Perkins v. Kershaw
Perkins v. Kershaw
Opinion of the Court
It appears that Col. Joseph Kershaw in 1790 conveyed the whole of his estate to five persons, of whom James Kershaw was one, in trust to pay the debts of the said Joseph out of the said estate ; and the residue, if any, to transfer and deliver to the said Joseph, his heirs, executors or administrators. Col. Kershaw died in 1791, leaving a will bearing date in 1788, which devised and bequeathed his real estate in certain specified portions among his eight children, and his personal estate in equal shares among his wife and children. James Kershaw and Joseph Kershaw, Jr., were two of the children, heirs-at-law and devisees of Col. Kershaw. Joseph Kershaw, Jr., was a tax-collector, and Adamson and James Kershaw were his securities : he made default and was found to be in arrear to the State $2202 99, for which sum, after his death (which took place in 1791) several judgments were recovered against John Kershaw, administrator of Joseph Kershaw, Jr., (deceased) and against Adamson and James Kershaw, the securities of the said Joseph. The whole amount was paid by Adamson, and James Kershaw contributed and paid to him the one-half of the amount so *by him paid ; and the executions issued 16th January, 1805, on the jndg-ments were returned satisfied. These transactions took place during the continuance of the trust, and before the death of James Kershaw, who died in 1815. It is true, that in 1794 the trustees, according to a power to that effect contained in the deed, appointed John Kershaw their attorney and general agent under the said trust deed, and he had from that time the entire management of the trust estate. In 1828, all the original trustees being dead, John Kershaw was substituted as a trustee under the trust deed in the Court of Equity. It is alleged by the complainants that James Kershaw was the surviving trustee : the defendant, however, contends that Robert Henry was; in this respect there appears to be no proof on the subject whatever; it is allegation against allegation, and
The submission by the heirs of Col. Joseph Kershaw, deceased, is in as general terms as it could well be couched — it is “ all our claims, interests and rights in the said estate.” This covers everything which could in any way be connected with, arise out of, or spring from the estate of-Col. Kershaw. To see whether the arbitrators, in making up their award, have exceeded their powers under this general submission, it is necessary that we should have evidence of the facts, which, as they supposed, autho-rised them to make the award which they did. This is not evidence in explanation of the award; but it is evidence to show whether it is or is not an award binding on the parties. It ascertains whether the thing awarded, which may or may not be within the submission, is within its terms and intention. The facts which have been already stated were either in proof before the arbitrators, or within their knowledge. Upon them they passed and made the award, which is now the subject of complaint. The single inquiry is, had they the right, on the facts before them, under the submission, to make the award ? Whether right or wrong, is not now to be investigated. If it was within the submission, it is not pretended that any ground exists upon which the award can be set aside.
Since the able and ingenious re-argument of the defendant’s counsel, I have gone over my former views of the case, and have compared his arguments with the facts of the case, and the views of the case heretofore expressed by this Court, and.I confess that I have been able to discover no ground upon which the Chancellor’s decree ought to be sustained, and the award set aside.
James Kershaw, who was one of five trustees in whom the legal estate
There is, however, another consideration, which to my mind, is conclusive to show the authority of the arbitrators to award as they did. The security, who pays the debt of his principal, has the right to be remitted to all the rights and securities of the creditor. He is in Equity substituted for the creditor. The debt to the State was a judgment against the administrator of Joseph Kershaw, deceased. In Equity the securities, upon showing that they, and not the administrator, paid the money, would be allowed to vacate the entry of satisfaction on the execution by the sheriff as made by mistake, and to set up the judgment as a subsisting lien on the real estate of Joseph Kershaw, Jr., deceased. The proof is clear, that Adamson first paid the entire debt, and that subsequently James Kershaw paid to him one moiety. The executions against them were properly returned satisfied, but that against the administrator of Joseph Kershaw, Jr., deceased, was improperly so returned ; and James Kershaw, for the amount paid by him or his representative, had the right
is therefore Ordered and decreed, that so much of the Chancellor’s decree as sets aside that part of the award vesting in Henrietta Perkins’ 13-81 parts of the estate of Col. Kershaw out of the share of Joseph Kershaw, Jr., be reversed, and that the said award be confirmed entirely.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.