1,216.67, with interest since June 30, 1880, on or before April 15, 1885. The second part orders, in default of such payment, that the mortgaged premises be sold, and a certain part of the proceeds paid into court. The second order does not come into operation if the first is performed. If the first is not performed, the second becomes operative instead of it, and, when performed, the decree is executed. This results from the alternative character of the two parts. This character would be at once apparent if, instead of the words (i.and in default thereof ” at the beginning of the second part, the language had been “ or in default thereof.” But in our opinion the meaning is the same whichever phrase is used, because the two parts are *204 alternative. Indeed, the first part, though mandatory in form, is an alternative in favor o£ the defendants, giving them time to avoid foreclosure by paying the debt. Some of the defendants here are married women, incapable of binding themselves personalty for the debt, and the court could not have intended to make an absolute personal judgment against them. The cases accord with this view. They hold, where the proceeds of sale under a decree of foreclosure by sale are deficient, that an action lies for the deficiency on the mortgage note or bond. Globe Insurance Co. v. Lansing, 3 Cow. 580; Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346; Stevens v. Dufour, 1 Blackf. 387; Porter v. Pittsburg, 36 Me. 278; Tooke v. Hartley, Bro. C. C. 125. So, likewise, in case of strict foreclosure. Hatch v. White, 2 Gallison, 152; Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562; Dunkley v. Vanburen, 3 Johns. Ch. 330. There are states in which the courts‘are empowered by statute to enter judgment for deficiency in foreclosure suits. In South Carolina the courts enter such a judgment as a matter of practice, Wightman v. Gray, 10 Rich. Eq. 518, but the practice is contrary to the precedents. A foreclosure in equity, it is said, though not a proceeding in rem, is in thb nature of such a proceeding, and is not intended ordinarily to act in personam. 2 Jones on Mortgages, §§ 1709-1711; Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure, §§ 85, 86. The decree here may be more peremptory in terms than such decrees usually are, but we do not think it can be held to be any different in meaning.

Plea of nul tiel record sustained. Judgment for defendants.