The question here presented arises as follows, to wit: Daniel W. Lyman, late of North Providence, died December 19, 1886, leaving a will dated July 14, 1885, and a codicil thereto, dated September 18, 1886. The will contains the following clause making provision for its execution, to wit: “ I appoint as executors of this my last will and testament William H. Wood, William A. .Hoppin, and Esther D. Chapin, requesting them to use their best judgment about the time for selling the property, and direct the entire property to be kept together for one year after my death, and the income, from whatever source, after necessary expenses, taxes, and so forth are deducted, to be divided equally between them as and for their salary or fee for being my executors.” When the 'will was made, Esther D. Chapin was a single woman, but before the codicil was made she married William A. Hammond, of New York. The will and codicil were admitted to probate by tbe Probate Court of North Providence, January 19, 1887, and letters testamentary were ordered to issue to William H. Wood and William A. Hoppin, as joint executors, upon their giving their joint and several bond, without sureties, to the court, in tbe sum of $100,000, but were refused to Mrs. Hammond for the reason that she was a married woman and a citizen of the State of New York, and therefore incapable of discharging the trusts of executrix and giving bond as required by the statute. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond appealed from the decree, and the question which we are called upon to decide is, whether she is entitled to qualify as executrix and have letters testamentary issued to her jointly with the other executors.

We do not think that residence in another state creates any insuperable objection to ber appointment. The question, therefore» is whether she is disqualified by being a married Avoman. At common law, a married woman was not incapacitated from acting as executrix if her husband assented to her acceptance of tbe trust. *568 Dr. Hammond does assent, and asks for his wife’s appointment. We have no statute which directly makes a married woman incapable of being appointed executrix. We have a statute, however, that, if an executrix marries after her appointment as such, her powers shall cease, and her co-executor or executors shall discharge the trust, the same as if she was dead; or, if she was a sole executrix, administration shall be granted to some other suitable person. Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 184, §§ 19, 20. 1 It has been argued that tbis provision impliedly makes a married woman incapable of appointment, but in the State of Maine, where a similar statute exists, the Supreme Judicial Court has decided that it cannot be so extended by implication. Stewart, Appellant, 56 Me. 300. We do not deem it necessary to come to a conclusion upon tbis point, since we feel constrained to decide the case adversely to the appellants upon another ground.

Our statute provides that an executor shall be exempt from giving a bond, or from giving a bond with sureties, whenever the testator shall have ordered or requested sucb exemption. Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 184, § 14. In tbis case the testator requested that no sureties be required on any bond of his executors, thus leaving his executors at liberty to give simply tbeir personal bond, but making it incumbent upon them, in order to satisfy the statute, to *569 give such a bond. The question is, whether Mrs. Hammond can give such a bond. Doubtless she can give such bond as a matter of form, but in effect such her bond would be utterly void, and therefore, in our opinion, it would not answer the requirement of the statute. The appellants contend that she can satisfy the statute by giving her husband’s bond, or the bond of some other person, and cite cases from other courts to that effect; but in Townsend v. Hazard, 9 R. I. 254, this court, construing a provision of a statute which required that in case of appeal the appellant should give bond, de-, cided that the giving of the bond of a stranger to the suit would not satisfy the requirement. The requirement to give bond with sureties is frequent in our statutes. Thus, the general treasurer of the State, the treasurers of the several towns, the clerks of the Supreme Court and Court of Common Pleas, the sheriffs and their deputies, are required to give bond with sureties, and they have in practice given their own bonds with sureties, and it has been supposed were required to do so. Moreover, the form of an administration bond given by the statute is a form in which the administrator or executor obliges himself as principal. We think, therefore, that the bond of Dr. Hammond or a stranger will not answer.

The appellants contend that, if the statute requires a woman to give a bond in order to become an executrix, then, since it does not exclude a married woman from acting as an executrix, it must be construed as enabling her to give bond. We do not think this argument is sound; for, though the statute does not expressly exclude her, neither does it expressly permit her to act as executrix, and therefore it seems to us that the sounder inference is, that, if it requires a bond, married women, being incapable of giving it, are thereby excluded.

We do not think that Mrs. Hammond has authority, jointly with her husband, to give bond as executrix, by virtue of Pub-Stat. R. I. cap. 166, § 4, 1 and it does not appear that she has any equitable estate which she can bind by her bond, even if in equity *570 such a bond would bind ber equitable estate. We think, however, the bond required by the statute is an instrument which must bind the obligor personally at common law.

The appellants argue that a bond without surety gives no security to the estate, or those having claims upon it, beyond what they would have without it, and that the purposes of' the testator will be disappointed if Mrs. Hammond cannot receive the appointment, because be intended the year’s income which he gives to ber and the other persons named as executors, “ as and for their salary or fee for being my executors,” partly by way of testamentary bounty as well as compensation. We shall regret it if the testator’s purposes are disappointed in tbis respect, or if any benefit which be intended for Mrs. Hammond fails to come to her; but if, as the appellants assume, ber receiving her share of the year’s income depends upon ber becoming executrix, and she cannot become such on account of ber inability to give the bond required, we have no power to help ber by dispensing with such bond.

We think that the decree of the court below must be affirmed.