Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2013

In the Matter of Yawn, Calvin

In the Matter of Yawn, Calvin
Court of Appeals of South Carolina · Decided July 24, 2013

In the Matter of Yawn, Calvin

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Calvin J.

Yawn, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2012-210426

Appeal From Greenville County G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-330 Submitted July 1, 2013 – Filed July 24, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 299, 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, this [c]ourt must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); id. at 300, 536 S.E.2d at 418 ("The trial court must deny the motions when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt."); id. at 300, 536 S.E.2d at 418 ("This [c]ourt will reverse the trial court only when there is no evidence to support the ruling below."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100(A) (Supp. 2012) ("The court or jury must determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(1) (Supp. 2012) ("'Sexually violent predator' means a person who: (a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.").

AFFIRMED.1 HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

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