THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Daryl Snow, a/k/a Darrell Thaddeus Snow, a/k/a Daryl T. Snow, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000280

Appeal From Georgetown County Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-009 Submitted December 1, 2016 – Filed January 11, 2017

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 299, 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, this [c]ourt must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); In re Taft, 413 S.C. 16, 21, 774 S.E.2d 462, 465 (2015) ("On appeal from the denial of a . . . directed verdict motion, the appellate court may only reverse the trial court if there is no evidence to support the trial court's ruling."); Welch, 342 S.C. at 300, 536 S.E.2d at 419 ("A motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44- 48-100(A) (Supp. 2016) ("The court or jury must determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44- 48-30(1) (Supp. 2016) ("'Sexually violent predator' means a person who: (a) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment."); White v. State, 375 S.C. 1, 8, 649 S.E.2d 172, 176 (Ct. App. 2007) ("When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction, and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning.").

AFFIRMED.1 WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.