THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Juan Michael Ramirez, Appellant, v. Progressive Northern Insurance Company, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000788

Appeal From Laurens County R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-280 Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed June 8, 2016

AFFIRMED

Edwin L. Turnage, of Harris & Graves, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Bradley Lewis Lanford, of Baker Ravenel & Bender, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Moorer, 330 S.C. 46, 60, 496 S.E.2d 875, 883 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Stacking refers to an insured's recovery of damages under more than one insurance policy in succession until all of his damages are satisfied or until the total limits of all policies have been exhausted."); Nakatsu v. Encompass Indem. Co., 390 S.C. 172, 178, 700 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Only a Class I insured may stack."); id. at 181, 700 S.E.2d at 288 ("[P]ortability refers to a person's ability to use his coverage on a vehicle not involved in an accident as a basis for recovery of damages sustained in the accident."); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160 (2015) ("If none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage." (emphasis added)); Brown v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 315 S.C. 393, 395, 434 S.E.2d 270, 271-72 (1993) ("This language clearly restricts stacking by providing for coverage from 'any one' vehicle.").

AFFIRMED.1 HUFF, A.C.J., and SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.