Norton v. Legatees & Creditors of Gillison
Norton v. Legatees & Creditors of Gillison
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
After partial administration of the estate of Samuel R. Gillison, deceased, under his will, the executor, Thomas S. Gillison, died intestate; and the plaintiff, as ordinary, took charge of the estates of testator and executor, as derelict. The appeal on the part of the plaintiff involves the extent of compensation to which an ordinary is entitled, in charge of derelict estates of a testator and of an intestate. It is clear that a public officer can claim no other compensation for the discharge of duties imposed upon him by the Legislature, than such as the Legislature chooses to allow. Admitting this principle, the counsel for the plaintiff insists, in argument, that under our Acts of Assembly, an ordinary in charge of derelict estates is entitled to five per cent, of the value of the whole estates; although, in this particular case, the ordinary may have waived, by the pleadings, his title to five per cent, on the realty not sold.
The Act of 1846 (11 Stat. 357) authorizes the ordinary to sell the perishable property and effects of derelict estates, without retaining possession of such perishable property for six months before sale; and further provides, that if the deceased owner of a derelict estate has left a will disposing of his estate, the ordinary in charge of such estate shall administer the same according to the provisions of such will, and for that purpose, that he “ shall be invested with all the powers and authorities and be subject to all the liabilities, which may be necessary for carrying such will into effect, in the same manner as if he had been duly nominated and appointed executor thereof.”
By the express terms of the Act of 1835, which originally applied to the derelict estates of testators as well as of intestates, the compensation to the ordinary follows the discharge of prescribed functions. He is required to take charge of a derelict estate for six months; then, to sell the same, pay the debts of the deceased;, and deposit the balance of the proceeds in Bank;”
The claim of tbe ordinary, however, is principally connected with tbe estate of tbe testator, Samuel E. Grillison. His compensation as to this estate depends upon the construction of tbe Act of 1846. Tbat Act is substantially a repeal of tbe Act of 1889, as to tbe services and compensation of tbe ordinary, where tbe deceased owner of tbe derelict estate bas left a will. Tbe ordinary, instead of pursuing a fixed routine of duties for which a fixed compensation is given, is directed to execute tbe will of tbe deceased, with all tbe powers and liabilities of an executor named by tbe testator, without any express mention of compensation. His functions must vary according to tbe caprice of testators in tbe dispositions of their estates, and it appears reasonable that bis reward should vary according to bis services. He is to be regarded as a statutory executor, with tbe responsibilities and emoluments of an ordinary executor. If tbe estate be small and tbe provisions of tbe will be simple, bis trouble and bis remuneration will be small; if tbe provisions of tbe will be complicated, be may apply, as any other executor, to tbis Court for instruction; and if bis commissions be
We are of opinion, that by the fair intendment of the Act of 1846, the ordinary, when invested with the powers and liabilities of an executor, is entitled to claim the commissions of an executor under the Act of 1789 ; but that the pretension is groundless for a compensation of five per cent, on the value of the estate, which is not received and disbursed. It was never supposed that an ordinary executor was entitled to commissions on the value of the estate, real or personal, delivered to specific legatees.
There is no appeal from so much of the Chancellor’s decree as refuses to allow to the ordinary the auctioneer’s commissions which were claimed; but to guard against misconception, it is proper to mention, that the services as auctioneer were rendered by the plaintiff himself, or by some member of a mercantile firm of which he was a partner.
The remaining question in' this case is upon the appeal of the defendants, Isadore Lartigue and wife, as to interest upon the legacy of $5,000 to Mrs. Lartigue.
It is considered safer to reserve the decision upon this point until we have fuller information upon the facts. Granting that the bequest in trust for Mrs. L. is a general, pecuniary legacy, and by the general rule entitled to interest from a year after testator’s death, still it is suggested to us, that circumstances controlling the general rule as to interest, may exist as to this legacy, at least as to a portion of the arrears. It is said, that the sum of this legacy was some time ago set aside in the administration of this ‘estate, under the direction of this Court; and that this sum has been since unproductive. This may bear upon the interest for a time. It may also be desirable to know when the devisees of testator entered upon the enjoyment of their lands. Inquiry and report by the commissioner will bring out the facts necessary to the final decision of the question.
It is ordered and decreed, that the circuit decree be affirmed as
It is further ordered, that the cause be remanded to the circuit, Court, so far as the claim of Isadore Lartigue and wife for interest upon the legacy to Mrs. Lartigue is concerned; and that the commissioner of this Court for Beaufort district be directed to inquire and report as to all the facts connected with said legacy: with leave to report any special matter.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.