State ex rel. Wilkinson v. City Council
State ex rel. Wilkinson v. City Council
Opinion of the Court
Curia, per
This case, lihe, that of James Adger against the same defendants, consists in another complaint of assumed taxation, oyer the non-residents of the city. of Charleston, by the city authorities. It comes also from the north side of Boundary street, on Charleston Neck, and is interesting to an entire profession, personally located there, but carrying on their art and trade in the city market, not on the highways or in private houses, (fee. Both of those cases were decided at the Circuit Court, merely to give them passports to the Court of Appeals, and on a single principle of the taxing power, that was supposed to embrace and support, at least, one point of Adger’s case, and to exclude the complaint of the present relátor.
These cases have been now reconsidered, with the attention due to every consequential decision, and to the feelings of communities situated like Charleston and the Neck, which are so likely, even under the best dispositions, to be led into collision. The court has to hold the scales even between them, and to let the one or the other decline, only by the weight of strict law; and not the less impartially, because this is the case of expectation to the fraternity of colored butchers on Charleston Neck, but carrying on their active occupation in fhe public market of the city, as the other case was to the men of business on the Neck. The tax Ordinance from which the relator claims exemption, by reason of his residence out of the city, is as follows. “That free negroes and free persons of color, shall be and are hereby made liable to the following taxes, viz: — Males, from the age of twenty-one to the age of
In dense populations, dependant for daily food upon the public market, not merely general convenience, but- the public health and. necessity, require such regulation and caution. It is not only in Europe, as the written argument of the relator’s counsel supposes, but every where, I apprehend, in such communities, from the days of the great Hebrew Legislator to the present time, that strict regulations have been deemed of essential importance, and duly enforced in the beef and flesh markets of large cities. And in this way, the butchering of cattle and the vending of meats becomes a regulated municipal calling for the common convenience and safety. It is under similar regulations in the Charleston markets, that the relator has elected to take his position as a butcher, and pays the monthly stallage of four dollars rent to the commissioners of the market. This monthly rent is what the relator’s counsel supposed the only exaction the city authorities could require of a non-resident butcher. Can, then, his residence on the Neck exempt him from the general undiscriminating tax upon all city butchers of his colour and class ? As a resident on the Neck, he could not be taxed, but by holding taxable property within the city, or on the income and profits of a profession, trade, or occupation, “carried on within the city.” The relator has assuredly carried on, at least, an occupation in the city. The term occupation, is very comprehensive, and may well include the calling of a butcher, (see Johnson or Webster’s Dictionary) but the legal doctrine upon which this case turns, has been expounded and applied to the case of Thomas, the slave of Adger, who worked out under a city badge. Thomas’s home was also at his master’s residence on the Neck, but his owner had to pay the general city tax assessed on his class, who are the actual inhabitants of the
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.