Curia, per

The only question is, whether the sale made by the sheriff to Vance and Davis, under the judgment of Eaves, can be supported by the elder judgment of Ross. Or, does the endorsement “wait orders,” (fee. suspend the lien, or binding efficacy of that judgment, so as to rest the sale, exclusively, upon the younger judgment, as if the former did not existí

*92It is of no consequence under what named execution or judgment, the sheriff sells a defendant’s property, the sale is, in virtue of all existing liens of the kind, and every execution gives the practical authority to sell until all are satisfied, and the liens are satisfied successively, in the order of priority of time ; and thus each execution amounts to a venditioni exponas for all the preceeding judgments. But does the indorsement “wait orders,” «fee. lift or destroy the prior lien on the older judgment, like an injunction out of chancery'?

The intention of such an order, is plainly to suspend the active proceeding of the sheriff. It could, at most, amount to a suspension or withdrawal of the execution, not of the lien of the judgment.

But the old case of Snipes vs. The Sheriff of Charleston District, in 1 Bay, 295, and again in Greenwood et al. vs. Naylor, 1 McCord, 414, decides the very case; the binding efficacy of the judgment remains, the active energy only of the execution is suspended, and the money raised, must still go to the first lien.

The contract of Young, to satisfy the elder j udgment to Ross, and the actual offer to pay it, after the sale by the sheriff, to Vance and Davis, could not alter their vested rights. Their title had, then, become perfected.

The court, therefore, perceive no good ground for the motion, which is accordingly dismissed.

dissenting. I do not concur in the opinion of a majority of my brethren, and I will state, concisely, the grounds of my dissent. 1. Eave’s fi.fa. was authority to the sheriff to sell only Red’s estate, but Red had no property in this land. He had sold to Young. Under Eaves’ execution, the sheriff then could not sell, and if there were no other authority, the purchaser could take nothing under the sale.

There are a great many cases which decide, that if the sheriff sell under an execution which gives no authority, but at the same time has in his office an execution which does give him authority, the sale shall be referred to that *93which confers the authority ; but all these cases, hold that he must have some authority which empowers him to sell. Now the sale in this case, cannot be referred to Ross’ execution, because that was stayed, for a limited time, and until the expiration of that time, the sheriff could not enforce it. But it is supposed that the sale is good, because the money has been applied to extinguish the lien of Ross’ judgment, which was older than Young’s deed. I do not think so. As well might it be said, that if the sheriff had sold without any enforcible execution, his sale would be good, because he applied the money to the extinguishment of the liens on the property. The rule seems to me to be this, the sale to be good must be made under a fi.fa. which confers on the sheriff the power to sell, when the money is raised, the law directs its application. But the application of money, has no connection with, and cannot aid a defect in the sheriff’s authority.

2d. Admitting, that in favor of a bona fide purchaser without notice, such a sale might be good, yet as to Vance, the sale would be void for fraud. He was the owner of Ross’ execution, he had notice of the sale to Young, and Ross had, for a valuable consideration, agreed to stay his execution until May, 1842. To allow him to keep the benefit arising from his purchase, in violation of his contract, would be to encourage fraud and dishonesty.