These cases involve a construc *96 tion of the will of the late Hezekiah Anthony as regards the three following clauses thereof, viz: —

Clause 16: “I give to Sarah Ann Cook, 'in trust for her grandson, Hezekiah Anthony Cook, the sum of ten thousand dollars, to have and to hold the same in trust for the use and benefit of the said Hezekiah Anthony Cook, with power to manage, invest, and reinvest the same, and to pay over to him from time to time the income thereof, and also with power to transfer and pay over to him said money at such times and in such parts as she may deem most for his interest.”

Clause 17 : “I give, devise, and bequeath to Sarah Ann Cook, in trust for Helen Cook, widow of Enos A. Cook, the sum of five thousand dollars, and also the house and land where said Enos A. Cook formerly lived, on Almy Street, in Fall River, Commonwealth of Massachusetts ; to have and to hold the same to her, the said Sarah Ann Cook, her heirs, executors, and administrators, for the use and benefit of Helen Cook, widow of Enos A. Cook, her heirs, executors, and administrators, with power to manage the same generally, and, if need be in her opinion,to sell the same and reinvest the proceeds thereof, and with power to change the investment thereof whenever in her opinion it shall seem best, and with power also' to convey said real estate to her, her heirs and ■ assigns, at any time when she may think proper, and with power to pay over to her said money or any part thereof, according to her discretion.”

Part of Clause 22 : “ In all cases where I have given property in trust for the use and benefit of other persons, and have not specially provided for its disposition on their decease, my will is that the trustee holding such property shall on such decease pay and convey the same in fee simple, discharged of all trusts, to the persons who by the laws of the State of Rhode Island would inherit it had the persons for whose benefit it was so given died seized and possessed thereof in fee.”'

Said Sarah Ann Cook, after accepting the trusts created by said sixteenth and seventeenth clauses, died leaving a will, which has been duly admitted to probate. The defendants are the executors of her will. Said Hezekiah Anthony Cook, who is complainant in the first named of these two cases, and said Helen Cook, now *97 Helen Hall, wife of Benjamin Hall, who with her husband is complainant in the second named, claim that they are respectively entitled under said clauses to the entire equitable interest or estate in the property thereby bequeathed or devised, and ask that the defendants, as executors as aforesaid, may be decreed to transfer it to them accordingly. The defendants contest their claim. We are asked now to determine what interests or estates said Hezekiah and Helen have respectively under said clauses.

We think there can be no doubt that said Hezekiah has the entire equitable interest in the property bequeathed by said sixteenth clause, if the clause is to be taken by itself, since the property, being personal, passes absolutely, without words of inheritance or representation, unless the bequest is qualified. We think it is not to be so taken, but that it must be taken and construed together with the twenty-second clause; for although, if taken by itself, it would dispose of the entire equitable interest, it would do so implicitly, not by any disposition specially provided' therefor. The correctness of this view is confirmed by the fact that there are only four clauses in the will besides the sixteenth that constitute bequests in trust, two of which are similar in form to the sixteenth, and the other two, the seventeenth being one, add to the names of the equitable legatees words of inheritance or representation, so that to say that the twenty-second clause does not apply to the sixteenth is tantamount to saying that it does not apply to any clause of the will. If we bring the two clauses together, so that one shall modify the other, the result is in effect this, namely, a bequest of ten thousand dollars to Sarah Ann Cook in trust for the use and benefit of said Hezekiah, with power to her as given therein, and after his decease, in trust to pay and convey the same, or what remains of the same, to the persons who would inherit it from him if he died the absolute owner of it. Such a bequest would be unambiguous. Under it said Hezekiah would take only an equitable life interest in the ten thousand dollars bequeathed, unless the trustee, in the exercise of the discretionary power bestowed upon her, should give him more; the remainder going at his death to his then heirs or next of kin. We think the sixteenth clause, as modified by the twenty-second, amounts to such a bequest.

The next question is, whether the devise and bequest of the *98 seventeenth clause are to be treated in the same way. If we bring the seventeenth and twenty-second clauses into union with one another, the result is a devise and bequest of the property specified in the seventeenth to Sarah Ann Cook, her heirs, executors, and administrators, in trust for Helen Cook, now Helen Hall, her heirs, executors, and administrators, with power in the trustee to dispose of said property or any part of it for the benefit of said Helen, and, after the decease of said Helen, in trust to pay and convey the same, or what remains thereof, to the persons who would inherit it from her if she died the absolute owner of it. The two clauses, instead of coalescing, exhibit an irreconcilable repugnancy, owing to the words of inheritance and representation. that are added to said Helen’s name. The question naturally arises whether the disposition of the property given in trust by the seventeenth clause, after said Helen’s decease, is not, within the meaning of the twenty-second clause, specially provided for by those words. We are of opinion, after carefully considering the question, that it must be answered in the negative. The words are words of limitation merely, not of testamentary disposition. Their office is to declare explicitly what would be understood without them, namely, that the entire property is given beneficially to the equitable donee.

To get at the mind of the testator, we may look into other parts of the will. The twenty-second clause gives one ninth of the residuary estate in trust for Mary Eliza Anderson and her son Hamlet, their heirs, executors, and administrators, and provides that the trustee shall, so long as said Mary shall live, apply the income to her support, and to the support and education of her son, in such way and proportions as he thinks proper, and after her decease, her son being under twenty-one, shall convey all said property over $7,000 in equal shares and in fee to Nancy A. Dyer and, Jane A. Harris, and hold said $7,000 for the support and education of said Hamlet, using principal as well as income if he sees fit, and, on said Hamlet’s arrival at the age of twenty-one, pay what is left over to him, and if said Hamlet does not survive his mother, then that the trustee shall transfer said trust estate to the persons who would inherit it if she died the absolute owner. The clause indicates that the testator used the words “ heirs, executors, and administrators ” very indefinitely, and that, at any rate, he *99 did not regard them as words by which, the disposition of the trust estates was specially provided for after the decease of the persons for whose benefit they were the more immediately given. The provision immediately precedes the concluding part of the twenty-second clause, and deserves the more attention from its proximity to it. Moreover, the sixteenth and seventeenth clauses, taken by themselves, however they would be legally construed so taken, contain indications that, in the mind of the testator, neither Helen Cook nor Hezekiah Anthony Cook was expected to take more than the income, unless the trustee, in the exercise of her discretion, should appropriate more to them. And, regarding the two clauses by themselves in that light, there seems to be no reason for supposing that said Helen was intended, by reason of the words of inheritance and representation added to her name, to have any fuller title than said Hezekiah, who was a great-grandson and namesake of the testator.

Our decision is, that the seventeenth as well as the sixteenth clause is affected by the twenty-second, and that therefore said Helen has only an equitable life estate in the property given or held in trust under it.