State ex rel. Gruber v. Champlin
State ex rel. Gruber v. Champlin
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We concur with the presiding Judge in these eases, that the place of captain of the magazine guard, is not such an office, that the writ of mandamus or an information in nature of a quo warranto, will lie to try the title to it. It is said in Jacob’s Law Dictionary, Title, Office, that there is1 ‘ difference between an office and an employment; for although every office is an employment, there are employments which do not come under the denomination of offices, such as an agreement to make hay, plough land, herd a flock, &c. which differ widely from that of steward of a manor.” And, indeed, without authority, it would be obvious enough, that there must be some such distinction.
The following seems to have been the origin of the employment in question. In the year 1793, the Governor of the State, in consequence of some public alarm, detailed an officer and a party of militia, for the purpose of guarding the magazine. This being found burdensome to the militia, the Governor employed a captain as he was termed, two non-commissioned officers, and eighteen privates, as a guard, whom he paid for the service out of the contingent fund placed at his disposal. This was communicated to the Legislature at the ensuing session, and the report of the committee, approving what had been done, and recommending the continuance of the guard, was concurred in
It is plain, that in the first institution of the guard, in 1793, the command of it was a mere employment. In virtue of his executive authority, the duty of protecting the magazine, as well as other public property, appertained to the Governor. The guard employed by him were his mere agents, whom he might have dismissed at any time. Their compensation, in the first instance, depended upon him alone. The Governor could not create an office. It is said by Lord Coke, 2 Inst. 533, that an office can only be created by act of Parliament. Whatever might be the royal prerogative in this respect, it is certain, that in this country, and under our institutions, the creation of an office must be an exercise of legislative authority, and cannot belong to the Executive. Nor do I perceive, that the various resolutions and acts of the Legislature, make any difference in the character of this employment. The resolution of 1794 merely approves what has been done, and gives the sanction of the Legislature to the Governor’s pursuing the same course in future. The various appropriations are for the purpose of enabling the 'guard to be kept up on the same footing. The manner
If the legislature should create an office, and should make no ® provision for appointing or electing the officer, I .suppose the appointment would belong to the Governor, by virtue of his general Executive authority. It belongs to him to carry the laws into execution, when no other method of executing them is established. If no certain tenure of the office was prescribed, I suppose also it would be held at the pleasure of the Executive. Such is the construction given to the tenure of offices, held under the . government of the United States. The officers are the agents of the Executive, for the time being, to carry the laws into effect. But I doubt whether an employment, where there is no certain tenure, but which is held at the pleasure of the Executive, can be considered an office in the legal meaning of the term.
The cases shew, that an employment held at will, is not an office for which a mandamus will lie. Such is the case of the King v. Wheeler, 3 Keb. 360, which was an application to restore a sister of Saint Bartholomew’s Hospital; but said by the Court, “ non allocatur, these alms women being at will.” It is said in the marginal note to King v. Ward, 2 Str. 893, but only appears from what was urged and admitted in argument, that a mandamus lies for the principal register of the Archbishop’s Court to admit and swear his deputy, but it will not lie for the deputy himself, he being an officer at will. In the King v. Jotham, 3 T. R. 575, which was an application for a mandamus to restore the minister of a dissenting congregation, the applicant stated in the affidavit, that he conceived the congregation could not remove him, unless for ill behaviour, but that his employment was for life. Ashurst J. said it was not enough for the complainant to state his supposition, that he was elected for life, he ought to have shewn the grounds of it. In Bac. Abr. Mandamus, C. 1. it is said a mandamus lies to restore a town clerk, but not where the corporation have a right to elect him, durante bene plácito,
The view which has been taken supersedes the necessity of giving an opinion on the question, which was made with respect to the power of the commissioners of public buildings. The power to remove the officer is claimed for them under the resolution authorizing them to take charge of the magazine guard. This imports a general power to superintend and control; but might seem too loose an expression to authorize the removal of the officer, unless in the event of the magazine being delivered over to the United States’ troops. But when it is recollected, what the nature of the charge was, which the Governor had of it before, and that the object of the resolution must have been to transfer that authority to the commissioners, perhaps the construction may be fairly admitted. The motions in both cases are refused.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.