This is a workmen’s compensation case. The employee sustained a work-related injury in 1963 and is presently receiving weekly compensation benefits for total incapacity from the second injury indemnity fund. 1 Relying on G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §28-33-5, 2 he now *359 seeks to be provided with an electric wheelchair and an automatic lift or elevator. A trial commissioner granted the first request, but denied the second. The employee appealed, the full commission affirmed, and the employee has now appealed to this court.

The relevant facts are few and undisputed. As a direct result of his 1963 injury the employee is presently unable to use his legs and barely able to move his arms. When he moved from a first to a second floor apartment in 1972, his attending physician felt that because of his condition he required “some change of environment if he can get it” and that an elevator or lift would provide a safer means of egress and ingress than would otherwise be available. When asked, the physician agreed that the benefit sought would relieve the employee from the effects of his injury, but he qualified that opinion by stating that the employee’s health would not thereby be improved nor his mobility increased. On this evidence, the commission concluded that a lift or elevator would only be a convenience or accommodation to the employee, and that it would not in the compensation sense relieve him from the effects of his injury. Accordingly, it denied relief.

In essence, the commission equated the relief sought in this ease with that requested by the employee in Lemoine v. Coby Glass Prod. Co., 115 R.I. 86, 341 A.2d 40 (1975), who sought reimbursement for a wig purchased to cover a bald spot that resulted from a compensable injury, and by the worker in Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429, 224 A.2d 387 (1966), whose hands had been so seriously injured in an industrial ac *360 cident that she required the services of a housekeeper to perforin the chores she had previously done herself but was no longer able to do.

In the Tirocchi and Lemoine cases, the particular benefits sought would undoubtedly have relieved the injured employees from the effects of their injuries. Notwithstanding, and despite our sympathy for the employees’ unfortunate predicaments, we denied relief in each case because' the only expenses for which the employer was chargeable under §28-33-5, were those “incurred in carrying out a course of medical treatment directly or implicitly related to the employee’s health and prescribed by [his] physician.” Lemoine v. Coby Glass Prod. Co., supra at 88, 341 A.2d at 42, quoting Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., supra at 443, 224 A.2d at 395. In short, it is not enough that the means used to relieve the employee from the effects of his injury have been prescribed by his physician; to be chargeable to the employer under the statute, they must be medical in nature as well. Lemoine v. Coby Glass Prod. Co., supra at 87, 341 A.2d at 42; Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., supra at 442, 224 A.2d at 395.

In this case, just as in Tirocchi and Lemoine, the benefit sought is indubitably convenient and perhaps even necessary to relieve the employee from the effects of his injury, but there is nothing in this record that compelled the commission to conclude that in the circumstances described an elevator or lift was medical in nature. Without that finding, relief under §28-33-5 is unavailable.

The employee’s appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.