Swygart v. Taylor
Swygart v. Taylor
Opinion of the Court
Curia, per
The only link in the chain' of plaintiff’s title that has been assailed, is the conveyance: 'from Vaughan to John Hines. It has been contended'that, it was not sufficiently proved — which depends on the-question, whether the paper was properly admissible in evidence as an ancient deed. The deed purports to have-been executed seventy-two years ago ; and,.upon inspection,, it had all the appearance of an ancient paper. Any incon-testible fact., going to shew that a deed was in existence-more than thirty years before it is offered- in evidence, will authorize its introduction as an ancient muniment of right.. Possession is that which seems to be most generally resorted to for this purpose, because it is the most usual mode of' asserting a right under legal title. This is not, however,, indispensibly necessary, according to the reason of the principle applicable to such evidence, as- recognized by modem decisions.' For if a registering officer were to-swear that a paper had been in his office for more than thirty years, or it could be made to appear that it had been recorded for that length of time, these facts must necessarily prove its previous existence.
In the case under consideration, there is no difficulty... The possession of Polly Hines, by her tenants, is .not only reconcilable with the deed to her father, but should be referred to it. The main possession being on the fifty acre-tract, can make no difference, for the deed included that,., as well as the hundred acre tract. A possession, therefore, on either tract, would fulfil the strictest requisitions-of the law. But there seems to have been clearings at!
The deed from Polly Hines to Etheldred King being proved to the satisfaction of all the parties, by the evidence of A. H. Fort, Esq. it presents no question for the opinion of the court. And its-existence being established, would go to confirm the previous existence of the other deed, and relieves the case from all doubt. Motion, refused.
Concurring Opinion
I think the preliminary evidence here was sufficient to justify the admission'of the deed in question as an ancient paper, without further proof of its execution. But I do not think that incomestible evidence of a paper’s being thirty years old, is, of itself, sufficient to authorize its admission, without something else to shew that it was originally genuine ; for this purpose, some possession under it is, I think, requisite. That no possession, such as the paper was likely to produce, was resumed for thirty years, would usually be a circumstance from which suspicion of its authenticity, however old, might arise.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.